CCP

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CLIVE HAMILTON

Clive Hamilton is an Australian author and academic. His influential
books include Silent Invasion^ Growth Fetish, Requiem for a Species: Why
we resist the truth about climate change and Defiant Earth: The fate of
humans in the Anthropocene. For fourteen years he was the executive
director of The Australia Institute, a think tank he founded. A professor
at Charles Sturt University in Canberra, he has held visiting academic
positions at the University of Oxford, Yale University and Sciences Po.
His articles have appeared in Foreign Affairs, The Guardian, The New
York Times, Times Higher Education Supplement, Nature and Scientific
American.

Mareike Ohlberg is a researcher based in Berlin who focuses on Chinas
digital policies and the global influence of the Chinese Communist
Party. From 2016 to 2020 she was a research associate at the Mercator
Institute for China Studies. Her work involves briefing European
governments and policy-makers on developments in China. She has
an MA in East Asian Studies from Columbia University and a PhD in
Chinese Studies from the Universin^ of Heidelberg. Her doctoral thesis
was on Chinese propaganda targeted at foreign audiences, and she was
a co-author of the landmark report Authoritarian Advance: Responding
to Chinas growing political influence in Europe. Her articles have been
published in The New York Times, The Neue Ziircher ZeitungCi\\(S.v‘Cix\o\xs>
other European media.

CLIVE HAMILTON
MAREIKE OHLBERG

EXPOSING HOW THE CHINESE COMMUNIST
PARTY IS RESHAPING THE WORLD

^airdt£

Contents

Preface

1 An overview of the CCP’s ambitions 1

2 A Leninist party goes out to the world 8

The CCPs Cold War mentality 8

‘Big external propaganda’ 12

The Party rules ^ ^

The united front ^ ^

Double-hatting and double-plating 18

The people and their friends and enemies 20

The 5 per cent rule and quiet diplomacy 23

CCP operating procedures 26

3 Political elites at the centre: North America 28

Making friends 28

The sad case of John McCallum 31

Influence in Washington D.C. 33

The White House 37

The Department ol Enemv \\ ork 4 \

Canadas Beijing elite /e

V

CONTENTS

4 Political elites at the centre: Europe 51

P.»rty*to-p;»rty diplomacy 51

Grooming Europe 54

d*hc EU-Cliina Friendship Group 56

Britain’s 48 Group Club 60

The Italian conversion 67

Elite entanglement in France 71

China’s friends in Germany 75

5 Political elites on the periphery 80

Subnational work 80

The curious case of Muscatine 85

Malleable mayors 86

BRI support in Germany’s countryside’ 89

Sister cities 91

6 The Party-corporate conglomerate 95

The Party and business 95

Comrade billionaire 97

America’s ‘globalist billionaires’ 99

The princelings of Wall Street 102

CCP in the City of London 106

Shaping economic perceptions 110

Yi shang bi zheng 113

The Belt and Road strategy 115

BRI as discourse control 117

7 Mobilising the Chinese diaspora 119

Qiaowu: overseas Chinese work 119

United Front: modus operandi and structure 121

Threats and harassment 129

Huaren canzheng 131

Huaren canzheng in the United Kingdom 133

8 The ecology of espionage 139

Influence and spying 139

China’s espionage agencies 141

VI

CONTENTS

Rccruirmciit tncthocis

riuiik tanks and research institutes l 4 g

A thousand talents 15 q

Professional associations J 53

PIjV scientists in Western universities I 55

Cyber attacks and influence ops 153

I'he Huawei case 159

9 Media: ‘Our surname is Party’ 1^4

Media discourse 164

Party above all 165

A global media force 167

Westerners finetune CCP propaganda 170

Crossing the Great Firew^all 172

Borrowing boats 174

Cooperation agreements 176

Chinese-language media 1 77

Buying boats 179

Self-censorship by foreign media 181

10 Culture as battleground 185

Political culture 185

Poly Culture 186

The China Arts Foundation 190

Cultural monopolisation 192

Crushing cultural deviance 195

Film and theatre censors 196

‘The Marxist view of art and culture’ 200

11 Think tanks and thought leaders 205

‘Eating the CCP’s food’ 205

The Hong Kong connection 210

Party-linked money in Brussels 212

Other forms of pressure 214

Opinion-makers 216

The Party’s domestic think tank expansion 219

vii

CONTENTS

12 Thought management:

CCP influence in Western academia

226

Universities as a political battlefield

226

Confucius Institutes

228

Direct pressure

231

Self-censorship

234

Financial dependence

236

Reshaping Chinese studies

237

University cooperation

239

Academic publishing

243

13 Reshaping global governance

249

Champion of multilateralism’

249

Sinicising the United Nations

250

Pushing Taiwan off the international stage

253

Policing goes global

255

Exporting Beijing’s definition of‘terrorism’

258

Creating parallel and pseudo-multilateral organisations

259

Human rights with Chinese characteristics

261

Exporting ‘internet sovereignty’ and standards for
new technologies

264

Afterword

267

Acknowledgemen ts

271

Glossary

273

Acronyms

277

Notes

288

Index

402

viii

Preface

The comforting belief that democratic freedoms have history on their
side and will eventually prevail everywhere has always been tinged with
wishful thinking. World events of the past two or three decades have
shown that we can no longer take these things for granted. Universal
human rights, democratic practice and the rule of law have powerful
enemies, and China under the Chinese Communist Party is arguably
the most formidable. The Party’s program of influence and interference
is well planned and bold, and backed by enormous economic resources
and technological power. The wide-ranging campaign of subverting
institutions in Western countries and winning over their elites has
advanced much further than Party leaders might have hoped.

Democratic institutions and the global order built after the Second
World War have proven to be more fragile than imagined, and are vul¬
nerable to the new weapons of political warfare now deployed against
them. The Chinese Communist Parry is exploiting the weaknesses of
democratic systems in order to undermine them, and while many in the
West remain reluctant to acknowledge this, democracies urgently need
to become more resilient if they are to survive.

The threat posed by the CCP affects the right of all to live without
fear. Many Chinese people living in the West, along with Tibetans,
U^'ghurs, Falun Gong practitioners and Hong Kong democracy activists,

PREFACE

arc at the forefront of the CCPs repression and live in a constant state
of fear. Governments, academic institutions and business executives arc
afraid of financial retaliation should they incur Beijing’s wrath. This fear
is contagious and toxic. It must not be normalised as the price nations
have to pay for prosperity.

Every Western democracy is affected. As Beijing is emboldened by
the feebleness of resistance, its tactics of coercion and intimidation are
being used against an increasingly broad spectrum of people. Even for
those who do not feel the heavy hand of the CCP directly, the world is
changing, as Beijing’s authoritarian norms are exported around the globe.

When publishers, filmmakers and theatre managers decide to censor
opinions that might ‘hurt the feelings of the Chinese people , free speech
is denied. A simple tweet that upsets Beijing can cost someone their job.
When university leaders pressure academics to temper their criticisms
of the CCP, or ban the Dalai Lama from their campuses, academic
freedom is eroded. When Buddhist organisations pledge their loyalty
to Xi Jinping, and spies are placed in church congregations, religious
freedom is under threat. With Beijing’s growing system of surveillance,
including cyber intrusions and filming citizens attending lawful protests,
personal privacy is violated. Democracy itself is assailed when CCP
linked organisations and Parry proxies corrupt political representatives,
and when Beijing co-opts powerful business lobbies to do its work.

The what, why and how of the CCPs influence, interference and
subversion in North America and Western Europe (hereafter the West)
is the subject of this book. The CCPs activities in Australia (detailed in
Silent Invasion) and New Zealand receive occasional mention. But its
important to keep in mind that the CCP’s enterprise is geared towards
reordering the entire world, and that while the form varies, the experi¬
ence of the West is very similar to that of countries around the globe. Its
hard to think of any nation that has not been extensively targeted, from
Samoa to Ecuador, from the Maldives to Botswana. CCP influence in
the global South is in urgent need of detailed study and exposure, but is
outside the scope of this book.

The CCP works hard to convince people in China and abroad that
it speaks for all Chinese people. It yearns to be seen as the arbiter of all
things Chinese, and insists that for Chinese people, w'herever they are.

PREFACE

to love the country means to love the Party, and only those who love the
Party truly love the country. It claims that the Party is the people, and
any criticism of the Party is therefore an attack on the Chinese people.

It is disturbing to find so many people in the West falling for this ruse
and labelling critics of CCP policies racist or Sinophobic. In so doing
they are not defending Chinese people, but silencing or marginalising
the voices of those Chinese opposed to the CCP, and the ethnic minori¬
ties who are persecuted by it. At worst, they are agents of influence for
the Party. In this book, then, we draw a sharp distinction between the
Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people. When we use the
word ‘China’ we do so as shorthand for the political entity ruled by the
CCP, in the same way that one might say, for example, that ‘Canada’
voted in favour of a resolution at the United Nations.

Conflating the Party, the nation and the people leads to all kinds
of misunderstanding, which is just what the CCP wants. One conse¬
quence is that overseas Chinese communities have come to be regarded
by some as the enemy, when in fact many are the foremost victims of
the CCP, as we shall see. They are among the best informed about the
Party’s activities abroad and some want to be engaged in dealing with
the problem.

The distinction between the Party and the people is also vital to
understanding that the contest between China and the West is not a
‘clash of civilisations’, as has been claimed. We face not some Confucian
‘other’, but an authoritarian regime, a Leninist political party replete
with a central committee, a politburo and a general secretary backed
by enormous economic, technological and military resources. The real
clash is between the CCP’s repressive values and practices, and the free¬
doms enshrined in the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights:
the freedom of speech, assembly, religion and belief; freedom from
persecution; the right to personal privacy; and equal protection under
the law. The CCP rejects each of these, in words or in deeds.

People who live in close proximity to China understand this much
better than do most in the West. It is this understanding that has fuelled
the recent protests in Hong Kong, and led to the re-election in January
2020 of Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen. In a landslide vote, the people
of Taiwan used the ballot box to say no to the CCP.

XI

preface

Some on the left, despite their history of defend’
find reasons to blind themselves to the nature of Chi^
under Xi Jinping. They have forgotten how totaIitarirnil,^°'^^*^^*^^»'t
power human rights. Even so, anxiety about the CCP s • •
political boundaries, not least within the US Congress wherTo^^
and Republicans have formed an alliance to challenge Beijing
applies in Europe. Despite their other disagreements, people ft- ^
left and the right can agree that China under the CCP is a grav^^
not only to human rights, but to national sovereignty,

The reasons why so many people in the West downplay or den
the threat posed by the CCP is a theme of this book. Onp r^o

r r * iCd-SOn is

ot course financial interest. As Upton Sinclair put it, Tt is difficult
get a man to understand something when his salary depends on his
not understanding it.’ Another reason, especially in the case of some
on the left, is whataboutism’. China may be doing some unpleasant
things, goes this argument, but what about the United States^ The
tactic IS more effective with Donald Trump in the White House but
whatever criticisms one might have of the T ^ • r •
both historically and today—and we are strong ’
any way diminish or excuse the extreme ’ I ^
suppression of liberties by the CCP regiinr rights and

And for all its faults, the United'^aies U. l
around the world, continues to have an effe ' ■ democracies

that change the government; courts that LeT""'' “PPosition; elections
state; a media that is diverse, unconstrained '"‘*'^P^"dent of the

the government; and a thriving civil society "t critical of

injustices. China under the CCP has none of k ^^'ganise a *
dencies of some politicians in Western demo ^uto

but they are restrained by the system in
restrains Xi Jinping’s autocratic impulses__^ operate
his allies have dismantled the political accord^ th

prevent the rise of another supreme leader by i ^nd

there’s much that is wrong in the West and de^ ^^do^ ^ ^^rty
political model offered by the CCP is not the a ''^hile

Ignorance explains some of the
coming to grips with the threat of the CCP, as ^ ^'^st j

" ' ' ■' ho.

PREFACE

iu>t previously had to contend with such an adversary. During the Cold
War, no Western country had a deep economic relationship with the
Soviet Union. Conscious of the economic and strategic importance of
China, many nations are trying to get smarter about the country at the
very time Beijing is pouring money into helping us ‘better understand
China’. Receiving information straight from the horse’s mouth might
seem a sensible route, but, as we will show, this is a bad mistake.

1

An overview of the
CCP’s ambitions

The Chinese Communist Party is determined to transform the interna¬
tional order, to shape the world in its own image, without a shot being
fired. Rather than challenging from the outside, it has been eroding
resistance to it from within, by winning supporters, silencing critics and
subverting institutions.

Whereas analysts on both sides of the Atlantic continue to agonise
over whether to label China an opponent or even an enemy, the CCP
decided this matter thirty years ago. In the post-Soviet world, it saw
itself surrounded by enemies that it needed to defeat or neutralise.
While the CCP and its supporters in the West like to speak of a ‘new
Cold War’ being waged against China, the Party itself has all along been
engaged in an ideological struggle against ‘hostile forces’. For the CCP,
the Cold War never ended.

The reshaping of alliances and the remoulding of the way the world
thinks about it are essential to the Party securing continued rule at
home, as well as to its reach and eventually making China the number
one global power. The Party’s plans have been explained at length in
speeches and documents. Its implementation strategy is to target elites
in the West so that they either welcome China’s dominance or accede to
its inevitability, rendering resistance futile. In some nations, mobilising

1

AN OVERVIEW OF THE COP’S AMBITIONS

the wealth and political influence of the Chinese diaspora, while at the
same time silencing critics within it, is central to the strategy.

Backed by its enormous economic clout, China engages in arm-
twisting, diplomatic pressure, united front and ‘friendship’ work, and
the manipulation of media, think tanks and universities—all these tac¬
tics overlap and reinforce each another. Some people claim that Beijing’s
influence around the word is no different to that of any other country.
While not everything the Party does in this respect is unique, the scope,
degree of organisation, and eagerness to use coercion distinguish the
CCP’ s actions from other nations’ diplomatic activities.

As the world’s largest factory and second-biggest economy, China has
been a magnet for Western businesses and many Western politicians.
Some industries are heavily dependent on access to China’s huge market,
and Beijing is willing to use this dependence as a political weapon. In
the words of one close observer, ‘If you don’t do what Beijing’s political
leaders want they will punish you economically. They put the economic

vise on politicians around the world. They have been doing it for years
and it works.’'

At times, the vice has been tightened in conspicuous ways. After
the attest of Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou in Canada in 2018, for

example, imports of Canadian soybeans, canola and pork were blocked
Keijmg reacted in a similar way in 2017 when South V
to aggression from the North,Lgan installing!: tSrn’I" T
missile system. Beijing took forty-three tetaliatory measures "
banning Chinese tourist groups to South Korea, drivin '
conglomerate out of China, barring K-pop stars, and U ^ ^o^^an

of electronics and cosmetics.^ Beijing was still punish 9 ‘"^Ports

in October 2019 when it demanded that the prestigious Koreans

of Music at the University of Rochester, in New Y^rk School

three Korean students from its top orchestra if it wanted ^^^lude
of China to go ahead.^ Citing the damage to Eastman’^

China if the tour were to be cancelled, the dean
Koreans behind. Only after an outcry by students and thg

school decide to cancel the tour.'' '^id th^

When Daryl Morey, general manager of the Houston Rock
ball team, tweeted his support for Hong Kong protesters in I

2

AN OVERVIEW OF THE COP'S AMBITIONS

Bcijings buckiush was instantaneous.^ (1 he torrent of criticism on Twitter
appears to have come from trolls and fake accounts in China.*^) The
televising of Rockets games to its huge fan base in China was suspended.
Sponsors withdrew. Beijing raged that Morey had ‘hurt the feelings of
the Chinese people’. The state broadcaster, China Central Television,
redefined freedom of speech to exclude challenging national sovereignty
and social stability’.^ Desperate to protect its growing market in China,
the US National Basketball Association issued a fawning apology that
read as if written by the CCP’s Central Propaganda Department.®

While only a few examples of extreme punishment are needed in
order to sow fear in everyone, Beijing prefers to keep its threats vague
and thus deniable, to keep the targets guessing. As Perry Link puts it,
vagueness frightens more people because no-one can rule themselves
out, and those in the frame therefore ‘curtail a wider range of activity’.^

Beijing has become the world’s master practitioner of the dark arts of
economic statecraft, in part because in recent decades Western nations’
commitment to free-market policies makes them reluctant to manipu¬
late trade for political reasons. That’s why the world was shocked when
Donald Trump launched a trade war against China in 2018. While
he is wrong on many other things. Trump is right that Beijing has
been systematically violating the principles of international economic
engagement and getting away with it.

Beijing’s vast program of infrastructure investment abroad, known
as the Belt and Road Initiative, is the ultimate instrument of economic
statecraft or, more accurately, economic blackmail. It provides an outlet
for China’s construction industry and enormous capital reserves, while
at the same time supplying the investment needs of other countries who
are short of capital and excluded from mainstream sources of finance.
The offer of low-interest loans is hard to resist, especially when they
come without environmental or other conditions.

However, the objectives of the BRI, also known as the New Silk Road
(see the list of acronyms on page 277), go well beyond providing an
oudet for surplus Chinese capital or helping poorer nations develop; the
initiadve is Beijing’s primary mechanism for reordering the global geo¬
political system." Xi Jinping’s signature policy is now so closely integrated
with almost all Chinese government activity abroad—commercial,

3

AN OVERVIEW OF THE CCP’S AMBITIONS

technological, academic, cultural—that it cannot be separated from the
PRC’s overall diplomatic engagement.

Xi Jinping has repeatedly referred to the BRI as essential to his vision
of constructing ‘a community of common destiny for humankind’.'^
While the idea might sound good to Western ears, its aim is a Sinocentric
world; that is, the one envisaged by the hawks elevated by Xi to the top
leadership positions. They view a China-led world order as an essential
part of the ‘great rejuvenation of the Chinese people’.'^

So the BRI is the most powerful vehicle by which Beijing is chang¬
ing the postwar international order.''* In a revealing 2015 speech,
defence strategist and retired PLA major-general Qiao Liang described
the BRI purely as the vehicle for China to achieve dominance over the
United States. It represents, he stated, China’s new and irresistible
form of globalisation, the success of which will be measured by the
renminbi displacing the dollar as the world currency, leaving the
United States hollowed out While Qiao is a pusher of boundaries,
the geostrategic rationale of the BRI is also made plain elsewhere, such
as the leaked minutes of a 2019 Chinese-Malaysian meeting on a BRI
project, which noted that despite the project’s ‘political nature’, the
public had to see it as market-driven.'**

The adjective most frequently attached to the BRI is ‘vast’, and
when China’s top diplomat, Yang Jiechi, said in April 2019 that the BRI
‘does not play little geopolitical games’, he was speaking the truth.'^
The former editor of the Far Eastern Economic Review, Nayan Chanda

describes the BRI as ‘an overt expression of China’s power ambitions in
the 21st century’,'®

Like other so-called parallel institutions created by the Chin
government, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank the BR T
pretends to pose no challenge to countries’ existing institutions h i
incrementally realigning their interests and shifting the global h 1 * ^

of power. A key part of the CCP’s thinking on global and regional ^
dynamics is the identification of a ‘main contradiction’ and
enemy’ to unite against. On a global scale, that enemy is the
States, which needs to be split from its allies and isolated. ^

Brexit, dissension in the European Union and the election of D
Trump have created a strategic opportunity for Beijing to weake""*^^**^

4

AN OVERVIEW OF THE COP’S AMBITIONS

transatlantic alliance and further erode European unity. Long seen by
the CCP as the largely irrelevant junior partner of the United States,
Europe is now viewed as the great prize. By winning over Europe,
the CCP hopes to convince the world that China is the ‘champion of
multilateralism’ and a much-needed counterweight to US hegemony
and unilateralism.'^ Beijing wants to mobilise European support for
its initiatives in the developing world. (Although we won’t be covering
them in this book, similar strategies of breaking up existing alliances
play out in other parts of the world.)

Despite all the news stories about ‘debt diplomacy’, ‘global connec¬
tivity’ and ‘win-win cooperation’, it’s apparent that the BRI’s goal of
strategic rebalancing is to be achieved not only by the political clout
that goes with infrastructure investment, but also by a subtle and multi¬
pronged program of global thought management. The BRI is about
the projection of power through controlling the terms of the debate.
(We develop this argument in chapter six.) It no longer makes sense
to confine discussion of the BRI to business and economics, because it
sprouts everywhere, from the Silk Road network of think tanks, media
agreements, and ties between cultural institutions, to the establishment
of sister cities and ‘people-to-people exchanges’, all of which are incor¬
porated into BRI memoranda of understanding.

Today, the CCP remains deeply anxious about ‘ideological infiltra¬
tion’ by hostile forces bent on regime change in China. As a manual
published by the Central Propaganda Department in 2006 explained,
‘when hostile forces want to bring disarray to a society and overthrow
a political regime, they always start by opening a hole to creep through
in the ideological field and by confusing people’s thought’.This Cold
War mentality is vital to an understanding of the CCP’s international
activities, which are first and foremost the global extension of the Party’s
desire for regime security.

In the face of this threat of ideological infiltration, the CCP decided
that the best form of defence is attack. Thus when its leaders talk of
making the international order more ‘democratic’, ‘open’ and ‘diverse’,
this is code for an order in which ‘authoritarian systems and values have
global status equal to liberal democratic ones’, as Melanie Hart and
Blaine Johnson express it.“'

5

AN OVERVIEW OF THE COP’S AMBITIONS

In April 2016 the Global Times, the Party’s pugnacious tabloid
its readers a glimpse into the mindset of the CCP when it justifiJd^tr
internet-censoring Great Firewall as a temporary defensive tool that
quelled Western intentions to penetrate China ideologically’.22
IS to say, once the CCP has reshaped global opinion, once its values
political system and policies have gained worldwide acceptance, the
threat to the CCP of Western ideas will be overcome and the Great
Firewall may no longer be needed. The Party believes it is now powerful
enough to transform the global conversation.^^

Beijing also seeks to ensure that the world community shuns
Chinese dissidents and proponents of an independent Taiwan. It wants
international support for the idea that the CCP is the sole party fit to
rule China. It also craves recognition that its political and economic
system is superior to Western democracy and the liberal-capitalist
economic order, and that CCP-ruled China, in contrast to the United
States, is a responsible global actor working for the greater good of
humankind.

Some have argued that this attempt to export the Party’s ideology
is bound to fail, but it’s an argument that no longer holds, as we shall
see. For others, Beijing’s claim to be a responsible world power, and its
criticism of the United States as an ‘irresponsible global rogue’, have
appeal m the light of evidence from the Snowden leaks, the calami¬
tous invasion of Iraq, and Donald Trump’s call for regime change in
Venezuela, among other events. The irony of Trump is that he has been
pus mg back hard against China’s economic power while at the same
time playing into the CCP’s hands by isolating the US from its allies
mak,ng them more vulnerable ro Party interference. Chinas rising
in uence in Europe has been welcomed by those who distrust America
as well as by some Eurosceptics who view China as a counterweight to
the European Union or Europe’s larger, more powerful countries

Beyond these camps, others are questioning the effectiveness of
democracy and expressing admiration for China’s system of auth • ^
tartan government. Others still, including squads of Western journal""
on all-expenses-paid tours, are awed by China’s hiah j lo^^^aJists

during their economic catch-up phases, and ignoring^the I'TLIu

6

AN OVERVIEW OF THE CCP’S AMBITIONS

was the CCP itself that prevented China from progressing at all for
several decades. While many in the West repeat the CCP s claim to have
lifted 700 million people out of poverty, it is more accurate to say that
for three decades after the founding of the PRC in 1949 the CCP kept
hundreds of millions in poverty, and it was only when it granted basic
freedoms—to own property, to start a business, to change jobs, to move
ones place of residence—that the Chinese people lifted themselves out
of poverty.

7

2

A Leninist party
goes out to the world

The CCP’s Cold War mentality

One of the Chinese Party-state’s favourite rhetorical tools to deflect
crmcism is to accuse its opponents of‘McCarthyism’ or having a ‘Cold
War mindset’. Hua Chunying, a foreign affairs spokesperson, frequently
uses the latter term, along with another favourite, zero sum thinking’. >
In 2019 the nationalistic Global Times proclaimed that the nation’s

giant, Huawei, had become a victim of‘high-tech
cCarthyism-.^ The Chinese ambassador to the United Kingdom, Liu

l'whCh“ ‘‘'f f-dom of navigation exercises in

South China Sea as gunboat diplomacy, motivated by a Cold War

mentally. Even condemnations of China’s abysmal human rishts
record are rejected as rooted in the same thinking ^

The charge of a Cold War mentality is often echoed in ,h w,

SW k.*d^ Peking University's

Shirk, deputy assistant secretary of state in the Clinton admi

warned of a looming 'McCarthyite Red Scare’ directed ar ™ "'

^he United States,’ According to Shirk, a 'herding instincfT

Americans to China threats everywhere, with pLentiallv d’
consequences.*' ^ tiaiiy disastrous

This is not only unfortunate for its casual dismissal of I ■ ■
concerns, bu, also ironic, because there are few people more bte"?'"

y 3.

8

THE CCP’S COLD WAR MENTALITY

Cold War mentality than the leadership of the CCP itself, and under Xi
Jinping this thinking has reached new heights. In December 2012, as the
new general secretary of the Party, Xi gave a speech warning that China,
despite its economic growth, should not forget the lessons learned from
the fall of the Soviet Union. He identified three particular failures that
had doomed the Soviet empire, allowing it to collapse overnight. First,
the leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had failed to
control the military. Second, they had failed to control corruption.
Third, by abandoning its guiding ideology, especially under Mikhail
Gorbachev, the CPSU had removed the barriers to ideological infiltra¬
tion by ‘Western hostile forces’. The CPSU had sealed its own fate.^

For astute observers, Xi’s speech was the first sign that the hope that
he would be a liberal reformer—further opening up China and allowing
it to integrate into the international order—would prove unjustified.®

In March 2019 the CCP’s flagship theory journal Qiushi (‘Seeking
Truth’) published an excerpt from another of Xi’s speeches, given in
January 2013 to the 300 members of the Party’s Central Committee.
Its theme was ‘upholding and developing socialism’, and he told cadres
that even though the Chinese system would eventually triumph over
the capitalist system, they must prepare for ‘long term cooperation and
struggle between the two systems’. He repeated his warning that a major
reason for the Soviet Union’s collapse was that ‘they had completely
negated the history of the Soviet Union and the history of the CPSU;
they negated Lenin and negated Stalin; they engaged in “historical
nihilism” [i.e., were critical of the Party’s own past] and brought chaos
to their ideology’.^

Xi’s words were not mere rhetoric; they were followed up with
decisive actions. In April 2013 the Party’s Central Committee prepared
a communique titled ‘Notice on the Current State ol the Ideological
Sphere’, better known as Document No. 9. This notorious bulletin,
distributed to leading cadres at or above the prcicctural level, outlined
seven ‘false ideological trends’ they were no longer permitted to sup¬
port—Western constitutional democracy, ‘universal values’, civil society,
neoliberalism. Western principles of journalism, historical nihilism, and
doubting the socialist nature of socialism with Chinese characteristics.
The Party was categorically rejecting democracy and universal human

9

A LENINIST PARTY GOES OUT TO THE WORLD

rights, and the circulation of the notice was soon followed by a harsh
crackdown on those promoting them in China. Document No. 9 was
only the beginning of the CCPs renewed attempt to eradicate ideas it
believed would threaten its grip on power." The CCP seemed to be
following a dictum attributed to Stalin: ‘Ideas are more powerful than

guns. We would not let our enemies have guns, why should we let them
have ideas?’

In October 2013 an internal documentary, likely produced by the

PLAs National Defense University and entitled Silent Contest, was

leaked." This ninety-minute film repeated the charge that the United

States was trying to bring about regime change through ‘ideological

infiltration’ of China. It pointed the finger at foreign NGOs like the

Ford Foundation, as well as turned Chinese academics who represented

an ‘inside threat’. After the leak, the Global Times tried to present the

documentary as the view of a few nationalistic military academics." Yet

aggressive campaigns against ‘heterodox thinking’ at Chinese univer-

siti^, the tightening of control over media, and new legislation, such

as the foreign NGO law of 2018 that severely curbed the activities of

Internationa NGOs, all echoed the warning made in Silent Contest,

suggesting that the documentary presented the CCP’s take on ideologi¬
cal threats to the Party." °

However, most Western observers continued to ignore rhe deeply
.deolog^al nature of the Xi regime, and this is only now slowly chang-

dviser mfhTA ^ cortespondent and

1 worn g ofT r ^ understanding of

officials that laid ouSCn t

While Xi Jinping has^rd^o^^t

Garnaut pointed out that the real tuminn Predecessors.

when Party leaders were shocked by studenrp'romsriri"

Square and used violence to suppress them A I T

thqt were even more deeply disturbed by the til of theT

which triggered the collapse of the mighty SovLLo

to focus on ideological security’ as an indi ui ^ ^^gan

regime security."* As Anne-M^rie Btadv oomponent of

prompted the Party to massively expand its

y expand its propaganda and ideological

10

THE CCP’S COLD WAR MENTALITY

work.The primary emphasis was on political indoctrination at home,
including ‘patriotic education’ in Chinese schools and the prevention
of‘hostile ideas’ reaching China.

In 1990 Joseph Nye introduced the concept of soft power.'® To Party
leaders, his ideas were proof that America planned to undermine China
ideologically. Excerpts from Nye’s book Bound to Lead were almost
immediately translated into Chinese, and were published by the Military
Affairs Translations Press in January 1992. In the preface, the military
editors explained that they had ‘specially invited’ Beijing’s professional
translators to render it into Chinese quickly to expose America’s plans.
They informed readers that Nye was proposing to intensify cultural and
ideological inflows to China, the former Soviet Union and the Third
World in order to make these countries accept the American values
system. America was planning to further its world domination not only
politically, but also culturally and ideologically, and Chinese people
needed to understand that the struggle against the American plot of
peaceful evolution’ would be long-lasting, complex and intense.^"

The idea that China was facing a life-or-death contest against hos¬
tile Western forces who were trying to cause chaos in China became
entrenched within the CCP. In 2000 Sha Qiguang, an official from the
Office of External Propaganda, which externally goes by the name of
State Council Information Office, went so far as to argue that the West
had been engaged in a ‘smokeless Third World War’ against China for
the previous ten years.‘Ideological subversion’ is not seen as an abstract
danger, in other words. The 2014 Sunflower Movement in Taiwan and
Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement in the same year were interpreted
as Western plots to destabilise China.So, of course, were the Hong
Kong protests that began in 2019, despite the vast crowds marching for
democratic freedoms.

Neither China’s admission to the World Trade Organization in
late 2001 nor its growing interdependence with Western economies
alleviated anxieties about ideological infiltration. If anything, the period
between 2000 and 2004, which saw the first Colour revolutions in
Eastern Europe, made the CCP more paranoid. It commissioned a
series of studies on the fall of the Soviet Union.In 2004 the Party
conceded for the first time that its continued grip on power was not

11

A LENINIST PARTY GOES OUT TO THE WORLD

assured. It began to realise that it needed more reliable and

ri • • 1 ^ P^^rnancnt

sources ot legitimacy than economic performance, which could fail and

nationalism, which could backfire if the Party could not deliver on the

expectations ot hyper-nationalistic citizens.^'*

Party leaders saw that, despite Chinas economic clout, it lacked the
power to shape the international debate—that is, how other nations
thought about China, its system and its role in the world. In the inter¬
national court of public opinion, the Party concluded, ‘the West was
strong, and China was weak’.25 That had to change; it needed ‘discourse
power’ {hmyuquan) and an image to match its status.^^

‘Big external propaganda’

In 1993 a young professor at Shanghai’s Fudan University, who had
a number of American campuses a few years earlier, picked
up on e concept of soft power, and in an article in Journal of Fudan
mversity introduced the idea to a broader circle of Chinese scholars of
nte,n tional re ations.- Initially seen as something to defend against,
soft p wer was later redefined as something China could deploy itself

L!iead T- by Xi Jinping into the

Politburo W rfSl ' Standing Committee of

fifth most powertui m • nF I'^Knants, and officially the

^liet stages, teffaming IntcmmaU “^^“tles. In the

“d policies formed part of the Patty's XtLr
become a global power without run-in

'■shed powers.” In December 2001 • ^ ^om the estab-

Pttrty general secretary Hu Jintao dec'lared'thm‘’“*’'*‘‘’“^

-ntetnanonal public opinion envitonml " ''»™utable

^ional security and social ..ability'" tLcT!,”'’'

:3in7iv:x:

12

'BIG EXTERNAL PROPAGANDA'

legitimacy, reshaping tlie global order and directing global conversa¬
tions doesnt make it any less consequential. On the contrary, the fact
that its tied to regime security means the stakes for the Party could not
be higher.

If the concepts of ideological infiltration and a new Cold War of
ideas have been a consistent theme since the 1990s, the ways in which
the Party has tried to neutralise perceived threats have changed sub¬
stantially, and become much more aggressive. As early as 2005, in an
article titled On external propaganda and building the ability of the
Party to rule, a Party theorist explained how reshaping international
public opinion could help avert the undermining of the CCP at home.
It described the propaganda China was targeting at foreigners as ^the
vanguard of the [struggle] against “peaceful evolution”’; it was helping
to discredit the messages of hostile forces before they reached China.^^

The financial crisis of 2008—09 was viewed by Party leaders and
Chinese scholars as an opportunity for China to become a globally
influential voice, and to present the Chinese political-economic model
as an alternative to the Western order. Party analysts highlighted how
the crisis revealed the weaknesses of financial deregulation and lack of
oversight. By comparison, they argued, China’s more careful reforms
could prevent such a meltdown. This led to the first extensive discussion
in Chinese academic circles of the ‘China model’ as a globally exportable
alternative to Western models of governance.^'^

Under Xi Jinping, these efforts have taken on a new quality. While
previous generations of leaders avoided using the term ‘China model’,
the CCP is now openly promoting what it calls ‘the China case’ and
‘Chinese wisdom’ to other countries.^’ During the 2019 National
People’s Congress, Colin Linneweber, an American working for
China’s official state news agency, Xinhua, proclaimed that ‘it is widely
acknowledged that a key to China’s success is its system of democracy’.
While on a visit to Paris in 2019, Xi Jinping offered ‘the China case’
and the Belt and Road Initiative as solutions to the erosion of trust and
cooperation in the international community.^^

As the National Endowment for Democracy has argued, authoritar¬
ian powers like China do not rely on soft power but on sharp power, the
exercising of coercive and manipulative influence.^® Indeed, this shows

13

A LENINIST PARTY GOES OUT TO THE WORLD

up in Chinese debates on the subject, which are always more con
with the power aspect than with the soft.

It would be a mistake to be complacent about the CCPs efforts to
promote democracy with Chinese characteristics’, and the various other
concepts with Chinese characteristics (human rights, the legal system
and so on), or to believe that these efforts are doomed to fail because
that system lacks appeal. For one thing, large parts of the Party’s target
audience in developing countries and in the West don’t know much
about China other than its economic achievements. Some believe that
Western governments and media ‘distort China’. Others, as recent sur¬
veys show, are attracted to more authoritarian government, and some
of the CCPs talking points may actually resonate well with them, as
the Party exploits crises in democracies to illustrate China’s strengths.

exit and the election of Donald Trump in 2016 were both seized on

^pport the claim that democracy inevitably results in chaos and
inefficiency.^^

The Party rules

fxrn ^ f ^binese Communist Party will turn one hundred. It has

with Us™” "" 'T "'T in 1921 to 90 million.

g trying to control every aspect of rhIn • r u

«ate appatatus that allows it to wait 1 ^

that seem notmal to the test of world tZTTu' "T “
influence in the world, many in the West write the S'!

One of the biggest challenges in dealing with ChZ , "'T'

political illiteracy of foreign interlocutors espedall '! '

with the proliferation of Party-linked infl, ^ combined

mask their ties. The internationd Tor:!:; hT ^^at

understand the comprehensive role the CCP plays

just how much the Party dominates all other insritution

People's Liberation Army is ««a national army but th

the CCP.« Executives of state-owned enterpriL " t°f

Organisation Department of the CCP. Chinese media'^''"''^''*

owned but Party-owned, with the controlling share bdoTgi;;":'-'’^
s propaganda apparatus. B g to the

14

THE PARTY RULES

Too many Westerners routinely speak of China as if the Party does
not exist, but focusing on the Party is indispensable for any understand¬
ing of the political entity we are dealing with. China’s influence abroad
is, as we’ve seen, an extension of the Party’s domestic goals, an adaptation
ot its domestic strategies and agencies. These actions make sense only
when viewed through the lens of the Party’s distinctiveness and history.

There have been times since the creation of the People’s Republic of
China when Chinese institutions and people interacted with foreigners
more freely. Xi Jinping has reversed the trend of gradual loosening. At
the 19th Party Congress in 2017 he famously used a quotation from
Mao to explain the role of the Party in China; ‘Government, military,
society and schools, north, south, east and west—the party rules
everything’. These were not empty words. Half a year later, at its 2018
annual meeting, the National People’s Congress announced a series
of changes that saw several government organisations dissolved and
merged into Party departments.'^' Every delegation permitted to leave
China is accompanied by at least one Party official whose explicit job it
is to keep an eye on everybody else.'^^

The CCP is a Leninist party founded with the specific purpose of
becoming the ‘revolutionary vanguard’ of the Chinese people. As such it
was set up as the central organisation, penetrating all sections of Chinese
society and placed above all other institutions, including the military and
state agencies. The most important and powerful organisations involved
in influence work have always been part of the Party bureaucracy, not the
Chinese government, which acts more as an extended arm of the CCP.
The Propaganda Department, the International Liaison Department,
and the United Front Work Department are all Party organisations.

The task of the United Front Work Department (considered in the
next section) is to liaise with all forces outside the CCP, such as recog¬
nised religious organisations and other interest groups. Its also tasked
with guiding the 50-60 million people of Chinese heritage abroad.
The line between its domestic and overseas work is blurred because
of the diaspora’s family and business links to China.

By comparison, the International Liaison Department (see chapter
four) is in charge of liaising with political parties abroad.It serves as a
kind of “radar” for identifying up-and-coming foreign politicians before

15

A LENINIST PARTY GOES OUT TO THE WORLD

they attain national prominence and office’.'’'* In May 2018 X'
speech emphasising Party leadership over China’s foreign affairs' ^
As Anne-Marie Brady points out: ‘This change reveals how the'ccp
revolutionary and transformative foreign policy agenda and method!
are now being fused with the Chinese state’s more mainstream forei
policy activities such as trade, investment and top-level diplomatic
meetings. The last time that these two aspects were joined was in the
1940s before the CCP came to power.

Of course, state organs continue to be involved in influence work
but they are under tight Party control, serving the Party’s interests and
carrying out its orders. While some previous leaders tried to separate
Party and state and gradually reduce the role of the CCP to a few core
nctions, Xi Jinping has decisively reversed the trend.

e same is true for the economy. Private businesses have long
liged to establish Party cells, but it is only under Xi that this
t has been widely enforced again. All large and medium-sized
Q . . ^oreign-owned enterprises, are required to set up Party

internatT'll 'Tl'’' While corporations operating

owned businesses in China is steadily narrowing.

The united front

An understanding of CCP infl

without an understanding of the impossible

of which is to induce, co-opt and^^^' objective

^ “nhed fron,'-or coalition of 1““
inter«ts-and to undermteTh '

o A Front at enemies.-'*

to the United Front WnrL groups, upper case if rF u .

I^eveloped

16

THE UNITED FRONT

coalition of interests so as to undermine the “chief enemy’”.'*’ Mao Zedong
described united front work as one of the three ‘magic weapons’ of the
Chinese Communist Party.After the founding of the PRC, the broad
strategy, and the relevant agencies within the Party structure, continued
to be used to co-opt and subdue ethnic and religious minorities, and to
retain the support of independent and marginalised groups.

The Party sees the united front strategy as a science, one based
on Marxist-Leninist fundamentals that is adjusted as it is put into
practice.^' Party theorists have developed a set of united front theories
covering such fields as political parties, intellectuals outside the Party,
ethnic groups, religious organisations, private companies and overseas
Chinese communities. In 2015 the Ministry of Education approved a
postgraduate degree program in United Front Studies, and Shandong
University produced its first batch of graduates in 2018.^^

Overseen by the CCP’s United Front Work Department, work is
carried out by a sprawling infrastructure of Party agencies, and organi¬
sations linked to the Party, and forms the core of the Party’s overseas
influence and interference activity. (More detail, including an organi¬
sational chart, is provided in chapter seven.) United front work is not
confined to the activities of the UFWD but is the responsibility of every
Party member.

United front work intensified when Xi Jinping became Party general
secretary in 2012.^'* Speaking in 2014 of work among overseas Chinese
(known as qiaowu), he declared: ‘As long as the overseas Chinese are
united, they can play an irreplaceable role in realizing the Chinese
Dream of National Rejuvenation as they are patriotic and rich in capital,
talent, resources and business connections.’^^ Elevated to ‘a new level of
ambition’, in the words of Brady,united front activity has been shaped
into an even more potent ‘magic weapon’ than Mao imagined, notably
in countries where the ethnic Chinese population is relatively large and
successful.

In recent years, united front work has increasingly been oriented
towards promoting a more favourable view of the PRC in the mainstream
of Western nations, and it’s these activities that are explored throughout
this book. Efforts to shape thinking and attitudes have mostly been
directed at elites, countering negative perceptions of CCP rule and

17

A LENINIST PARTY GOES OUT TO THE WORLD

highlighting the positives. As we will see, influential Westerners keen
engage with Chinese culture or get to loiow Chinese businesspeople may
find that the organisation they are dealing with is a covert part of the
united front structure of the Party and that they are being worked on

Political leaders are a natural target, the more so if, for electoral rea¬
sons, they want to engage with their local Chinese community. United
front activity is particularly prevalent in hometown and cultural groups
and in the business community, including Chinese chambers of com¬
merce, where influence operations have been supercharged by the rapid
growth in trade and investment. Western business executives welcome
the opportunities to get to know and work with Chinese-heritage
businesspeople. United front operatives in the business community
gather information to feed to Chinas consulates, and cultivate relation¬
ships with a view to promoting opinions sympathetic to the PRC.
Many leading Western business figures now serve as megaphones for
Beijing s message to their governments and the wider public, not least in
warning about damaging the relationship’, and the risks of retaliation

en statements are made that may upset Beijing. (A similar story is
told about university elites in chapter twelve.)

Espionage may not appear to fall under the rubric of foreign influ-
en« operations because in the West, spies steal secrets for military and

motr fl closely integrated

health slal' ' 1 ““'^ »■' <he personal lives,

leaders. busineLmr.\L!“'“"

build personal profiles, and at times to coemeTrglr'The p" "
front operatives oass • . ^^rgets. 1 he Partys united

United front activity as it rekres'm'Be ''—“
detail in chapter eight. eijmgs spying is considered i

in

^ub,e.hattlnganddouble-p,a,ing

'*Tien foreigners fail ,0 recoenise rfi. k- •

are mistaken about who they ate deaf Party ant

■l-c CCP actively attempts’:o :ht iTeT '

group. hundreds^f ^ 00 ,

Chinese people have been fotmed. each h

t or indirect links

18

DOUBLE-HATTING AND DOUBLE-PLATING

ro the network operated by the United Front Work Department. They
may be expressly political, such as those with ‘peaceful reunification’ in
their names, but more often they are business groups, professional asso¬
ciations, or cultural and community organisations. These are explored
in detail in chapter seven, but it’s worth stressing that the covert nature
of united front work often makes it difficult to identify them, even if
one understands the operation of united front work.

In addition, within the official structures of the CCP, it’s common
for individuals to wear several different hats, and for organisations
to use different nameplates depending on the setting. For example,
Zheng Bijian, the man who coined the idea of China’s ‘peaceful rise’,
is variously introduced as ‘a Chinese thinker’, as the chair of the China
Reform Forum (‘a nongovernmental and non-profit academic organiza¬
tion), and as an ‘adviser to China’s leaders’.From these positions he
has befriended a wide range of global political and intellectual leaders.
The titles are all misleading because his other positions describe much
more accurately who he really is inside the CCP, and that is a very senior
and trusted cadre. From 1992 to 1997 Zheng served as the deputy head
of the CCP’s Central Propaganda Department, and from 1997 to 2002
he served as executive vice president (in effect, the top leader) of the
Central Party School. And he was a leading member of the Chinese
People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC).^^

To take another example, Lu Jianzhong is a member of the
National People’s Congress and chairman of the Silk Road Chamber of
International Commerce. But he also introduces himself as chairman
of the board of Datangxi Municipality Cultural Industry Investment
Group, vice president of China’s International Chamber of Commerce,
vice chairman of the China International Studies Foundation, or chair¬
man of the Shaanxi Association for the Promotion of Chinese Culture.

While this double-hatting is intended as a smokescreen for foreigners,
it also has an unintended advantage: it allows us to roughly reconstruct
where a particular organisation is located in the Chinese bureaucracy.
Typically, if a person is concurrently chair of organisation B and vice
chair of organisation A, one of the organisations is under the direct
leadership of the other. In some cases, A and B are simply different name¬
plates for the same organisation. For instance, until recently, the head of

19

A LENINIST PARTY GOES OUT TO THE Worlq
the China Association for International Friendlv Conto

/ conp

ser\^ed as the deputy head of the Liaison Department of th
Political Department of the PLA, suggesting an institutional
The governments State Council Information Office un(j
name, holds government press conferences and generally acts
the outside world can see, as if it were a part of the government ^
than the Party. However, internally it is known as the Central Offi
External Propaganda of the CCP, and official Chinese sources confir^^
that it is under the leadership of the Party, specifically the CenM
fnTofg)'^" Department (since the latest major institutional overhaul

in rh“' ‘‘““'’•^-hatting and double-plating are normal

- Chtna and at times the CCP relies on the ignorance of foreigne
to maskitscontro . Forexamnle in 1007 j signers

carrying out cultural united:; worfo ' ^

Central Institute of Sori^- • ™ '^P within the

under the command of the'uFWa A

socialism’ in it would be ‘inr • t at a name with the word

on the Academy of Chinese Gjr'T *e CCP settled

China's media and other ^
propaganda have been instructed t!,"""'.T'

government otgans (let alone Patty oneT'u themselves as

"f 'p ‘*'"'‘"8 '^'t't foreigners,

of rhe CCP, for instance, interacts wiTthe ' T'®" language Bureau

As we'll see th pT , PoblisI” T" "

J>ee, me 1 LA and the Ministr, r ^ ^roun f^IPr-^

front organisations for intellieence o u ^ Seen h ^ '

rhe China Association for Int naTio^Tp""®- ca

tHe PLA or MSS is known. Horrt' ^-tacr::’ "

as .ntermediarv contact. .„itP c„ . '«'« use. c ’ 'mk

as intermediary contacts with foreig'ets ku;;*/ ‘‘''k t

mst.tutions like the Shanghai Academy of sCI use!

approach them ''>'1 ^ ^ Scien^e^ ^ "^^search

a f,

The people and their friends and enemies

rher (ronts (or engaging with foreigners are .
organisatinns, "Che people' and their Triendship' w^Itr^.O-piet

to

20

THE PEOPLE AND THEIR FRIENDS AND ENEMIES

concepts with special meanings in Chinese politics—meanings that few
in the West understand. I he Party’s cynical, opportunistic concept of
friendship was explained in 2017 by Xi Jinping, who told cadres that
their friends outside the Party are not their ‘own personal resources’, but
should be made friends for the Party’ or ‘for the public good’. He went
on to say. Of course, friendships made outside the party will develop
into personal friendships. But personal friendships must comply with
the work for the public good. Principles, discipline, and rules must be
maintained.’*'^

Anne-Marie Brady’s 2003 book Making the Foreign Serve China is an
indispensable guide to understanding the ‘external friendship’ system
developed by the CCP.*'^ She writes that political friendship is ‘an
application of united front principles to divide the enemy by focusing
on contradictions and uniting all forces that can be united around a
common goal’. In the language of the CCP, ‘friendship’ does not refer
to an intimate personal bond, but to a strategic relationship. The Party’s
terminology of friendship ‘is a means to neutralise opposition psycho¬
logically and to reorder reality’. Foreign friends, writes Brady, are those
willing and able to promote China’s interests.

In China, civic organisations are never independent but always tied
into the Party system through united front organisations. Just as in the
United Kingdom no community organisation can use the word ‘royal’
in its title without official permission, in China no community group
would include the words ‘people’ or ‘friendship’ in its title without
Party approval.

Other words that sound benign, such as ‘benevolent’, ‘peace’, ‘devel¬
opment’, ‘understanding’ and ‘unity’, when used in nameplates indicate
Party-controlled, united front organisations. The Chinese People’s
Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, the China Council
for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification, and the Chinese
Association for International Friendly Contact are all examples that will
come up throughout this book.

In his 1937 essay ‘On contradiction’, Mao defined two types—
‘contradictions among the people’ {renmin neibu maodun) and ‘con¬
tradictions between the people and the enemies of the people’ {di wo
maodun) The idea of the people and the enemies of the people shows

21

A LENINIST PARTY GOES OUT TO THE WORLD

up in many different forms, on both the domestic and international 1
In his speech at the 2013 National Work Conference for Propagand
and Ideology, Xi Jinping identified three zones in the Chinese ideo
logical sphere: red (CCP stronghold), grey (middle ground) and black
(negative public opinion, the ‘enemy’ zoiie).*^^ Xi instructed the Party to
hold the red zone, reach out to the grey zone so as to incorporate it into
the red zone, and fight the black zoneJ^ In its approach to international
rdations, the CCP divides foreigners into those already sympathetic to
the Party; the political middle’, who are the main target of influence
work; and hardliners who cannot be convinced/*

In dealing with debate and dissent, the CCP again identifies three
categories for contentious issues, each requiring a different approach:
academic issues, misunderstandings (defined as ‘problems of ideologi¬
cal grasp), and political issues. Academic issues are those for which the
Party has not outlined a clear position.It therefore allows more open
discussion and exchange on these, which represent, in Mao’s sense,
onflicts among the people. Misunderstandings, the second category,
e issues on which the CCP has a clear stance on what is correct but
tor which it assumes no malicious or premeditated intent on the part
person or group who voices a position diverging from it. In these

ZZ T explaining the correct

rn^he ^eopr -understandings are a conflict

a which che

falsehoods. Once malicious intent and nrem spreading

person or group expressing the incorrect postdi/^Hl’ 'he

camp and needs to be repudiated firmly. Under Xi V '"‘t''’'
moved more and more issues into the political ca«go3
e tdea of premeditation is used to classify polUi^ .
groups assert that a protest was spontaneous ^ 7^0
avoid their activity being labelled political and \L k ?
or black hands’ {heishou). And the CCP often labels ^ forces,

stranons spontaneou.,- in order to pre-empt cha^rs h"’"
or implicitly encouraged them. For example, t 2oT9''rh‘''’r^''”'’=''

Chinese

22

.VaSCr^raKrKTlt awir»r.«'*»ar'

THE 5 PER CENT RULE AND QUIET DIPLOMACY

consulate general in Auckland, New Zealand praised the ‘spontaneous
patriotism’ of students from mainland China who attacked Hong Kong
protesters at the University of Auckland.^'* Conversely, the CCP makes
sure to label those protests it disapproves of as ‘not having occurred
spontaneously’, and being ‘orchestrated’ by ‘foreign hostile forces’/^

Importantly, when confronted by a contradiction between the people
and the enemies of the people, there are no limits to what the CCP can
do. It will do whatever it can to stop ‘enemies of the people’, who have
no rights. In the ideological cosmos of the CCP, these people impede
the progress of human history and therefore need to be dealt with
by any means necessary. This distinction between the people and its
enemies is used by the Party to justify its extremely brutal treatment of
dissidents and other ‘troublemakers’, such as human rights lawyers and
Falun Gong practitioners.^*' Tellingly, the distinction between ‘contra¬
dictions among the people’ and ‘contradictions between the people and
the enemies’ has been formally re-introduced into Party regulations
under Xi Jinping.^^

The 5 per cent rule and quiet diplomacy

So how is the population divided between ‘the people’ and ‘the enemies
of the people’? Mao declared that ‘95 per cent of people are good’; that
is, they are on the people’s side and therefore on the side of the CCP,
the Party being the ‘vanguard of the people’ after all. China’s political
system is notorious for setting quotas, and this declaration about the
95 per cent affected domestic campaigns during the Mao period, when
quotas for ‘bad’ people who were to be purged were often set at 5 per
cent.^® The official verdict on the Tiananmen movement remains that
‘a tiny handful of people exploited student unrest to launch a planned,
organized and premeditated political turmoil’.

This kind of framing is also common in the international setting.
Since China is good, and the overwhelming majority of the people are
good, it is impossible for a large number of people ever to be against
China. Beijing’s propaganda generally presents China as being in line
with what the majority of the world thinks. Anyone who opposes the
CCP must by default be in a tiny minority. For instance, in response
to a letter demanding the freeing of Canadians Michael Kovrig and

23

A LENINIST PARTY GOES OUT TO THE WORLD

Michael Spavor, detained by the CCP, a foreign ministry spokespcrso
wrote in the China Daily: ‘If every Chinese citizen sent an open letter
to Canadian leaders, their voice would be more resounding, and would
certainly join with the maimtimm voice of the international community
which is on the side of justice. ... The handjul of people behind the open
letter are intentionally creating an air of panic.’®*^ (The emphasis is ours,
both here and in the following paragraph.)

When, on the basis of intelligence advice, the Australian government
cancelled the permanent residency visa of businessman Huang Xiangmo,
he told the Global Times that ‘the anti-China group [in Australia] is only
a very small handful of people’.^* The Chinese embassy in Sweden issued

a statement in 2019 in which it lamented that a '^very small handful of
people posed as China experts to spread their anti-China sentiment.®^
And according to a Chinese government spokesperson, it is ‘futile for a
handful of Hong Kong people collaborating with foreign forces to inter¬
vene in Hong Kong affairs’.

at

Ihe actual number of people who oppose CCP policies, be they
me or abroad, doesnt matter—the CCP will always claim it is
, this is vital to its claim to legitimacy. However, especially
m the international context, where the Party has nothing close to an

ofcrp of framing requires other opponents

to soeak^^ 'k directly attacked. If they were

narraciveTtexplainsVhyTcctlt

idea that quiet diplomacy behind rh pushing the

diplomacy. Unfonuna J ™cal

ploy, allowing themtelves’'mTeTa™XlA

was^relifes t^’h^U^atefhhtLT' “’7®“'

lated the Philippines (which, as a countty "nTe d '"'‘"‘Pu-

default part of the people’) into bringing a claimToTh"®

tribunal in The Hague. The United States was ih

Filipinos were misled or coerced. The same nar ■ while

the battle over Huawei’s participation Tsc 2'"

■r portrayed by China as the sok instilo?'ora„ States

Huawei, fought for ulterior motives. “gainst

24

THE 5 PER CENT RULE AND QUIET DIPLOMACY

Although small in number, hostile forces can have a large impact if
they succeed in misleading or manipulating the people, and the CCP
views these forces as a dark version of itself—a small group of people
smart enough to manipulate others, but which uses its powers to mislead
rather than to lead people in the correct direction, as the CCP claims to.

Linked to the idea that 95 per cent of people are good and therefore on
the side of the Party is the political act of declaring ones allegiance with
the CCP As David Shambaugh explains it, to declare allegiance {biaotai),
by repeating a particular slogan {kouhao) or other political phrase, is in
China an important ‘ritualistic, rhetorical, and significant political act’.®'^

The practice of biaotai is also becoming more common among
foreigners. The CCP demands, for example, repeated verbal commit¬
ments from foreign interlocutors regarding the ‘One China Policy’, each
repetition of which adds to the Party’s sense of its legitimacy. Members
of the Silk Road Think Tank Network must declare that they commit
to ‘the common understanding that the Belt and Road Initiative is an
important endeavor to promote world economic growth’.®^ Whether
they know it or not, these international think tanks and organisations—
including Chatham House, the Elcano Royal Institute, and the German
Development Institute, among many others—are engaging in acts of
biaotai. Repeating someone else’s wording to express political loyalty is
not unknown in other parts of the world, but it is taken to an extreme
in China under the CCP; we will give several other examples later.

In ‘On contradiction’, Mao made another argument that continues
to shape the thinking of the CCP. Groups of people can be allies in one
situation, defined by time, place or issue, and the main adversary in
another. China’s biggest global adversary at present is the one standing
in the way of‘the irresistible historical trend toward multipolarity’, the
United States.®^ This conflict is classified as one between the people and
an enemy of the people {di wo maodun), meaning the US cannot be
won over. So why then does the CCP still try to win over the American
public and specific American interest groups? Because the US is only
the enemy when looking at the power balance in the world as a whole
{zhengti). Inside American society itself, only a ‘small number’ are true
enemies, regressive forces of world history; the majority are part of ‘the
people’. Some of the latter may have been misled in their thinking, but

25

A LENINIST PARTY GOES OUT TO THE WORLD

as long as the CCP continues to patiently explain the truth to them, they
can be won over, as opposed to those who try to hold onto American
dominance and thereby stand against the ‘irresistible historical trend
towards multipolarity’, a euphemism for US decline.®^

CCP operating procedures

As a rule, the CCP tries not to antagonise too many people at the one
time, especially when acting in a situation where the majority of people
oppose the Party’s point of view. If several countries do something the
CCP dislikes, it will often single out one or two for criticism, either as
a test balloon or as a deterrent to others. In some cases it will even stay
silent altogether. This is informed by the idea that the 95 per cent are
still potential allies; it also helps ensure that the majority of people dont
feel pressured by the CCP.

Another working rule enunciated by Mao for united front work is

expressed in the slogan ‘round outside, square within’ {wai yuan nci

Alternatively translated as ‘firmness of principles, flexibility

of strategy, this approach allows certain concessions to be made for

strategic purposes, as long as the most important principles are not lost
sight of.

rt er principle indicative of the CCP s flexibility is the practice

gically allowing some friendly forces to venture criticism so that

'm7/T ‘‘>‘8 with a little badmouth’ (xiao

newsln”’”^‘*T ’ 'u' observation of the

.... ^t t e Nationalists (Kuomintang) prior to 1949 Bv

»

bdanced, despite being Stmly

lobby groups there. A few hints from Chines! offi ■ I Powerful

26

CCP OPERATING PROCEDURES

groups or billionaires to pressure their government to do nothing to
upset Beijing; this tactic is known as yi shang bi zheng (literally, ‘using
business to pressure government’). Examples are legion—Taiwanese
tourism operators marched in the street because Beijing slashed tourist
numbers from China, Australian mining tycoons urged Canberra not
to make a statement about the death of dissident writer Liu Xiaobo,
and US business organisations have pressured Donald Trump to end
the trade war. Often, business groups act pre-emptively, before Beijing
makes threats.

Prior to taking power in China in 1949, the CCP was forced to
retreat from the cities and establish bases in the countryside. It later
incorporated the lessons learned from this in the strategy of ‘using the
countryside to surround the cities’ {nongcun baowei chengsht). This
slogan should not be understood only in the literal sense; the idea is to
go to areas where the CCP’s enemies are weak or not well represented,
organise the population there and then use them to encircle the enemy’s
strongholds. In global terms, the CCP has drawn a parallel between ‘the
countryside’ and ‘the developing world’. That is to say, the developing
world is seen as a region in which it is comparatively easy for the CCP to
establish itself Once enough developing countries are on China’s side, it
becomes easier for the CCP to chip away at the developed world’s grip
on power.

A similar idea is expressed in the slogan ‘using the local to surround
the centre’ {difang baowei zhongyang), or moving from the periphery
to the centre, from the small to the big, from the Iringe to the main¬
stream.^® This is a tried and tested strategy of CCP influencing abroad,
and also of Party-owned media like Xinhua or Chinese companies like
Huawei. By winning over smaller or more marginal groups, usually
more easily convinced, CCP-affiliated institutions slowly make their
way towards the mainstream. This principle, noted throughout this
book, helps explain the emphasis Beijing places on local councils and
sister-city relationships in the West.

27

3

Political elites at the centre:
North America

Making friends

When considering Beijing’s structure of influence in the West, we need
to look at the world the way Beijing does: by studying where the centres
of power lie in each country, and determining who are the elites in busi¬
ness, politics, academia, think tanks, media and cultural institutions.
Information is collected on who they have connections with and who
Aeir friends and family members are.' Business and personal links in
hma are especially useful. Front groups associated with the United

nt Work Department and the PLA are then tasked with selecting
people to get close to.^

The elite power map for the United States will be t.nlike the one
or "many or example, which in turn will not resemble those for

poIhlTle d fP--"' “"d future

m c“ HilT T g-rnme„t-national. provincial or

Richard BauL.3The Ststt wllgo™-“
with the Party on everything; they are often quoted in the
The second is ‘friendly personage', someone who is relied unr b'"
teally trusted, like businesspeople; they are open to manipulationt'C;

28

MAKING FRIENDS

have an interest in appearing friendly. The third category, which often
includes scholars and journalists, are 'those who really love China but
know all the vices of Chinese communism’. These people are beyond
influence. The fourth category is made up of ‘those people who love
China but hate Chinese communism’.'* They are classed as ‘enemies’
and are discredited whenever the opportunity arises. The final category
is reserved for those who either ‘didn’t know or didn’t care much about
China. These people are potentially useful because they can always
be invited to a film or cultural event and will hopefully leave with a
positive impression.

Invitations are also made to those targeted as potential friends of
China—to a conference, a reception or a cultural occasion, events
organised by apparently neutral charities or academic organisations,
where warm feelings are cultivated. Gifts may be given, setting up a sense
of obligation and reciprocity. A free trip to China might follow, during
which the target is worked on intensively in a carefully scripted program
of meetings and tours. While the hosting organisations are often front
groups allied to the UFWD or the Liaison Department of the Political
Work Department of the CMC, state-owned companies can also serve
in these roles, and, in the Xi Jinping era, private corporations too.

In his memoir, George H.W Bush proved just how easy it is for
naive Western politicians to walk into the trap of ‘friendship’: ‘When
Deng called me a lao pengyou., an old friend of China, I felt the phrase
was not just the usual flattery, but a recognition that I understood the
importance of the US-China relationship and the need to keep it on
track.’^ Deng then gave Bush ‘a rare insight into his thoughts’ on Sino-
Soviet relations.

Those who believe they have been entrusted with the inner thoughts
of top leaders often proceed to act as Beijing’s messengers, urging others
to have ‘greater understanding’, ‘to see it from China’s perspective’ and
‘adopt a more nuanced position’. Former Australian prime minister Paul
Keating, appointed along with Henry Kissinger to the international
advisory council of the China Development Bank, hinted that he had
access to the private thoughts of the top leadership, including meetings
with President Xi. Keating is one of the regime’s most committed advo¬
cates, describing human rights as ‘Western values’ that do not apply in

29

POLITICAL ELITES AT THE CENTRE: NORTH AMERICA

CJ\ina, uiul praising the CCP government as ‘the best governrne
the world in the last thirty years. Full stop.’^’

A tormer senior UvS State Department official, Susan Thornton
alsxT ^Hvsitions herself as a friend of China. In a widely read attack
the United States’ pushback against Beijing in 2019, she argued that
the breakdown in relations was the fault of the US and that with good
diplomacy China could be coaxed into becoming a responsible global
citizen. Beijing, she wrote, was working hard to provide more ‘inter¬
national public goods’. Thornton claims that ‘the China Dream is to
be more like the United States’, and that senior Party officials are more
concerned with getting their children into top US universities than
seeing their country dominate the United States.

Susan Thornton is one of the principal authors of a July 2019 open
letter, signed by roughly one hundred concerned American scholars,
foreign policy experts and business representatives, repudiating the
tougher position taken by the Trump administration on China.«
^ile aclmowledging that China’s behaviour has in recent times been
‘troubling’, the signatories called for a continuation of the cooperative
and welcoming stance of previous decades. For them, nothing has
happened to undo the belief that, as China is drawn into the global
economic order, the forces of political liberalisation at home are
becoming stronger and must sooner or later prevail. The fact that the
very opposite has been taking place, that the authoritarians under Xi
have been vastly .lengthened by tbe integration of China into th^
global economy, has passed these signatories by.

Tellin^y, the letter speaks only of‘China, with no mention of rh
Chinese Communist Party. The signatories believe that ‘China’ b
interest m replacing the United States as the global leader fL rl'
China IS not a serious ‘economic enemy’ or a securitv' ■ 1 .
believe that the real problem is tbe United States, with ifs ad '

^sture and exa^erated sense of the threat posed by the PRC
Trumps affiressivc stance, they argue, is weakening those in rk

Naturally, this intervention by US experts atguing for ,

ation of the warm and fu«y approach that the CCP h ‘ T'’'*"'*-

‘ for yea,„

30

THE SAD CASE OF JOHN MCCALLUM

been cultivating was applauded by Party officials. The foreign minis¬
try described the letter as ‘rational and objective’.'^ The Global Times
interviewed one of the five initiators of the letter, Michael Swaine, a
senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (an
institution that provided nine of the signatures).'” Swaine condemned
Americas cold war response and ‘extreme policy’ approach to China,
saying China does not want to overthrow the international order, only
introduce some reforms to it.

In one of the most effective rebuttals, John Pomfret argued that the
letter is in the tradition of the United States’ ‘profoundly paternalistic’
view of China, which is based on the belief that the natural superiority
of the American system will coax China’s leaders into emulating it."
As for Chinas liberal leaders in waiting, in whose lap the letter-writers
place their hopes, Xi has converted, purged, imprisoned or otherwise
silenced them.

The sad case of John McCallum

Over its history, the CCP has developed sophisticated techniques of
psychological manipulation of friends and enemies alike. They have
been applied to excellent effect on a wide range of people in Western
countries identified for their value to the Party. The aim, once again, is
to draw them into alignment with Beijing’s political objectives, often
by convincing them that they have a special relationship with China.
As China scholar James Jiann Hua To writes, this kind of psychologi¬
cal work is ‘an effective tool for intensive behavioural control and
manipulation’ while at the same rime appearing ‘benign, benevolent
and helpful’.'^

When Huawei’s chief financial officer, Meng Wanzhou, was arrested
in Canada in December 2018, on an extradition request from the
United States, she was accused of bank fraud, among other things. At
the height of the angry diplomatic fight that ensued—in which Beijing
made dire threats to Ottawa rather than Washington and jailed two
Canadian citizens on trumped-up charges—Canada’s ambassador to
China, John McCallum, gave a press conference to Chinese-language
media in Ontario in which he offered advice to Meng as to how she
could mount the best legal defence against extradition.'^ McCallum,

31

POLITICAL ELITES AT THE CENTRE: NORTH AMERICA

already well known as a friend of China—he’d recently said that C

had more in common with China than with the United States_listed

what he saw as serious flaws in the extradition caseJ'^

Some suggested the ambassador sounded as if he were speaking for

the government of China rather than defending Canada’s position.fo

Beijing, the Global Times praised McCallum for his ‘truth-telling’ and

reproached Canadians for their lack of ‘moral righteousness’,’*^ After

widespread criticism of McCallum at home, his former chief of staff

characterised his speech as a ‘verbal miscue’ and defended him as ‘a

fundamentally decent and optimistic man’, a longstanding Sinophile

whod travelled often to China over three decades—all of which goes

a long way towards explaining how the ambassador could have fallen

victim to the CCPs psychological techniques.'^

A few days later McCallum followed up his advice to Meng on

how to fight her extradition by saying it would be good for Canada to

release her, thereby privileging the pacification of Beijing over Canada’s

g obligation to the United States. Prime Minister Justin Trudeau

orced to sack him, leaving observers to puzzle over how such an

experienced politician and diplomat could misfire so badly.

Others like McCallum who are targets of the CCP are wooed not by

m ucements but by playing to theit vanity and their desire to be agree-

able. ^ one headline wtiter sardonically put it, ‘I think that Ch.nese
official really likes me!’’®

One who did recognise why McCallum was saying the things he
did in support of Meng Wanzhou was former Me ■ c ® ,

to Beijing, Jorge Guajardo. He had been groomed T
Envoys new to Beijing ate isolated from senior Chines" Iffi ”

ume, a message is sent that a high-ranking official wishes m m ®

They meet and are told they have a unique understand T

and delicacy of the party’s position’ Thev h • the nuance

Velar. They are granted rare access It; ^^e rs^r/bt"’"'^^^ “
been entrusted with an unusual insight into th • ^ they’ve

Chinese politics. Of course, other envoys are h • ^ 'forkings

the same. As special friends of China the env ”5 ^’’^^timed to beJi

back home reflects their unique insight, and i^Lctly tL'advf' T"
wants them to communicate.^*' ^ advice Beijing

eve
masters

INFLUENCE IN WASHINGTON D.C.

Selt-bclicf coupled with the need to feel important opens people
to seduction. 1 he CCPs expert manipulation of vanity was identified
hy a previous Canadian ambassador to China, David Mulroney: You
and you alone are sufficiently gifted and experienced to understand the
situation and explain it to your government. The fate of the bilateral
relationship is in your hands.’^' Far more so than with any other country,
diplomats in China become convinced that ‘the most important thing
in the world is maintaining good relations’.They are persuaded that
China is difficult for foreigners to understand, and instead of explain¬
ing their countries’ viewpoint to China, ambassadors see their role as
explaining China’s position to their governments, and so they become a
conduit for the CCP’s messaging. That was McCallum’s mistake.

This situation is unlike the Cold War, in which loyal citizens were
‘turned’ and began to work consciously for the other side. It’s far more
effective if those arguing the CCP’s case believe in their hearts that they
remain loyal but have come to the view that China’s position is in the
best interests of their own country. (It was therefore inept for one of
the most popular newspapers in China to declare in a headline, when
McCallum gave his support to Meng, that the Canadian ambassador
had ‘changed sides’.

The conviction that maintaining good relations with Beijing is para¬
mount is rife in foreign affairs departments across the Western world,
and colours the advice they give their ministers on a daily basis. For these
officials, calm relations with plenty of bilateral meetings are regarded as
successful diplomacy; in truth, they put the CCP in the box seat. When
Beijing cancels meetings and puts diplomats in the freezer. Western
officials are inclined to panic and advise their governments to relent.

Influence in Washington D.C.

In the targeting of anyone who may have the ear of a political leader,
official and unofficial advisers, civil servants, party colleagues, donors,
friends, spouses and other family members, business associates and mili¬
tary brass are all fair game. Influence operations become much easier
when there is a financial reward for the target, and business dealings
therefore facilitate China’s influence in the United States in a way the
old Soviet Union could only dream of Think tanks, especially those

33

POLITICAL ELITES AT THE CENTRE; NORTH AMERICA

headed by former political or business leaders, are seduced th
donations and research cooperation. (This topic is covered in
eleven, with other avenues for influencing Washingtons decision-mar^^
considered in earlier chapters. While its not possible to nr -a
a full account of CCP influence in Washington, we aim to give a strong
sense of its dimensions.)

In 2018 the well-connected Washington Post columnist Josh Rogin
pointed out that China had been building networks of influence in
the United States over many years, and that the US government ‘is
preparing for the possibility that the Chinese government will decide to
weaponize them to get what it wants.^^ (Although Beijing is not known
to use Russian-style ‘active measures’ in the West, deploying them is
only a matter of political calculation.) One of the CCP s most auda¬
cious penetration operations, Chinagate in 1996, saw a top intelligence
operative meeting a naive President Clinton in the White House, along
with donations to the Clinton campaign made through people with ties
to the Chinese military. (See chapter eight.)

Beijing has been working to gain influence in the US Congress since
970s. Through the activities of the CCP s International Liaison
epartment, and Party-linked bodies like the China Association for
nttrnanonal Friendly Contact (considered later), China has made
some .nfluennal ftiendsd> Nevertheless. Congress has for the most parr

T>*e the b “ '"c White

been -geredT;ZT:Tgt::efe^^^ ®-“P^

weTclrc^TThTTLeM D.C. and beyond

of constructive engagement’ ‘^rope, and the value

developed economL'ly, it wouU nr7" “ ^hina

This view was not without foundatiZ blcT '"b ^
factions within the CCP did struggle with h 7 ‘‘b^fal

US It reinforced a kind of institutiLal naN b“t in the

Beijing. Many of those who stuck to this 'Z by

pointed firmly to the contrary had a stto '''‘den

defending Beijing, Personal investment

ice

in

34

. irr ra x- .v

INFLUENCE IN WASHINGTON D.C.

In May 2019 Joe Biden distinguished himself from all of the other
candidates for the Democratic Party’s presidential nomination by ridi¬
culing the idea that China is a strategic threat to the United States.
‘China is going to eat our lunch? Come on, man,’ he told a campaign
crowd in Iowa City.^^ Biden had for years adopted a soft approach to
China. When President Obama’s secretary of state, Hillary Clinton,
was taking a tougher position towards China’s adventurism in Asia,
Vice President Biden was urging caution. Biden had formed a warm
personal relationship with Xi Jinping when Xi was vice president and
president-in-waiting.^®

In his second term, Obama replaced Clinton as secretary of state
with the more accommodating John Kerry. The dynamics help to
explain why Obama’s 2012 ‘pivot to Asia’ was a damp squib. The
United States stood back while China annexed islands and features in
the South China Sea and built military bases on them, something Xi
had promised Obama he would not do. Breaking the promise has given
China an enormous strategic advantage.

Joe Biden cleaves to the belief, now abandoned by many China
scholars and most Washington politicians, that engagement with
China will entice it into being a responsible stakeholder. The University
of Pennsylvania’s D.C. think tank—named, for him, the Penn Biden
Center for Diplomacy and Global Engagement—aims to address
threats to the liberal international order, yet China is absent from the
threats identified on its website: Russia, climate change and terrorism.^^
Biden has spoken about China’s violation ol human rights but still
clings to the idea of China’s ‘peaceful rise’.

So does it matter if Joe Biden has a clifterent view ol China? It does,
because there is evidence that the CCP has been currying his favour
by awarding business deals that have enriched his son. Hunter Biden.
One account of this is given by Peter Schweizer in his 2019 book Secret
Empires.^^ Some of his key claims were subset]uently challenged and
Schweizer refined them in an op-ed in the New York Times (famous for
fact-checking).^* In short, when Vice President Biden travelled to China
in December 2013 on an official trip, his son flew with him on Airforce
Two. While Biden senior was engaging in soft diplomacy with Chinas
leaders. Hunter was having other kinds of meetings. Then, ‘less than two

35

POLITICAL ELITES AT THE CENTRE; NORTH AMERICA

wccJcs after the trip, I In liters firm ... which he fountleci with two other
businessmen fincluding John Kerry’s stepsonj in June 2013, finalized
a deal to open a fund, BHR Partners, whose largest shareholder is the
government-run Bank of China, even though he had scant background
in private c*quity’.

1 he Bank of China is owned by the state and controlled by the CCP,
Hunter Biden’s exact role in the company is disputed, but one expert
has said that his share in it would be worth around $20 million.

However, the point here is not the ethics of the Bidens (as the news
media have framed it^"^) but the way in which the CCP can influence
senior politicians. This ‘corruption by proxy’, in which top leaders keep
their hands clean while their family members exploit their association
to make fortunes, has been perfected by the ‘red aristocracy’ in Beijing.
In the crucial years 2014 and 2015, Beijing was aggressively expanding
into the South China Sea while Obama, Kerry and Biden were sitting
on their hands.

The billionaire businessman and former New York mayor Michael
Bloomberg was a late entrant in the contest to become the 2020
Democratic Party candidate for US president. He is the most Beijing-
friendly of all aspirants. With extensive investments in China, he
opposes the tariff war and often speaks up for the CCP regime. His
media company has suppressed stories critical of CCP leaders, and
Bloomberg himself claimed in 2019 that ‘Xi Jinping is not a dictator’
because he has to satisfy his constituency.^’ 7'/je Washington Post's
Josh Rogin argued that ‘his [Bloomberg’s] misreading of the Chinese
government’s character and ambitions could be devastating for U S
national security and foreign policy. He would he advocating for a naive
policy of engagement and wishful thinking that has already been tried
and failed.

Republicans too have seen the influence of money from China
Since 2015, Kentucky Senator Mitch McConnell has been Senate
majority leader and the most powerful man in Washington after the
president. Once a hardliner, in the 1 990s he became a noted China
dove (although in 2019, in a likely instance of‘big help with a little
badmouth’, he voiced support for Hong Kong protesters^^). In I 993
he married the daughter of one of his donors, Chinese-American

36

THE WHITE HOUSE

busincssiiiun James Chao. Llaine Chao went on to serve as secretary
oHabor under President George W. Bush and in 2017 was sworn in as
President Trumps transportation secretary. She wasted no time organ¬
ising a trip to China that included meetings between members of her
family and Chinese government officials, a plan that was spiked only
when the State Department raised ethical concerns.^*

James Chao has excellent -connections—in China, includ¬

ing his classmate Jiang Zemin, the powerful former president of China.
Chao became rich through his shipping company. Foremost Group,
which flourished due to its close association with the state-owned
behemoth the China State Shipbuilding Corporation. McConnell,
after his marriage to Chao s daughter, was courted by the highest CCP

leaders, and his in-Iaws were soon doing deals with Chinese government
corporations.^^

In 2008 James Chao made a gift of several million dollars to his
daughter and her husband, making Mitch McConnell one of the tichest
members of Congress. Since the 1990 s he has been working to shift
the Republicans to a more China-friendly position.® In 1999 , when
Republicans strongly backed a resolution pledging support fot Taiwan,
McConnell was missing in action. He has opposed measutes to punish
China for human rights violarions and currency manipulation. Fot het
part, Elaine Chao was dismissive of a teport in 20()() calling out Chinas
espionage activit,-, refusing to acknowledge (hat Cdiina could pose any
threat to the United Stares."*'

The White House

When Donald Trump occupied the Oval Office in February 2017, the
US governments attitude towards China began to change, although
more slowly than might have been expected given Trump’s red-hot
rhetoric on the campaign trail. 1 hroughoui mucb of his first year
in office, the administration was hedging its bets. One of the new
presidents first acts was to can the Irans-Pacilic Partnershij), a trade
agreement berxveen twelve Pacihe-rim nations that would have served as
a counterweight to Chinas increasing economic dominance. Powerful
voices in the \\ hire Fiouse, people \s ith deep China connections, were
urging a conciliatory approach.

POLITICAL ELITES AT THE CENTRE: NORTH AMERICA

Wilbur Ross, the new commerce secretary, had extensive invest¬
ments in China, and one of his companies was partnered with a
state-owned Chinese corporation (under pressure, Ross appears to
have divested in 2019).“^ While in China in 2017 he talked up a
partnership between Goldman Sachs and the state-owned investment
fund China Investment Corp, to provide up to $5 billion to buy into
US manufacturers, including sensitive assets.(Readers might consult
this books index to grasp the outsized role Goldman Sachs plays in
Beijing’s influence operations.)

Trump’s director of the National Economic Council, Gary Cohn,
had been president of Goldman Sachs, which was heavily involved
with Chinese banks, giving Cohn a personal stake in their success.
Among his financial interests in China before his appointment was a
multimillion-dollar stake in a huge Party-controlled bank, the Industrial
and Commercial Bank of China, which he helped to buy assets in the
US. The bank is reported to be the largest commercial tenant in Trump
Tower.Having worked at furthering US-China trade and investment
links, Cohn also has deep connections with Chinese financial and
political elites.

Trump’s treasury secretary, Steven Mnuchin, had also once worked
for Goldman Sachs and held stocks in the company, worth several
million dollars, which he divested soon after taking office. Mnuchin
quickly became the leading China dove in the White House, working to
head off or derail moves to impose tariffs and other sanctions.

Donald Trump’s own family had high hopes of enriching themselves
in China. When Trump appointed his son-in-law, Jared Kushner, as
White House senior adviser, Kushner held substantial investments in
Blackstone, an investment company owned by Trump’s friend Stephen
Schwarzman which was heavily invested in China. In 2018 it was

reported that Kushner’s real estate company was being investigated over
a scheme to lure Chinese investors to buy into apartment towers with
the promise of obtaining visas to live in the United States.'*'^

China the presidents daughter, owns valuable trademarks in

She was

to thitrhii^ cm7

some

38

THE WHITE HOUSE

Initially, President Trump referred often to his ‘great friend Xi
Jinping,hut in 2018 the atmosphere in Washington D.C. turned sour.
C.onstructive engagement’ was replaced with an adversarial approach.
The structures of influence the CCP had built proved impotent, but
not for want of trying. In March 2019 the journal Mother Jones broke
a tawdry story about a Chinese-American Trump donor named Cindy
Yang, who operated brothels in Florida. She was reported to be arrang¬
ing visas for rich Chinese, and working hard to get close to Trump,
without much success. She did, however, get the presidents sister,
Elizabeth Trump-Grau, to participate in an event at the Mar-a-Lago
resort. Yang was active in CCP united front organisations, notably the
Florida branch of the China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful
National Reunification. She also held a position on the National
Committee of the Asian American Republican Party. Known as the
‘Asian GOP’, its aim, according to executive director Cliff Zhonggang
Li, was to ‘promote Chinese-American political participation’, words
that signal engagement in the CCP’s huaren canzheng work (literally,
‘ethnic Chinese participation in politics’, explained in chapter seven).

There have been more sophisticated and effective programs to influ¬
ence America’s first families. During the 2016 presidential primaries,
Jeb Bush looked like a better bet than Donald Trump. One of the
stand-out donors to Jeb’s campaign was a Singapore-based Chinese
couple named Gordon Tang and Huaidan Chen, owners of a property
development company in California. I hey had previously attracted
attention for their links to Gary Locke, the former Washington state
governor who was appointed US ambassador to China by Obama.'‘‘^ In
2013, while Locke was ambassador, Huaidan Cdicn bought his home
in Bethesda, Maryland for Si.68 million.(Ltliics experts said it was
a clear conflict of interest.*’*) After Locke left office, they began paying
him as an adviser to their company.

Although Gordon Tang and Huaidan Chen’s Si.3 million donation
to Jeb Bush’s election campaign did not pay off, they had appointed
his brother, Neil Bush, as non-executive chairman of their company
SingHaiyi as early as 2013.^* The Bush family’s China friendship began
in 1974, when George H.W. Bush serxed as de facto ambassador in
Beijing. He would later say, I know how China works,’ and was deeply

39

POLITICAI ELITES AT THE CENTRE: NORTH AMERICA

rCxSjTctuxI in C,hin;i as an old friend’, a rarely bestowed honorific rescrv
Ktp \vx)rld figures who have rendered great help to China. (He
Kissinger and fi)rnicr head of the International Olympic CommituL^
juan Antonio Samaranch, have received the same honour.”) As presi'
dent in 1989 Bush worked hard to smooth relations after the June
massacre in Tiananmen Square, sending a secret delegation to Beijing in
early July, just a month after the bloody crackdown.”

Today the Bush legacy is carried on by Neil, the former president’s
third son. He chairs the George H.W. Bush China-U.S. Relations
Foundation, which among other activities staged a major conference in
Washington D.C. in October 2018 in conjunction with the important
united front body, the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with
Foreign Countries.” The CPAFFC works with the Bush foundation
to promote closer ties between the two countries and ‘to create a more
peaceful and prosperous future’.”

The problem is that the CPAFFC, commonly abbreviated in
Chinese 2 & youxie (‘friendship association’), is an official organisation
masquerading as an NGO. It is an agency of the Chinese People’s
Political Consultative Conference, a top-level advisory body that forms
an integral part of the CCP’s united front work. Its task is to win friends
under the banner of people-to-people diplomacy. Friendship, or youyi,
writes Anne-Marie Brady, ‘is a term that has come to be closely associ¬
ated with foreigners and the CCP s system of structures and strategies
for dealing with them’.” Winning foreign friends through the activities
of organisations like the CPAFFC is integral to the CCP’s system of
exerting influence abroad. For example, in May 2019 Xinhua reported
the signing of a memorandum of understanding between the CPAFFC
and a think tank in Ireland, AsiaMatters, to promote people-to-people
exchanges and cooperation. At the ceremony, Ireland’s foreign min
istet and deputy prime minister. Simon Coveney, said the deepenint.

opining thatTe Uni2d^stt«''tjusi'*'''^''r”^

wapon to bully' China.” While Chi"^ ""'g' P°‘‘«cal

THE DEPARTMENT OF ENEMY WORK

Aiwcricuivs into seeing China as a problem. The role of his organisa¬
tion, he explained, is to help Americans see the truth about China. In
an interview with the state broadcaster CGTN, he gushed about ‘the
natural kindness and gift giving of the Chinese people’, unwittingly
revealing the tactics used to groom him.*^®

A month later Neil Bush was in Hong Kong giving the keynote
speech at a conference organised by Tung Chee-hwa, former Hong
Kong chief executive and top united front operative. Bush blamed ‘anti-
China’ sentiment in the US for the tension between the two powers,
telling the audience that the US should not meddle in China’s affairs,
that CCP leaders are motivated by concern for the people, and that
‘US-style democracy’ is not suited to China.*^' Bush developed these
themes in another sycophantic interview on CGTN in October, where
he said that Americans would change their view of China if they could
only see the rise of the freedom people are enjoying’ there.^^ His words
so closely echoed those generated by the CCP’s Propaganda Department
they could have been written by it.

The Department of Enemy Work

In recent years, China has used increasingly bellicose language and
military muscle flexing, not least in its annexation and militarisation of
islands in the South China Sea. Behind the scenes, a quieter and more
powerful process of achieving supremacy has been taking place, a pro¬
cess of disintegrating the enemy. At the heart of it lies the International
Liaison Department of the Political Work Department of the Central
Military Commission. Previously known as the Department of Enemy
Work, the Liaison Department is an integral element of China’s intelli¬
gence community.^’^ However, as China scholar Geoff Wade writes: ‘its
functions are broader, as it develops links with global elites and aims
at influencing the policies and behaviour of countries, institutions and
groups beyond China. It engages in a broad range of activities including
propaganda, liaison, influence peddling, information gathering and
perception management.’^

CCP experts Mark Stokes and Russell Hsiao have described its
modus operandi. Elite individuals and organisations in foreign defence
and the militar)" are classified as friend, enemy, or those in the middle

41

^'Ol MICAI CLIfES AT

THE CENTME; Nownt AMERICA

who C4n xn>n ovc^—thKv is similar to the CCP’s classlficati(,n of
fVXTp c ia C.hina ihat we saw in chapter two, and to I^ichard Baum*
taxTTnonTy descrihexi above. ‘Psychological assessments of elite figures’
Nsrite Stx>kes and HvSiao, ‘examine leaders, assess an individuals career
les'cl xTf culture, motivation, values, political orientation and factional
amliation, social status, family, and professional competency.’^^

Information acquired by cyber hacking of personnel databases
health records, personal email accounts and so on can be especially
usefiil when aiming to create rapport with members of military and
p>olitical elites, both past and present, along with academics. To conduct
this work, the Liaison Department has created or supports a number of
front groups and front companies.*’^

A month after Donald Trumps inauguration, a Chinese-American
businesswoman, Angela Chen, bought a $15.8 million condo in Trump
Tower.^ Journalists Andy Kroll and Russ Choma, writing in Mother
Jones, revealed that Chen, whose consulting firm sells access to power¬
ful people, chairs an overseas influence organisation tied to China’s
military intelligence.^® This organisation, the China Arts Foundation
International, is a non-profit group that sponsors cultural events and
hosts galas that bring together the rich and powerful. (We examine
its activities in more length in chapter ten.) It is linked to the China
Association for International Friendly Contact, a front group of the

to
to
to
senior

Liaison Department.*^^ (Among the CAIFC’s other subsidiaries is the
Centre for Peace and Development Studies.) Although its official aim is
‘promote international people-to-people exchanges and cooperation’
enhance world peace and development, its main function, according
Stokes and Hsiao, ‘is establishing and maintaining rapport with
foreign defense and security community elites, including retired
military officers and legislators’.^® More bluntly, according to a manual
seen by Australian Beijing correspondent John Garnaut, it specialises
in ‘carrying out work of disintegrating the enemy and uniting with
friendly military elements’.^' In one instance, uncovered by Garnaut
a group of Australia’s most senior businessmen was courted by CAIFC
officials, unaware that their solicitous contact, Xine Yunminc
lieutenant-general in the PIA." Xing was until 2015 the executi’vr' "

ptesidentoftheCAIFCandtheheadofthePUUiaisonDepartrenT'

42

the department of enemy work

He Ik»s also hosted Tony Blair and Bill Gates, among other dignitaries.
Geoff Wade notes; This intense engagement by senior members of the
I LA in CAIFC activities clearly shows the degree to which it is a covert
arm of the PLA, engaged in intelligence and propaganda work.’^'*

China has drawn many former US officials into its network of influ¬
ence operations.One of the more important recruits was US Admiral
(rtd) Bill Owens, former vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffs*’
Owens was given extraordinary access to top PLA leaders, including the
vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, Xu Qiliang, and
according to Garnaut, writing in 2013, he ‘has probably spent more
time with top Chinese generals in the past six years than have all serving
American generals combined’.^^

After retiring from the US Navy in 1996, Owens used his China
connections to build a lucrative career in a Hong Kong investment
firm and as an adviser for cross-border technology transfers. He also
mixed with Washington D.C. opinion-makers and held board positions
at think tanks, including Brookings, Carnegie, Rand and the Council
on Foreign Relations.^® Beginning in 2008 Owens arranged meetings
between a stream of high-ranking US military officers and their Chinese
counterparts; it was known as the Sanya Initiative. Some US officers
came away from these meetings echoing CCP propaganda, such as
that Chinas intentions are peaceful and not a threat. Owens himself
wrote opinion articles for the Financial Times, one of which, headlined
‘America must start treating China as a friend’, argued that it’s not in
America’s interests to sell arms to Taiwan.A report of a 2008 Sanya
Initiative meeting claimed that ‘all four American generals have already
begun to discuss writing op-ed pieces to provide a counterpoint to the
current writing about China’s military’.The CAIFC also attempted
to delay the publication of a Pentagon report on PRC military power.

In 2013 Owens founded a consultancy firm named Red Bison,
which opens up partnerships with China.®- He continued his work
of introducing senior militar\^ officers to their ‘Chinese counterparts’.
A 2012 paper by the Congressional Research Service raised concerns
about the nature of the contact between current and former US military
officers and the PLA. It specifically discussed Owens’s involvement with
the Sanya group and his business interests in China.®^ When it was D’ ;,

43

POLITICAL ELITES AT THE CENTRE! NORTH AMERICA

to him, Owens declined to comment on whether he had received as
much as $100 million from his China business activities.®'* At a meeting
of the Republican National Committee in 2012, calls were made for
congressional hearings into the affair, but they were not pursued because
it was believed an investigation would harm the party.®^

The Sanya Initiative continues to flourish. In October 2018 it
convened a meeting paid for by the CCP-linked China-United States
Exchange Foundation (see chapters six and eleven) and ‘private donors’.
The CAIFC also collaborated.®^

Of the high-powered guests who have appeared at functions organi¬
sed by the China Arts Foundation International, Stephen Schwarzman,
CEO of the Blackstone Group, stands out. A Palm Beach neighbour of
Donald Trump, Schwarzman has been described by Michael Kranish
of The Washingto 7 i Post as Trump’s ‘China whisperer’, because he has
‘one of the closest relationships to Beijing of any American executive’.®'
Throughout 2017 and 2018 Trump zigzagged between being hard and
soft on China, though he seemed to harden permanently in early 2019.
Sometimes, Schwarzman’s message to Frump to take a soft line has been
overruled by more hawkish voices. But in Schwarzman Beijing has a
sympathiser intimate witli the president. Frump appointed him to head
a White House business advisory panel, the sixteen-member President’s
Strategic and Policy Forum, which included the top executives from
J.P. Morgan Chase, BlackRock, Boeing, Intel, Ernst & Young, and
IBM. At its first meeting they told Frump that he had China wrong and
should be more conciliatory.®®

When the Blackstone group was publicly listed in 2007, a Chinese
government entity, China Investment Corporation, bought 9.9 per
cent of its shares, just below the threshold that would trigger a national
security review. CIC is a sovereign wealth fund that manages part of
China’s foreign exchange reserves.®^ In June 2017 Blackstone pocketed
$13.8 billion when it sold Logicor, owner of the largest portfolio of
logistics and distribution properties in Europe, to CIC. In 2016
Blackstone sold a portfolio of luxury US hotels to the Chinese insurance
and banking firm Anbang Group for $5.5 billion, then tried to buy
them back three years later when the firm was crippled by a corruption
scandal. Schwarzman had become ‘the go-to man for Chinese buyers.

CANADA'S BEIJING ELITE

Sduvamnaii lias remarked that he is considered both the ‘unofficial
LIS ambassador to Cliina* and the ‘unofficial Chinese ambassador to the
US Although he was joking, his comment rings uncomfortably true.
He’s well known to top leaders in Beijing. At the 2017 World Economic
horum in Davos, President Xi pulled Schwarzman aside for a chat,
confirming the billionaires good standing at the highest levels of the
CCP. Before Trump met Xi Jinping at Mar-a-Lago in 2018, Schwarzman
told him, ‘President Xi is a great guy.’^^ Schwarzman has endowed a
new college at Tsinghua University in Beijing, the university regarded by
many as the best in China; it s the alma mater of many top Party leaders,
including Xi Jinping.^^ Schwarzman College teaches a masters program
in global affairs for ‘promising young leaders’. Nearly half of its students
are drawn from the United States and it’s all free of charge.

In February 2017 Schwarzman staged an opulent Silk Road-themed
seventieth birthday party for himself. Guests included fellow friends of
China and incoming Trump cabinet members Steve Mnuchin, Wilbur
Ross and Elaine Chao, along with Jared Kushner and Ivanka Trump.^'^

Blackstone owns the major share of the big financial news and
data analysis service Refinitiv (in partnership with Reuters). In June
2019 Refinitiv censored news stories on the thirtieth anniversary of
the Tiananmen Square massacre, after demands from the Cyberspace
Administration of China.Three months later Schwarzman was play¬
ing the peacekeeper in the trade dispute, praising China’s ‘astonishing
miracle’ but urging it to change its trade and business practices to
accommodate Western concerns. He characterised Beijing’s massive
program of tech theft as ‘other approaches to intellectual property’.

Canada’s Beijing eiite

For many years journalists have been fascinated by the extraordinary
political influence of Power Corporation, the Canadian conglomerate
owned by the Desmarais family. Much less well known is the way in
which China, through Power Corp, has become closely integrated into
a deep network of Canada’s political-business elite, an elite that seems
at times to run the country. This insinuation of Beijing’s influence goes
a long way towards explaining why the Trudeau government froze in
reaction to the 2018 crisis over Huawei’s Meng Wanzhou, and remained

45

POLITICAL ELITES AT THE CENTRE: NORTH AMERICA

frozen. The story of how this network developed is told by long-serving
foreign correspondent Jonathan Manthorpe in his important book of
2019, Claws of the PandaP^

One of the early events was the staging of a conference in 1977 that
brought together what Manthorpe calls ‘Canada’s corporate aristocracy.
At a time when Washington had not yet formally recognised China, it
led to Power Corp chief Paul Desmarais and CEO of Petro-Canada
Maurice Strong to call for a permanent trade presence in China.
(Strong, a member of the Liberal Party, later became president of Power
Corp.) In 1978 the pair formed what would become a powerful business
lobby, the Canada-China Business Council. Remarkably, among the
ten officially listed founding companies was the China International
Trust and Investment Corporation. Set up in 1979 on the orders of
Deng Xiaoping, CITIC began operating in Hong Kong in 1987 and
was soon swallowing up several large companies, growing into a huge
conglomerate.^® Its senior executive ranks included members of the red
aristocracy. It had close links with the PLA and was ‘swarming with
secret agents’.^^ The president of CITIC, Wang Jun, whose father had
been vice president of the PRC and a close friend of Deng Xiaoping,
was an intelligence operative; he was later intimately involved in the
Chinagate scandal that engulfed the Clinton presidency, until the
Monica Lewinsky affair took all the oxygen.

It was Paul Desmarais, as the new chair of the Canada-China
Business Council, who drew CITIC into the lobby group, and thus into
the most senior levels of Canada’s business elite. Power Corp channelled
most of its China investments through the military-linked company.
Desmarais then offered CITIC a 50 per cent share in one of Power
Corp’s paper mills, an offer that gave CITIC its first important overseas
investment opportunity and began a process of heavy investment in
Canada by China’s state-owned enterprises. The Desmarais family, with
Paul succeeded by his son Andre, has maintained tight links to Chinas
business and political elites ever since. (Paul Desmarais has named Mao
Zedong as one of the four historical figures he most admires.

Until 2012 the Desmarais family’s closest friend in the CCP
hierarchy was the high-flying Bo Xilai, the rival of Xi Jinping, whose
spectacular fall in a corruption and murder trial did not dent the deep

1 ^!

CANADA’S BEIJING ELITE

connection between Power Corp and the Canada-China Business
Council. Bo Xilai s son, Bo Guagua, a Columbia University law gradu¬
ate, began work at Power Corp in 2018.*°^

The Liberal Party, the dominant party of Canadian government
for many decades, is intimately linked with Power Corp. A revolving
door has cycled dozens of political advisers, ministers and provincial
governors through the corporation, but here we focus only on the top.
Paul Desmarais was an adviser to Pierre Trudeau both before he became
prime minister and during his tenure of office (1980-84). After Trudeau
left parliament, Desmarais paid him to advise Power Corp.'®** The con¬
servative Brian Mulroney, prime minister from 1984 to 1993, had been
a lawyer for Power Corp. ‘I loved him like a brother,’ Mulroney said
on Desmarais’s death.After the arrest of Meng Wanzhou, Mulroney
weighed into the debate over Beijing’s bullying, supporting a plan for
Ottawa to appease Beijing.'^*^’

Liberal Prime Minister jean Chretien (in office 1993—2003) had
served on the board of a Power Corp subsidiary in the late 1980s, and
in 1981 his daughter married Andre Desmarais. Along with being the
future president of Power Corp, Andre also chaired the Canada-China
Business Council and today he maintains strong links with Beijing’s
ruling elite, including a position on the board of CITIC Pacific Ltd,
a Hong Kong affiliate of Cll’lC.'^^ d’wo months after he left office,
Chretien made a secret visit to China, organised by ("ri’lC, to arrange
personal business deals.He was accompanied by his son-in-law
Andre. Chretien’s successor as prime minister, Paul Martin (in office
2003-06), had worked for Power Corp for thirteen years before buying
from Desmarais the Power Corp subsidiary he’d been running.

In 1999, while the Chretien government was in power, the
sensational Sidewinder report was leaked to The Globe and
Oonathan Manthorpe provides the best discussion of this.'^') Secretly
prepared in 1997 by officers of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police
and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the report argued
that a new triumvirate’ had established itself in Canada, an alliance
of China’s intelligence agencies, triad gangs, and Chinese tycoons who
were buying up local companies.”- The three groups were cooperating
in operations to steal Canadian technology, acquire influence over the

1 [

POLITICAL ELITES AT THE CENTRE:

north AMERICA

economic levers of the country, and exercise politica /

building associations with powerful politicians. The report y h a

of growing CCP interference in universities, and of Beij g
tycoons building political influence through real estate investme ts
The report further noted that the acquisition of Cana ian rms
was led by CITIC, and that it had developed close links with Power
Corp. It noted that CITIC had become a substantial donor to the main

political parties.

The Chretien government, more interested in actively pursuing closer
economic links with China, had no interest in looking closely at the
claims in the Sidewinder report. The report was denounced and buried."^

Manthorpe describes Power Corp as ‘the premier gatekeeper’ of
Canadas formal relations with China. CCP bosses had come to believe
they would always get what they wanted in Canada, so much so that
they responded to Meng Wanzhou’s arrest as if betrayed. And they badly
wanted Meng back.

In 2016 it was reported that Justin Trudeau, elected prime minister
in 2015, had been visiting the homes of wealthy Chinese-Canadians
for private fundraising events. Some of the hosts had close connections
with the CCP and had been actively promoting Beijing’s takeover
of islands in the South China Sea.”"^ One donor lobbied the prime
minister to loosen the immigration rules lor wealthy Chinese. Another,
Zhang Bin, who The Globe and Mail described as a ‘Chinese billionaire
and Communist Party official’, with his business partner donated
C$50,000 to Montreal University for a statue of Trudeau’s father, Pierre.
Buying favour does not get much more blatant, but for good measure
they threw in C$200,000 for the Pierre Elliott 'rrudeau Foundation, a
charity honouring Justin’s father."^ The donors knew they had a friend
in Justin; after all, in 2013 he had confided to another fundraiser that he
admired China’s ‘basic dictatorship’ because it could get things doneM
It was the deep misfortune of Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor, the
Canadians seized on fdke charges by Beijing in retaliation for the arrest
of Meng Wanzhou, that their government was led by a man so unwi mg

to confront the CCP. l

This network of elites in Canada and China has also

election of trusted Chinese-Canadians to poliucal office.

48

CANADA’S BEIJING ELITE

number in federal parliament. One of those most often mentioned for
his closeness to Beijing is Michael Chan, a minister in the Liberal Party
government of Ontario from 2007 to 2018. As early as 2010 Canadas
spy chief, Richard Fadden, had warned that government ministers in at
least two provinces were ‘under the influence of a foreign government’,
and were shifting government policy."^ Although he did not name
China, Fadden endured a storm of criticism for implicitly singling out
Chinese-Canadians as disloyal. A parliamentary committee demanded
that the government apologise and put a gag on Fadden.

In 2015 The Globe and Mail reported that Chan was one of those
whom Fadden had had in mind."® Chan denied the claim and sued
the paper.The Ontario premier dismissed concerns about Chan as
baseless. Clearly, no-one in power in Canada was willing to take the
CSIS concerns seriously, either because they were under Beijings sway
or were too scared of accusations of racism and Sinophobia.

In 2016, after China’s foreign minister testily rebuked a Canadian
reporter for asking questions about human rights. Minister Chan
defended China’s human rights record in a Chinese-language pub¬
lication.After leaving parliament, in the midst of the 2019 Hong
Kong riots, Michael Chan spoke at a pro-Beijing rally urging Hong
Kong police to deal severely with protesters. He later echoed Beijings
criticisms, claiming that outsiders were responsible lor stirring up the
trouble, and inflaming feelings of historical humiliation.'’'

During the Huawei crisis, Justin Trudeau, having sacked ambassador
John McCallum for becoming in effect Beijing’s envoy in Ottawa,
replaced him with someone even more deeply entangled with Beijing’s
elites. Dominic Barton was a managing director of McKinsey &: Co
from 2009 to 2018, during which time he spent five years in Shanghai
as the company’s Asia chairman. McKinsey has been described by
The New York Times as having ‘helped raise the stature of authoritarian
and corrupt governments across the globe’.'"’ The company has exten¬
sive involvement with China’s government; for example, it signed up a
client that was helping build artificial islands in the South China Sea.'23

Barton has also served on the advisory board of the state-owned
China Development Bank and is an adjunct professor at Tsinghua
University. He has been said to write glowingly about China’s ‘success

49

POLITICAL ELITES AT THE CENTRE: NORTH AMERICA

Story.When he left McKinscy in 2018 it was to chair the hoard
of Feck Resources, one of Canada’s biggest mining companies. Part-
owned by the CCP-controIled China Investment Corporation, and
with China its biggest market, Teck raised eyebrows in 2016 when it
took an unprecedented step in appointing to its board a Party member,
Chong Quan, a former member of the National People’s Congress.'^^

In a move that will doubtless draw him further still into Beijing’s
net, in early 2019 Barton married Geraldine Buckingham, head of Asia-
Pacific operations for BlackRock, the giant US investment fund that has
been working hard to build its presence in China (see chapter six).

The diplomatic appointment of Dominic Barton reflects a common
political mistake in the West, the belief that it’s always an advantage
for ambassadors to have long experience in China. Governments forget
that, in the process of getting to know China and some of its powerful
players, many succumb to Beijing’s subtle influence techniques, so that
an ambassador may in practice serve as a conduit for Beijing’s messaging
back to the Western capital.

After his re-election in October 2019, Prime Minister Trudeau
appointed a new foreign minister, to whom Barton answers. Fran^ois-
Philippe Champagne appears to be as enamoured with the CCP regime
as Barton and Trudeau, and his mentor Jean Chretien.In an interview
with CGTN in 2017, Champagne was full of praise for Xi Jinping.
China and Canada, he gushed, ‘stand out as [a] beacon of stability,
predictability, a rule-based system, a very inclusive society’.

All this explains the cone of silence that has descended over Canada’s
elites in response to the litany of Beijing’s outrages—in Xinjiang, Hong
Kong and in Canada itself, where there have been kidnappings, cyber
attacks, trade bans, blatant united front activity and frequent diplo¬
matic insults. During his 2019 election campaign, Trudeau cancelled
the traditional foreign policy debate and said nothing about the deepest
diplomatic crisis the nation has faced since the end of the Second
World War.'28

50

4

Political elites at
the centre: Europe

Party-to-party diplomacy

The Chinese Communist Party has a long history of cultivating friendly
relations with political parties abroad, beginning with its membership
of the Soviet Unions Communist International; the latter had helped
found the CCP in 1921. Until the 1980s, fraternal contacts were largely
confined to parties with a communist ideology, but since then, all par¬
ties have become targets for influence. While the United Front Work
Department is responsible for guiding overseas Chinese and suppressing
dissident voices, the task of pursuing party-to-party diplomacy, as well
as links with foreign NGOs and other political groups, lies with the
CCPs International Liaison Department.’ I he department’s deputy
head quoted Xi Jinping: ‘Party-to-party diplomacy is an important
battlefront for our Party, and an important component ol the nation’s
overall diplomacy.’’

The ILD has been growing for a couple of decades and has been
further strengthened in the Xi era. Its broad outreach has allowed it to
build relations with other countries’ governments, opposition parties
and potential future governments.-’ Following the 2016 dispute over
Beijing’s annexation of islands in the South China Sea, the ILD claimed
that China had the support of over 240 parties from 120 countries,
plus that of 280 well-known think tanks and NGOs."^ This particular

51

POLITICAL ELITES AT THE CENTRE! EUROPE

number may be inflated, or the importance of supporters exaggerated,
but by and large party-to-party diplomacy has produced some impres¬
sive results.

In November 2017 the ILD staged a huge conference in Beijing
called ‘CPC [Communist Party of China] in Dialogue with World
Political Parties High-level Meeting’. It drew 600 representatives from
300 political parties from around the world,^ There were delegates
from the UK’s Conservative Party, Canada’s Liberal Party and the US
Republican Party, with the latter represented by Tony Parker, treasurer
of the Republican National Committee.At the conference’s conclu¬
sion delegates put their names to the ‘Beijing Initiative’, declaring
that they commend the immense efforts and important contribution
of the Communist Party of China with General Secretary Xi Jinping
as the core 7 They endorsed Xi’s vision for an alternative to a liberal,
rules-based order, an option that Party messaging calls ‘the building of
a community of a shared future for mankind’. The declaration called
for respect for each country’s own values, CCP code for the rejection of
universal human rights.

As Julia Bowie of the Party Watch Initiative notes, this does not mean
that the US Republican Party or the UK Conservative Party secretly
worship Xi Jinping.® These events are valuable because of the opportu¬
nity they provide for the CCP to befriend individuals, who then return
home to inject Beijings viewpoint into their parries’ deliberations. Such
events also have substantial symbolic value for the CCP, in showing that
the Party and its policies enjoy international support.

Like other official CCP organisations, the International Liaison
Department presents itself using the language of ‘peace’, ‘development’
and progress 7 It regularly publishes reports on its meetings with various
foreign entities.'® In May 2019 the head of the ILL), SongTao, met with
Manfred Grund, a delegate of the Cierman Bundestag and member of
its Committee on Foreign Affairs. According to the IL.l), Cirund offered
assurances that his party, the Christian Democratic Union, ‘actively
supports the Belt and Road Initiative’ and ‘stands ready to strengthen
exchanges and mutual learning with the CPC ." When later asked to
comment, Grund said that he did not recall saying this, but that he did
see common interests for Europe and China in Central Asia.'^

52

PARTY-TO-PARTY DIPLOMACY

Publishing statements by foreign politicians belongs to the ritual of
huwtiiii expressing allegiance’, whereby foreigners, as we saw in chapter
two, are induced to repeat CCP phrases. In another instance of this,
Norway’s foreign minister, Ine Eriksen Soreide, said in December 2018
that the ‘Norwegian Government respects China’s core interests and
major concerns and will take concrete actions to safeguard the political
foundation for bilateral relations.’’^ And the president of the Hungarian
Socialist Party, Toth Bertalan, declared that his party ‘is willing to
learn from the successful experience of the CPC in party building and
state governance’.

Some are content to be cited like this, while others may be unaware
that they have been quoted or paraphrased in ways that support the
CCP and its policies. Either way, since the purpose is to create the
impression of a broad pro-CCP consensus among foreigners, the goal
is achieved, as long as people who feel they have been misquoted don’t
demand to have the record corrected; doing so can cause loss of face on
both sides, with material consequences for the complainant.

The ILD meets with nearly all political parries in Europe, established
and new. Not everyone is willing to give cnrhiisiasric endorsements,
but almost all high-level politicians are happy to meet, usually resulting

in reports in which assurances of support for China are attributed to
them.'^

The ILD has put enormous effort into promoting the Belt and Road
Initiative, with the objective of persuading parties around the world to
endorse it. Nations that have been worked on most intensively include
Japan, Greece and the United Kingdom.'^’ One of the more loyal friends
of the ILD is Peter Mandelson, former senior cabinet member in the
Blair government and honorary president of the (ireat Britain-China
Centre.'^ In May 2019 Mandelson was reported as saying that relations
with China are very important to Britain, which ‘hopes to actively
participate in the building of the Belt and Road Initiative’. In words
that read as if composed by a Parn^ propagandist, he added: ‘The UK is
ready to continue to work with China to well conduct the UK-China
dialogue between political parties, strengthen exchanges between politi¬
cal parties of the nvo countries and promote the building of a “Golden
Era of UK-China relations. '^

53

POimCAl. ELITES AT THE' CENTRE; EUROPE

A luoiuh l.ncr, Mantlclson was writing in the Sunday rimes that
the Unittxl States had launched a trade war against China to quash a
ri\’al, and that Britain should not take sides.Claims about the security
risks ol Huawei were ‘completely overblown’ and aimed at strangling
the cx)mpany, he wrote. Britain, not being in geopolitical competition
with China, should instead be influencing China as a trade partner.
Mandelson is among those who still believe that, with a bit of persua¬
sion, CCP leaders can become good international citizens. The tenor of
his article is that there is no downside to the CCP, and Britain should
welcome China’s rise and engage enthusiastically. Mandelson is a fellow
of the 48 Group Club (see below).

Grooming Europe

The same process of grooming that worked so well with Canada’s John
McCallum may have shaped the thinking of the Swedish ambassador
to China, Anna Lindstedt,^' who in January 2019 was reported to have
aided attempts to silence Angela Gui. Angela’s father, Gui Minhai, a
Swedish citizen, was working as a bookseller in Hong Kong in 2015
when he was kidnapped by Chinese authorities in Thailand and impris¬
oned in China without trial, as part of the crackdown on Hong Kong
booksellers. Like many others, he was paraded on Chinese state televi¬
sion, where he made a forced confession. Angela had been campaigning
vocally for his release.

Ambassador Lindstedt asked Angela Gui to meet with her and
several Chinese businessmen, who claimed to be well connected in
Beijing and promised to help have her father released.At that meeting,
in a Stockholm hotel, the businessmen used flattery, bribes and threats,
all in Lindstedt’s presence, to induce Gui to stop speaking out about her
father’s detention. Angela claims that the ambassador told her that if
she did as she was told and her father was released, then she, Lindstedt,
would ‘go on Swedish television and speak of the bright future of
Sweden-China relations’.

After Gui went public about her experience. Ambassador Lindstedt
was stood down.^"^ The Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs claimed it
was unaware of the meeting. It would have been violating all protocol
if Lindstedt, without informing her employer, had travelled to Sweden

54

GROOMING EUROPE

to engage in negotiations with Beijing’s proxies. Swedish prosecutors
bcg;in a criminal investigation into Lindstedt’s actions and in December
2019 she was charged with the obscure offence of arbitrariness during
negotiations with a foreign power’.When PEN Sweden awarded Gui
Minhai a prize, which was presented by culture minister Amanda Lind,
China’s ambassador in Stockholm, Gui Congyou, said China would
punish Sweden with trade restrictions.

Anna Lindstedt is not the first European diplomat to have come
under scrutiny for being too close to Beijing. In 2013 Mikael Lindstrom
became an adviser to Huawei after leaving his post as Swedish ambas¬
sador to China.^^ Elsewhere, Serge Abou, head of the EU Mission
to China from 2005 to 2011, was hired as a consultant for Huawei
in Brussels. This prompted the European Commission to make the
rare move of imposing a cooling-off period on Abou until the end of
2012 and placing additional restrictions on his activities in Brussels,
including a ban on ‘engaging in any lobbying activity in relation to the
[European] Commission’.In early 2014 Abou withdrew from his role
at Huawei.^®

Other former ambassadors have lent their support to Xi Jinping’s Belt
and Road Initiative. Michael Schaefer, Germany’s ambassador to China
from 2007 to 2013, was praised by Xinhua for being ‘among the first
German politicians to advocate China’s Schaefer has said that

the BRI is ‘an amazing project of the 21sr century’. Well connected to
Germany’s elite circles, Schaefer is on the board of the German-Chinese
Business Association and he chairs the board of the BMW Foundation
Herbert Quandt.He is also on the board of F'urope’s leading China-
focused think tank, the Mercator Institute for China Studies.^' In 2016,
echoing the CCP’s messaging, Schaefer called on the liuropean Union to
embrace Beijing’s ‘new kind of diplomacy based on inclusiveness, equal
opportunity, and the respect for the diversity of cultures and political
systems, terms that the CCP uses to reject universal human rights and
the idea that democratic forms of government are to be preferred over
authoritarian ones. ’’

Schaefer, an honoraty professor at the China University for Political
Science and Law in Beijing, has praised China’s ‘enormous progress’
in social and economic rights, arguing that freedom of expression and

55

POLITICAL ELITES AT THE CENTRE: EUROPE

freedom of the press ‘hardly play a role’ in countries like China.” He
has also expressed his personal admiration for Xi Jinping, calling him
the most impressive Chinese leader he has ever met.” It goes without
saying that his words were highlighted in Chinese media, specifically in
an article reporting the praise of important foreigners for Xi, dubbed by
journalist David Bandurski as China’s new science of sycophantology.”

The EU-China Friendship Group

According to Peter Martin and Alan Crawford, writing for US news
agency Bloomberg News, China’s network of friends throughout the
European Union, including politicians, officials and businesspeople, is
extensive.” Along with the ILD, the influence operation has been spear¬
headed by the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign
Countries, which focuses on building influence networks at local levels.
These Party outfits promote Beijing’s position and try to marginalise its
sceptics. One sympathetic group is Germany’s BGA trade association,
which in 2019 warned that ‘there is no basis for the current China pho¬
bia’Beijing is happy to cross political boundaries, from 2017 making
successful overtures to populists, including the far-right Alternative for
Germany (AfD), and Italy’s ‘anti-establishment’ Five Star Movement.
The deputy chair of the German-Chinese group in the Bundestag is
AfD politician Robby Schlund. After meeting with the vice president of
the CPAFFC he pledged to deepen cooperation and promote sister-city
relationships between the two countries.”

Beijing reportedly took a close interest in the 2019 European
Parliament elections, and how the results might influence Europe’s stance
on China.”The Chinese Mission to the EU is very active and has so far
faced very little backlash. As we will see in chapter eleven, it sponsors
almost all think tanks working on China and Asia in Brtisscls, quite a few
of which are headed by former EU officials. Many of the mission’s activ¬
ities are jointly organised with departments of the pAiropean Union."**^

As well as a range of EU institutions, Brussels hosts NATO’s head¬
quarters. The city is a hub for diplomats, military brass, journalists and
political leaders, and attracts intense interest from Beijing’s influence
and espionage agencies. In fact, Brussels is described by Belgium’s
intelligence agency as a ‘chessboard’ for spies, notably from China

56

THE EU-CHINA FRIENDSHIP GROUP

Dif Welt reported in early 2019 that the European External Action
Service estimates there are around 250 Chinese spies in Brussels, and
urges diplomats and military officers to avoid certain eateries in the
capital.'^ (Chinas EU mission was 'deeply shocked’ at the accusation,
claiming it never interferes in the internal affairs of other countries.'^^)
In January 2020 Germany’s Federal Prosecutor’s Office launched an
investigation into a former EU official and diplomat, Gerhard Sabathil,
suspected of passing information to China.'*'* Belgium is an easy target
for China’s spying and influence because of its fractured political system
and lackadaisical attitude.^’ And the government wants to cultivate
Beijing for greater investment. If Italy is Beijing’s southern entry point
into Europe, Belgium is its northern gateway.

Some of the CCP’s most unapologetic supporters are found in the
EU-China Friendship Group of the European Parliament in Brussels.
In 2019 the group claimed a membership of forty-six MEPs from some
twenty countries, making it the parliament’s largest friendship group.'*'"
(Jichang Lulu, who has published an important study of the group,
suggests that active members are fewer.‘*^) It has been a staunch advo¬
cate of closer relations between Europe and China and has worked to
stop the parliament criticising China’s human rights abuses, including
thwarting a ‘plot’ by MEPs for an EU boycott of the 2008 Beijing
Olympics.'*** Delegations from the group frequently visit China, and
also Tibet, where they are shown the CCP’s efforts to protect Tibetan
culture.'*** After one such visit the Chiyia Daily proclaimed: ‘Friendship
group praises Tibet after 3-day field trip’.^**

Founded in 2006 by Nirj Deva, Conservative member of the
European Parliament for South liast Faigland, the group was also
chaired by him until the 2019 elections. It keeps a low public profile in
Europe, but its existence is evident in Chinese media. 1 he Global limes
describes Deva as a 'famous friend of China’, high praise indeed.^' I he
power behind the throne, as it were, is Gai Lin, secretary-general of the
friendship group and an accredited assistant of Deva’s at the European
Parliament. According to the Czech research collective Sinopsis, Gai
Lin is affiliated with the provincial branch of the CP.AFFC in his home
province of Liaoning.'- Chinese media claim that in 2009 he became
the first and only Chinese national to work as an EU civil serv'ant.^^

57

POLITICAL ELITES AT THE CENTRE: EUROPE

Acctmiing to a report by China Radio International, Gai Lin began
working for OcN^t .iftcr he ran into him in a bar in Brussels in the summer
of 2004, while Gai was studying hotel management. I’he two struck up
a cx>n\ersation and Deva suggested that Gai Lin do an internship at
the Luropean Parliament. In the summer of 2005, Deva wrote to the
president of the European Parliament requesting special permission to
employ Gai Lin. The MEP wanted to employ a Chinese citizen because
he folt that nobody at the European Parliament properly ‘understood’
China. Gai was soon hired as a consultant.^'^

Writing in the Peoples Daily in 2014, Gai Lin claimed it had been his
idea to found the EU-China Friendship Group in 2006.^^ It would, he
said, allow members of the European Parliament to better ‘understand’
China by providing some ‘positive propaganda’, and Nirj Deva had
agreed. Gai boasted of drafting and amending legislation put before the
parliament, trying to stop the parliament welcoming the Dalai Lama,
and convincing delegates that China was still a developing country,
resulting in 128 million euros of development aid.^'^

The EU-China Friendship Group seems to have had quite an
impact in shifting the discourse on China at the European Parliament,
including on human rights. Deva himself frequently echoes Beijing’s

talking points.^^ He has dismissed security concerns about Huawei as
‘nonsense; defended Chinas human rights situation, arguing strongly
(and successfully) against a boycott of the 2008 Beijing Olympics; and
supported Chinas crackdown in Xinjiang in 2009.^*^ When the Uyghur
businesswoman and activist Rebiya Kadeer spoke at the European
Parliament in September 2009, Deva questioned how she could have
become so rich, have eleven children, and speak Uyghur fluently if
China suppressed Uyghurs.^^ In 2018 Xinhua reported on a visit to the
parliament by a Tibetan delegation from the National People’s Congress;
the delegation explained the rapid growth and social cohesion in Tibet
and criticised the Dalai Lama’s ‘splittism’. The report also quoted Deva
as saying that the ‘EU-China Friendship Group will continue to objec¬
tively present China’s efforts in promoting the development of Tibet in
the European Parliament’.

Deva and the members of his group receive better access to to
leaders in China than the EU’s official delegation, despite the fact they

58

THE EU-CHINA FRIENDSHIP GROUP

luwt lu) formal role/’* Deva has repeatedly advocated for China in the
h.uropcan Parliament, lambasting the EU for ‘treating China as a small
child . ^ He has been presented on Chinese state television as a ‘UK
expert. In July 2016 he questioned the legitimacy of The Hague
Iribunals ruling on the South China Sea, reciting Beijing’s position
that the Philippines should have tried to resolve the issue through
bilateral discussions.*^^ Deva stated that in over fifteen years of China¬
watching he could not think of one big mistake the Chinese government
had made.*^"^

Deva and Gai Lin have also launched a range of other initiatives.
On Gai Lin’s suggestion, some members of the friendship group set
up an NGO called the EU-China Friendship Association in order to
reach segments of society beyond the parliament.^^ Among other things,
the association has formed a partnership with the Chinese province of
Liaoning to help its government cooperate with various EU institutions
and companies.*^^

Deva failed in his re-election bid at the 2019 European elections,
as did the friendship group’s vice chair, the British Labour Party MEP
Derek Vaughan.*"^ The group has had no trouble surviving, however, and
according to Chinese reports is now led by Czech MEP Jan Zahradil.^®
Zahradil is a significant player in Europe, having been runner-up for
presidency of the European Parliament in 2019.*"^ As CCP analyst
Jichang Lulu points out, he is a strong supporter of the BRl and he
seems as committed as his predecessor to bringing China into Europe.
Gai Lin continues to be the group’s organiser.^**

In March 2019 the friendship group launched the Policy Co¬
ordination Committee of the Belt and Road Initiative in Europe.^' In
October 2019 several MEPs hosted an event called ‘Sustaining an open
global digital ecosystem with Huawei: a European perspective’. The
event, organised with Huawei, took place just days after the European
Commission had issued a 5G network security risk assessment, which
warned of risks posed by ‘states and state-backed actors’.One of the
event’s hosts was Jan Zahradil, the new head of the EU-China Friendship
Group, but his ties to the group were not disclosed.

The problem is not limited to the EU. Friendship groups have been
formed in a number of Europe’s national parliaments.^'* In France, both

59

POLITICAL ELITES AT THE CENTRE: EUROPE

house.s of parliament have France-China friendship groups, dominated
by Republicans and members of President Macrons party. One of the
more China-friendly groups is the left-wing party La France Insoumise
(France Unbowed), led by Jean-Luc Mdenchon.^^

In Britain, the All-Party Parliamentary China Group was estab¬
lished in 1997. In 2006 it signed an agreement to deepen ties with the
China-UK Friendship Group of the Chinese National People s Congress.
The group does not give uncritical support to everything done by the
CCP, but it works closely with the Great Britain-China Centre and the
China-Britain Business Council, both in Beijing’s orbit.^^

In the next four sections, we examine some of the ways in which the
CCP has insinuated itself into the highest levels of decision-making in
Europe. While it’s not possible to provide a comprehensive review of
these, by focusing on certain influence efforts in Britain, France, Italy
and Germany we will illustrate the significance and modus operandi of
CCP operations.

Britain’s 48 Group Club

In 1954, a group of forty-eight British businessmen travelled to Beijing
to establish trade relations with the PRC. On their return they founded
the 48 Group of British Traders with China, chaired by Jack Perry.
The current list of those in China and Britain who play a role in the
48 Group Club, which grew out of the original 48 Group, is a who’s
who of power elites.^^

The well-known names on the British side include former prime
minister Tony Blair; former deputy prime minister Michael Heseltine;
former deputy prime minister John Prescott; the billionaire Duke of
Westminster; foreign minister in the Blair government Jack Straw;
Alex Salmond, former first minister of Scotland; former Labour Party
powerbroker and European trade commissioner Peter Mandelson; and
Nirj Deva. There are also five former British ambassadors to Beijing,
masters of colleges at Oxford and Cambridge, a retired general, the
chairman and director of the British Museum, the chief executive of the
Royal Opera House, the chair of British Airways, a director of Huawei,
and people closely linked to the Bank of England, Goldman Sachs and
JP Morgan.

60

BRITAIN’S 48 GROUP CLUB

Among the less prominent members who appear elsewhere in this
book are Lady Katy Tse Blair, Tony Blairs well-connected sister-in-law;
Tom Glocer, former CEO of Thomson Reuters; Professor Peter Nolan,
University of Cambridge; and Professor Hugo de Burgh, University
of Westminster.

On the Chinese side are Li Yuanchao, former head of the CCP s
powerful Organisation Department, and vice premier of the PRC;
Madam Fu Ying, vice minister of Foreign Affairs, and former ambas¬
sador to the UK; Ji Chaozhu, former ambassador to the UK (and
formerly Mao Zedongs interpreter);^® Jiang Enzhu, former chairman of
the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Peoples Congress; Liu
Mingkang, chairman of the China Banking Regulatory Commission;
and Zha Peixin, former UK ambassador, and chair of the NPC-European
Parliament Relations Group. Clearly, Beijing rates the 48 Group Club
very highly in its overseas influence effort. Huawei Director Victor
Zhang is also a member.

In 1991 the 48 Group of British Traders with China had merged
with the Sino-British Trade Council to form the China-Britain Trade
Group, which later became the China-Britain Business Council, a
powerful lobby group bringing together some of Britain’s largest com¬
panies.^^ The board of the CBBC is stacked with powerful business
figures, especially from banking and accounting firms. In 2019 one of
its board members, John McLean, said that the council has been at the
heart of UK-China trade relations for over 65 years’.®^ Among many
activities, the council promotes the Belt and Road Initiative and works
closely with the All-Party Parliamentary China Group.®’

Following the merger, the 48 Group Club was launched to broaden
the membership of the original group beyond business elites. Today it is
chaired by Jack Perry’s son, Stephen. As a sign of the 48 Group Club’s
importance to China’s leadership, when Stephen Perry visits China he
is granted unmatched access, from Xi Jinping down.®^ Perry has praised
Xis concept of a community of shared future as a new approach to
a philosophy to underwrite international norms’. He also reproduces
Party propaganda in statements like this one: ‘China does not seek
empire. It seeks a socialist state where the benefits of economic activity
are s ared reasonably, where the people’s lives are cared for, and culture

POLITICAL ELITES AT THE CENTRE: EUROPE

ami vS'ocial development will be vital in developing the moral base of the
nation.’**'

In 2018 Perry was honoured with a most prestigious award, the
China Reform Friendship Medal, conferred on him personally by
President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang.®'* (A fellow medal recipient,
American public intellectual Robert Kuhn, who wrote a hagiography of
Jiang Zemin, was described in a Xinhua magazine as ‘one of the all-time
top-ten influential supporters of China’s ruling party’.

While the 48 Group Club is feted at banquets in Beijing, it keeps
a very low profile in the United Kingdom. With over 500 members,
it serves as a meeting place and networking hub for friends of China,
through which Beijing grooms Britain’s elites. (We will see its members
cropping up elsewhere in this book.) Chairman Stephen Perry’s stream
of commentary on the group’s website is a robotic repetition of CCP
propaganda.®*^ He defends the abolition of limits on the term of China’s
presidency, and sees increased Party control as necessary to give the
government the power it needs to bring change. He says Xi Jinping
is responsible for freeing our minds. In a Xinhua interview he said
it’s time for the world to fully embrace the BRI, which he claims is
about sharing, which ‘is the essence of Socialism with Chinese char¬
acteristics’.®^ In November 2019 he told New China TV that China’s
system of democratic governance, that of‘hearing the people, listening
to the people and ... serving the people’, will lead the world in the
twenty-first century.®®

No group in Britain enjoys more intimacy and trust with the CCP
leadership than the 48 Group Club. On the face of it, this is puzzling,
but if we look behind the club’s airbrushed origin story, we begin to
understand why the Party’s top leaders place so much confidence in it.®^

In the early 1950s, due to its involvement in the Korean War, China
was the subject of an embargo on strategic goods by the United States
and Britain. The Soviet bloc was also subject to a trade embargo and,
to get around it, in 1952 Moscow created a front group called the
International Committee for the Promotion of Trade. It held an inter¬
national economic conference in Moscow that same year and Jack Perry
was a delegate. He returned to Britain to found, with others, the British
Council for the Promotion of International Trade, whose aim was to

62

BRITAIN'S 48 GROUP CLUB

help the USSR and China get around the trade embargo. Also in 1952,
on the instructions of Premier Zhou Enlai, the CCP formed the China
Council for the Promotion of International Trade, which then carried
out external work under the personal care and guidance of Zhou Enlai
Its first task was to persuade foreign businessmen to begin trading with
China and to convince their governments to lift the embargo. (A 1957
CIA dossier, declassified in 1999, noted that the CCPIT was closely
affiliated with Moscow’s ICPT.^‘)

The two most senior office holders in CCPIT also served on the
committee of the Soviet International Committee for the Promotion of
Trade.^^ The chairman of the CCPIT was the governor of Chinas cen¬
tral bank, Nan Hanchen.^^ From the late 1930s Nan had been deputy
director of the United Front Work Department, and he also held various
senior positions in United Front organisations subsequently.CCPIT s
vice chairman and secretary-general was Ji Chaoding, who came to be
regarded as ‘the principal architect ... of close relations between China
and the UK’.^^ With excellent English, perfected in the United States, Ji
was a secret member of the CCP in the 1930s and 1940s. He was also a
brilliant spy and worked directly under Zhou Enlai; according to some
accounts, he played a vital role as a double agent in the destruction of
the Nationalist government, of which he was a senior official.(Zhou
Enlai was revered in the Party for his leadership of CCP intelligence
from its early days.^^)

In 1953 Jack Perry helped organise a major conference in Moscow,
staged by the Soviet International Committee for the Promotion of
Trade. Perry attended the conference as chairman of his new company,
the London Export Corporation; he had been encouraged to give up
his job and establish the corporation by Ji Chaoding, who he had met
in Europe in 1951. The Chinese delegation was led by Nan Hanchen
and Ji Chaoding.^® At the conference, Nan Hanchen invited Perry to
bring a delegation of sixteen British businessmen to China to open
up trade, which Perry did a month or so later. Although barely men¬
tioned by the 48 Group Club today, there were two others involved
in the London Export Corporation, Roland Berger and Bernard
Buckman; these two led the visit to China, hosted by the CCPIT and
its secretary-general Ji.^^

63

POLITICAL ELITES AT THE CENTRE; EUROPE

Roland Berger had been a civil liberties activist and in 1953 was the
secretary oFthe Britisli Council for the Promotion of International Trade.
He was also a secret member of the Communist I arty of Great Britain,
Bernard Buckman, a textile merchant, was another secret member of
the CPGB, and a Labour Party entrist.'”" Buckman became a frequent
visitor to China, and when he died in 2016 the C/^/»a Daily reported
that no other Westerner had enjoyed his level of access to top leaders.'"'

At Ji Chaodings invitation. Jack Perry returned to China in 1954
with a larger delegation, this time forty-eight British businessmen.
According to the 48 Group Clubs own account. Perry was prompted
to set up the 48 Group, which was also known as The Icebreakers, by a
discussion with Premier Zhou Enlai. Back in London the businessmen,
led by Perry, went about building trade between the two nations.

From the earliest days of the British Council for the Promotion of
International Trade, the British government suspected it was a Soviet
front closely linked to the Communist Party of Great Britain.'"^ Soviet
front groups had proliferated in the West since the 1920s, and especially
after the Second World War. When some of the forty-eight businessmen
who visited China in 1954 were questioned by trade officials on their
return, one said of Perry, Berger and Buckman, ‘If they are Communists
they manage to disguise the fact successfully. It seems fitting to dis¬
cover now that Jack Perry, along with Berger and Buckman, was also
a member of the Communist Party of Great Britain.'""' In 1963 and
subsequendy he was active in the split of Maoists from the CPGB, in
reaction to the latter’s ‘revisionism’. Perry was reported, along with the
48 Group itself, to be funding the new Maoist newspaper The Marxist,
first published in 1966.'"^

In short, at the instigation of a member of the Standing Committee
of the Politburo, Zhou Enlai, the 48 Group was the work of three secret
members of the Communist Party of Great Britain. From this founda¬
tion the club quickly developed an unrivalled level of trust and intimacy
with the top leadership of the CCP, and has built itself into the most
powerful instrument of Beijing’s influence and intelligence gathering
in the United Kingdom. Reaching into the highest ranks of Britain’s
political, business, media and university elites, the club plays a decisive
role in shaping British attitudes to China.

64

BRITAIN’S 48 GROUP CLUB

Four years after its inaugural trip to China in 1954, 48 Group mem¬
bers were returning from Beijing to report on the ‘extraordinary prestige
of the group in China. Puzzled but pleased at the solicitous treatment
they’d received, they began to speak of the group’s ‘mystique’.'®^ Today the
48 Group Club is playing an even greater role, enthusiastically fostering
the interests of the CCP in the United Kingdom or, as Xinhua prefers to
put it, ‘promot[ing] positive UK-China relations’.'®^ In October 2018
the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade hosted a
grand banquet in Beijing to celebrate the sixty-fifth anniversary of the
original group’s visit.'®® Stephen Perry had an audience with Xi Jinping,
something Britain’s diplomats cannot achieve, signalling that the CCP
leadership sees the 48 Group Club as central to its influence efforts in
Britain. Xi applauded the work of the 48 Group Club, and Perry lauded
China’s ‘tremendous achievement’ and praised Xi’s idea of a ‘community
with a shared future for humanity’.'®®

Stephen Perry’s son, another Jack, leads the Young Icebreakers, set up
by the 48 Group Club for promising young British businesspeople with
an interest in China. The formation of the Young Icebreakers seems to
have been the suggestion of Premier Wen Jiabao on a visit to Britain
in 2006."® Jack the younger, who studied law at University College
London, told the Chma Daily, ‘I read about Marxism, Leninism and
Mao Zedong thoughts more than law books.’"'

One event is especially revealing about the role of the 48 Group
Club. After the 19th Party Congress in 2017 voted unanimously to
incorporate ‘Xi Jinping Thought’ into its constitution—with Chinas
parliament inserting it into the nation’s constitution a few months
later—Party members across China joined study sessions to absorb
the paramount leader’s ideas. In April 2019 the Chinese embassy in
London held a study session, Xi Jinping d'hought on Diplomacy."^
Over seventy people were present, including many from the 48 Group
Club and its sister organisation the China-Britain Business Council.
Ambassador Liu Xiaoming gave the opening speech. After acknowl-
edging ‘Chairman Stephen Perr}^’, he urged participants to engage in
earnest study and accurate interpretation’ of Xi Jinping Thought in
order to strengthen the bond bersveen the people of the two coun¬
tries . ^ He finished by echoing Xi-isms central concept: I count on

65

POLITICAL ELITES AT THE CENTRE: EUROPE

)^ur contribution to the building of a community with a shared future
for mankind!’

The speeches by other eminent persons at the study session are not
recorded, but the embassy reported that Stephen Perry was followed
by Professor Martin Albrow, honorary vice president of the British
Sociological Association and the author of Chinas Role in a Shared
Human Future, which argues that Xi Jinping Thought can heal the
divisions in the world and promote global peace. Published in 2018 by
a CCP-linked company, the book was greeted enthusiastically by Party
media in China. Anthony Giddens, a prominent sociologist and
theorist for the Blair government, lauded Albrows ‘remarkable’ book
for explaining how China ‘not only can, but must, assume a pivotal
position in shaping world society for the better’.”^ (In 2019 Albrow
and Giddens were full of praise for the launch of the international
edition of China Daily, the CCP’s primary English-language news¬
paper, whose journalism is ‘infused with the spirit of the party Peter
Frankopan, professor of global history at Oxford University, joined in
the celebration.)

Another who was invited to speak at the embassy study session was
Martin Jacques, author of the bestselling 2009 book When China Rules
the World: The end of the western world and the birth of a new global order.
While at the G20 summit in Osaka in June 2019, he gave an interview at
a forum organised by the China Daily in which he laid all the blame for
the breakdown of Sino-US relations at the feet of Washington. Jacques
identified the rise of American nationalism as the problem. China, he
wrote, will be unique in history as a great power that only wants peace. ’
The following month, in an interview with state broadcaster CGTN,
he attacked the protesters in Hong Kong as militants whose actions
should not be tolerated by the authorities."® Beijing is not trying to
exert control over Hong Kong, he said, and those who fear otherwise
show a ‘lack of trust’; the people of Hong Kong are too Western in their
thinking and are ‘extraordinarily ignorant’ about China.

Among the other participants at the embassy study session were
the chair of the House of Lords international relations committee.
Lord Howell; the chairman of the CBBC, Lord Sassoon; the director
of the Confucius Institute at the School of African and Asian Studies,

66

the ITALIAN CONVERSION

Dr Nathan Hill; the chairman of Asia House, Lord Green; and Ian
MacGregor, former editor of The Telegraph and The Sunday Telegraph
In our judgement, so entrenched are the CCP s influence networks
among British elites that Britain has passed the point of no return, and
any attempt to extricate itself from Beijing’s orbit would probably fail.

The Italian conversions^®

In March 2018 Italy joined with Germany and France to call for an
EU investment-screening mechanism to keep Chinese companies out
of strategic sectors, and so moderate Beijing’s geopolitical push into
Europe.'^’ Thirteen months later Prime Minister Guiseppe Conte
joined with President Xi to witness the signing of Italy onto the Belt
and Road Initiative. Europe’s third-biggest economy had decided to
ignore security issues and look east. What happened?

The volte-face was due to the formation in June 2018 of a new
coalition government dominated by Eurosceptics and right-wing popu¬
lists, and also to the outsized influence of a previously obscure finance
professor, Michele Geraci, who had recently returned from a decade
in China. Over a dinner in 2017, Geraci’s views on China impressed
the leader of the League party, Matteo Salvini.'-’ When Salvini became
deputy prime minister, he appointed Geraci undersecretary of state for
economic development. Geraci soon set up Tiskforce China, overseen
jointly with economic development minister Luigi Hi Maio, to facili¬
tate Chinese investment in Italy. Geraci wanted Italy to be the leading
European partner in the Belt and Road Initiative, and was given pri¬
mary responsibility for negotiating the memorandum ol understanding
with Beijing.

Italy, in a coup lor Beijing, was the first major industrial power
to join the BRl. According to Ding Chun, director ol the Centre lor
European Studies at Shanghai’s Fiidan University, Beijing saw Italy’s
debt crisis as an opportunity to expand the BRl into ‘the heart’ of
Western powers, and the outcome was of‘huge significance’ to China
as it met stronger headwinds with the United States.'"’ Strategists in
China had been taking close note of the fractures in the EU over the
debt crisis, the austerity imposed by Germany, conflicts about migra-
on, and Britains decision to leave. A divided Europe was much easier

67

POLITICAL ELITES AT THE CENTRE; EUROPE

CO tempt and subvert. A senior Chinese academic and former diplomat,
Wang Yiwei of Renmin University, said that the Euroscepticism of the
new Italian government made it willing to defy Washington and move
closer to China.

China scholar Lucrezia Poggetti has noted Beijing’s pattern of pre¬
senting itself as an alternative economic partner to European countries
with economic vulnerabilities and rising Euroscepticism.Before Italy,
Beijing had succeeded in persuading several Central and Eastern European
nations to join the BRI—Poland, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria and
Hungary—as well as Portugal, Greece and Malta in Southern Europe.
Italy’s joining reinforces the impression that Beijing is pursuing a strategy
in Europe of‘use the countryside to surround the city’.'^®

China was already a substantial investor in Italy, with a Chinese
chemical company buying Pirelli, and Huawei buying mobile phone
operator Wind.’As China specialist Francois Godement points out,
previous Italian governments were happy to sign a series of science and
technology cooperation agreements that were ‘essentially a carbon copy’
of the priorities laid out in Made in China 2025, Beijing’s blueprint
for becoming the world’s dominant technological power.This was
no accident; the government had said it wanted to make Italy Europe’s
leading partner in Made in China 2025, despite fears that the program
was one of continued industrial theft.In March 2019 Italy and Britain
were the only two EU states to abstain from a second vote to introduce
an investment-screening mechanism, the same proposal that Italy had
put with France and Germany in 2017.'^^

Before taking power in Italy in 2018 , the League and Five Star par¬
ties opposed Chinas expansion in Europe, but once in government the
new prime minister and his senior ministers began trekking to Beijing
for talks.’” Michele Geraci’s links and views have been influential, per¬
haps decisive. In Italy, some see China as an ‘obsession’ for him.’^'^ Flis
public utterances indicate that he sees no political risks from BRI ^35
For him, Sino-European economic integration is natural and desirable
Huawei is just another equipment provider. Asked about the company’s
potential for cooperating with Chinese intelligence, he said that China
IS misunderstood, that it is a Very peaceful nation’ and just wants to
feed Its peopleHe encourages his staff to communicate using the

68

THE ITALIAN CONVERSION

Chinese social media app WeChat, which is monitored in Beijing.
He brushes oft criticism from Italian politicians and journalists that he
is kowtowing to Beijing.

In June 2018 Geraci wrote an opinion piece that is a paean to the
wonders of modern China. He claimed that China is the answer to all
of Italy s major problems—national debt, migration, population ageing
and even, because Chinas justice system is better than Italy’s, public
security—and will also provide the funding for a flat tax, the recovery
of manufacturing, and the greening of the economy.'^® The article
attracted a scathing open letter from a group of Italian China scholars,
who derided Geraci’s views as naive and unethical for endorsing the
Chinese government.

Geraci was an investment banker before moving to China. He spent
ten years as a part-time professor at universities in Zhejiang, includ¬
ing Nottingham University’s Ningbo campus, source of a number of
pro-CCP Western academics with a global influence.When in 2016
the Ningbo campus co-hosted a forum with the Center for China and
Globalization, a think tank whose president is a top United Front
official, Michele Geraci was invited to speak.Geraci had been writ¬
ing ‘reverential’ opinion columns for the Beijing business news outlet
Caixin, praising President Xi and the ‘win-win’ for countries joining the
BRI.*'*^ He was also a regular commenrator in the Party outlets CCTV
and China Daily.

When Geraci returned to Italy in 2017, his pro-Beijing views found
an environment that had been well prepared. Among other activities,
an Italy China Cooperation Week had been staged in Rome in 2017
to promote the BRI. It was organised by the CCP’s Chinese People’s
Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries; the Italy China
Friendship Association, formed in 2013 under the CPAFFC’s auspices;
and pro-Beijing groups such as the Italy China Link Association.
Carlo Capria, a top civil servant, former undersecretary for economic
development, and strong supporter of the BRI, was present. In 2019
Capria referred to the BRI in the China Daily as ‘a last call for Italy’.

Local united front groups had been actively promoting the BRI
among the Chinese diaspora, and making links with senior business
an political figures. In December 2017 Zhao Hong>-ing, deputy

69

POLITICAL ELITES AT THE CENTRE! EUROPE

.v<XTetary-general oF the All-China Federation of Returned Overseas
Chinese, a United Front agency, led a delegation to Rome vv^here he
held a loruin titled ‘Take advantage of the role of overseas Chinese,
pitnnote OBOR’. (One Belt, One Road, or OBOR, is another name
hTf tlie BRI.) Key members of the China Italy Chamber of Commerce,
most of whom had United Front links, vowed to contribute to the great
aiuse.'"*^ And, underlining Beijing’s determination, in August 2017 the
head of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, Qiu Yuanping, arrived in
Italy to organise Chinese-Italians to back the BRI more actively.

CPAFFC, AFROC, OCAO: a trifecta of the top United Front bodies
(see the organisation chart on pages 124—5) was actively preparing the
ground in Italy for the sign-up to the BRl.''*^

The year 2017 also saw the formation of the Italian OBOR Institute,
with enough funding to employ thirty staff in offices in Beijing and
Rome.'"^* The head of the institute, Michele de Gasperis, has said
that the BRI is all about cooperation, not political interference, and
represents a new ‘politically stabilizing’ paradigm in international rela-
tions.''*^ By joining the BRI, the institute’s website claims, Italy will be
‘renewing the relations between China and Europe’.'^®

In April 2019, a month before President Xi and Prime Minister
Conte oversaw the signing of the BRI memorandum, the EU issued
a report labelling China (among others) a ‘systemic rival’.'5‘ At the
signing ceremony, Xi thanked Italy for its ‘deep friendship’. Conte said
he looked forward to greater ‘connectivity’ and reviving ‘the ancient
Silk Road’. Twenty-nine separate agreements were signed by Italian
ministers and business leaders.Among them was an agreement
between Italian state bank Cassa Deposit! e Prestiti and the Bank of
China for the Italian bank to sell ‘Panda’ bonds—loans to Chinese
investors denominated in renminbi—one more step towards Beijing’s
aspiration of internationalising Chinas currency.

The Conte government has allowed a Chinese firm to buy into the
nations electricity network, and Italy’s ports are also expected to feature
strongly in the flow of BRI investment, especially in Trieste, which
Geraci has said ‘must be open to Chinese investments’.'” Trieste’s port
enhances Italy’s role as China’s gateway to Europe. (The city also boasts
many of the nation’s top scientific research institutions.)

70

elite entanglement in FRANCE

If. as some believe, the BRI is a Trojan horse smuggling CCP
influence into a country’s political system, some seemingly innocuous
provisions in the Italian memorandum of understanding hint at what
is hidden in its belly. Along with promoting sister-city networks—and
specifically the twinning of Verona and Hangzhou—the memorandum
agreed that Parties will promote exchanges and cooperation between
their local authorities, media, think tanks, universities and the youth,
including cooperation between Italy’s national public broadcaster,
RAI, and the China Media Group (overseen by the CCP’s Central
Propaganda Department).'^'* These provisions open the door for greater
CCP influence activity.

Matteo Salvini, the leader of the League party and Michele Geraci’s
political patron, was absent from the BRI signing ceremony. Perhaps
influenced by Steve Bannon, former White House chief strategist,
hed had a late change of heart and had begun to warn about Italy’s
‘colonialisation’ by China.

In July 2019, in a move that gave the appearance of blackmail,
Huawei offered to invest $3.1 billion in Italy while simultaneously
leaning on the government to ensure Huawei’s participation in the
countrys 5G network.'^*’ The head of Huawei’s local subsidiary said
that it planned to cut 1000 jobs in the United States and create the same
number in Italy. The offer came a week after the Italian government had
adopted a decree giving it more power to protect the security of the 5G
network. The decree needed to be ratified by parliament within sixty
days, but it took only a week for the government to quietly announce
that it would not be pushing through the legislation.'^^

Elite entanglement in France

The intermingling of French and Chinese business and political elites is
well advanced. An investment firm known as Cathay Capital has built a
remarkable web of political contacts in both countries. Careful detective
work published by the Paris-based Intelligence Online has managed to
unravel some of it, and this section draws partly on its report

Cathay Capital was formed in 2006 by Chinese national Cai Mingpo

China Development Bank and the French governments

71

POLITICAL ELITES AT THE CENTRE: EUROPE

investment bank, Bpifrance. The company, a vehicle for French inves¬
tors in China, is especially well networked in the business community
of Lyon, and also has offices in New York, San Francisco and Shanghai,
Cai Mingpo has recruited several former senior civil servants to the
firm. Bruno Bezard, former director general of the French Treasury, is
a managing partner of Cathay Capital.Bezard also spent two years
as minister counsellor in France’s Beijing embassy, and worked closely
with Jean-Pierre Jouyet, now France’s ambassador in London and a
confidant of President Macron.

Cai Mingpo is also close to Lyon businessman Thierry Delaunoy
de La Tour d’Artaise, who sits on the board of a Chinese company
with senior CCP members.Another associate is Frederic Beraha,
who was an executive with the military helicopter maker Eurocopter, a
predecessor of Airbus Helicopters. Cai’s complex network in Lyon and
Paris includes links to President Macron’s office, to his political party,
and to former and current Chinese diplomats. He is also connected
to senior CCP officials in China, including Li Yuanchu of the Hubei
Provincial High Technology Investment Company, who is involved in
organisations accused of economic espionage.

Cai himself is vice president of the Shanghai branch of the Yangtze
River International Chamber of Commerce, a united front organisation
founded in Hubei in 2014, which later expanded into a network of
chambers of the same name across China, North America, Europe
and Australia.He is a graduate of the Shanghai-based China Europe
International Business School, founded in 1994 by the Chinese
government and the European Commission. It is said to be ‘a hatint of
prominent French nationals who have an interest in China’.Cai has
funded a chair in accounting at the school and is a member of its advi¬
sory board. Joining him at meetings of this board are top French CEOs
and the director of a subsidiary of the Aviation Industry Corporation of
China. AVIC is a massive, state-owned enterprise and the main supplier
of military aircraft to the PLA Airforce, including stealth fighters and
attack drones,

When long-time president of the business school Pedro Nueno
retired in 2018 he received a friendship award from the government of
China and was praised by Xi Jinping. (The school has a European and

72

elite entanglement in FRANCE

a Chinese president.'^) Professors at the school have included former
World Trade Organization head Pascal Lamy, and former French prime
ministers Dominique de Villepin and Jean-Pierre Raffarin.'^'^

Raffarin is worth particular attention. His enormous value to the
Party was confirmed on 29 September 2019, ahead of the seventieth
anniversary of the founding of the PRC, when he was named as one
of only six foreigners to receive the ultimate symbol of Party gratitude,
a Friendship Medal, awarded by Xi Jinping himself. (The only other
Westerner was Isabel Crook, a Canadian anthropologist, KGB spy and
long-time friend of China.According to Xinhua, Xi stressed that the
medals were for loyalty to the cause of the Party and the people’.

Raffarin was prime minister from 2002 to 2005. On a state visit to
China in 2005 he endorsed a law authorising China to invade Taiwan.

In 2008 he intervened to smooth the path for the Olympic torch through
Paris. In 2010 a book he authored praising China’s achievements was
published by a CCP publishing house, in Chinese only.'^' A Silk Road
enthusiast, he is a director of a number of Chinese companies and is on
the board of the Boao Forum, the CCP’s version of the World Economic
Forum at Davos.

Raffarins establishment credentials are unmatched. In addition to
serving as prime minister, he was France’s vice president from 2011 to
2014, and chairman of the Defence and Foreign Affairs Committee
from 2014 to 2017. In 2018 he was appointed as the Macron govern¬
ments special representative for China.A Ino pengyou or ‘old friend’
of China, he claims that China merely wants dialogue and coopera¬
tion in the trade war with the United States.Together with former
Chinese diplomat Xu Bo, Raffarin set up the Club Paris-Shanghai and
appointed as its director the former head of Huawei Healthcare, Patrice
Cristofini. In June 2018 the club held a meeting for the ‘European-
Chinese community’ to promote ‘mutual understanding for the benefit
of air. It was held in France’s National Assembly building.

Raffarin is said to have initiated the prestigious France China
Foundation, launched in 2012, the official partner of which is the
Chinese People’s Institute for Foreign Aff'airs, a united front organisation
as for many years regularly invited politicians, policy-makers and
journalists to China and drip-fed them Beijing’s line; some regurgitate

73

POLITICAL ELITES AT THE CENTRE: EUROPE

it when they return homc.'^ (Larry Diamond and Orville Schell write-
CdMhA is a so-called united front organization, similar to those found
in the former Soviet Union and other Leninist states that seek to oppor¬
tunistically build alliances wherever they can.’’^®) Cathay Capital wa.s
until recently listed as a partner of the France China Foundation.The
strategic committee’ of the foundation is a who’s who of the rich and
powerful of the two nations.'®® The French side includes the CEO of
L’Oreal, Jean-Paul Agon; the chairman of insurance giant AXA, Denis
Duverne; author and intellectual Jacques Attali; former prime ministers
Laurent Fabius and Edouard Philippe; the chair of the investment
committee of France’s sovereign wealth fund, Patricia Barbizet; and film
director Jean-Jacques Annaud. In 1997 Annaud earned Beijing’s wrath
for making Seven Years in Tibet, a film about the PLA’s brutal invasion
that treated the Dalai Lama sympathetically. Annaud was banned from
China (as was co-star Brad Pitt), but after he underwent a self-criticism
the ban was lifted, and in 2015 he made a Party-approved film called
Wolf Totem}^^

The Chinese side features a stellar cast of internet billionaires—
Jack Ma of Alibaba, Pony Ma of Tencent, Wang Yan of Sina.com, and
Ya-Qin Zhang of Baidu. All are Party members. They are joined by the
CEO of PLA-linked corporation China Everbright Ltd, Chen Shuang;
the chairman of PLA-linked company CITIC Resources Holdings,
Peter Viem Kwok; and a former foreign minister, Li Zhaoxing.'®^
Clearly, the CCP views the France China Foundation as its foremost
avenue of influence on France’s elites. In this respect, it is similar to
Britain’s 48 Group Club.

The France China Foundation sponsors the Young Leaders Forum, a

dub that each year since 2013 has brought together twenty French and

twenty Chinese ‘high potential’ leaders.Emmanuel Macron has been

a member, as has the president of Radio-France, Sibyle Veil, and Prime
Minister Edouard Philippe.'®'^

Chinte) Foundation (with the same name in

operates under thJ mutual understand and cooperation.'*’ It
CotttactsTpTA f *”*’*"* Association for International
' CAIFC is reported as a

CHINA’S FRIENDS IN GERMANY

‘key member of the foundation, along with the huge conglomerate
HNA Group, which often acts for the Party.’*'^The ‘Honorary President
for China* of the 2014 France China Foundation is Sun Xiaoyu, direc¬
tor of the Development Research Center of the State Council, Chinas
central administrative authority. The foundation’s honorary president
for France is the disgraced former boss of the International Monetary
Fund, Dominique Strauss-Kahn.The website of the foundation is
packed with pro-Xi and BRI propaganda.'®^

China’s friends in Germany

When former German chancellor Helmut Schmidt passed away in
2015, China Central Television let it be known that an ‘old friend
of the Chinese people had died. The first item on the seven-o’clock
evening news reported messages of condolence from both Xi Jinping
and Premier Li Keqiang.'^® In life as in death, Schmidt received the full
treatment as a lao pengyou.

Schmidt had earned his title. He first travelled to China before
Germany took up formal relations with the PRC in 1972. In fact, he
claimed that after this trip he privately advised then chancellor Willy
Brandt that Germany needed to establish diplomatic relations, which,
as Schmidt noted in an interview, ‘he did, seven years ahead of the
Americans.'^' Whether or not Schmidt was actually responsible for
Germany breaking ties with Taiwan and recognising the PRC, Beijing
had many reasons to be grateful.

In 1975, he became the first German chancellor to visit China. He
was also the first German politician to travel to China after relations had
been frozen following 1989’s l iananmen massacre.Indeed, Schmidt
was infamous for justifying the bloody crackdown by saying that the
Chinese military had been provoked, and that Hiiropean standards
should not be used to measure other countries.'''^ When the CCP
needed someone to endorse Xi jinping’s l)ook (lovernance of China,
Schmidt was happy to oblige, describing it as an ‘inspirational piece of
work.'^ He was also the official patron {Schirmherr) of the Hamburg
Summit, a high-level biennial summit on economic relations between
China and Germany, organised since 2004 by the Hamburg Chamber
of Commerce and the China Federation of Industrial Economics.

75

POLITICAL ELITES AT THE CENTRE; EUROPE

W'hilc the CX'P liaises with all ot Ccrinanys major politiail parties
and has won over politicians in each, Schmidts Social Democratic Party
(SI'l>) has pla\ cxl a large role in building and maintaining Sino-Gertnan
ties, from the time the CCP decided to forge closer relations with socialist
parties in luiropc. In 1984, while the Christian Democratic Union wa<
in power, the SPD was one of the first non-communist parties the CCP
began liaising with. The SPD-affiliated Friedrich Ebert Foundation was
the first German political foundation to establish a presence in China.’’^
In a provocative 2013 essay titled ‘The China sympathisers and their
democratic enemies’, journalist Sabine Pamperrien noted that German
support for China tended to emanate from two distinct camps—‘left-
wing politicians and publicists’, often fuelled by anti-Americanism; and
powerful businesspeople who don’t want to see their ‘flourishing trade’
with China impeded by concerns over human rights.These two need
not necessarily contradict each other. For some, sympathy for nominally
left-wing regimes and profit motives go hand in hand.

Few embody this mix better than former chancellor Gerhard
Schroder. Schroder is mainly known in Germany for having sold out
to Russia after leaving office in 2005, and for becoming chairman of
the board of the state-owned oil giant Rosneft in 2017.'^^ But he is also
firmly in Beijing’s orbit, so much so that in 2009 Der Spiegel published
a photo of him literally hugging a panda.Well before his 2007 public

attack on Angela Merkel for meeting the Dalai Lama, he was held in
high regard in Beijing.In 1999 he was the first politician to travel to
China to apologise for the accidental NATO bombing of the Chinese
embassy in Belgrade.^"® In the fall of 2001, before visiting China, he
told German media that he was tired of bringing up lists of political
prisoners with the Chinese side.^o' While in office (1998-2005) he was
a strong proponent of lifting the arms embargo imposed by the EU on
China after the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre.

On leaving office, Schroder was appointed as an adviser to the Chinese
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, albeit in a minor role helping transform an old
Chinese embassy building in Bonn into a centre for traditional Chinese
medicine.203 spends much of his time in China, brokering

contacts between CCP officials and European businesses. For example,
e introduced the Swiss Ringier media group to the Politburo member

76

CHINA’S FRIENDS IN GERMANY

in cluirgc o( lucclia and propaganda work, Li Changchun.^”’* When asked
about Chinas rc-oducation centres in Xinjiang, he feigned ignorance:
I ni not sure; 1 in very careiul because I have no information.’^®^

After Helmut Schmidt died, Schroder became the official patron
of the Hamburg Summit^®® and won the summit’s China-Europe
Friendship Award.^®^ Predictably, Schroder has used the summit to
express his strong support for the BRI.^®®

Rudolf Scharping, former chairman of the SPD (1993-95) and
former German minister of defence (1998-2002), also turned China
into a career after politics. Following a path blazed by other senior
politicians, he established a consultancy to help German companies
gain a foothold in China, and Chinese companies to enter the German
market. His company is also registered in Beijing. According to
German media reports, he spends more than a third of each year in
China and has told German businesses that, as long as they don’t ques¬
tion the rule of the CCP or China’s territorial integrity, ‘there is much
freedom’ that companies can use for themselves.^®® Unsurprisingly, he
is seen as an ‘old friend’ in China rather than a business consultant.^'®
In 2013 ‘old friend’ Scharping was appointed as economic adviser to
the governor of Guangdong, and in 2018 he received the Yellow River
Friendship Award from the provincial government of Henan.

Scharping has been a major asset for the CCP in promoting the BRI
in Germany, and regularly appears alongside Chinese diplomats to give
talks about it.*'* A local SPD branch reported, after hosting him, that
‘his love and enthusiasm for China were visible. He skilfully avoided
a handful of critical questions.’*" More importantly, his company has
teamed up with the China Economic Cooperation Center to organise
an annual Sino-German Belt and Road Conference. Founded in 1993,
the CECC is under the International Liaison Department of the CCP
and can be understood as the economic arm of the vast party-to-party
diplomacy machine (that is, united front work for people not of
Chinese descent).*'® It brings together business leaders from companies
like Siemens, Daimler, Volkswagen and many others. Despite being
organised by a private consultancy, the Sino-German Belt and Road
Conference has attracted high-level participants from German minis¬
tries and the Bundestag.*'^'

77

POLITICAL ELITES AT THE CENTRE! EUROPE

Wlulc the SPn may stand out for its prominent ex-politicians
who have hcconic Cliina enthusiasts, it would be unfair to paint the
party as Chinas only supporters in Germany. The governing Christian
Oomocratic Union, ever mindful of the interests of German industry,
worries about offending China. Chancellor Angela Merkel’s deter¬
mination to ignore security advice, and critics in her own party, to
allow Huawei equipment into Germany’s 5G network is an excellent
example.*’^’ Politicians from other parties have also been cultivated.
After leaving office, former vice chancellor and chairman of the Free
Democratic Party, Philipp Rosier, became the chief executive of the
Hainan Cihang Charity Foundation in New York, which is run by
the huge, mysterious and probably corrupt Chinese conglomerate,
HNA Group.(Rosier moved there from the Beijing-friendly World
Economic Forum. He resigned from the foundation in 2019.)

In the German Left Party (Die Linke), scepticism towards the
United States has led many to instinctively embrace CCP talking
points. On the party’s official website is an article demanding that
Germany protest in the UN Security Council against weapons exports
to Taiwan.^'® Another calls the arrest of Huawei’s Meng Wanzhou a
‘politically motivated kidnapping’.There’s also an interview with the
first of its members to have joined the parry from China. Identified only
as ‘Norbert’, he praises Xi Jinping’s social reforms for having improved
the ‘lives of people in the countryside in West China’.(The website
makes no mention of Xinjiang in west China.) And at a public hearing
on religious minorities in China, held at the German Bundestag, the
expert invited by the Left Party argued that the problem needs to be put
in historical context and external threats felt by China need to be taken
account of

Most significantly, it was reported in January 2020 that a new group
called the China Bridge (China Briicke) had been formed to serve as
a network of German elites to boost ties %vith China. According to
its initiators, it is modelled on the Atlantic Bridge, which promotes
transatlantic ties. It is headed by Hans-Peter Friedrich, a politician in
the conservative Christian Social Union, the Bavarian sister party of
the Christian Democratic Union. Friedrich is also vice president of the
German Bundestag and a former minister of the interior. He claims he

78

CHINA’S FRIENDS IN GERMANY

h;ul the idea during a visit to China. Reuters paraphrased him saying:
an export nation like Germany cannot afford to lack close personal
networks with China.^^^ It remains to be seen whether the network will
rake on the role of mobilising pro-Beijing elites in the way the 48 Group
Club and the France China Foundation do.

While the CCP s policies gain mainstream legitimacy from the back¬
ing they receive from top political figures and parties, fervent support
also emanates from the fringes. The Schiller Institute has been particu¬
larly active in boosting Beijing’s influence in Europe. It was founded in
1984 in Wiesbaden by Helga Zepp-LaRouche, the wife of controversial
American conspiracy theorist Lyndon LaRouche, and is linked to the
right-wing LaRouche Movement.The Chinese media regularly
features Zepp-LaRouche expressing her support for the CCP’s policies
and ideas.The Schiller Institute’s main focus is promoting the BRI.
It strongly advocates the ‘China model’ and Xi’s concepts as alternatives
to the current global order. In election campaigns, Zepp-LaRouche’s
political party, BiiSo (Citizens’ Movement Solidarity), promotes the
BRI as the ‘future of Germany’.^-^

The Schiller Institute also promotes the BRI elsewhere in Europe. The
LaRouche Movement’s main organisation in Italy is Movisol, which has
been very active. Movisol has teamed up with the local government of
the Lombardy Region to organise a BRI conference in Milan. Speakers
included the architect of Italy’s BRI agreement, Michele Geraci, who
highlighted the importance of the agreement to Italv’s future.During
a visit to the Chinese embassv in Stockholm, the head of the Swedish
Schiller Institute told ambassador Gui C^ongyou he would be promoting
BRI cooperation between the rwo countries ‘through seminars, media
campaign, courses targeting Swedish companies, and visits of Swedish
business delegations to China’.In May 2018, jointly with the China-
Sweden Business Council, the institute launched the Belt and Road
Initiative Executive Group in Stockholm.'***

So while the LaRouche Movement is on the fringe in Germany, it
has managed to get much closer to the centre of Italian, and possibly
Swedish, politics.

79

5

Political elites on
the periphery

Subnational work

When it comes to CCP influence activities, a wide knowledge gap
typically separates central government from local and state or provincial
governments. But even central governments can find it difficult to track
a sprawling organisation like the CCP, which works through a confusing
array of Party and front groups whose agendas are hidden, as we saw in
chapter two. Western leaders can believe they are dealing with leaders
of genuine Chinese civic organisations, whereas in fact they are dealing
with Party operatives or people guided by agencies in Beijing.

Local politicians typically know little abour China and have no
responsibility for national security, and because their Chinese inter¬
locutors present themselves as oflering people-to-people exchanges and
‘opportunities for local business’, these politicians have a strong incen¬
tive to remain uninformed. The focus is typically on economic and
cultural ties, and it’s easy to pretend that there is no political element.
As we will see, however, these local ties are in fact highly political, and
where necessaty they can be leveraged to pressure national governments.
This is the tactic of‘use the countryside to surround the city’.

CCP analyst Jichang Lulu has explored the localisation of united
front influence activities in the Nordic countries, where local officials
with considerable decision-making power are targeted for ‘friendly

80

SUBNATIONAL WORK

contact because they are insulated from strategic debates in the capital
cities and do not have the expertise to understand Beijing’s intentions
and tactics. He notes that Beijing has been actively cultivating political
influence in Greenland, which Beijing sees as important for resource
supply and for being an Arctic state. The strategy includes investments,
an attempt to acquire a derelict naval base, and political work on
Greenland s elites, activities that have rung alarm bells in Denmark.
However, due to the small-scale, decentralised nature of much of the
CCP s work at the local level, alarm is the exception rather than the rule.

Wilful ignorance, and the influence of united front agents at top
levels of state government, help explain why the state of Victoria in
Australia signed on to the Belt and Road Initiative, despite the federal
government having expressly declined to do so, and the fact that the
issue had been widely discussed in the media.^ The Victorian pre¬
mier, Daniel Andrews, often photographed with united front figures
in Melbourne, said that he wants the state to be ‘China’s gateway
to Australia’.^

In San Francisco, the board of the Municipal Transport Agency
named a new subway station in Chinatown after a prominent Chinese-
American community leader, Rose Pak, despite the fact that she had
deep, demonstrable links to the CCP going back decades, links that had
been exposed in the media."* After detailing the various ways that Beijing
had showered honours on Pak, the executive director of the Human
Rights Law Foundation, Ferri Marsh, urged the board not ‘to honor
someone who has been closely associated with China’s dictatorship’.^
Although some local Chinese-Americans expressed fierce opposition to
the name choice, Pak’s united front work had given her high status in
the mainstream as a communit)' leader. The board voted four to three
in favour of honouring Pak, with one member saying that ‘as a woman
of color she wanted ‘to elevate a person of color who fought really hard
to make something happen’.The majority chose to ignore Pak’s close
links to Beijing.

In Sweden, a small municipalir\' was more cautious. The town of
Lysekil was approached by a Chinese consortium offering to build a
new port, new infrastructure and a health resort. The chairman of
the consortium had strong links to the United Front and the PLA,

SI

POLITICAL ELITES ON THE PERIPHERY

indicating that the offer was part of Beijings maritime strategy of
acquiring ports around the world. (In Australia a state-linked Chinese
company was allowed to take out a 99-year lease on the strategically
\'iral Port of Darwin.) Although the consortium pressured the Lysekil
municipality for a rapid answer, news of its links to the CCP leaked out
and the proposal died.

Beijing’s logic for subnational influence is straightforward. First,
friendly relations at this level can help smooth the way for investment
in strategic assets—ports, regional airports (including pilot training
schools), satellite dishes (as in New Zealand), developments adjacent to
military bases, certain agricultural developments and the like. Second,
Beijing knows that some subnational leaders will graduate to national
parliaments, where the friendship can pay even higher dividends.
Finally, they understand that local leaders can exert political pressure
on the centre.

A salutary example of the latter occurred in August 2019 in the
middle of the China—US trade war. Xinhua featured a story titled ‘U.S.
state and local officials are seeking to enhance cooperation with China
despite simmering trade tensions between the world’s two largest econo¬
mies .® The story was built around a video clip from a forum held at the
Brookings Institution in the capital on 29 July, where Oregon’s gov¬
ernor, Kate Brown, complained about the 'chilling effect’ of the trade
war on Oregon’s exports to China. She blamed Wiishington, and said,
‘It’s been extremely detrimental particularly in the agricultural sector,
which is a huge driver of the Oregon economy.’'^ I hc deputy mayor of
Los Angeles, Nina Hachigian, reinforced the message by detailing the
impact of the trade war on exports from LA ports. (In August LA mayor
Eric Garcetti told the South Chinu Adorning Post that a continued trade
war would see children starving in his city.‘“)

The most striking comments featured by Xinhua were made by Bob
Holden, former Democratic governor of Missouri (2001-05). He said
that agricultural producers 'are ver\' scared’ that the relationship with
China will break down.'' Holden is a Beijing favourite, and for good
reason. According to the Chirm Daily, on a visit to China in 2004 he
had a revelation: Chinese people and -American people share common
values.'" Appointed a professor at ebster University" after he lost the

82

SUBNATIONAL WORK

governorship, Holden was instrumental in setting up Missouri s first
Confucius Institute in 2005.'^

Bob Holden is also the chairman of the United States Heartland
China Association, formed to build bridges of friendship and coopera¬
tion with China, and which brings together twenty Midwest states. It was
reconstituted in 2018 and ‘welcomed the support’ of the China-United
States Exchange Foundation.’^ As we will see in chapter eleven, CUSEF
is funded and chaired by Tung Chee-hwa, a Hong Kong shipping tycoon
and major CCP player.’^ During the 2019 Hong Kong protests, Tung
accused Washington of ‘orchestrating’ events, defended police accused
of brutality, and said there should be no compromise. In December
2019 Tung Chee-hwa was named by Hong Kong democracy advocates
as one of the territory’s eleven top-tier perpetrators of human rights
and democracy abuse.The advocates identified CUSEF as an attempt
by the Chinese government to interfere with US politics and called
for Tung to be sanctioned. CUSEF is registered as a foreign principal
for China in the United States, where some organisations, such as the
University of Texas at Austin, have rejected its funding offers because of
its CCP links.

None of this seemed to worry Bob Holden when he arrived at the
fifth annual U.S.-China National Governors Collaboration Summit,
held in Kentucky in May 2019 at the height of the trade war. The
event raised concern in Washington because the National Governors
Association had organised the summit jointly with the Chinese People’s
Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, a united front agency
whose top leaders arc often drawn from the red aristocracy.”* Its ‘people’s
diplomacy’ is a covert element of Beijing’s official diplomacy and foreign
influence work.’’ Its president, Li Xiaolin, the daughter of a former
president of China, Li Xiannian, addressed the summit. C^PAFFC
has particular responsibility for cultivating links at subnational levels,
through building sister-city relationships and promoting the BRl.^**

The CPAFFC also has responsibility for strengthening friendship
societies in Western countries, including donating substantial sums to
reinvigorate moribund societies, as occurred in New Zealand.^’ 1 he
U.S.-China Peopl es Friendship Association was founded in 1974 and
has thirt\"-five chapters across the US. It has drawn in many Americans

83

POl inCAL ELITES ON

the periphery

«i.l. the (.«. ,>.o,ivc,«. iM.r h, recent year, it ha. come under more direct
inHnence (K.n. the farty. thronsh tl.e CPAHl-'C.^^ Barbara Harr..„n,
.K'fivc ill the UcSCPh'A >«;iiicc flic 1970s and its president for five years
until 20()S. was in 2004 made a Friendship Ambassador, the CPAFFCs

hi^hest accohulc.*'

While the Kentucky governors’ summit was ostensibly designed to
Facilitate investment deals and drew ‘prestigious investment firms’,^
if was an ideal opportunity for the CCP to bypass Washington and
build personal relations with significant players across the US. China’s
ambassador in Washington, Cui Tiankai, took time off from trying to
manage the trade war to tell the 400 gathered at the summit that he
hoped it would identify win-win opportunities’.^^ He said, ‘I always
find true friendship, not groundless suspicions.’ And a PRC foreign
ministry spokesperson expressed enthusiasm for the summit because it
showed the two countries could benefit by ‘deepening sub-national and
across-the-board exchange and cooperation’.^*’

If, according to a leaked email, the White House was ‘not happy’
about the summit, Kentucky governor Matt Bevin was sure that the
suspicion and misunderstanding driving the trade war would vanish
‘when people talk’.^^ This was precisely Beijing’s desired message and,
as always, such statements of support were amplified in China’s official
media.^® (Matt Bevin was happy two months later when a Chinese
company announced plans to invest $200 million in rural Kentucky
to build a new paper-and-pulp recycling facility, creating 500 jobs.^’)
Commenting on the role of the CPAFFC at the governors’ summit,
John Dotson of Chim Brief observed that the Americans involved
‘might think they’re dealing with a representative of a civic organisation
but theyre not. They re actually dealing with ... functionaries of the
Chinese Communist Party’.-^" These relationships are points of leverage:

Chinese diplomats leant on the governors to lobby Washington to dial
back the trade war.^'

The summit put into practice the strateg)' elaborated in March 2019
by the influential Fudan University scholar Huang Renwei. Drawing on
Mao's essay ‘On protracted war', he argued that to ‘resolutely fight back'

a^inst Washington, China should establish ‘deeper economic and trade
relations with the 50 US states’.'-

84

THE CURIOUS CASE OF MUSCATINE

ri\c CPAM^C was on a roll. In July 2019, two months after the
Kentucky governors’ summit, it was in Houston co-hosting the fourth
U.v''.-China Sister Cities Mayors’ Summit with the US peak body,
Sister Cities International. Ambassador Cui Tiankai sent a message:
'Subnational cooperation and people-to-people exchanges are the
highlights ol the history of China-U.S. interactions and the driving
R')rce for the growth of our relations.’^^ The 277 US-China sister-city
friendships—and the fifty sister-state pairings—had led to win-win
cooperation, he said. As if reading from the Beijing script, the vice chair
of Sister Cities International, Carol Lopez, told the delegates, ‘Our
people are so intertwined. We believe when people connect—people
to people, community to community—we just become stronger
together.’^'* Delegates talked up the Maritime Silk Road (the ‘road’ of
BRI) and smart cities. In China, ‘smart cities’ technology is inseparable
from the CCP’s surveillance state, but the CCP trades on the naivety
of well-meaning people and benefits from the covert support of others.

The curious case of Muscatine

In 2018 the elite Zhejiang Symphony Orchestra made a brief tour of
the United States. It put on only four concerts, in Detroit, Chicago,
San Diego and ... Muscatine. A struggling, soybean-farming town on
the banks of the Mississippi River in Iowa, Muscatine has a population
of 24,000. What was the attraction for the orchestra? The town’s special
relationship with China began in 1985 when an official from Hebei
province led a trade delegation to farms and towns in Iowa, including
Muscatine. The same official returned in 2012, e.xcept this time he was
China’s vice president and soon to be president, Xi jinping. He praised
his ‘old friends’ in Iowa, Hebei’s sister stare, for their ‘agrarian common
sense, family values and hospitality’.^^

Having built on these early links, a network of prominent business¬
men from the state refer to themselves in Beijing as the ‘Iowa mafia’.
They are backing Xi’s Belt and Road Initiative as a way of getting
more Chinese investment in lowa.'^ In 2018 they welcomed a former
governor of the stare. Terry Branstad, as the new US ambassador to
China. Branstad had been governor during both of Xi Jinping’s visits
and counts himself a friend. "

S5

POLITICAL ELITES ON THE PERIPHERY

Another of President Xfs old friends is Sarah Landc, who go,
know him in 1985 and hosted him in her living room In 2012. She fir^
met Xi in her role with the Iowa Sister States organisation. She went on
to Ixvome its executive director. In 2013 another delegation from the
CPAFFC arrived in town.^** Some eighty people, including journalists
Irom official Chinese media, had come to award a gold medal to Sarah
Lande and bestow on her the title of Friendship Ambassador, one of
only eight awarded to Americans.She and her husband Roger, who
sN'as director of the Iowa Department of Natural Resources, were part of
the ‘old friends’ group that travelled to China in late 2012 to meet with
the nation’s new leader.

Xi Jinping’s links to Muscatine are well known in China. Groups of
Chinese school students go to visit the town, and a number of Chinese
businessmen have bought up property there, hoping to cash in on the
association with Xi.'^’ The visit of the symphony orchestra was funded
by businessman Lijun ‘Glad’ Cheng, who has made Muscatine his
second home, buying various properties and refurbishing an old hotel.'^^
When in 2018 Beijing retaliated against Donald Trump’s tariffs, it
was aware that by restricting US soybean imports the impact would be
felt in Iowa. Iowa was among the Midwest farming states that switched
to Trump from the Democrats in the 2016 presidential election, another
reason why, during the early weeks of the trade dispute, Beijing paid the
Des Moines Register to publish an insert from the China Daily. But the
move backfired: rather than persuading lowans to pressure Washington,
it raised ire in Washington, with Trump denouncing the insert as
foreign interference.

Malleable mayors

TheCCP has ‘useful idiots’ (a term, attributed to Lenin, that described
naive foreign enthusiasts for the revolution) in many places, enablin
the mtensifiation of local influence activities as resistance to its prac^
tices tUes in the centre. Anne-Marie Brady has noted that the CPAFFC
has for some years organised an annual China-New Zealand n,
forum where tourism, education and agriculture are d'

At the 2018 forum a ninety-strong deloar on inci

86

MALLEABLE MAYORS

Council spent NZ$100,000 on a banquet. The mayor declared it a
‘resounding success’.

In Canada, the Chinese consulate general in Vancouver, British
Columbia, has for some years been hosting cocktail receptions at the
annual convention of local government leaders, the Union of BC
Municipalities.'^^ No other foreign government appears to have sought
to exert influence over these politicians, so why does Beijing bother?
As one close observer put it, China’s diplomats were ‘sizing up the
chumps’.^^" After a number of such receptions without controversy,
in 2019 several BC mayors, including Vancouver’s, announced they
would boycott the next one. They were responding to media reports
and pressure from a public angered by China’s bullying after the arrest
of Huawei’s Meng Wanzhou. The mayor of Port Coquitlam, Brad West,
denounced China’s involvement in the receptions as unethical and ‘cash
for access’.

As Vancouver’s mayor from 2008 to 2018, Gregor Robertson built
an impressive reputation as a leader committed to sustainable urban
living in a green city. Visiting Shanghai in 2010, a few months after
China had torpedoed global climate negotiations in Copenhagen, he
said that China’s policies were greener than those of Western countries.
But what attracted more attentiori back in Canada was his claim that
these better policies were due to China’s superior form of government.
The Globe and Mail observed that Robertson was echoing those who
once praised Mussolini because he made the trains run on time.'^**

Gregor Robertson is proud to be descended Irom one ol the most
revered ‘old friends’ of China, Norman Bethune.'^*^ In 2018, after agita¬
tion by united front groups, Robertson issued an apology on behalf
of the city for past injustices to people of Chinese heritage.Canada,
like many other Western nations, had a lot to apologise for, but the
apology was also an excellent opportunity for Beijing’s propagandists to
reinforce the sense of grievance among Chinese people, including over¬
seas Chinese. Beijing stokes nationalist resentment for past wrongs, and
presents the Parn’ as the answer to historical humiliation. Robertson’s
words of contrition were aired by Beijing’s official broadcaster, CCTV.

It was an example of how the CCP ccmically exploits legitimate
social-justice discourses in the West. It’s no accident that united front

87

POLITICAL ELITES ON THE PERIPHERY

gtx'ufW' won' rcvspoiusiblc for erecting memorials to the 1937 Nanjing
Massacre.'' 1 ho memorials are less a means of quiet remembrance of
the victims of an atrocity, and more a way to whip up jingoistic resent-
mei\t against fotx'igners. The CCP’s treatment of Chinas minorities,
meanwhile, has much in common with Western nations’ treatment
of Chinese people in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
and we can expect that one day monuments will be erected to their
persecution.

In 2019 Gregor Robertson was appointed a roving ambassador for
the Global Covenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy. Formed in
2015 in reaction to the failure of national governments to grasp the
nettle, the group represents 9200 cities around the world, all pledged
to strong action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.Robertson will
be touring the world, meeting international and local environmental

groups, putting a positive, sincere and friendly spin on the achievements
of the CCP.

No event at the local level is too trivial for the CCP to exert its
power over. In 2018, in the remote Australian town of Rockhampton
(population 80,000), the local council joined with the beef industry to
propose the creation of a large papier-mache bull decorated with fish¬
shaped flags, to be painted by schoolchildren to represent the variety of
nations they hailed from. The bull would thus be a celebration of the
cultural diversity of the town. Two students painted small Taiwanese
flags because that’s where their mother was from. When the bull was
put on display they were dismayed to discover that, alone among the
other childrens flags, theirs had been painted over by council workers.
It transpired that the council had received a complaint from the Chinese
vice consul in the state capital, Brisbane. The students’ mother, Amy

Chen, said her children were Very^ sad and disappointed’ by the decision
to erase their flags.^^

Rockhampeons mayor tried to exetrse her council’s behaviour by
sying the action was in line with Australia’s ‘one China policy’, as
1 that had any bearing on a children’s art project in a remote town.

. . China policy only ‘acknowledges’ that China

irrrVrD^"T “ntrary to the repeated assertions

ot the CCP and its sympathisers.

88

BRI SUPPORT IN GERMANY’S 'COUNTRYSIDE'

BRI support In Germany’s ‘countryside’

In her 2019 exploration of united front organisations in Germany, the
first in that country, journalist and united front expert Didi Kirsten
Tatlow found over 190 Chinese groups *with direct ties to the United
Front bureaucracy’.’'* These included Chinese professional associations,
business organisations, media outlets and Chinese aid centres, among
others (see also chapter seven).”

As is the case elsewhere, German organisations often partner with
Chinese organisations without knowing they are dealing with the
CCP. For instance, the Deutsch-Chinesische Wirtschaftsvereinigung
(German-Chinese Business Association) partners with the Party-
run China Council for the Promotion of International Trade.”
One of the most important umbrella organisations identified by
Tatlow is the Federation of German China Friendship Associations
(Arbeitsgescheimschaft Deutscher China-Gesellschaften). Its ground¬
work was laid in 1993, when a musical centre in Mainz received an
invitation from the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with
Foreign Countries to host a pipa, or Chinese lute, ensemble. Kurt Karst,
the founder of the musical centre, did not know at the time what the
CPAFFC was and he accepted.” Ibday Karst is the chairman of the
German-Chinese Friendship Association of Mainz-Wiesbaden as well as
president of the Federation ol Cierman China Friendship Associations,
which ties together the friendship associations across Germany. Its
launch in 2016 was attended by Chinese diplomats, representatives ftom
the CPAFFC, and German officials.”^ I'wo years later, the lederation
signed a cooperation agreement with the CPAFFC in Beijing.’’* This
is a classic example of a genuine civil society organisation cooperating
with a CCP-led organisation headed hy a cadre ol ministerial or
vice-ministerial rank. 1 he national federation has reprinted verbatim
Chinese propaganda on the BRI, including Xi jinping’s speeches and
his claims that the initiative is ‘marked hy peace and prosperity’.^’**

The vice president ol the Federation ol German China Friendship
Associations is Johannes PHug, a Social Democrat and from 1998 to
2013 a member ol the German Bundestag. He is now on the board
ol the newly founded elite networking club, China Bridge.*** In 2016,
in the presence ol the Chinese consul general, PHug was appointed

39

POLiriCAL ELITES ON THE PERIPHERY

honorary China representative of the city of Duisburg. In the press
release announcing this appointment, Duisburg labelled itself ‘an
integral part' of the Belt and Road Initiative.^^ Pflug has appeared in
promotional videos for the BRI run by local German press, and has
been interviewed in CCP-linked media targeted at Europe, such as
Nouvelles d'Eiirope and the German online version of the official CCP
mouthpiece, the Peoples Daily.^^ Pflug also heads the China Business
Network of Duisburg, which brings together local businesses with
interests in China but also works with the local Confucius Institute.^

Most local German governments have ties to China, but some stand
out for their intensive contact and economic engagement. The state of
North-Rhine-Westphalia has several cities with close ties and that argue
for deeper Sino-German relations. One is the state capital Diisseldorf;
the site of a Chinese consulate, it is referred to by the city’s mayor as
Germanys most important China business location’.Duisburg, also
based in the state, selected Huawei to turn it into a ‘smart city’, includ-
ing the provision of cloud computing solutions and e-government
infrastructure. ^ This decision followed a visit by Duisburg’s mayor,
Soren Link, with a nineteen-strong government delegation, to Huawei s
headquarters in Shenzhen.^^ Duisburg has refused to disclose its memo¬
randum of understanding with Huawei, despite requests, claiming that
Huawei has threatened legal action if the document were to be made
public.^®

Another important hub is Hamburg, a German city-state where
over 550 Chinese companies have set up shop. Hamburg, host
to the Hamburg Summit discussed in chapter four, is sister cities
with Shanghai and has hosted an office of the Chinese Chamber of
Commerce in Germany since 2017.*^^ Hamburg’s parliament holds
regular exchanges with Shanghai’s Standing Committee and the city’s
Peoples Political Consultative Conference. ® The mayor of Hamburg,
Peter Tschentscher, has praised the BRJ, declaring that, as a centre of
international trade, Hamburg is “a natural node and endpoint of the
New Silk Road .'' Adjacent to Hamburg is the state of Lower Saxony, the
home of Volkswagen, which sold over 4 million cars in China in 2018.
At a meeting with the Chinese consul general in Hamburg, the state’s
economics minister, Bernd Althusmann of the Christian Democratic

SISTER CITIES

Union, said that China is not only an important cooperation partner
For Lower Saxony but also ‘a significant force for world peace’

In sum, while the German federal government has been apprehen¬
sive about the Belt and Road Initiative and careful not to endorse it,
the CCP has found more than enough local politicians willing to do so.
They are used to pressure the central government to change its stance.
Its a tactic that has been deployed around the world.

Sister cities

Sister-city and sister-state agreements have been very effective for the
CCP in gaining influence in local communities, and cities across the
world continue to sign new agreements. But here, too, most municipal
governments lack even a rudimentary understanding of the CCP’s
political goals in these arrangements.

While in the West a decision to enter a sister-city partnership is
made by a municipal council or city government, in China the pro¬
cess is coordinated by the CPAFFC, described by Jichang Lulu as ‘the
main “people’s diplomacy” organisation within the CCP foreign-affairs
systemJ^ Behind the sister-city banner, the CPAFFC systematically
advances the Party’s political and strategic goals. Officials build personal
relationships that can then be ‘weapon ised’ when a city plans an activity
the CCP does not like, such as dealings with Taiwan (including cultural
activities) and with the Dalai Lima.^'’

A decade or so ago, after some years in the doldrums, the CPAFFC
was reinvigorated in order, in Brady’s words, ‘to coopt foreigners to sup¬
port and promote China’s foreign policy goals’.In Xi Jinping’s China
there is no ‘people’ in the sense of an independent civil society, so what
is really being built in sister agreements are Party-to-people relation¬
ships. Thousands of well-meaning citizens in Western nations who
have worked hard to foster genuine understanding and harmony with
Chinese people are having their commitment exploited by the C>CP.

Sister-city/state relationships provide another opportunity for
deploying the tactic of ‘use the countryside to surround the city’. Despite
the soothing language of international cooperation and world peace,
for the CCP ‘all exchanges have a political character and hopefully a
political hars est'. '’

POLITICAL ELITES ON THE PERIPHERY

The state of Matyknd is an instructive case study. Adjacent to
Washington D.C., Maryland hosts many federal government research
centres security organisations and intelligence establishments, from
NASA's’Goddard Space Flight Center to the National Security Agency
and the Internal Revenue Service.^' It also hosts fourteen military instal¬
lations, ranging from U.S. Cyber Command at Fort Meade to the Naval
Surface Warfare Center. Tens of thousands of personnel employed at
these centres, some with high-level security clearances, live and work
in Maryland.

Maryland has longstanding ties with China, including immigration,
stretching back to an era when relationships were more innocuous. It
signed a sister-state agreement with the Chinese province of Anhui in
1980, the first of its kind in the United States, and is the base for the
USA-China Sister Schools Association, which organises educational
and cultural exchange programs in secondary schools in the D.C
area.^® Rockville, in the county of Montgomery, Maryland’s largest
is home to some 50,000 Chinese-Americans and has been described
as the region’s new Chinatown’.(The county government even once
considered declaring Chinese New Year a holiday for public schools
The University of Maryland was one of the earliest to build ties
with China, and in 2004 became the first university in the US to host a
Confucius Institute (and only the second in the world).**' It now hosts
a large number of students from China, teaches several courses aimed
at Chinese officials, and has many research collaborations. When in
2017 a Chinese student, Yang Shuping, used her commencement
address to praise the ‘fresh air of free speech’ in the United States
the Chinese Students and Scholars Association launched a campaign
to denounce her harshly for betraying the motherland.**^ The Peoples
Daily accused her of ‘bolstering negative Chinese stereotypes’.®^
Chinese embassy officials praised the CSSA and encouraged others
to engage in similar activity. Yang’s family in China was harassed and
she was bombarded with threats. She was forced to issue a grovelling
apology. To its credit, the university spoke in defence of the right of
students to speak (although it could hardly do otherwise).Perhaps in
retaliation, the uni\ersit\ s lucrati\'e programs to train Chinese officials

SISTER CITIES

appear to have experienced a sharp decline in enrolments, and student
numbers also appear to have fallen off.**’

Howard County, also in Maryland, is home to Columbia, a city of
100,000 people. A high proportion of its residents work in sensitive
federal government agencies. When Columbia decided to partner with
a city in China, it set up a committee to find a suitable candidate.®*^
Liyang was seemingly selected from eight Chinese cities, although
delegations from Liyang had been lobbying for it over some years.®^ The
initiator of the Columbia-Liyang sister city partnership was Clarksville
resident Wu Chau. He served as vice chair of Columbia’s China Sister
City Planning Committee.®® While a doctoral student at the University
of Maryland in the 2000s, Wu served as the president of the Chinese
Students and Scholars Association. In 2008 he and his comrades
organised students to make complaints about the pro-Tibet movement,
and campaigned against those making negative remarks about Beijing’s
hosting of the Olympic Games.®^

The agreement was brokered by a woman named Han Jun, who runs
an organisation called Success International Mutual Liaison Services in
Rockville.^® She was reportedly ‘hired by China to find a sister city on
the East Coast’, indicating she may have links with the CPAFFC.^' She
also has close connections with senior government officials in Liyang,
including the mayor and the provincial office of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, which manages the CPAFTC.*'’

In 2016 Wu Chao and Han jun were nominated as Outstanding
Chinese in the Greater 1).C. Area at an event hosted by Alliance
Cultural Media Inc., a pro-Beijing media outlet with links to CCP
media.Wu Chao was also presented by the CX^P’s Overseas Chinese
Affairs Office as a role model for huaren canzhen^, the Party’s program of
encouraging trusted Chinese-Ainericans to become active in politics.

In 2018 he was elected to the Howard County Board of ICiucation.*^^

MaiA’land has been fertile ground for united front activity. A number
of prominent citizens—including the director of a medical centre, an
engineer at Georgetown University, and a scientist at the National
Institutes of Health—have links to the CCP or CCP-run organisations.'^^'
Maiv'land political activist He (Helen) Xiaohui was in 2018 appointed
president of the National .Association for China’s Peaceful Unification

93

POLITICAL ELITES ON THE PERIPHERY

in W^jshington D.C., the Washington chapter of the China Council
for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification, an agency of
rhe CCP (see the organisation chart on pages 124-5).'^^ Accepting the
position, she promised to ‘work tirelessly for the great rejuvenation of
rhe Chinese nation’.'^® Helen He has been heavily involved in promot¬
ing Chinas influence activities in Maryland and is often presented as a
spokesperson for the local community when criticising the ‘anti-China’
moves of the US government.

Noting that her appointment ceremony was presided over by a
senior official from the Chinese embassy, Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian
wrote that Helen He now ‘serves as a top point of contact between the
Chinese Communist Party in Beijing and the Chinese-American com¬
munity in greater Washington, D.C.’. As a sign of her importance, in
2009 she served as an overseas delegate to the Chinese People’s Political
Consultative Conference, an honour reserved for those of proven value
to the Party.

The case of Prague also shows that the CCP views sister-city agree¬
ments as an instrument of political influence. In 2019 Prague City Hall
voted to terminate its partnership with Beijing, after Beijing refused
to remove a one China’ policy clause from the agreement.Prague’s
recently elected mayor, Zdenek Hrib of the progressive Pirate Party,
argued that the partnership was supposed to be a cultural one, and that
the one China’ clause was a matter of international politics. Beijing,
accustomed to getting its way in the Czech Republic under the slavishly
pro-Beijing presidency of Milos Zeman, was enraged. The embassy
demanded that Prague reverse its decision or ‘it will be their own inter¬
ests that will be hurt’. In China, concerts by orchestras that had ‘Prague’
in their names were cancelled. Two months after ending its sister-city

relationship with Beijing, Prague announced that it would partner with
Taipei instead.

In its reaction to Pragues decision, Beijing gave the game away.

94

6

The Party-corporate
conglomerate

The Party and business

When President Trump began a trade war with China in 2018 he
cited a long list of Beijing’s infractions of the standards of free-market
behaviour, including manipulating the currency, dumping subsidised
goods in American markets, and forcing US companies to engage in
joint ventures that resulted in their technology being stolen. In 2016 the
same practices had led industrialised nations to refuse to grant China
the status of market economy under WIO rules, something Beijing
badly wanted.

In any Chinese embassys mapping of a nation’s centres of power,
business elites feature prominently. Both Cdiinesc companies operating
abroad and Western companies with economic interests in Cdiina are
important vectors of CX.P influence. While most Chinese businesses
operating abroad have commercial reasons for doing so, at the same
time they are required to serve the interests of the Party-state. I he-se
businesses benefit materially from cultivating good relations with senior
CCP cadres, and are punished if they do not obev the Parts'. In 2017 the
requirement for such businesses ro assist China’s intelligence agencies
abroad was formalised in Chinese law.*

^ hen the CCP opened up the Chinese economv to market forces
it did not mean that government withdrew. It would be more accurate

TKE PART Y-COr^POrMTE CONGLOMERATE

see the prxTcess us one in wiiich uspccts of modern cupitulism were
gratTcxl onw a Leninist state apparatus, creating a new model of Leninist
capiwlism. The spread of market forces did not weaken the power of
the Rirt}’-srare; in fact, today it is more powerful than ever because of
market forces.

Historically in the West, the spread of private property and markets
saw the development of an independent legal system that could adju¬
dicate disputes according to legislated principles. Along with criminal
law, this gave rise to the notion of the rule of law. It cannot be stressed
enough that there is no rule of law in China. What the country has
is rule by law; that is, the use of law as an instrument to govern.^ The
Part}'- is quite clear about this: its the Party that decides on the laws, and
the interests of the Party trump all interests that are in conflict with it.
Judges must serve the Party’s interests. Lawyers who act as if there is rule
of law find themselves in prison.^

State-owned enterprises, responsible for around a third of Chinas
industrial output, are being strengthened. Their top executives are
appointed by the Party’s powerful Organisation Department. President
Xi declared in 2016 that SOEs should ‘become important forces to
implement’ the Party’s decisions, and their boards are now expected
to take guidance from the internal Party committee before making
major decisions.^ Party control is not confined to SOEs. Virtually all
large and medium-sized private enterprises, including foreign-invested
companies and sensitive ones, such as internet firms, now have Party
committees operating within them.^ The Party secretary can often
appoint and dismiss senior managers and nominate board members,
and may chair the board or hold an executive position.^ In 2016 it was
reported that henceforth the secretary of the Party committee and the
chairman of the board must be the same person.^

When it was reported that the boards of the four largest banks in
China are required by their articles of association to take account of the
opinions of the Party committee before making important decisions,
David Webb, an independent investor and shareholder-activist in Hong
Kong, observed: ‘This is a reminder to investors they are buying into a
party machine.’® The same applies to foreign firms operating in China,
which may need Party approval for the appointment of senior managers.’

96

COMRADE BILLIONAIRE

In the words of one close observer, Yi-Zheng Lian, the modern Chinese
economy is ‘a party-corporate conglomerate’.Whereas several years
ago it was plausible to argue that the CCP would permit continuing
economic liberalisation, today, it’s apparent that the Party has been
moving decisively in the opposite direction.

The links between senior Party officials and Chinese companies are
personal as well as political. Officials typically have financial interests in
Chinese corporations, usually through family members and shell com¬
panies. Even the family of corruption-busting Xi Jinping has enormous
wealth hidden offshore.” Certain companies, such as the mysterious
HNA Group (whose chairman reportedly died when he fell off a wall in
France in 2018), are believed to be vehicles for hiding, protecting and
growing the wealth of top Party officials and their families.'^

An academic study published in 2018 found that when firms linked
to the twenty-five or so members of the Politburo purchased land
owned by local governments, they paid less than half the price paid by
buyers without political connections.'^ Firms connected to the seven-
member Standing Committee of the Politburo received a 75 per cent
discount. The obliging local officials all expected promotions in return.
As Minxin Pei shows at length in his 2016 book, those promotions are
in turn monetised through the extraction of bribes from lower-level
officials and businessmen.’'' The 2018 study shows that President Xi’s
anti-corruption crackdown led to only a small decline in the discounts
provided to Party leaders.

Comrade billionaire

Some executives and business commentators in the West, and even some
academics, still argue that the role of the Party in private companies is
merely a lormality, but in the Xi era nothing could be further from
the truth. Any CEO ol a major company who refused to abide by a
direction from the Parrv' would soon find themselves in trouble, with
their assets confiscated. The claim by Huawei’s founder, Ren Zhengfei,
that he would deff any order trom the Party to install backdoors in the
company’s equipment does not pass the laugh test.”

While the 2017 National Intelligence Law obliges all citizens and
organisations to comply with any direction to cooperate in ‘national

97

THE PARTY-CORPORATE CONGLOMERATE

iiuclllgenoc work', it only formalises a pmctice going back many years.
(l\v putting it explicitly into law, CCP leaders have shot themselves in
the foot, as the law is regularly cited in the West to argue that a company
like Huawei cannot refuse to assist Chinas intelligence agencies.*^)

It stretches credulity when Chinas most powerful tycoons pledge
their undying allegiance to the Party, as Richard Liu of JD.com—
Chinas 'Jeff Bezos’—did when he said ‘communism would be realised
in his generation’.’^ Loyalty to the Party is a condition of doing business.
When Xu Jiayin, chairman and Party secretary of the country s largest
property developer, declared that ‘everything the company possessed
was given by the party’, and when heavy-industry tycoon Liang Wengen
said his life ‘belonged to the party’, both were speaking a truth, though
not the one intended.'®

From the early 2000s the CCP adopted a policy of drawing capitalists
and corporate executives into the Party apparatus and subjecting them
to its chain of command in exchange for official favours. Billionaires,
bankers and chief executives have in this way been rewarded with
appointment to the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference.
Even a superstar entrepreneur like Jack Ma—the revered founder of the
ecommerce behemoth Alibaba, who was worth $42 billion at the end
of 2019—succumbs to the Party’s wishes, publicly saying, for example,
that sending in the tanks to crush the students in Tiananmen Square
was the ‘correct decision’.'^

As a measure of how deep is the fusion between Party-state and
private business, the delegates at the 2018 meeting of the CPPCC
included the CEOs of the biggest tech firms in the country, including
Tencent’s Pony Ma and Baidu’s Robin Li.^" The Peoples Daily revealed
late that year that Jack Ma has been a member of the Party since the
1980s.^* So are most of the other CEOs of major tech firms.

Whether they participate in top Party events for opportunistic,
ideological or patriotic reasons, by doing so they signal their deference
to the CCP. In 2018 the CEO of tech giant Sogou, Wang Xiaochuan,
told business leaders that they were entering an era in which their com¬
panies would be ‘fused together’ with the Party, which may ask them
to allow state companies to buy a share. They should not resist, for if
they were to think that their interests differ from the state’s then they

98

AMERICA’S ‘GLOBALIST BILLIONAIRES’

would ‘probably find things are painful, more painful than in the past'
(our emphasis).^

The marriage of business and the Party-state in China is especially
apparent in the CCP s policy of‘civil-military fusion’.^** A pillar of Chinas
military modernisation, this fusion is deeper and more far-reaching
than the US military-industrial complex. Since Xi Jinping ascended to
power in 2012, civil-military fusion has been part of nearly every major
strategic initiative, including Made in China 2025, the Next Generation
Artificial Intelligence Plan, and the Belt and Road Initiative.^^

America’s ’globalist billionaires’

In November 2018 Peter Navarro, the White House trade adviser who
at the time was intimately involved in President Trump s trade war with
Beijing, launched a scathing attack on what he called the ‘globalist
billionaires’ of Wall Street.^^ He accused the ‘self-appointed group of
Wall Street bankers and hedge fund managers’ of engaging in their own
‘shuttle diplomacy’ with the Chinese side, and attempting to sabotage
US trade negotiations by putting enormous pressure on the White
House to give way to Beijing. Navarro further accused the financial elite
of being ‘unregistered foreign agents’ acting as part of Beijing’s influence
operations in Washington.

It was strong stuflF, but was there any foundation to it?

When Navarro referred to the bankers’ shuttle diplomacy, he was
probably thinking of a meeting in September 2018 between executives
from Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, the Blackstone Group and
others, and Xi Jinping’s powerful right-hand man, vice premier Wang
Qishan. And he would have been aware that eacii time China’s chief
trade negotiator, Liu He, arrived in the US for talks, his first meeting
was with the top Wall Street bankers.-^

Beijing has been working on Wall Street for a long time. When
Prime Minister Zhu Rongji visited the US in 1999, he holed up in
New York’s Astoria Hotel and spent days in hack-to-hack meetings
with business leaders. ‘Zhu seems never to tire of courting Corporate
.i^merica’, reported The New York The titans of US finance have

for decades been guiding the nation’s China polic)^ VCienever presidents
Clinton, Bush or Obama threatened to take a tougher stance on China’s

99

THE PARTY-CORPORATE CONGLOMERATE

trade protectionism, currency manipulation or technology theft, Wall
Street chief*' used their influence to persuade them to back ofF.^’ And
it NN^as pressure from Wall Street that proved decisive in the Clinton
White Houses decision to support Chinas admission to the World
Trade Organization, despite Chinas serial violation of trade rules.^
Twenty years later, The New York Times 'nzs writing: ‘In Washington, on
Wall Street and in corporate boardrooms, Beijing has used the country’s
size and promise for decades to quell opposition and reward those who
helped its rise.’ Financial institutions have been Beijing’s most powerful
advocates in Washington.^'

In recent times, Beijing has ‘encouraged’ US investors to buy into
Chinese-listed companies. Writing in The Washington Post in June 2019,
Josh Rogin noted that US capital markets are ‘drastically increasing their
holdings of Chinese companies, giving Beijing massive leverage inside
the United States’.^^ Billions of dollars from US institutional investors
like pension funds are now invested in Chinese companies. And Wall
Street has for years been helping Chinese companies obtain investor
funds from the US stock markets—companies whose accounts are
opaque and shielded from foreign scrutiny, exposing the US economy
to higher risk.

The finance sector—the big banks, hedge funds and investment
vehicles—is thus in the centre of the map of power in the US, and
occupying pride of place is Goldman Sachs. No organisation has been
more important to the CCP’s campaign to penetrate US elites, or more
willing.^^ For the CCP, titans of finance are easy targets, as there’s a con¬
cordance of interests. Wall Street executives, anticipating an Eldorado
when Beijing opens up its vast finance markets to foreigners, have been
advising Chinese companies on which American companies to buy,
and lending them the money to do it, taking a cut from the sales.In
the words of a senior White House official, ‘People who like making
deals really like the Chinese Communist Party.The CCP is pushing
on an open door. But the alignment of interests may not be long term,
if its Beijing s intention to displace New York and the City of London,
and eventually make Shanghai the financial capital of the world. As

Lenin reputedly said, ‘The capitalists will sell us the rope with which
we will hang them.’

100

AMEK'ICA’S 'GLOBALIST BILLIONAIRES'

By 2003 Golcliiuiii Sachs ‘had become the lead underwriter for major
Chinese state-owned companies’.In 2006 Henry Paulson moved
from CEO of Goldman Sachs to Treasury secretary under George W.
Bush, raking with him one of the best contact books on the Chinese
elite. Paulson had visited the country some seventy times. He asked the
president if he could take charge of America’s China economic policy,
and Bush agreed.

But Henry Paulson, in the judgement of Paul Blustein, screwed up.
Blustein argues that if Paulson had responded more forcefully to Beijing’s
currency manipulation, tight control of state-owned enterprises, mis¬
treatment of US enterprises in China, and program of technology theft,
then the conditions that led to the trade war might not have arisen.
Instead of recommending retaliatory actions to protect US companies,
Paulson worked to head them off in Congress, proposing to hold a
‘Strategic Economic Dialogue’. Needless to say, this gave the advantage
to Beijing.

Paulson, a good friend of Beijing’s then mayor, Wang Qishan, and
already inclined to look benignly on the Party’s efforts to open up the
economy, was being manipulated. The CCP was drawing him further
into its inner circle, stoking his perception of his own influence. He was
granted a private, one-on-one briefing with President Hu Jintao.

After Paulson left office in 2009—having overseen the global financial
crisis, during which he phoned Wang Qishan and begged him to order
a state-owned Chinese bank to bail out Bear Stearns—the Goldman
Sachs alumnus set up the Paulson Institute, dedicated ‘to fostering a
US-China relationship that serves to maintain global order .

John Thornton is another influential graduate of (loldman Sachs.
He led Goldmans entry into China, and when he retired as the bank’s
chairman in 2003, he became director of the Global Leadership Program
at Beijings Tsinghua University. Thornton is a strong supporter of
Stephen Schwarzmans scholarship program at Tsinghua and sits on
the board of a number of top Chinese and American corporations.
In 2006 he put his money into a new China Center at the Brookings
Institution, where he is chairman of the board of trustees. In 2008 the
Chinese Communist Party gave him its highest award for foreigners, the
Friendship Award of the Peoples Republic of China.^^

101

THE PARTY-CORPORATE CONGLOMERATE

This part of the Wall Street story would not be complete without
mentioning the US investment fund BlackRock, the worlds largest,
with 56.5 trillion worth of assets under management. In 2019 its CEO,
Ltrrv Fink, told the company’s shareholders that he planned to turn
BlackRock into one of China’s leading asset managers, saying he would
be ready to take advantage once Beijing opened up its capital markets
to foreigners, and that he aimed to become one of the first foreign-asset
managers to raise renminbi funds in China.**® To this end, Fink has set
out to Sinicise the company, and has recruited Tang Xiaodong (Tony
Tang) to head its China operations. A veteran investor, with stints at
J.P. Morgan, RBS Greenwich and CITIC Group, Tang has an MBA
from the University of Chicago. After being recruited through the
Thousand Talents Plan, he spent five years as a top finance regulator in
Beijing.**' BlackRock’s head of Chinese equities is Helen Zhu. Based in
Hong Kong, she joined the company in 2014, after being poached from
Goldman Sachs. She studied engineering at MIT.**^ The head of strategy
and innovation at BlackRock is Amelia Tan, who’s based in the City of
London and who joined the company from Citibank.

While the power of Wall Street in setting China policy has been real
enough, in 2017 something changed. US manufacturers decided they
had had enough of their intellectual property being stolen and they were
no longer willing to wait for Beijing to honour its promises to liberalise
Chinas economy and provide a level playing field for American firms.
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce published a report saying so, driving
a wedge between finance and manufacturing, a gap that allowed the
Trump administration, backed by the Democrats, to muscle up to
Beijing. This prompted intensified lobbying by the finance sector, and
closer coordination with its allies in Beijing.

The princelings of Wall Street

The CCP has not been content to rely solely on a concordance of
interests between Beijing and big finance in the West. One important
avenue of influence are the princelings—the sons and daughters of
top Party leaders, past and present. For years, the giant state-owned
investment company CITIC has been dominated by princelings, as
has China Poly Group, the conglomerate that was built around arms

102

THE PRINCELINGS OF WALL STREET

ni;u\uf;icturing.‘'- Cliinas burgeoning private equity sector is controlled
by the ‘red aristocracy’ and their children.

For Western hedge funds, insurance companies, pension funds
and banks, a prerequisite for doing business in the emerging, highly
lucrative Chinese capital markets is a network of connections to the
families that control the largest companies and dominate the Party
hierarchy. Giving jobs to the sons, daughters, nephews and nieces of
these families brings immediate guanxi. The offspring need not be well
qualiffed or even especially bright; it’s their connections that count.
An ideal career path for a princeling is an undergraduate degree at a
prestigious university, preferably an Ivy League college or Oxbridge,
then straight onto the trading floor of a big bank or hedge fund in
New York or London, and after a few years there, an MBA and then a
Wall Street firm.

An unusual insight into how this works was provided by an inquiry
by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission in 2016, which led
to J.P. Morgan paying $264 million for violating the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act. J.P. Morgan had been caught hiring Chinese princelings
to win business, something the commission described as ‘systematic
bribery .‘*'*The company operated what it called the Sons and Daughters
Program, which provided dozens of jobs in Hong Kong, Shanghai and
New York to children of the Party eiite."*^

One was Gao Jue, the son of China’s commerce minister, Gao
Hucheng. A recent graduate of Purdue University, Gao jue landed a
job after a meeting between his father and senior J.P. Morgan executive
William Daley. (Daley was a former US commerce secretary under
Clinton, and pushed for Chinas entry into the W 1 O. He later served
as President Obamas chief of staff.) Cjao jue interviewed poorly but was
offered a coveted analyst position with the hank. Prone to falling asleep
at work, he was soon judged to be an ‘immature, irresponsible and
unreliable employee. When, as part of a general downsizing, the bank
later wanted to lay him off, his father took the head of the bank’s Hong
Kong office. Fang Fang, to dinner and pleaded for his son to be kept on,
promising to ‘go extra miles’ for j.P. Morgan in its China deals.'*^ Fang
was persuaded and a senior executive in New York agreed to keep Gao
jue on, even though the executive’s own son had been laid off. Business

103

THE PARTY-CORPORATE CONGLOMERATE

is busincSvS'. When Gao Jue was eventually let go, he took other finance
jobs before winding up at Goldman Sachs.

As one equity executive told the Financial Times, ‘You don’t say no to
a princeling,’ which begs the question of what else the banks do for the
Party elite, besides employing their children.''^ Another J.P. Morgan hire
brokered by Fang Fang was Tang Xiaoning, the son of Tang Shuangning,
a former senior bank regulator and chairman of the Everbright Group, a
Fortune 500 banking and financial services group owned by the Chinese
government. Tang Xiaoning had previously worked for Goldman Sachs
and Citigroup. J.P. Morgan also provided an internship for the daughter
of Leung Chun-ying, Hong Kong’s former chief executive (and member
of the CPPCC), while she was still a high-school student. The bank
had created a ‘summer camp’ for the children of well-heeled and well-
connected elites.^®

There are, of course, many mainland Chinese working in US finance
who are highly competent and deserve their positions, often very senior
ones. Fang Fang is one example. Fang graduated from the prestigious
Tsinghua University in the 1980s and then studied for an MBA at
Vanderbilt University in Nashville. In 1993 he took a job at Merrill
Lynch, working in New York and Hong Kong, and in 2001 he began
a thirteen-year career with J.P. Morgan, rising to the position of chief
executive for China investment banking, based in Hong Kong."^^ In
that time he brokered the appointment of many sons and daughters to
positions within the bank.^° He also gained intimate knowledge of the
personal finances of some of China’s ruling elite. Fang is said to have a
‘deep network of contacts in Chinese government and business circles’.^'
While not CCP royalty. Fang is on very close terms with the red
aristocracy. Fojtune describes him as a media-friendly executive with
close ties to the Communist Party’.In 2011 he founded the Hua Jing
Society in Hong Kong, a social club for the children of mainland elites
who had studied abroad and returned to Hong Kong.” The society
has been described as the Princeling’s Club, and the Hong Kong
or CCP princelings. A sign of the trust and regard in which
ang was eld by the ruling elite was his appointment in 2008 to the

accm? Consultative Conference, which gives direct

the top Party leadership.” He was also made vice chairman

104

THE PRINCELINGS OF WALL STREET

oF an important, Party-linked think tank, the Center for China and
Globalization.

There was nothing unique about J.P. Morgans Sons and Daughters
Program; all the big American finance companies had something
similar. It was claimed in 2013 that Goldman Sachs had employed
wenty-five sons and daughters, including the grandson of Jiang Zemin,
the all-powerful CCP boss until the early 2000s.^^ Merrill Lynch (and
before it, Citigroup) employed the daughter-in-law of former premier
Zhao Ziyang, Margaret Ren. In 2012 she was promoted to managing
director, China country executive, and chairman of Bank of America
Merrill Lynch. She has an MBA from the MIT Sloan School of
Management and is a council member at the Center for China and
Globalization.^® Merrill Lynch also employed the son-in-law of Wu
Bangguo, who for a decade until his retirement in 2013 was ranked
second in the Party hierarchy. Janice Hu, granddaughter of former Party
head Hu Yaobang, also worked at Merrill Lynch before joining Credit
Suisse, where she rose to the position of head of investment banking in
Hong Kong.

Morgan Stanley hired the son of former premier Zhu Rongji. It
also employed Chen Xiaodan (Sabrina Chen), the daughter of Chen
Yuan, chairman of the massive China Development Bank before he was
appointed vice chairman of the CPPCC.^'^ Chen Yuan’s father was one
of the ‘Eight Immortals’ who fought alongside Mao Zedong.^’“ Sabrina
was educated at a Massachusetts private school before attending Duke
University and gaining a Harvard MBA. (When the China Development
Bank offered summer internships, applications were accepted only from
graduates of Harvard and MIT.^’’ Other Ivy League graduates did not
make the cut.) Her brother, Chen Xiaoxin, was employed by Citigroup.
He too went to a private school in Massachusetts, then Cornell, then
Stanford for an MBA.^’ And Citigroup also employed Li Wangzhi, the
son of purged Part}- boss Bo Xilai.^^

For the CCP elite, entanglement with the masters of Wall Street
through the placement of scores of princelings serves a more important
purpose than employment for their kids.*^ It is a means of gathering
intelligence and exerting influence because it places its informants and
agents in the heart of American power. The entire workings of a US

105

THE PARTY-CORPORATE CONGLOMERATE

tirm may be sent back to a father or an uncle in China, along with
confidential information on the personal and financial affairs of the
wealthiest people in North America.

CCP In the City of London

European financial institutions were not slow to recruit princelings
either. In the 2000s Deutsche Bank, Germany’s biggest, used bribes and
corrupt practices to gain access to China, including showering expensive
gifts on leaders, especially the family of then premier Wen Jiabao, and
then mayor of Beijing Wang Qishan, now a member of the Politburo’s
inner cabinet, the Standing Committee.In 2009 Deutsche Bank beat
J.P. Morgan to a deal because it had employed the daughter of the client’s
chairman.The bank also had an active program of employing the chil¬
dren of powerful officials. Among them was the son of then propaganda
minister Liu Yunshan, and one of the daughters of Li Zhanshu—now
one of the seven on the Politburo Standing Committee—even though
both were rated unsuitable for the job.^^ Wang Xisha, whose father
Wang Yang is now vice premier and a Politburo Standing Committee
member, was also hired by Deutsche Bank. She is married to Nicholas
Zhang (Zhang Xinliang), the grandson of PLA general Zhang Aiping.
Nicholas Zhang was an investment banker at UBS and Goldman Sachs
before setting up his own hedge fund, Magnolia Capital Management.^®

In Zurich, Credit Suisse employed the daughter of Wen Jiabao, who
as China’s premier until 2013 ran economic policy. Credit Suisse kept
a spreadsheet that tracked princeling hires against how much money
they brought in. It hired over a hundred sons, daughters and friends of
senior government officials.^’ One princess’ was employed after Credit
Suisse bankers helped massage her resume. Once on the payroll, she
often didn’t show up for work. When she did, she was judged ‘rude
and unprofessional’ and sometimes brought her mother with her.
Nevertheless, she was paid US$1 million a year and given a number
of promotions because her family awarded deals to the bank. (In 2018
Credit Suisse agreed to pay USS77 million to US authorities to avoid
prosecution on bribery charges."*^)

V O'

While the placement of princelings and promises of access to China’s
huge financial market have been the foremost avenue of influence in

106

CCP IN THE CITY OF LONDON

Wall Street) in the City of London the situation is different. Londons
financial district—the square mile east of St Paul’s Cathedral known as
the City of London, or simply the City—is also the financial hub of
Europe, giving big finance an inordinate influence in British politics.
Brexit has many wondering whether the City can retain its dominant
position or will be displaced by its rivals in Frankfurt or even Paris.
The mandarins of the City have been working hard to ensure its pre¬
eminence, which provides a golden opportunity for Beijing. It would
be an exaggeration to say that if Beijing could control the City it
could control Britain, but not a large one. An ominous, if small, sign
of the influence Beijing already wields came in May 2019 when the
City of London Corporation, the district’s municipal government,
banned the Taiwan office from contributing a float to the annual lord
mayor’s parade.^*

At the centre of the CCP’s ambitious strategy for global economic
domination is the push for China’s currency, the renminbi or RMB
(also known as the yuan), to become the foremost global currency,
replacing the US dollar. The size of China’s economy and the fact
that the RMB is the second most used currency for trade helps, but
financial markets know that China’s financial system is not robust, and
that the government manipulates it, which creates distrust. So rather
than liberalise its markets, Beijing has embarked on a campaign to
influence key decision-makers abroad in favour of the RMB. As far
back as 2011, Der Spiegel was criticising China for pursuing ‘economic
hegemony’ by ‘forcing other countries to maintain reserves of Chinese
money’.^' More recently, Beijing has shown more subtlety but also
greater determination.

To explain its approach, we are indebted to the excellent work of
Martin Thorley of Nottingham University, who has exposed the influ¬
ence network of an organisation called the International Monetary
Institute. Based at Renmin Universit)' in Beijing, the institute claims
to be independent, but Thorley has shown that its senior staff have
strong Part)' and united front links. Its founder and executive director,
Ben Shenglin, is a ver)' significant operative.

Ben Shenglins involvement in united front bodies includes being
a committee member of the All-China Federation of Industry and

107

THE PARTY-CORPORATE CONGLOMERATE

Coniiucrcc, aiul a nicnibcr oF the Zhejiang Provincial Committee of
tlio CJiincse People's Political Consultative Conference. If not a red
aristocrat, Ben Shenglin is certainly a senior courtier. He has worked
assiduously at cultivating links and partnerships with respectable
organisations in the West. In 2016 the Brookings-Tsinghua Center
co-hosted with the IMi a seminar discussing whether the renminbi
would supplant the US dollar.The Penn-Wharton China Center
was also involved. The panel included both the director and the
deputy director of the IMI, and the moderator was a reporter for
Chinas state broadcaster CCTV. In 2018 publishing house Palgrave
Macmillan lent legitimacy to the IMI and its claims by publishing
Currency Internationalization and Macro Financial Risk Control,
a book produced by the institute. A perusal shows it to be Beijing
monetary propaganda.

The Cato Institute republishes on its website the IMI’s journal, the
International Monetary Review, which is full of articles promoting the
rise and rise of the RMB. Cato Institute senior fellow Steve Hanke is a
member of institutes international committee.^*"

Foremost among the IMI’s influence networks is the Official
Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum, a London-based think
tank focused on central banking and financial market regulation. It has
links to British sovereign wealth and pension funds. Martin Thorley
has uncovered the close interweaving of people associated with these
two organisations. At least seven people hold positions in or contrib¬
ute to both, including the chairman and co-founder of the forum,
David Marsh, who is a member of the lMI’s international advisory
committee and sits on the board of its journal. The journal’s editor,
Herbert Poenisch, also writes for the forum. In 2018 Poenisch was
arguing that Beijing should adopt a bolder RMB expansion strategy.
Ben Shenglin is a member of the forum’s advisory council, giving this
top united front operative direct access to senior players in the City.

One such player is Labour Party peer Lord Davidson of Glen Clova.
He has been Beijing’s most effective advocate for the internationalisa¬
tion of the RMB, speaking in the House of Lords and writing opinion
pieces urging the Treasury to open itself up to the RMB. In 2014 he
berated the Treasury for its timidity and lack of imagination in failing

108

CCP IN THG CITY OF LONDON

to IncKidc the RMB in the UK’s foreign currency reserves; he wanted to
make London the major offshore centre for China’s foreign currency.
His wish came true in 2018 when London accounted for 37 per cent
of all RMB transactions outside China, the largest of any overseas
financial centre.*”

Davidson is a well-known friend of China. When in 2013 he par¬
ticipated in a human rights forum in Beijing, a leading German human
rights lawyer described him as the ‘most vocal human rights relativist at
the Forum’.*' In 2014 Davidson travelled to Lhasa for a ‘Development
Forum’, where, breaking with Labour Party policy, he condemned the
Dalai Lama and praised the CCP government for bringing social har¬
mony and happiness to Tibet.*^ In 2018 he suggested in the House of
Lords that it was more important for the British government to strike a
post-Brexit free trade deal with China than to indulge in ‘bellicosity by
sending a Royal Navy ship to the South China Sea.*^

Predictably, Davidson is a fellow of the 48 Group Club.*'' He’s also
well connected in the United States. When he travelled to Beijing
in 2018, his expenses were paid by the Berggruen Institute.*^ This
California-based think tank, set up by German-American investor
Nicolas Berggruen, advocates for closer China-US ties (see chapter
eleven). Berggruen spent $25 million on a China centre at Peking
University to promote cross-cultural ‘dialogue’.*”

Today, the City of London Corporation can’t get enough of China.
In March 2019, two months before he banned Taiwan’s float in his
parade, Lord Mayor Peter Estlin joined a delegation to China to pro¬
mote ‘fintech and green finance’ links, along with the City’s role in the
Belt and Road Initiative. While there, Estlin talked about the important
part the City plays in China’s success.*" Interviewed on Phoenix IV,
he revealed that the City would be hosting a banquet the following
September to celebrate the seventieth anniversary of the PRC.** The
lord mayor praised the BRI’s ‘win-win culture’, and said he sees the City
playing a vital role in helping to finance ‘a fantastic initiative’ and a ‘very
exciting’ vision.

The delegation was led by John McLean, a board member of the
China-Britain Business Council, who declared that ‘London is open
for business for Chinese financial and tech companies’.*^ Earlier in

109

THE PARTY-CORPORATE CONGLOMERATE

201'') the cluu'r of the City of London’s policy committee, Catherine
Nk'Cninness. welcomed the launch of the global edition of the CCP’s
CMfui DtiilyK noting that the paper ‘is based in the Square Mile and is a
friend of the City of London Corporation’.

The International Monetary Institute also has its eye on Frankfurt,
the most important financial centre in continental Europe, and has
teamed up with the House of Finance of Goethe University to launch
the Sino-German Center of Finance and Economics at the Frankfurt
School of Finance and Management, a training school for German
bankers. It promotes RMB internationalisation and is supported by
the central banks of China and Germany. The IMI’s Ben Shenglin,
in his capacity as a dean of Zhejiang University, is on the board
of trustees.^'

Among top Party operatives, Ben Shenglin has perhaps the best
connections into official and academic finance networks around the
world. As a further example, the IMI’s close connections bring him into
contact with the US chairman of the Official Monetary and Financial
Institutions Forum, Mark Sobel, formerly a top official at the US
Treasury Department and now an associate with a Washington think
tank, the Center for Strategic and International Studies.^^

Shaping economic perceptions

Bridgewater Associates, the world’s biggest hedge fund, had been trying
to build its business in China for some years. In 2015 Ray Dalio,
Bridgewater’s founder, confidentially advised his clients that the debt
crisis in China was reaching a critical point and they should divest
as soon as they could.^^ When his advice was leaked to the Financial
Times, Dalio changed his tune. His advice had been ‘taken the wrong
way’, he said. China’s debt was not such a big problem because it was
denominated in its own reserves, he claimed, and in the longer term the
outlook was good.^*^

Two years later Dalio’s reassessment paid off. Bridgewater became
the first wholly foreign-owned enterprise to establish a Chinese asset
management company permitted to invest in China’s markets.’^
2018, while expressing pessimism about world economic pros¬
pects, Dalio waxed lyrical about China. ‘China’s been tremendously

110

SHAPING ECONOMIC PERCEPTIONS

successful ... I’m excited about China—1 can’t understand how any¬
body couldn’t be excited about China.”^^’ In 2019 he wrote that senior
leaders had explained to him that China is a kind of family-state, with
the state having ‘paternal’ responsibility for the citizens, which is what
the social credit system is all about. By contrast, he wrote, the US is
based on individual rights. ‘I’m not saying which system is better.
Dalio has been shameless in his cultivation of political favour, not least
through charity work, going so far as to enlist his sixteen-year-old son
to ‘set up a charity called China Care to help special-needs orphans’.^®

In global financial markets, perceptions rule. The opinion-makers—
the senior bank economists who appear on the evening news, analysts
at investment funds, financial commentators in newspapers, economists
with subscription newsletters, experts at ratings agencies—play a critical
role in shaping understanding and expectations of world markets. What
they say can influence perceptions of, for example, the credibility of
China’s growth forecasts and the stability of its financial sector. They are
therefore of acute concern to Beijing.

China’s government is deeply concerned about any loss of confidence
in the country’s fragile financial markets, both legitimate and shadow. If
a financial crisis were to cause the economy to crash, it would jeopardise
the Party’s hold on power, not to mention a huge writedown in the
value of assets owned by the red aristocracy.

When China’s stock market was crashing in June 2015, a directive
was issued to state media ordering them to change their reporting so
as to ‘rationally lead market expectations’.I hey were directed to halt
all discussions and expert interviews. The directive went on: ‘Do not
exaggerate panic or sadness. Do not use emotionally charged words
such as “slump”, “spike”, or “collapse”.’

Two months after the crash, a reporter for the respected business
magazine Giijhig, Wang Xiaolu, was arrested on charges of ‘spreading
rumors Hed done nothing other than his usual reporting work, but
when he appeared on television confessing that his stock-market report
was irresponsible , the message to other journalists was unmistakeable.
Foreign journalists found that the Chinese experts they went to for
analysis and quotes had clammed up. Officials pressured foreign jour¬
nalists, criticising them for being too pessimistic and demanding ‘more

IMf; PARTY-CORPORATE CONGLOMERATE

ImIumuxI' coverage of Chinas economy, even as data, alw^ays unreliable,
Invame harder to get."”

i*AX>non\isrs and market analysts specialising in China are concen-
ttated in Hong Kong. Over the past decade or so, overseas-trained
economists from the mainland now working in foreign or Chinese firms
have come to be predominant in these ranks, but regardless of where
they re from, most are subject to pressure from Beijing to suppress
concerns they may have about Chinas economy and financial markets.
Often the independent advice’ offered by Hong Kong economists
looks coordinated, but it may be that the commentators pick up the
same cues from Chinas official media.Those who behave may in
time be rewarded. By influencing the private and public pronounce¬
ments of economists, Beijing shapes global perceptions of China’s
economic outlook.

When financial risks to the Chinese economy became serious in
2015, the CCP began exerting subtle influence on international banks

not to rock the boat with bad news. UBS, the largest Swiss bank, has a
long history in China and has been actively pursuing a deeper role in its
financial system. It too has been pressured to rein in its public com¬
mentary, and in 2018 one of its employees was detained in China, for
no apparent reason, causing UBS management to bar travel by its staff
to China. Because Xi s anti-corruption drive has focused especially on
the financial sector, its participants are nervous anyway.

Expectations can be manipulated downwards too, to punish those
who annoy the Party. During Hong Kong pro-democracy protests in
2019, Cathay Pacific earned Beijing’s ire when some of its staff members
joined in. An analyst at an investment bank, Zhao Dongchen, advised
clients that Cathay had done irreversible damage’ to its brand and pre¬
dicted that its share price would collapse. He rated the shares a 'strong
sell. Of nineteen analysts tracked by Bloomberg, Zhao Dongchen
was the only one with a sell’ rating; thirteen were recommending ‘buy’
and five hold . Zhao, who is expert in energ\' companies and not air¬
lines, works for the giant state-owned Industrial and Commercial Bank
of China. Other analysts have accused him of assigning harsh ratings to
foreign companies and positive ones to Chinese companies.*^ (Rather
than tumbling, Cathay’s share price plateaued then rose.)

112

Yl SHANG Bl ZHENG

Yl shang bl zheng

As wc have seen, getting foreign businesses to lobby their govern¬
ments on Beijing’s behalf is one of the CCP’s most powerful tactics.
Commenting on the debacle that followed the tweet by the Houston
Rockets’ manager in support of Hong Kong protesters, John Pomfret
observed that rather than ‘us’ changing ‘China’—the dream of those
urging greater economic integration—China is increasingly changing
us, and Western businesses are Beijing’s decisive weapon.'®^ During the
NBA imbroglio, America’s leading sports network, the ESPN channel,
banned its presenters from any discussion of the politics of it. ESPN
also displayed a map of China showing the Nine-Dash Line; this map
includes disputed territory in the South China Sea and has been ruled
contrary to international law. It is almost never used outside the PRC.*®®
In other examples, camera-maker Leica, spooked by patriotic netizens,
immediately distanced itself from its own advertisement referencing
the ‘tank man’ of Tiananmen Square fame. Marriott International
fired a junior employee who ‘liked’ a Twitter post supporting Tibetan
autonomy, and it changed the name of Taiwan to ‘Taiwan, China’
when Beijing expressed annoyance. In Stockholm the Sheraton Hotel,
a Marriott subsidiary, banned the local Taiwan office (the de facto
embassy) from celebrating Taiwan’s national day at the hotel.

Perhaps the most prominent spot in the corporate hall of shame
belongs to Apple. After challenging the US government in court when
the FBI wanted access to Apple users’ data, the corporation then handed
over encryption keys and iCloud data to Chinese authorities.'®® Apple,
whose iPhones are assembled in China, also came under fire for deleting
an app that allowed Hong Kong people to avoid street clashes with the
police. It acted a day after China’s state media accused it of protecting
‘rioters’. Soon after, Apple CEO Tim Cook was appointed to chair a
business school advisor)' board at Tsinghua University."®

Beijing’s economic statecraft has in Xi’s ‘new era’ evolved into
a powerful instrument of political influence.'" One tactic deployed
frequently is yi shang hi z/seng {usino business to pressure government).
The tactic was used during Trump’s trade war to persuade the admin¬
istration to ease up. In June 2019 a coalition of some 600 companies
and associations (with an inordinate number of producers of pet food

113

THE PARTY-CORPORATE CONGLOMERATE

and sporting equipment) wrote an open letter to the president warning
him against ‘tariffs that are hurting American families and communi¬
ties’. It was part of a slick, disciplined and expensive campaign organised
by a group called Tariffs Hurt the Heartland. Its website highlights
how tariffs had caused one non-profit organisation to cut the number
of cribs it was providing to ‘low-income moms across the Midwest’."^
The letter was duly featured in CCP news outlets."^

It’s not clear whether any CCP-Iinked organisations are backing
Tariffs Hurt the Heartland. However, the China links of its spokes¬
person, Charles Boustany, were exposed by Bethany AIIen-Ebrahimian
in Daily Beast}^^ As a Republican member of congress for Louisiana,
Boustany co-chaired the U.S.-China Working Group. On leaving
Congress in 2017, he joined the lobbying firm Capitol Counsel, in
which role he registered as a foreign agent representing the U.S.-China
Transpacific Foundation. The foundation paid him to introduce US
members of congress to Chinese business and political figures in order
to enhance their understanding of China.

In Germany, the government appears to have at times adopted a more
critical position towards Beijing, only to revert back to a more ‘business
friendly’ stance. The CCP’s use of business to exert pressure here is
essential to understanding why. When Chancellor Angela Merkel ruled
out a law blocking Huawei from Germany’s 5G network, Handelsblatt
reported that she ‘feared a rift with China’."' In 2018 the bilateral trade
volume between the rsvo countries was almost €200 billion, making
China Germany’s largest trading partner for the third consecutive year.
Chinese imports of German goods that year totalled €93 billion."^ Such
has been the growth in Germany’s economic relations with China in
recent years that it is now, of all the EU countries, the most dependent
on China.

But while German exports to China have been growing, their size
alone cannot account for the impact they have on Berlin’s China policy.
More particular industrial interests seem to be at play, fhe German
automotive industry has for decades wielded disproportionate politi¬
cal influence."^ In 2018 over 5.5 million German vehicles were sold
in China.*^’’ In July 2019 BM'X' announced it was teaming up with
internet gitmt Tencent to develop self-driving cars.'"® Although not the

114

THE BELT AND ROAD STRATEGY

only pro-CCP voice in German business, the auto industry has been an
invaluable and carefully cultivated asset for the Party. As a result, in the
words of Der Spiegel, ‘the heads of Germany’s vaunted car companies
want to do everything to avoid a conflict with Beijing’.'^'

To ingratiate themselves, German car manufacturers self-censor their
comments on China. In an interview with the BBC, the chairman of the
board of Volkswagen denied any knowledge of the concentration camps
in Xinjiang, stating he was ‘extremely proud’ of the company’s activities
in the region. Mercedes-Benz was quick to apologise after using an
innocuous quote from the Dalai Lama in one of its Instagram ads (which
was blocked in China anyway).Audi promptly and ‘sincerely’ apologised
for using an ‘incorrect’ map of China (one that did not include Taiwan as
part of China) during one of its press conferences in Germany.

The German industrial conglomerate Siemens has also tried hard to
curry favour with Beijing.It was an early embracer of the Belt and
Road Initiative, signing agreements with ten Chinese partners, and in
June 2018 staged its ver)'^ own BRI international summit in Beijing.'”*"
Asked to comment on the Hong Kong protests, Siemens CEO Joe Kaeser
argued that Germany should ‘balance’ its values and its interest: ‘When
jobs in Germany depend on liow we deal vvirli sensitive topics, one should
not add to the general outrage but carelully consider all positions and
measures in all their aspects’.'*^ Kaeser had in Pebruary 2019 become the
chairman of the influential Asia Pacific Committee of German Business.'”"

Hans von Helldorfl, chair of the federal Association of the German
Silk Road Initiative (formally launched in Bremen in March 2019,
though it had been active prior to then), has attacked Giermany’s policy
on China on national television, calling for an end to the country’s
‘value-oriented’ policies.In other words, the government should stop
criticising China’s human rights violations and focus solely on business
interests. Few express this position as openlv as von 1 lelldorff, but it’s a
common argument behind closed doors.

vT*

The Belt and Road strategy

^\s of 2019 over sixn' countries, accounting for two-thirds of the world’s
population, had signed on to the BRI or intended to do so.'^' Across
Eurasia, Indochina and Southeast .A-sia, Chinese state-owned and

THE party-corporate CONGLOMERATE

State-linked companies arc investing in roads, ports, airports, railways,
energy networks and dan.s. Ports are particularly valued because of
Chinas dependence on sea trade, and also for their strategic function, in
rimes of peace as well as conflict. The building of infrastructure in the
nations bordering the South China Sea helps create a fatalistic accept-
ance of Chinas annexation of islands in the sea.

As the think tank Council on Foreign Relations noted, ‘the United
States shares the concern of some in Asia that the BRI could be a Trojan
horse for China-led regional development, military expansion, and
Beijing-controlled institutions’.And, it should be stressed, for the
control of critical infrastructure. After 40 per cent of the Philippines’
national electricity network was sold to the giant state-owned State
Grid Corporation of China, the head of the national transmission
corporation conceded that the Philippines’ entire power supply could
be shut down by the flick of a switch in Nanjing, the location of the
monitoring and control system.'” State Grid also owns a large share of
the electricity networks in the Australian states of Victoria and South
Australia.'” Its bid for the New South Wales grid was rejected on
national security grounds. (In 2016 Donald Trump’s hotel company
was negotiating with State Grid for the latter to manage a major
development in Beijing.'”)

In Europe, Chinese companies now own airports, seaports and wind
farms across nine countries.'” (They also own the tyre-maker Pirelli, the
Swiss agrichemicals company Syngenta, a large slice of Daimler, a slew
of office towers in London’s financial hubs, and thirteen professional
soccer teams.) All or part of the ports of Rotterdam (Europe’s largest),
Antwerp and Zeebrugge are Chinese-owned. 'I'he state-owned China
Ocean Shipping Company owns the major Greek port of Piraeus and
has a majority share in the Spanish port-management firm Noatum,
and so controls the ports of Bilbao and Valencia.'” Barcelona’s huge
new container terminal is owned by a liong Kong-based company.

While the UK, Germany and France have attracted the largest share
of Chinese investment, Mediterranean Europe, alienated from the EU
following the debt crisis, is receiving increased attention. The BRI is
the perfect vehicle for winning over nations that feel hard done by,
and these countries do not have the investment filters that some others

116

BRI AS DISCOURSE CONTROL

use to keep foreign firms out of vital infrastructure.'^® China also has a
growing naval presence in the Mediterranean. The PLA Navy has been
conspicuous for its activity in the Eastern Mediterranean and in 2015
held joint manoeuvres with Greece’s navy.

Although Beijing insists in public that its port acquisitions are
about promoting trade, it has a long-term plan to build strategic
pressure, including beneath-the-radar expansion of its military pres¬
ence. According to a study by Devin Thorne and Ben Spevack for the
security-analysis think tank C4ADS, ‘Port investments are viewed as
vehicles with which China can cultivate political influence to constrain
recipient countries and build dual-use infrastructure to facilitate Beijing’s
long-range naval operations.’’^^ The shift in strategic landscape is most
advanced in the Indo-Pacific, but good progress is being made in the
Mediterranean. In Chinese-language sources, PLA Navy experts put
the strategy this way: ‘meticulously select locations, deploy discreetly,
prioritise cooperation, and slowly infiltrate’.Beijing aims to build
‘strategic support states’ (that is, those that can be guided to fit China’s
‘strategic needs’) by investing in infrastructure and ‘making relevant
countries believe China’s benevolence’.

BRI as discourse control

The leading Chinese scholar Xiang Debao has written that through the
BRI China ‘is exercising its international communication and interna¬
tional discourse power’.It is because ol this role in shaping thinking
that the BRI recurs throughout this book. I he initiative is one ol the
main vehicles by which Beijing challenges existing regional orders and
promotes alternative models of governance, including its authoritarian,
state-directed capitalism, but is couched in language of ‘equality’ and
‘coexistence’. In short, it’s agitprop for the (Jhina model.

This ideological contest between the CCP and the West takes the
form not so much of competing ideas as alternative narratives, using
language that frames social realin- more subtly. Narratives are a source of
power because they set constraints on what is imaginable and considered
feasible.^\s two Part}’ theorists have put it, ‘In the new era, the Chinese
approach to global governance represented by Belt and Road must be

117

THE PARTY-CORPORATE CONGLOMERATE

rcHccrcxl in the story oFChina, anti China must send a deeply penctrat-
ing Chinese wice through Belt and Road.’ (The emphasis is ours.)'*^
Fn>m the outset, the BRl has been presented as a model of‘inclusive
globalisation' and aimed at those who feel shut out. The language plays
to the dream of global harmony through trade and cultural exchange.
When Xi Jinping uses the phrase ‘community of shared future’, the sub¬
text is that China’s new world order will replace the postwar American
hegemony. The BRI can be seen as the CCP’s principal vehicle for
promoting and entrenching the Party’s alternative discourse system for
the world. To the outside world, Xi and other leaders talk about ‘win-win
cooperation’, and ‘a big family of harmonious co-existence’ and ‘a bridge
for peace and East-West cooperation’, but in discussions at home, the
talk is of achieving global discursive and geostrategic dominance.

So when a nation or a state signs on to the BRI it signs on to the
CCP’s narrative. Italy’s memorandum of understanding on the BRI
endorses ‘common development and prosperity, deepened mutual
trust and beneficial cooperation’.’^^ The government of Victoria, the
Australian state that ignored the federal government’s repudiation of the
BRI, has committed itself to ‘the aspiration of promoting the silkroad
spirit centering on peace, cooperation, openness, inclusiveness, mutual
learning and mutual benefits and aspiration to further enrich such spirit
in keeping with the new era’—that is, Xi Jinping’s new era.’*^^

Typically, after signing on to the BRI, political leaders and senior
bureaucrats soon adopt the CCP’s language, reinforcing the Party’s way
of presenting China to the world, in a kind of subliminal soft power.
In the Party’s eyes, they legitimise its ambitions and become part of Xi’s
community of shared future for humankind.

At the end of the Second Belt and Road Forum in Beijing in 2019,
dozens of world leaders signed a communique declaring, ‘The ancient
Silk Road contributed to the strengthening of the connectivity and the
expansion of the world economy in the spirit of promoting peace and
cooperation, openness, inclusiveness, equality, mutual learning and
mutual benefit.’’^’® They went on to endorse the whole word-world
that Party theorists and propagandists have developed to gift-wrap the
promise of Chinese investment. Properly understood, the wrapping is
more important, because it’s more insidious than what’s inside.

118

7

Mobilising the
Ch inese diaspora

Qiaowu: overseas Chinese work

Some 50-60 million people of Chinese descent live elsewhere, a popu¬
lation the size of Britain’s. As would be expected, they are very diverse
socially, politically, culturally, linguistically, and in their feelings about
China. They hail not only from the mainland, but also Taiwan, Hong
Kong, Malaysia and other places. Many emigrated before the Chinese
Communist Party came to power.

Over the past two or three decades, united front work, which origi¬
nally focused on building coalitions with non-communist organisations
in China, has shifted to a larger number of groups, including overseas
communities. More recent additions to them—referred to as xinqiao if
migrants, and hunqiao if PRC nationals living abroad—are more likely
to retain their links to China and to ‘have an emotional and psycho¬
logical need to participate in activities associated with their ancestral
homeland’.' These links, including family and business connections,
provide great leverage for the CCP. In 2015 Xi Jinping designated
Chinese students studying abroad as a new and important focus for
united front work.’

The Part)' has propagated a version of‘Chineseness’ aimed at bind¬
ing overseas Chinese to the ‘ancestral homeland’, in so doing mobilising
for its own purposes national pride in China’s achievements. In the face

119

MOOILISING IHE CHINESE DIASr*0»»A

of'WcvN'tcrti crificism of human riglux violaiion.s, for instance, the Party
often defends its governing style as the Chinese way or the Confucian
wtiy. (By implication, in the propaganda of the CCP, laiwanese have
cluxsen a path that Is unsuitable to Chinese people and arc paying the
price in the form of social and political chaos.)

New Zealand CCP analyst James Jiann Hua To has provided an
extraordinarily detailed picture of the objectives and methods of united
front work in Western countries, including programs directed at overseas
Chinese.^ Known as qiaowu (literally, overseas Chinese affairs), its pur¬
pose is to mobilise sympathetic or potentially sympathetic community
o-roups to serve the interests of the CCP, while at the same time sup¬
pressing those deemed hostile. It also aims to disseminate Party policy
among overseas Chinese and prevent the spread of poisonous western
ideas’ (including representative democracy, human rights and academic
freedom). A teaching manual for United Front cadres notes: ‘The unity
of Chinese at home requires the unity of the sons and daughters of
Chinese abroad.’^

Over the past twenty years the CCP has succeeded in suppressing
many voices critical of it in the West—primarily those campaigning
for democracy, Tibetan autonomy, Uyghur rights, Taiwanese independ¬
ence, and the rights of Falun Gong practitioners. These voices are barely
heard today, in either mainstream or Chinese-language media. Control
of Chinese-language media overseas has been vital in this respect. In
the 1990s in Australia, for example, there was a vibrant and diverse
Chinese-language media; now virtually all newspapers and radio stations
reproduce Beijing’s position and promote loyalty to the motherland.

Again from the 1990s, trusted individuals sympathetic to the CCP,
assisted by Chinese embassies and consulates, have taken over many
if not most of the established Chinese community and professional
associations in North America and Western Europe. And many new
organisations with a pro-Beijing position have also been established,
including in business and the sciences, professional bodies, community

groups for ethnic Chinese, and, since 1989, students and scholars asso¬
ciations on campuses.

rbe e ■ P^O'Beijing elements are now seen as representing

cse community and are often reported that way by the

120

UNITED front: MODUS OPERANDI AND STRUCTURE

mainstream media. This apparent legitimacy enables them to associate
with mainstream political representatives. Beijing, through its embas¬
sies and consulates, tends to guide ethnic Chinese organisations rather
than directly control them. In the words of a confidential government
document, the aim is to 'infiltrate their inner workings without overtly
intervening; and to influence through guidance, rather than openly
leading them’.^

United Front: modus operand! and structure

James To writes that qiaowu work engages in ‘a continuous and evolving
effort to influence the choices, direction and loyalties of the OC [overseas
Chinese] by dispelling their negative suspicions and misunderstandings
concerning China, and replacing those thoughts with a positive under¬
standing instead’.^ The work appeals to patriotism and sentiment, and
routinely associates criticism of the CCP with ‘anti-China’ sentiment.
But there are other motives too. As Party expert Gerry Groot writes,
‘targets are rewarded with enhanced status and in some cases material
advantages as well’.^ Coercive and threatening methods against dissent¬
ing overseas Chinese are typically left to the Ministry of State Security
and consulate staff.®

The psychological techniques used bv the CCP in united front work
have been developed and refined over decades and are taught to cadres
with the help of classified manuals. James lo observes that the tech¬
niques are effective for ‘intensive behavioural control and manipulation’
while appearing to be ‘benign, benevolent and helpful’.'^ Speaking to
the Central United Front Work Conference in 2015, Xi Jinping empha¬
sised that the art of ‘making friends’ must be practised because it is
‘an important method of carrying our united front work’. He added,
‘Party cadres, government officials, united front cadres should master
this method.’

Since the early 2000s, national and provincial offices of the
Overseas Chinese Affairs Office have been hosting ‘training sessions’
and root-seeking summer camps’ for young overseas Chinese, targeting
those identified as future communin' leaders." This next generation of
leaders will have a strong command of the native language of their place
of residence and be at ease with the local culture. The objective is to

121

MOBILISING THE CHINESE DIASPORA

enhance their patriotic feelings and tic them into networks in mainland
Cliina. While data is scarce, it was reported by official sources that in
2006, 11,000 young overseas Chinese participated in training.'^

An organisational chart of overseas united front influence activities
for a generic Western country is shown on the organisation chart on
pages 124-5.'^ The chart is not comprehensive, and does not show the
PLA’s influence agencies (notably the CAIFC), or influence operations
in universities, think tanks and non-Chinese-language media. And the
more diffuse work of Party agencies cannot be reflected in a chart.
What the chart does show are the links between the CCP and domestic
organisations in the West: the latter are shown below the line dividing
China and the Western nation. Only the main implementation agen-

_those that make their presence felt in Western nations and that

appear in this book—are shown, rather than the policy development
bureaucracy that sits above these agencies (such as the Foreign Affairs
Commission and the Leading Small Groups).

United front work falls under the aegis of the CCP rather than
state agencies (shown on the right of the chart), although the latter are
controlled by the CCP and also engage in influence work. The United
Front Work Department is a large department under the authority
of a Central Leading Small Group. After a recent restructuring, the
3rd, 9th and 10th bureaus of the UFWD are tasked with carrying out
influence operations among ethnic Chinese communities abroad.
Two other Party departments also engage in overseas influence work:
the International Liaison Department (also known as the International
Department) and the Propaganda Department. The UFWD set out
its broad strategy in its 2004 Blue Book.'^ The aim is to foster the
‘cohesion of the Chinese nationality’ by emphasising the ‘cultural iden¬
tity’ and patriotism towards country and hometown of non-communist
overseas Chinese wherever they may be.

In August 1979 General Secretary Deng Xiaoping gave explicit
directions to the l4th national conference on united front work: ‘The
united front work is a task for the entire party, it depends on the entire
party to do it. Party committees at ever)^ level should include the united
front in their agenda.’*^ This means that, in practice, united front work
is less structured and more amorphous than suggested by the chart.

122

UNITED front: MODUS OPERANDI AND STRUCTURE

The UFWD guides the Chinese People’s Political Consultative
Conference, a large, high-level advisory council that draws non-Party
elements into the CCP s orbit (more on this below). Overseas Chinese
persons who serve the Party well are invited to join the national Political
Consultative Conference or its provincial counterparts. One of the
CPPCCs most important overseas agencies is the China Council for
the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification, which has some
200 chapters throughout the world. The All-China Federation of
Returned Overseas Chinese is also formally a constituency body of the
CPPCC, but is in practice controlled by the UFWD, and for this reason
is shown in the box that captures the major agencies controlled by the
UFWD—the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, the China News Service,
and the China Overseas Friendship Association, also referred to as the
Chinese Overseas Exchange Association.

Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries
The CPAFFC is the primary organ of influence in Western countries for
‘people’s diplomacy’ through state, provincial and local governments;
sister cities, parliamentary friendship groups; and China friendship
societies, among others, 'fhe CPAP'FC is mentioned often in this book.

The location of the CPAfPC in the Party hierarchy is uncertain, but
Jichang Lulu makes a persuasive case that it is managed, though not
controlled, by the Ministry of foreign Affairs, with ‘management’ being
defined as ‘political and thought leadership’ rather than day-to-day
management.'^ The CPAffC is staffed by cadres from Foreign Affairs.
As it is controlled by a powerful princeling, Li Xiaolin, daughter of one
of the Parry’s ‘Eight Immortals’, Li Xiannian, it enjoys considerable
autonomy.'*

Overseas Chinese Affairs Office

The OCAO is responsible for overseas (diinese including guiding or
supervising as much activity by overseas Chinese as it can. James do
writes: The OCiAO also has a clear soft power agenda through guid¬
ance, coordination, solidarity', and friendship with the OC [overseas
Chinese] mass media, cultural societies, and schools to carry out cultural
communications.’’^

123

MODILISING THE CHINESE DIASPORA

111 2018 all of the functions of the OCAO were absorbed by the
lO'Wl) (into the 9th and 10th bureaus), but it still exists as a name for
external use."'* We retain its luse here because the activities of ‘OCAO
ofiicials’ are reported in Western-oriented reports and commentary.
Importantly, the OCAO and AFROC have provincial, city and county
counterparts throughout China, and these have a direct role in cultivat¬
ing and maintaining links with associations of overseas Chinese. Dozens
of such organisations exist in most Western countries at the national,
state and city levels, and all have links with the Chinese embassy or
local consulates.^'

As part of Xi Jinping s intensification of united front work, in June
2014 the OCAO unveiled its eight big plans for benefitting overseas
Chinese’, a program aimed at Chinese community groups, mutual aid
centres, education, traditional Chinese medicine, cultural exchange,
businesspeople and information services.The OCOA also operates its
own international news network, the China News Service. While official
news agencies like Xinhua feed stories to Chinese-language media in the
West, the CNS ‘covertly runs overseas media organizations’, including
through ownership.^^

The overseas Chinese organisations in the bottom half of the chart
can be sorted into nine types: peaceful unification councils; business
associations, such as chambers of commerce; professional, scientific
and scholarly associations; alumni associations; hometown associa¬
tions; religious groups, such as Chinese Christian congregations and
Buddhist groups; cultural and heritage groups, such as dance troupes,
writers’ organisations and PLA veterans’ associations; friendship and
exchange associations, which also draw in non-Chinese people; and
student associations.

Veterans’ associations are worth dwelling on for a moment. In
Western nations with large Chinese diasporas, PLA veterans have been
forming associations for the purpose of renewing the camaraderie of
the army days, as well as building for mutual advantage in busi¬

ness and social affairs. The nostalgia helps keep members emotionally,
linguistically and culturally close to the PRC. But as United Front
organisations, they also have subversive and influence functions.The
French Foreign Legion Chinese Veterans Association was established

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UNITED FRONT: MODUS OPERANDI AND STRUCTURE

in 1996, nithough it did not become active in social events until 2004
when it registered with the Chinese embassy.” Its website notes that as
long as PLA veterans can pass the test, they can join the French Foreign
Legion, serve for five years and secure French citizenship.” In 2016
Chen Jianqing took over as president of the association, in the presence
of various dignitaries and ‘under the care of the Chinese Embassy in
France’.” The outgoing president detailed a series of influence activ¬
ities carried out by the association, including science and technology
exchanges, BRI promotion, a forum on Chinese public security issues,
and the facilitation of links between overseas Chinese and China. Among
this last were cultural activities in China for Chinese-French children.”

In London, at the 2016 celebration of Army Day (held on 1 August to
commemorate the establishment of the PLA), the president of the British
Chinese Veteran’s Association, Wang Jing, declared that the association
would ‘safeguard the dignity of the motherland’ and ‘respond to the call’
of the motherland whenever it is needed.” In Canada, the founding of
the Canada Chinese Veteran’s Society in 2018 caused unease in sections
of the Chinese-Canadian community.’” The society has staged concerts
in which veterans dressed in PLA uniforms sing patriotic military songs,
and has held retreats where they arc photographed goosestepping and
saluting the flags of the PLA, China and Canada.

In Sydney, PLA veterans formed the Australian Chinese Ex-services
Association in 2015. It too has staged events featuring army uniforms
and patriotic songs, and has used military tactics to participate in
welcoming ceremonies on city streets for Chinese leaders. On Army
Day in Melbourne in 2018, uniforms were again donned, this time
by the Australia-China Veterans Club, and there was marching to
revolutionary songs.” In New Zealand, the role of the New Zealand
(Chinese) Veterans Association has been more sinister. Its members
have monitored events unsympathetic to Beijing and engaged in intimi¬
dation of critics.” Authorities in Western countries have done nothing
in response to such behaviour.

Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference

One of the leading institutions of United Front work, the Chinese

Peoples Political Consultative Conference is a high-level advisory

127

MODILISING the CHINESE DIASPORA

body wliosc role is to integrate non-Party elements into the national
dccision-niakiitg process. Some years ago, it was opened up to busincu
leaders and professionals, and has since become highly effective in
co-opting wealthy and influential Chinese, abroad as well as at home,
into the Party’s sphere. Those invited into the CPPCC gain invaluable
access to China’s power centres. It has been reported that the 2013
national conference included fifty-two billionaires among its delegates.^^
The CPPCC has provincial and municipal counterparts, allowing
the net to be spread even wider. As a political body set up to draw
in forces outside the CCP considered significant, it is arguably ‘the
most prominent national united front body’.^'* Overseas Chinese who
participate in the CPPCC are usually trusted by the Party to advance
its interests. Fred Teng, for example, president of the America China
Public Affairs Institute (and also ‘special US representative’ of the
China-U.S. Exchange Foundation), acted as convener of a session at
the 2018 conference. While in Beijing, Teng told his hosts that ‘a strong
China is the most ardent hope of overseas Chinese’.^^

China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification
Established in 1988 to counter Taiwanese independence, the China
Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification has since
broadened its influence activities among overseas Chinese. In some
countries the CCPPNR chapter is the foremost united front group. In
a sign of its importance in the CCP hierarchy, the chair of the council,
Wang Yang, is a member of the Politburo’s Standing Committee. Its vice
chair is the head of the UFWD. A thinly disguised front organisation of
the UFWD, the council promotes CCP propaganda. John Dotson has
listed ninety-one countries that host chapters of the CCPPNR, some
with several region^il chapters, and notes that it’s ‘an organisation that is
becoming more active in covert political influence efforts on behalf of
the Chinese government’.

While the English names of the council’s chapters vary, the Chinese
characters are generally the same. In the United States, which has
branches in most major cities, the national headquarters in Washington
D.C. is called the National Association for China’s Peaceful Unification.
In the Chicago area, it’s the Chinese i\merican Alliance for China’s

128

IHI?EArS AND HARASSMENT

IVuccful Reunification. In Britain it’s the UK Chinese Association for
the Promotion of National Reunification.

1 he leaders of all of these groups around the world have close
links to Beijing, and their work as agents of influence has been further
elevated under Xi Jinping. The Sydney-based Australian Council for
the Promotion of Peaceful Reunification of China has been very active
in influence peddling, establishing deep links with the major political
parties, not least through large donations. In 2018 the council’s then
president, billionaire Huang Xiangmo, was denied re-entry to Australia,
in part because of his links to CCP operations.^^

In the United States, CCPPNR affiliates have kept a lower profile.
In D.C., efforts to cultivate politicians appear to be modest, confined
mainly to moulding opinion within the ethnic Chinese community
rather than wider public opinion or government policies. But here
too, the increasingly prominent role of these Party affiliates means that
dissident voices are drowned out.^®

True to its name, the CCPPNR works towards excluding Taiwan
from the international community. The European Association for the
Peaceful Reunification of China has published an appeal to ‘all compa¬
triots in Europe’ to oppose events organised by Taiwanese activists in
support of Taiwan’s participation in the World Health Assembly.

Threats and harassment

Among the Chinese communities (and communities the CCP claims
as Chinese) subjected to harassment, practitioners of Falun Gong have
been at the sharp end. A peaceful spiritual practice based on tai chi and
Buddhism, Falun Gong had millions of followers across China in the
1990s, perhaps in response to moral decline under CCP rule, lamented
by many writers and intellectuals. Although it had no political interests,
Falun Gong’s rapid spread frightened the Parry’s leaders, and in 1999
Premier Jiang Zemin launched a ferocious crackdown. Many practi¬
tioners managed to escape from China, but wherever they’ve settled
they have faced persecution, from the petty to the violent.

One of the more serious incidents took place in Flushing, in Queens,
New York City, which has a large Chinese community. In 2008 Falun
Gong practitioners were abused, harassed and attacked on the streets

129

>fMNm

MOBILISING THE CHINESE DIASPORA

by patriotic ‘anti-cult’ activists led by a man named Michael Chu. Chu
was the vice president of the New York Association for the Peaceful
Reunification of China.‘“’ Falun Gong practitioners also received phone
aills threatening them with death, and punishment for their families in
China. It emerged that China’s consul general in New York, Peng Keyu,
had personally instigated the violence.'"

In 2019> repression in the ‘autonomous region’ of Xinjiang
at an all-time high, including surveillance equipment in wide use and
more than a million people interned in concentration camps, Chinese
authorities intensified their harassment of Uyghurs living outside
China In France, Chinese police have been contacting expatriate
Uyahurs by phone and WeChat, demanding they provide such infor¬
mation as scans of their French ID cards and marriage certificates, along
with their home and work addresses. In Germany, when the sister of
exiled Uyghur Abdujelil Emet phoned him from her home in Xinjiang
to beg him to stop his activism, a security agent took the phone and
told him, ‘You’re living overseas, but you need to think of your family
while you’re running around doing your activism work in Germany.
You need to think of their safety.’'*^ Persecution of Uyghurs is occurring
in many countries and foreign citizenship provides no protection from
the Chinese police.'*^

Uyghur students in the West have been threatened by their Han
Chinese classmates for expressing their opinions. A Uyghur student in
the US was told he would be reported to the Chinese embassy for using
the term ‘East Turkistan’, the name preferred by many Uyghurs for
their homeland.Denouncing him as a separatist, the Chinese students
were heard to say, ‘We cannot allow you to speak against China in our
class!’ (The teacher told them that if they reported him to the embassy,
the Uyghur student would be entitled to report them to the FBI. They
backed down.) Uyghurs in Canada, Britain, Sweden and Germany have
been told that unless they agree to spy on fellow Uyghurs they will never
see their families again.Some might think that once you flee China,
you are free, said a Canadian Uyghur leader. But you are never free.’

Wen Yunchao, a human rights activist based in New York, has said
that Chinese authorities took photos of his son on his way to school.
They just wanted to let me know that at any time they can harm my

130

HUAREN CANZHENG

child/ he sald/^’ Many other Chinese people living abroad, including
human rights lawyers Teng Biao and Chen Guangcheng, report
receiving death threats.'*^ Democracy activist Sheng Xue from Toronto
said that Chinese authorities were tracking her and had threatened to
kill her if she didn’t stop criticising Chinas leaders. She has also been
harassed online, including having her head photoshopped onto nudes
which were then posted to escort sites, along with her phone number
and address, resulting in countless phone calls.^®

In Germany, Chinese artist Yang Weidong said, its getting to
the point where they are treating Germany as if it were the Chinese
Communist Party’s backyard.Didi Kirsten Tatlow recounts an inci¬
dent at a memorial service for Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo in
Berlin in 2018, where a number of Chinese guests ‘with unemotional
expressions’ started filming everyone, frightening anyone familiar with
the methods of Chinese state security. The sense of insecurity and fear
felt by many Chinese, Uyghur, Hong Kong and Tibetan people residing
in the West, along with Falun Gong practitioners, is reinforced when
law enforcement authorities collaborate with China’s police and intelli¬
gence services, as will be seen in chapter thirteen. As if to remind CCP
critics that the Party-state can find them anywhere, patriotic Chinese in
Western cities have taken to kitting out their cars to look like Chinese
police vehicles.^'

Huaren canzheng

Beijing began pushing its policy of huaren canzheng, or ‘ethnic Chinese
participation in politics’, around 2005.^' Often exploiting the narrative
of a ‘century of humiliation’ and continuing anti-Chinese racism, it was
a new tactic in the Party’s united front strategy, and over the following
years it saw ethnic Chinese people supported by Beijing joining politi¬
cal parties and running for office in Canada, the United States, New
Zealand, Australia, Britain and beyond.

United front organisations are increasingly following the advice laid
out in 2010 by a CCP strategist—build eth nic Chinese-based political
organisations, make political donations, support ethnic Chinese poli¬
ticians, and deploy votes to swing close-run elections.The approach
ts related to the ‘mixing sand’ tactic used by Chairman Mao; that is,

131

MOBILISING THE CHINESE DIASPORA

planting trusted people in the enemy’s camp.” Its program is mott
advanced in Canada but has been building in Germany, France, Nev/
Zealand and Australia.” In September 2019 Australian news outlets
reported that a newly elected member of federal parliament, Gladys Liu,
had links to a number of united front groups, in both Australia and
China.^7 Most damningly, evidence emerged that she had been a member
for several years of the council of the Guangdong Overseas Exchange
Association, a chapter of the China Overseas Exchange Association, a
UFWD agency (see the organisation chart on pages 124-5). Liu won
selection as a Liberal Party candidate because she was a prolific fundraiser
in the Chinese community (A$l million, or US$700,000).” After she
was elected to parliament, the prime minister, Scott Morrison, dismissed
the allegations of Liu’s CCP links as a smear with racist undertones.”

In November 2019 a leading Australian investigative reporter,
Nick McKenzie, broke an explosive story about a Chinese spy ring
attempting to recruit a luxury car dealer in Melbourne to run for
federal parliament.” Bo (Nick) Zhao was promised A$1 million
towards his campaign. The spy ring was reportedly led by Melbourne
businessman Brian Chen, described as a suspected senior Chinese
intelligence operative’ (a claim Chen rejects). The plan was to back
Nick Zhao as the Liberal Party candidate for the seat of Chisholm
(the seat subsequently won by Gladys Liu). Zhao reported the attempt
to recruit him to the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation in
late 2018, and in March 2019 he was found dead in a motel room in
mysterious circumstances.

People of Chinese heritage living in the West are often under¬
represented in politics, and more should be done to encourage their
participation. However, the situation is being exploited by the CCP to
push forward candidates sympathetic to it. Democratic elections are
used to advance the Party s authoritarian influence, and again, a history
of anti-Chinese sentiment is often used to unite voters.

Another avenue for gaining political influence is the formation
of ethnic Chinese ginger groups within mainstream political parties.
In Western Australia, for example, the Australian Chinese Labor
Association is influential within the Labor Party, and has promoted
favoured candidates into political office.^' The WA Chinese Liberal

132

HUAREN CANZHENG IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

Civil) lias done the same on the conservative side. Candidates recruited
and supported by such organisations are expected to put ethnic Chinese
niters’ interests first. United front organisations appear to be grooming
a new generation of Chinese-Australians for entry into politics, either
rhrougli mentoring or ‘educational seminars’.

In France, representatives of the Association des Chinois Residant
en France travelled to Beijing in 2017 to meet the deputy head of the
Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, Tan Tianxing. The association’s presi¬
dent, Ren Limin, told Tan that his organisation would nurture young
ethnic Chinese community leaders and encourage young people to
participate in local politics.The following year Ren Limin was invited
to the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, a measure of
the Party’s trust in him.*^^

Huaren canzheng in the United Kingdom

Some prominent Britons of Chinese heritage are office holders or
members of united front organisations that meet in China.^'* In May
2018 the OCAO in Beijing encouraged Chinese-Britons to get out and
vote, and praised the large number of them standing for election.*'^ Two
Chinese-Britons are particularly noteworthy.

Christine Lee is a solicitor whose firm has offices in Beijing, Hong
Kong and Guangzhou, as well as London.In 2006 she founded the
British Chinese Project (the Chinese name for which translates as ‘British
Chinese Participation in Politics’). At the rime, she was a member of
the China Overseas Exchange Association.^’^ Her links to the CCP go
deep. She has been the chief legal adviser to the Chinese embassy in
London and a legal adviser to the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office. Lee
is also an overseas member of the Chinese People’s Political Ck)nsultative
Conference.^^These positions are unmistakable signs of her importance
to the Part)^ Yet she is also the secretary of the Inter-Party China Group
of the British parliimient.*^'^

Lees involvement in British politics appears to have begun during
the prime ministership of Tony Blair, when she formed an alliance
with London Labour MP and minister Barrs' Gardiner, more recently
Ubour’s shadow international trade secretar>'.'° Exposing these links in
2017, Hannah McGrath and Oliver Wright wrote in The Times-. ‘What

133

mobilising the CHINESE DIASPORA

1 was a fruitful association that eventually led Ms Lee to
to o\\xx ^^‘^^^^ 200^000 to both the MP and his constituency party/
donate ^ Blair government minister, Barry Gardiner became

of Christine Lees British Chinese Project and the two of them
thec airo of making friends in Westminster, boosted

embarked on a 1 b

(' rdiners tbriiiation in 2011 of an all-party group ... to represent

* * •HT<*ns in Britain. One of Lees children, Michael Wilkes,
Chinese citizens

became its vice chairman.

\nother son, Daniel Wilkes, began working in Gardiner’s parlia-
mentar}' oHice, with his salary paid by his mother’s law firm. Gardiner
has been a strong advocate of closer Sino-British relations and invest¬
ment in Britain by China’s sovereign wealth fund. He was a strong
advocate for the construction of a nuclear power station at Hinkley
Point by a state-owned Chinese corporation, which Theresa May’s
<rovernment put on hold due to concerns about national security.
According to The Times, ‘A Labour source said that he [Gardiner]
strongly opposed internal party criticism of Chinese involvement in
rbe Hinkley Point project.’^^

On her blog Christine Lee describes the CCP’s huaren canzheng
program and gives advice to British people of Chinese heritage on
how to gain influence. She writes that the British Chinese Project is
working with former Tory MP Edmond Yeo (originally from Malaysia);
the chair of Chinese for Labour, Sonny Leong; and the co-chair of the
Chinese Liberal Democratic Party, Merlene Emerson.^^ Lee’s work has
won praise from official CCP media, with the China Daily reporting in
2011 that she had made great efforts to promote the rights of Chinese
in the UK.7^

Lee has organised many events for visiting Chinese delegations and
met with Beijing’s top leaders, including Xi Jinping. She appears to
have developed a good relationship with David Cameron while he
was prime minister. In 2012 she led the largest ever huaren canzheng
delegation to Beijing. She was accompanied by Sonny Leong and
the chairwoman of the Liberal Democrats and they were received by
Tan Tianxing, then deputy head of the OCAO.^^ In 2016 Lee and
Sonny Leong again met with Tan, this time with the vice president of
the Chinese Liberal Democrats. Tan encouraged British-Chinese to

HUAREN CANZHENG IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

join the political mainstreams^ The following year, Lee, Leong and
a group of UK huaren canzheng promoters were back in Beijing to
consult with TanS^

In 2015 Lee was again lauded for her huaren canzheng' noxV, this
time by the People's Daily, which reported that she ‘led the door-to-door
encouragement of Chinese to vote, popularise electoral knowledge, and
help Chinese to fill in the voting cards’/® In 2016 an official qiaowu web¬
site said of Lee’s work, ‘the Chinese must control their own destiny’/^
On 31 January 2019 Christine Lee received a Points of Light Award
from Prime Minister May, in recognition of her contribution through
the British Chinese Project/® A photo of Lee in front of 10 Downing
Street shows the iconic door draped with red banners displaying New
Year couplets in Chinese characters and announcing the ‘Golden Era’ of
Sino-British relations. The symbolism is blunt and powerful: Lee at the
heart of Britain’s government, being embraced by it.

One of the founders of Chinese for Labour was Katy Tse Blair, the
Chinese-American sister-in-law of Tony Blair, who was prime minister
at the time the group was established in 1999.®' It’s affiliated with the
Labour Party, is represented on the National Executive Committee
and the National Policy Forum, and regularly meets with the leader,
deputy leader and shadow cabinet.®^ Chair Sonny Leong is a member
of the 48 Group Club and also of the Labour Party 1000 Club (which
provides access for donations), and an executive committee member of
BAME Labour—the Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic Labour group
affiliated to the party. ®^

The second Chinese-Briton of particular relevance to this book is
involved with the other side of politics. Li Xuelin arrived in Britain in
1989 and after some years entered the real estate business.®"^ In 2009 she
p) became the founding president of the Zhejiang UK Association, which

carries out united front work.®^ She continues to serve as ZJUKA’s
honorary chair. In the same year, she was appointed vice president of

e council of the Zhejiang Overseas Exchange Association, an affiliate
\ls 0 t e United Front Work Department.

^ In one of the clearest signs of the CCP s faith in her, Li Xuelin is execu-

Na,Association for the Promotion of
^unification, the British chapter of the CCPPNR. In 2013

135

MOBILISING THE CHINESE DIASPORA

she alst' appointed as an overseas council member of AFROC, and
>vas ifap(>ohHcd in 2018 (see the organisation chart on pages 124-5).'’'’

In 2009 Li Xuelin attended a five-day leadership workshop in
Hani^rJtou. Organised by the OCAO, its purpose was to ‘promote the
susrainablc development of qiaowu work’.”‘^ The next year she was back
in Hangzhou meeting with top Party officials, where she ‘reported to
loaders of her home country and hometown’ on her work. The Zhejiang
UK Association was praised for its achievements.'’’’

Li had quickly become an enthusiastic campaigner for the Conservative
Part)' on arriving in Britain, and for David Cameron in particular, meet¬
ing him on many occasions.^’ By 2015 Cameron began speaking of
‘a Golden Era in the Sino-British relationship.^^ At the same time, Li was
working as a ‘pro bono advisor’ to Lord Wei (Nathanael Ming-Yan Wei),
asocial entrepreneur and the first British-born Chinese-heritage peer. Li
Xuelin accompanied Wei to China, where she reportedly enhanced Lord
Wei’s understanding of the PRC.^^

In 2011 Li met the Conservative peer and sometime minister of
state Lord Michael Bates. In that same year she introduced him to Li
Xiaolin, president of the CPAFFC and a top Party cadre.^^^ Li Xuelin and
Michael Bates married in 2012.^^ Lord Bates had been a friend of China
for some years, so much so that when Xi Jinping addressed the British
parliament during his 2015 state visit he singled out Bates for praise.
And Bates was present at Xi’s meeting with the elite of the CCP’s British
friends, along with a number of prominent faces from the 48 Group
Club, of which Bates is a fellow.In 2019 Bates gave a TED talk in
which he professed his love for China and the amazing achievements of
its government, reeling off a string of statistics and telling his audience
that China only wants peace.^^ In April that same year, Li Xuelin, now
Lady Bates, attended a seminar, Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy,
hosted by the Chinese embassy and also attended by several 48 Group
Club luminaries, including Chairman Perry.^^

The marriage to Bates opened more doors. Over the years, she has
actively facilitated access by Chinese businesspeople to Britain s elite
circles, receiving praise in united front outlets in China.^

In 2014 Xuelin Bates was caught up in a property development
scandal involving Boris Johnson, then mayor of London, with whom

136

HUAREN CANZHENG IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

she had developed a friendship. A deal she facilitated between Johnson
and a Chinese company she worked for, Advanced Business Park, to
redevelop a part of Londons Royal Albert Dock was worth £1 billion
and described as ‘Chinas largest property investment in the
It was claimed that Johnson gave preferment to ABP because of Bates’s
donations to the Conservative Party—£162,000 between 2010 and
2012. Lady Bates said the money had not come from ABP but from
her own pocket.'"' It seems that in 2015 she persuaded Johnson to
back another development by a Chinese firm, this one in Crystal Palace
Park and worth £500 million.'"^ Lord Bates failed to declare a financial
interest in the scheme, which subsequently collapsed.'"^

Xuelin Bates pays £50,000 a year to be a member of the Leader’s
Group, which was set up by David Cameron for top donors to the
Conservative Party.Members have special access to senior politicians.
In May 2014, at a Conservative Party luncheon that she co-organised,
Xuelin Bates introduced her Chinese guests one by one to Cameron, in
order, it was said, to lay a foundation for future Sino-British coopera¬
tion.'"^ In 2017 she campaigned with her husband for Theresa May in
the forthcoming general election, sitting next to the prime minister as
May made phone calls to voters. ZJUKA’s newsletter emphasised that its
president Xuelin stood next to May when the prime minister delivered
her campaign speech.'"" Lady Bates was again rubbing shoulders with
the prime minister at a Two Cities Luncheon in 2018.'"^ In 2019 Lord
and Lady Bates campaigned enthusiastically for Boris Johnson.

In February 2019 ZJUKA held the UK-China ‘Golden Era’ New
Year Dinner in the Houses of Parliament, where British politicians,
Chinese diplomats and businessmen mingled. At a charity auction
session, a piece of papercut art made by Theresa May was bought by
Beijing businessman Yao Yichun.'"" A few days later, at the Conservative
Partys annual black-and-white fundraising ball, Xuelin Bates informed
Theresa May that Yao Yichun had paid £2200 for her artwork. The
prime minister was reportedly very pleased and thanked Yao for his
generosity.'"" Two years earlier, Yao Yichun had donated £12,000 to a
charity event hosted by Lady Bates.""

On the same day that Christine Lee was draping the door of
0 Downing Street with Chinese banners, Xuelin Bates and three other

137

MOBILISING THE CHINESE DIASPORA

figures linked to CCP agencies were decorating the inside of Number 10
for a celebration of Chinese New Year with Theresa May.'" Christine
Lee and Xuelin Bates had both succeeded in positioning themselves close
to Brirains top elites, where they could spread a ‘Chinese perspective .

Lord Michael Bates is an enthusiastic hiker and has undertaken several
'Walks of Friendship’ through China. In August 2019, with Lady Bates
in attendance, he took a month-long hike around Zhejiang province.
The walk was co-organised by the Chinese People’s Association for
Friendship with Foreign Countries and the Walk for Peace Foundation
(chaired by Lady Xuelin Bates).A soft-soap documentary was made
of Bates’s meet-the-people walk by a subsidiary of the China Foreign
Language Bureau, part of the CCP’s external propaganda machine.

Whether seen as pathetic or sinister, Michael Bates’s activities are
ideal for the CCP tactic of‘use the foreigner to tell good China stories’.
Interviewed by the Peoples Daily in 2019, he once again gushed about
modern China, stressing how much it has contributed to world peace
and prosperity."^

At a screening of the documentary at the Chinese embassy in
London, the ambassador told those gathered: ‘On their journey, [the
Bates’s] tried to find out about the connection between Xi Jinping
Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era
and different places and people in China, and what kind of guidance
it offered to local development.Agreements have been reached to
air the documentary on CNBC, The Wall Street Journal website, China
Central Television, and a number of new media outlets.

More importantly for the CCP’s influence work in Britain, in
December 2019 it was reported that Bates had signed an agreement
with LiXiaolin, president of the CPAFFC, to establish the UK China
Friendship Association, scheduled to be launched in February 2020.'"^
The agreement was made at a meeting in the Beijing office of the
CPAFFC with Li Xiaolin. During the same visit, Lord and Lady Bates
were presented with an award for spreading the Brilliance of China by
the deputy minister of the CCP’s Propaganda Department.

138

8

The ecology of espionage

Influence and spying

In 1996 President Bill Clintons re-election fund received a large
donation from the Chinese-Indonesian company Lippo, and further
donations from the Chinese-Thai group Charoeun Popkhand and
the Macau company San Kin Yip, Lippo had been partly acquired by
China Resources Group, a company that was owned by the Ministry
of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation. All up, these donations
amounted to $4.5 million. They had been brokered by a number of
Chinese-Americans with links to the CCP. It was later reported that
$300,000 had been provided by the daughter of General Liu Huaqing,
a vice chairman of Chinas Central Military Commission until 1997.'

The brokers were frequent visitors to the White House, often bring¬
ing Chinese associates. One organised a meeting between Bill Clinton
and Wang Jun, head of the Hong Kong-based companies CITIC
and China Poly Group, both of which have close links with the PLA.
A Hong Kong insider said that the leadership of Cl LIC is known to
harbour within its ranks a large number of secret agents’ from military
intelligence, and Poly Technologies (a Poly Group subsidiary) has been
de^ribed as 'a haven for the Red Princes’.^ Wang Jun, in other words,
intelligence when he mer the US president in the

139

THE ECOLOGY OF ESPIONAGE

Tl\erc is niucli more to the ‘Chinagate’ scandal, which was con-
voluttxi and had implications never fully exposed, in part because the
Lewinsky scandal distracted attention. But it did reveal the ability of
Chinas intelligence agencies to penetrate to the highest levels.^

Chinagate was a foretaste of something else. Beijing’s espionage
activities (stealing secrets and intellectual property) and its influence
operations (shaping opinion and behaviour) frequently go hand in
hand, and often involve the same people and organisations. But while
united front operatives in the West can often be identified, not least
because they are inclined to brag about their activities, intelligence
agents operate under deep cover. This chapter explains how influence is
leveraged to facilitate espionage, and how espionage is used to inform
and enhance influence activities.

Historically, Western spy agencies have confined themselves to
stealing government and military secrets, by recruiting agents, plant¬
ing moles and intercepting communications. While the Chinese state
engages in these traditional practices, it also crosses boundaries, sending
intelligence agents into all kinds of other domains. Beijing devotes
enormous resources to both industrial espionage, aimed at commercial
secrets, and state espionage, aimed at government and military secrets.
The assistant director of counter-intelligence at the FBI, Bill Priestap,
observed in late 2018 that the bureau has handled ‘thousands’ of com¬
plaints about and investigations into non-traditional espionage activity,
mostly concerning China. ‘Every rock we turn over, every time we look
for it, it is not only there—it is worse than anticipated,’ he said.'* The
U.S. Department of Justice estimates that between 2011 and 2018
China was involved in 90 per cent of economic espionage cases.^

Industrial espionage has been practised by private companies for a
long time, but China has taken the leap of deploying its diplomatic and
intelligence services to facilitate the theft of intellectual property.In
addition, the united front apparatus and the intelligence agencies reach
deeply into overseas Chinese communities where they recruit both agents
of influence as well as informants and spies. While traditional forms of
espionage rely on specialised training, China’s diffuse program of intel¬
ligence gathering relies on thousands of amateur information collectors,
what James To calls ‘de-centralised micro-espionage’.' Professionals,

140

CHINA’S ESPIONAGE AGENCIES

businesspeople, students and even tourists are encouraged to provide
information to handlers in embassies and consulates as part of the thou¬
sand grains of sand’ strategy. In 2007 the head of the Canadian Security
Intelligence Service observed, ‘It’s surprising, sometimes, the number of
hyperactive tourists we get here and where they come from.’® The infor¬
mation may be about technology, trade negotiations, business pricing
and strategies, or reports on the activities of members of the diaspora.^
Peter Mattis, among others, argues that, although there are indeed
thousands of amateurs gathering information, much of the activity is
conceived and directed by professionals in the intelligence services.
Mattis describes a ‘layered approach to intelligence collection, from
traditional operations by spy agencies down to amateurs working
from their homes and offices." Rather than waiting for what comes
in, intelligence professionals target particular pieces of intellectual
property, often working with factories and research labs in China, and
then finding people who can acquire them.'* With advice or training
from their handlers, some amateur spies use ‘tradecraft’ methods such
as encryption, covert communication, aliases and counter-surveillance
practices. In November 2019 Xuehua Peng, a San Francisco tour guide
and US citizen, was convicted on spying charges after being caught
making ‘dead drops’; to wit, hiding cash-filled envelopes in hotel rooms
then returning to pick up memory cards containing classified security
information, which he took to China and handed to agents at the
Ministry of State Security.’’

China’s espionage agencies

Since the remit of China’s intelligence agencies is much broader than
those of Western nations, they need more resources, and Xi Jinping
has made sure thev receive them. As Roger Faligot has written, there
has been a ‘formidable increase in the authority of the Chinese intel¬
ligence apparatus, specifically since 2017’.'^ There are two primary
spying organisations: the Ministry of State Security, and the Intelligence
Bureau of the CMC Joint Staff Department (formerly 2PLA, the Second
Department of the PLA. General Staff Department).

Roughly speaking, the Ministry of State Security combines the
functions of the CIA and the FBI, but with much more power and

141

the ecology of espionage

txKUSCil on the political security of the CCP. The MSS is responsible for
l>oth clonicstic and overseas intelligence and security operations. It can
order Chinese organisations and individuals, including those abroad,
to undertake intelligence activities. Much of the work is carried out
by provincial and municipal offices. Peter Mattis and Matthew Brazil,
authors of the most recent and authoritative account of China’s spy
agencies, identify eighteen MSS bureaus.*^ For our purposes, several are
wordi noting.

The 1st Bureau is responsible for agents in deep cover, with no links
to the government, and the 2nd Bureau runs agents ‘using diplomatic,
journalistic, or other government-related covers’.'*^ The 10th Bureau
(Foreign Security and Reconnaissance) manages Chinese student
organisations abroad, among others; the 11th, comprising the CICIR
think tank, does open-source research and network-building abroad;
the 12th (Social Affairs) handles ‘MSS contributions to united front
work’; and the 18th (U.S. Operations) carries out clandestine espionage
in the United States. Most of the operations against the US are run by
the Shanghai State Security Bureau.'^

It was reported in 2005 that the FBI believed the MSS had set up
around 3000 front companies to conceal its activities.*® The MSS has
various arms engaged in economic espionage and it has ‘embedded
itself deep in major financial and commercial organizations, particu¬
larly in Shanghai and Hong Kong’.'^ Not all economic espionage is
state-directed. Chinese nationals are known to set up firms that take
orders from companies in China to obtain and supply specific pieces
of intellectual property from their competitors in the West, usually by
identifying an employee willing to provide such secrets.^**

The People’s Liberation Army also undertakes extensive intelligence¬
gathering and espionage. The structure was overhauled in 2016 and
much remains opaque, though Peter Mattis sets out the new structure
as best as is known.^*

The Intelligence Bureau of the CMC Joint Staff Department is
responsible for military intelligence but also has a history of extensive
activity in civilian domains. It draws on military attaches and signals
intelligence to gather intelligence. The Joint Staff Department has
its own think tanks—the China Institute for International Strategic

142

CHINA’S ESPIONAGE AGENCIES

Studies, which focuses on research, and the China Foundation for
International and Strategic Studies, which engages in academic and
policy exchanges.2^ Its Institute of International Relations (now part of
the National University of Defense Technology) trains military attaches
and secret agents. In their 2016 book Chinas Espionage Dynasty, James
Scott and Drew Spaniel estimated that 2PLA had 30,000-50,000 plants
in organisations around the world, whose aim is to collect information,
confidential and otherwise, to be sent back to China.

The Central Military Commission’s Political Work Department
maintains the Partys control structures in the armed forces, including
education, indoctrination and discipline. According to Mattis, its
Liaison Department specialises in united front work, political warfare,
and clandestine HUMINT (human intelligence).^'^ It has maintained
an extensive program of infiltrating or covertly taking over private
companies, and of using state-owned companies as cover for intelli¬
gence activity. Many of these companies are based in Hong Kong. The
Liaison Department operates the important front organisation, the
China Association for International Friendly Contacts, described in
chapter ten.

The PLAs powerful Strategic Support Force, formed in 2016,
brings together most of the PLA’s technical reconnaissance capabilities
overhead, in cyberspace, and across the electromagnetic spectrum’.
With a focus on intelligence-gathering lor military operations, the SSF
is responsible for signals intelligence including monitoring telecommu¬
nications, as well as cyber intelligence, special operations, information
warhire, and ofiensive cyber operations (tasks previously done by the
General Stall Department’s third and fourth departments).

Chinas enormous appetite for other countries’ technology—obtained
legally or otherwise—is satisfied by a number of means. At the heart of
defence-industry technology transfer is the State Administration for
Science, lechnology and Industry for National Defence, ‘a veritable
intelligence vacuum cleaner”’.’^

This central intelligence apparatus has parallel structures in State
Securin' Bureaus in each province. Provinces and major cities also have
their own talent and recruitment programs linked directly to the United
Front Work Department.-^

the ecology of

ESPIONAGE

Recruitment methods

A review of Cl.ina.|i„kcd espionage cases of all kinds in ,he US
be,ween 2000 and early 2019. carried on, by the Center for Stratcvic
and International Studies, tallied 137 reported instances. I, found
that 57 per cent of actors were ‘Chinese military or government
employees’, 36 per cent were ‘private Chinese citizens’, and 7 per cent
were ‘non-Chinese actors (usually US persons)’.^'^ (A study of all cases
of economic espionage in the US between 2009 and 2015 found that
52 per cent of those charged were of Chinese heritage, a tripling of the
percentage for the period 1997 to 2009.^“)

It’s possible that the high proportion of Chinese-heritage spies is due
to racial bias in the FBI and Department of Justice. But rather than a
sharp rise of anti-Chinese racism in federal agencies, a more plausible
explanation is that Beijing has stepped up its program of industrial
espionage in the US and has recruited Chinese visitors to America, and
Chinese-Americans, to commit the crimes.^* Even so, the number of
people of non-Chinese heritage induced to spy for China appears to

be rising.

Ego, sex, ideology, patriotism, and especially money are all exploited
by China’s intelligence services to recruit spies. In 2017 an FBI employee,
Kun Shan Chun (Joey Chun), was convicted of supplying information
about the bureau’s organisation and operations to Chinese agents, in
exchange for free international travel and visits to prostitutes.^^ i^mong
those who spy for China, ideology is a factor mainly for people of
Chinese heritage (unlike during the Cold War, when Westerners spied
for the USSR for ideological reasons). Beijing also deploys the threat of
punishment of family members in China if a target refuses to cooperate.

Ideology appears to have been the motive for Russell Lowe, the
alleged spy who worked for many years for Senator Dianne Feinstein,
including the period when she chaired the Senate’s intelligence commit¬
tee, a role that gave her access to many of America’s most closely guarded
secrets.^^ Feinstein was informed by the FBI that she had a suspected
spy in her office in 2013. Russell Lowe, a Chinese-American, had spent
years as a pro-Beijing activist in the San Francisco Bay Area, providing
political intelligence to the Chinese consulate. Among the organisations
Lowe worked with was the Education for Social Justice Foundation

144

RECRUITMENT METHODS

which exposes the sexual slavery of women, mostly Korean, by the
Japanese Imperial Army during the Second World War. The comfort
women atrocity is used by CCP agents to stir resentment and patriotic
leelings among overseas Chinese, and to drive a wedge between Japan
and its Western allies. Lowe is also linked to a group known as the
End National Security Scapegoating coalition, which argues that the
prosecution of Chinese-heritage spies is no more than racial profiling
under the pretext of national security.^'*

Feinstein has been a China-booster from the early 1990s, often
backing pro-Beijing legislation in the Senate. Her husband has strong
business links in China, which she denies have had any influence on
her. In 1997 she compared the Tiananmen Square massacre to the
shooting of four students at Ohio’s Kent State University in 1970, and
called for a joint US—China commission on the two nations’ human
rights records.Lowe left Feinstein’s office after the FBI warned her
about him.

China’s intelligence agencies also target Westerners not of Chinese
heritage for information-gathering. In 2017 a long-serving State
Department employee, Candace Claiborne, was indicted for accepting
money and gifts from Chinese agents in exchange for diplomatic and
economic information.-^^ She had been targeted by the MSS’s Shanghai
State Security Bureau after she asked a Chinese friend to find a job in
China for a family member. Claiborne maintained secret contact with
MSS agents for five years, supplying them with information in return
for help with her ‘financial woes’. She was sentenced to forty months
in prison.

In the early 1990s Britain’s M15 wrote a protection manual for
businesspeople visiting China; the advice remains relevant today: ‘Be
especially alert for flattery and over-generous hospitality ... [Westerners]
are more likely to be the subject of long-term, low key cultivation, aimed
at making “friends” ... The aim of these tactics is to create a debt of
obligation on the part of the target, who will eventually find it difficult
to refuse inevitable requests for favours in return.

Chinas civilian and militarv^ intelligence agents are trained in the art
of cultivating ‘friends’. Sinophiles, and newcomers with a fascination
for the culture, are especially vulnerable. After grooming they may

145

the ecology of espionage

n«i«ly supply i,uclligc.,ce information believing they ate eontril ■
to mutual understanding and harmony. ^ <'ihuting

Ta-pically, Westerners are lured by money, sexual favour, and tb
excitement ol clandestine opetations. Money appears to be the m
aammon bait for those Westerners, judging by the cases that haT
become public. A target might be offered a modest sum for a shoo
White paper’ on, for example, US-China trade relations. Once paymen't
for information has been normalised, larger payments and tequests for
confidential information are made, until the line has been crossed into
illegality.

In the case of commercial secrets, the target, such as an engineer at
a high-tech US company, might be offered a trip with expenses paid
plus a stipend to give a lecture at a university in China. If the target is
of Chinese heritage, they may also be leant on to help the motherland
No corporate secrets may be given away on this occasion, but as the
relationship develops over time, the target betrays their employer.

One such instance is the case of Xu Yanjun, a senior officer with the

Jiangsu office of the MSS, who was charged in 2018 with attempting
to obtain ‘highly sensitive information from GE Aviation. Working
with the Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronomies, Xu
contacted American aerospace engineers and offered them educational
exchanges.^® Travel expenses were paid, along with a lecturing fee, and
the desired relationships built gradually. In another case, Ji Chaoqin
arrived in the United States in 2013 to study electrical engineering
at the Illinois Institute of Technology. In September that year he was
charged by the FBI for attempting to identify scientists and engineers as
potential recruits for China. Ji had allegedly been recruited as a spotter
by the Jiangsu office of the MSS.^^ He had enlisted in the U.S. Army
Reserves.

when sex is the means of exploitation, there are three methods. The
first is seduction that leads to the direct theft of secrets. For example
Ian Clement, deputy to the then mayor of London, Boris Johnson, was
caught in a honey trap while in Beijing for the 2008 Olympics. He was
approached by an attractive woman, agreed to have a couple of drinks

en invite her up to his hotel room." There he passed out apparentlv

146

RECRUITMENT METHODS

contents of his BlackBerry downloaded. A top aide to Prime Minister
Gordon Brown fell for the same trap in the same year.'“

The second method is seduction that leads to blackmail, using
compromising photographs. This classic honey trap {meirenji, literally
‘beautiful person plan) was perfected by the Russians.'*^ Though the
method is not uncommon, cases rarely come to light.'*^ In 2017 the
former deputy head of MI6, Nigel Inkster, said that Chinas agencies
were using honey traps more often.^^ In 2016 reports suggested that the
Dutch ambassador to Beijing had been entrapped.'*^

The third method is the formation of a long-term relationship that
causes the target to turn—that is, to see the world from a CCP point of
view. In May 2018 two former agents of France s external intelligence
service, Direction generale de la securite exterieure (DGSE), were
arrested for spying for China.'**^ One of them, Colonel Henri Manioc,
had allegedly defected in 1998 after falling in love with a Chinese
woman. He had been head of mission at the French embassy in Beijing.

In more recent times, Chinas intelligence agencies have exploited
social media to approach potentially useful Westerners. In 2018 French
authorities revealed that they had uncovered a program to approach
thousands of experts using fake accounts on Linkedin, the professional
networking tool. Posing as think tank staff, entrepreneurs and consult¬
ants, the account operators told individuals that their expertise was of
interest to a Chinese company, and offered them free trips to China.
Those who accepted spent a few days being befriended through social
activities and were then asked to provide information. It’s believed that
in some cases they were photographed in compromising situations,
such as accepting payments, making them prone to blackmail.'^^ The
French expose followed a similar one in Germany, where more than
10,000 experts and professionals were approached.'*** It’s believed that
several hundred expressed interest in the offers made to them. In 2016
a Chinese secret service agent posing as a businessman used Linkedin
to contact a member of the German Bundestag, offering to pay him
€30,000 tor confidential information on his parliamentary work. The
MP, who has not been named, accepted."*^

The CCP's activities have brought all people of Chinese heritage
under more scrutiny, leading to accusations that American agencies

147

THE ECOLOGY OF ESPIONAGE

have been engaged in racial profiling.’^’ The evidence for this is scant
although there have been some unwarranted arrests, and the risk is that
blame will be deflected away from the very active Chinese intelligence
agencies and onto US law enforcement agencies, which have said they
do not have the resources to keep up.^'

Think tanks and research institutes

Various Chinese intelligence agencies have spent years cultivating rela¬
tionships in Western universities and think tanks, partly with the aim
of winning friends over to the CCP s point of view. Faligot notes that
the ‘Chinese secret services have frequently tried to infiltrate foreign
institutes and China research centres’.

One of the most important organisations for this work is the China
Institutes of Contemporary International Relations.It was reported
to have 400 or so members in 2011, including PLA and intelligence
officers, and is overseen by the MSS’s 11th Bureau.(CICIR’s president
from 1992—98 was Ceng Huichang, who became Minister of State
Security from 2007 until 2016, and a member of the CCP Central
Committee.^^) In addition to engaging in influence activities, CICIR
trains future intelligence officers and prepares intelligence briefings
for the Standing Committee of the Politburo. David Shambaugh has
described CICIR as a ‘Soviet-style intelligence organ’.

Through exchange of personnel, CICIR has close links with the
University of International Relations in Beijing, set up to train, among
others, undercover intelligence officers for Xinhua News Agency.^"
Its influence derives not so much from recruiting informants as the
cultivation of professional links across the globe. Its stock in trade is
academic exchanges and conferences, described by Faligot as ‘one of
the tricks’ CICIR uses to gain entry to ‘the most closed circles of the
host country’.^®

CICIR holds an annual dialogue with the EU’s Institute for Security
Studies in Paris, and has met regularly with influential Washington
D.C. think tank the Center for Strategic and International Studies to
discuss cybersecurity.These dialogues provide opportunities not only
to create networks for intelligence gathering, but also shape the thinking
of American and European experts, by, for example, presenting China

148

THINK TANKS AND RESEARCH INSTITUTES

as the victim of cyber intrusions and casting doubt on the US’s ability
to attribute hacking to China/’"

In Italy CICIR has organised workshops with the Turin-based think
tank Torino World Affairs Institute. TWAI’s journal, OrizzonteCinu
{China Skyline) not only avoids criticism of the CCP but offers a
generally admiring perspective on China under the CCP, including
welcoming the extension of the BRI into Southern Europe,^' TWAI
has partnered with the University of Turin and the prestigious ESCP
business school in Paris to create a China-centred ‘knowledge hub’.

Since the early 2000s, CICIR has been arranging conferences
with other Chinese organisations, including the China Institute for
International and Strategic Studies, an arm of military intelligence, and
the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.*’^ These conferences, too, are
an opportunity to persuade foreigners to commit to regular exchanges.*’^

The Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences is a distinguished organisa¬
tion with over 500 research staff, second in prestige only to the Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences. Agents of the Shanghai bureau of the MSS
are known to pose as researchers from the Shanghai academy, and acad¬
emy staff are used by the Shanghai State Security Bureau as spotters for
foreign spies and agents of influence."'^ The Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences has been used for the same purpose. In July 2017 US journalist
Nate Thayer wrote a detailed account of attempts by the Shanghai State
Security Bureau to recruit him for espionage."^

In a 2017 affidavit, the FBI presented evidence that Kevin Mallory,
who had previously worked for the Pentagon’s Defense Intelligence
Agency and had a ‘top secret’ security clearance, was recruited to spy
for China by someone claiming to be from the Shanghai Academy
of Social Sciences."" After being approached through his Linkedln
account, Mallory travelled to Shanghai where he was given a new phone
and shown how to use an encrypted service for communicating and
sending documents. He was asked to prepare white papers on US policy
matters, which he agreed to do. According to the FBI, he also acquired
secret and top-secret documents from defence-related firms and sent
them to his contacts in Shanghai in exchange for thousands of dollars.

By contrast, US citizen Glenn Duffie Shriver fell in love with China
on a summer study-program visit."' He moved to Shanghai and was

149

the ecology of espionage

rc;ruit«l by ,hc MSS after responding ,o a newspaper advertisemen,
seeking «>m«>ne to write a paper on trade relations. He was paid $120
ft>r a short report. Over time, 'friendships’ were built and Shriver wa.,
ortcred n\ore money. Xhen he was encouraged to seek employment in
the US Swte Department or the CIA and was paid large sums when
he applied for positions. At his sentencing hearing he said things
had spiralled out of control. He admitted being motivated by greed;

'I mean, >^u know, large stacks of money in front of me.’^®

A thousand talents

The CCP s qiaowu activities among the diaspora are another means of
recruiting spies.*’^ MSS and PLA agents cultivate warm relationships
through such things as dinners and events organised by embassies or
cultural and professional associations. According to James To, the
PLA and MSS also identify recruits before they leave China.^° Carrots
and sticks are deployed. The carrots are promises of good jobs and
houses when targets return to China. The sticks include refusing visas
and threats to harm families. Graduate students may become sleeper
agents, only activated if they find themselves in jobs with access to
desirable information. James To writes that clandestine and aggressive
methods are used mainly on those overseas Chinese who can provide
information of scientific, technological or military value.^*

The Thousand Talents Plan aims to recruit highly qualified ethnic
Chinese people to ‘return to China with the expertise and knowl¬
edge they’ve acquired abroad. Alternatively, those loyal to China can
‘remain in place’ to serve. The US Department of Energy, whose work
includes nuclear weapons and advanced R&D on energy, has been
heavily targeted to this end.^^ Around 35,000 foreign researchers are
employed in the department’s labs, 10,000 of them from China. Many
of the latter return via the Thousand Talents or other programs. Other
returnees take knowledge gained in top defence labs. According to one
report, ‘so many scientists from Los Alamos [science and technology
labs] have returned to Chinese universities and research institutes that
people have dubbed them the “Los Alamos club’”.^^

Although the Thousand Talents Plan was only established in 2008
the systematic transfer of technology from the West has been under way

150

A THOUSAND TALENTS

for much longer. When China began to open up under Deng Xiaoping
in the late 1970s and early 1980s, a program was developed to send
technically talented young Chinese to the West. Many of the brightest
students were sent to Germany and the United States to obtain PhDs in
physics; some stayed on and achieved senior positions at top universi¬
ties, from where they could send information to China.

In the United States it has been known for some years that scien¬
tists with access to advanced knowledge and valuable research data
have been working for China.^'* But until recently very few have been
willing to recognise the problem for what it is and to confront it. In
March 2019 it was reported that the nations largest funder of science,
the Maryland-based National Institutes of Health, had written to
hundreds of research universities asking about the links of certain
researchers to foreign governments.^^ It expressed concern about the
theft of intellectual property by researchers linked to the Chinese
government or Chinese universities (Russia and Iran were also on
the radar).

The following month a story broke about the prominent Houston
cancer centre MD Anderson, which had fired three Chinese-American
researchers named by the National Institutes of Health as suspected of
stealing research and failing to disclose foreign ties.The NIH partly
funds the cancer centre. At least fifty-five other institutions were
reported to have received similar letters from the National Institutes of
Health.Some of those named came under scrutiny because of their
involvement in the Thousand Talents Plan. On 28 January 2020 one
of Harvard’s most senior facidty members, chemist and nanoscientist
Dr Charles Lieber, was taken away in handcuffs when the FBI alleged
that he had been recruited into the Thousand Talents Program. The
Department of Justice alleges that between 2012 and 2017 he was
paid $50,000 a month plus generous living expenses to set up a lab at
Wuhan University of Technologv and transfer his knowledge.^® Lieber
failed to disclose his China links to Harvard, even though the Wuhan
centre was called the ‘'VCTJT-Harvard Joint Nano Key Laboratory’.
His wooing had been going on for some years; in 2009 the Party had
honoured him with a Friendship Award.If the allegations are true,
he appears to have been motived solely by greed.

THE ECOLOGY OF ESPIONAGE

The Association for International Exchange of Per,on

keetxs t lo^y 'lave heard of u

O ‘ dblv dcxlicatctl to people-to-people exchanges, the CAIEP ha.,

the US, Otnada, Russia, Germany, the UK. Australia. Israel
^ S'injptix^'^' agreements and collaborates

^sations in many more countries. In 1999 the US Congress’s
A ^Tk Cox Committee report on Chinese nuclear spying described
rllEP as organisations set up by the PRC to iHe-

^ ire technology through contacts with Western scientists and
gaily acqui^^ a vast espionage operation that has combed the

^"^'"Tstates in search of sensitive weapons secrets’.®'

ears later, US law enforcement is still grappling with
Twenty j 2019 the Department of Justice arrested the head

rAlEPsacuvities. m ^

r New York office on a charge of conspiracy to commit visa fraud.®^
^.ve an invaluable insight into CAIEP’s recruitment of

The indictment gave an 1 o

• IT specialists and others to return to China with
scientists, engineers, n-u- ■. a p i

dieir workplaces' intellectual property. Bu.ld.ng on united front work,

the CAIEP work with ethnic Chinese professional associations, ‘friends’

in US universities, and Confiicius Institutes, all in close collaboration
with Chinese consulates.

The CAIEP is managed by the Stare Administration of Foreign
Experts Affairs, which reports directly to the Ministry of Science and
Technology (see the organisation chart on pages 124-5). Espionage
experts Hannas, Mulvenon and Puglisi single our SAF'i-A (sometimes
referred to as the Foreign Experts Bureau, a more direct translation of its
official Chinese name) as the foremost PRC-based, technology-transfer
organisation.®^ In practice ‘there is no distinction to be made between
cooperating with’ CAIEP and with SAFEA.®"* I he latter was caught
red-handed in the US recruiting an engineer to supply to the PRC
Highly classified designs for US stealth missiles.®'' The engineer was
sentenced to thirty-nvo years in prison. While the United States has
acking down on illegal technolog)' transfer, Canada has for years

beenaettvelyEcilitatinetheworkofrATFP %

fKp‘o L r ^ ak or and removing barriers For

me exchange of talent’.®^ ^ ^ ^ lor

where it states ffiat tinted at on its website,

'""’'“'on-ouse’n.anyo-pesofrecrui.men;

152

PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS

channels’ and to do so by making ‘full use of contacts with govern¬
ments, exchanges with sister cities, international economic and trade
negotiations, international conferences, and like opportunities’ to
recruit foreign experts. One such channel is private companies. Triway
Enterprises is a Virginia-based company set up under SAFEA’s auspices,
with branches in Beijing and Nanjing.®® Its function is to link Chinese
firms and local government offices with US experts who can supply
intellectual property.

Professional associations

The Chinese Association for Science and Technology USA is probably
the largest association for ethnic Chinese scientists and engineers in the
US, with over 10,000 members.®^ It collaborates with Triway Enterprises
and has tight links with China’s government and universities, consistent
with its mission to serve as a bridge between the US and China for
scientific and technological cooperation.Some of its office holders
also hold positions at Chinese universities, and according to its national
president in 2016, twenty presidents of its various chapters have
returned to work in China.

The Washington D.C. chapter of CAS l -USA has over 1000 mem¬
bers, drawn from Maryland and Virginia a.s well as D.C.^* The CAST
Network Society was founded in 2000 at the University of Maryland
for Chinese-heritage experts in information technology.In 2002
the University ot Mar\’land agreed to host one of China’s national
innovation parks, tlie first of these facilities to be established abroad.

CAS l-USA is ttniy one of an extensive network of similar associa¬
tions in the US. and there are others elsewhere.'^^ In Australia the peak
body tor such associations is the federation of Chinese Scholars in

Australia, whose office holders are professors and university administra¬
tors of C.hitiese heritaiie. ' Its launch in October 2004 was celebrated

by the Ptop/^s Duily, which noted that the federation had begun ‘with
the energetic support and aid or the Chinese Embassy in Australia’s
^ueation office. f hinas ambassador to Australia at the time, Fu Ying,

"as reported as saying she hoped that the specialists and scholars
■ould be able to transfer advanced technological achiev'ements back to
ffitinding president ot FOCSA was -Max Lu (Lu Gaoqing),

THE ECOLOGY OF ESPIONAGE

;\t tl\c time a nanotechnology expert at the University of Queensland, He
has long maintained close connections with the Chinese state, including
membership of an Expert Consultative Committee of the Chinese State
Council.'^^ In 2017 Lu became the vice chancellor of the University of
Surrey in the UK.

Many of these professional associations have deep links with the
Chinese state, collaborating closely with consulates and SAFEA offices.
Professional associations are in some cases created at the suggestion of
the Chinese state. Patriotic overtures are made, but so are promises
of ‘extremely high’ salaries on top of legitimate salaries.^® Hannas,
Mulvenon and Puglisi write that Beijing ‘courts these associations and
steers their activities using a mix of psychological pressure, political
control, and financial incentives’.^^

There’s a concentration of ethnic Chinese professional organisations
in Silicon Valley, where around one in ten high-tech workers is from
mainland China.'®® The Silicon Valley Chinese Engineers Association
was created in 1989 for mainland Chinese experts living in the Bay
Area. Its mission includes ‘establishing channels to allow members to
engage in China’s rapid economic development’.'®' The dependence of
China’s growth on Western technology was disclosed, along with one
of the methods of acquiring it, in an indiscreet 2013 interview by a
senior IT engineer in Silicon Valley, Jack Peng. He also held office in the
Silicon Valley Chinese Overseas Business Association, which links over¬
seas Chinese experts with the PRC. According to Peng, ‘China regards
those of us living overseas as essential. It extends a hand to us to make
the results of our research blossom on Chinese soil ... Most ol us serve
as advisors to the Chinese government through the SCOBA organisa¬
tion ... Everyone has entered into a system of full-scale cooperation.’'®^

Canada has a similar network of PRC-linked professional associ¬
ations. While these organisations provide social contact and career
advancement, they also bring experts together in ways that can be
manipulated, as directed by Chinese consulates.

In 2017 the head of the SAFEA, Zhang Jianguo, was in New York
to celebrate CAIEP’s thirty years of operation in the United States.'®^
He expressed pleasure that it had maintained deep engagement with a
host of US educational institutions, industrial associations and famous

154

PLA SCIENTISTS IN WESTERN UNIVERSITIES

scholars’, noting that it had arranged many academic visits and offered
help to foreign experts working in China.

The following year, a similar event was held in London to celebrate
the UK’s thirty-year anniversary of SAFEA/CAIEP activity. Those
present were told by a British intellectual property lawyer that China
was building a world-class system of IP protection and that most reports
about Western companies having their technology ripped off could be
explained by lax behaviour by the companies concerned.

In 2019, as Chinese-American scientists with links to China came
under greater federal scrutiny, some of them (backed by the Committee
of 100, see chapter eleven) complained of a new McCarthyism, and
of being forced ‘to pick one side’ (as if working for both sides were
the norm).'®*" Reporting the sacking of Chinese-American scientists
suspected of giving IP to China, Bill Bishop of the respected Sinocism
newsletter noted that some Chinese-American scientists of his acquaint¬
ance claimed the practice of secret ‘double-dipping’ had been going
for many years and a crackdown was long overdue.Bishop quotes
one Chinese-American scientist saying that he and others like him are
ashamed of the degree of pilfering they see around them’.

PLA scientists in Western universities

Western universities have been the target of intensive influence efforts
by the CCP for some years, Their scientists have been invited to collab¬
orate with Chinese universities, including the PLA’s National University
of Defence lechnology, and Western universities have also invited
Chinese scientists and engineers into their labs, to work on military-
related research projects. As a result, universities in the West have
been helping China to gain military superiority over the US through
advanced weapons research.

Forensic research by Alex Joske has uncovered the extensive network
of collaboration between researchers in Western universities and scien¬
tists linked to China’s military."^** He found that since 2007 the PLA has
sent more than 2500 military scientists and engineers to study abroad,
in the process developing research relationships with hundreds of top
scientists across the globe. The highest number are to be found in the
Five Eyes nations (the US, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand),

155

the ecology of espionage

along with Germany and Singapore. By 2017 Western scientists h
written lunulreds of scientific papers with Chinese military scientilts^^
In many cases, the PLA affiliation of Chinese military scientists work
ing abroad has been obscured. Some claim to be from the Zhengzh
Information Science and Technology Institute, which, judging by th
number of publications in which its cited, is one of the world s leading
centres of computer science and communications engineering. Joske
discovered that its scientists have published, at times in collaboration
with US researchers, over 900 papers in major science journals, includ¬
ing the prestigious Physical Review Letters, one of the world s top physics
journals, and The Computer Journal, published by Oxford University.

Yet the Zhengzhou Information Science and Technology Institute
does not actually exist. It has no website, no phone number and no
buildings. It does have a post office box in Henan provinces capital
city, Zhengzhou, but that’s about it. The name is in fact a cover for
the university that trains China’s military hackers and signals intelli¬
gence officers, the People’s Liberation Army Information Engineering
University, which is based in Zhengzhou.Researchers from the
University of Texas at Dallas, the State University of New York at Buffalo,
Clemson University in South Carolina, Louisiana State University, and
City University of New York have all collaborated with individuals who
disguise their affiliation with this PLA university, which is in effect its
cyberwarfare training school."®

The doors to PLA scientists appear to be most open in Australia. As
Joske has shown, for some years a complex network of collaboration
has been flourishing between Australian scientists and their counter¬
parts in top PLA universities, helping to advance Xi Jinping’s ‘Strong
Army Dream’.'" Australian researchers have published hundreds of
joint papers with researchers from the PLA’s National University of
Defense Technology, covering such areas as materials science, artificial
intelligence and computer science. One collaborator is Professor Tao
Dacheng, formerly at the University of Technology Sydney, now at the
University of Sydney. His work on computer vision has applications i
automatic target recognition, missile guidance, and battlefield asse

ment and prediction. Tao’s research with NUDT scienrierc k c

funded by Australia’s national research funding agency.

156

PLA SCIENTISTS IN WESTERN UNIVERSITIES

Until recently the president of NUDT was Lieutenant General Yang
Xuejun, who’s now the president of the PLA’s Academy of Military
Science, China’s leading military research centre. In 2017 Yang was
appointed to the CCP’s Central Committee."^ One of his closer col¬
laborators has been Xue Jingling, professor of computer science and
engineering at the University of New South Wales and a ‘Thousand
Talents Scholar’."^ Their work has focused on stream-processing tech¬
nology, vital to the new-generation supercomputers that are used by the
military for advanced aircraft design, combat simulation and testing
nuclear missiles, among other things. Xue is also a professor at NUDT
and has written at least thirty-six scientific papers with researchers there.

Scientists at Australian universities also have research collaborations
with leading Chinese weapons and defence-systems manufacturers,
such as the Aviation Industry Corporation of China, the major supplier
of military aircraft to the PLA Air Force, and the China Electronics
Technology Group Corporation, primarily a military research
organisation, which once described itself as ‘the national squad for
military-industrial electronics ."‘'The CETC declares that its purpose is
‘leveraging civilian electronics for the gain of the PLA’."^

In January 2011 a Massachusetts court jailed two PRC nationals
for conspiring to steal and export military electronics components,
and sensitive electronics used in military phased array radar, electronic
warfare and missile systems.' 1 he CETC was one of the organisations
that was to be supplied with the stolen material. In October 2010 two
PRC nationals were arrested in California on charges of conspiring
to export restricted electronics technology to China without a licence
and making false statements."^ 1 hey were alleged to have entered
into contracts with the 24th Research Institute of CETC to design
and transfer technology lor the development of two types of high-
performance, analog-to-digital converters.

Western universities have displayed extraordinary naivety in their
dealings with Chinese companies and universities, and are often
unwilling to admit the risks even when confronted with the evidence.
Funding bodies like the US National Science Foundation and the
Australian Research Council have no due diligence procedures, and
rely on universities to vet researchers and companies."^ The universities

157

THE ECOLOGY OF ESPIONAGE

otWn hi'YC u strong financial incentive to keep themselves in the dark
\vhil<^ traditional scientific culture of openness and trans-

ixircnc)’. even though this is being systematically exploited by Beijing.

Cyber attacks and influence ops

Jfj what may be collaboration between China’s influence apparatus
and its cyber-hacking centres, large data banks containing personal
information have been hacked by state actors in China. Even the
EU, historically reluctant to wade into this topic, has taken note."’
In Australia, in a massive and highly sophisticated hacking operation in
2018, large amounts of information on staff and students at the pres¬
tigious Australian National University were stolen, including names,
addresses, phone numbers, passport numbers, tax file numbers and
student academic records.*^’ Many of this university’s students go on to
senior positions in the civil service, security agencies and politics. ANU
also hosts large numbers of Chinese students.

Security agencies around the world have noticed an alarming spike
in cyber attacks on medical records, with state-based actors in China
the leading suspects. In August 2018 it was reported that 1.5 million
medical records had been stolen from the Singapore government’s health
database, in an attack experts believe came from state-based hackers in
China.*^’ Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong was among those targeted,
leading him to tweet; ‘Perhaps they were hunting for ... something to
embarrass me.’'^^

The Singapore theft followed a massive hack in the US in 2014
that sucked up the records of 4.5 million patients across 206 hospitals,
and another in 2015 that saw up to 80 million records stolen from a
health insurer.'^^ In 2014-15 a state-sponsored Chinese agency known
as Deep Panda hacked US healthcare providers, stealing the records
of some eighty million patients, data that could be used to blackmail
persons of interest.*^"^ The year 2014 also saw the theft of 4.5 million
health records from a Tennessee-based hospital chain, in an attack
again attributed by experts to state-backed hackers in China.That
same year, the medical records of an unspecified number of Australian
soldiers, including special forces operating overseas, were sent to China
by a health contractor that also has facilities in Guangdong.

158

THE HUAWEI CASE

The medical records of current and future political, military and
public service leaders are likely now in the hands of Chinas intelligence
services and could be used to identify their weaknesses to be exploited
for influence or for blackmail. Some may have medical conditions they
dont want to become public. Data on medications would be enough.
Publication of such sensitive information could wreck careers and make
those who have been compromised open to coercion.

The Huawei case

The story of Huawei, the world s biggest telecom equipment maker,
is an excellent case study in how the PRC melds spying, intellectual
property theft and influence operations. While the full story is too long
to tell here, the key elements are instructive.

Suspicions about Huawei s links to Chinas intelligence services go
back a long way. The company’s founder, Ren Zhengfei, is believed
by some to have been a director of the PLA’s Information Engineering
Academy, reportedly responsible for telecom research for the Chinese
military and, according to industry analysts, associated with 3PLA,
its signals intelligence division.'^** A 2005 RAND report noted that
China’s military is believed to be the company’s political patron as well
as an important customer from its earliest days.*^^ According to a 2010
report, Huawei’s chairwoman, Sun Yafang, was a former employee of
the Ministry of State Security.‘-^“

In 2018 Huawei equipment was implicated in the theft of confi¬
dential information from the headquarters of the African Union in
Addis Ababa. It appears very likely that every night for five years, this
equipment was used to download masses of data and send it to servers
in Shanghai.*^' It’s widely believed among Huawei employees that
the Chinese government places intelligence agents in Huawei’s global
network of offices.'^* As one employee in Shenzhen is reported to have
said, ‘The state wants to use Huawei, and it can use it if it wants.In
Poland in Januar)' 2019, Huawei employee Wang Weijing was arrested
on suspicion of spying for China.’

Huawei has been accused many times by its suppliers and competi¬
tors of stealing their intellectual property.A U.S. Justice Department
indictment alleged the launch in 2013 by Huawei headquarters of‘a

159

the ecology of espionage

t;,rmal policy in.stitotiog a |,„,u,s program ,o reward employee, wh,
smic conhdciitial information from competitors’.'* The company had
drctllatcd a schedule of payments, calibrated to the value of the stolen
information, and provided an encrypted email service for especially
sensitive information. Every six months, the three Huawei regional
operations supplying the most valuable stolen information were to
receive company awards.

However, framing the problem as one of law-breaking may obscure
the larger danger posed by Huawei. As Elsa Kania put it, ‘Huawei’s
global expansion, in and of itself, can serve as a vector for Beijing’s
influence. After all, if Huawei achieves its goal of becoming the
dominant supplier and builder of the global communication network of
the twenty-first century, that gives Beijing enormous influence around
the world. Huawei is at the fulcrum of President Xi’s two fusions, the

Party—corporate fusion and the civilian—military fusion, to which might
be added a third, the influence—espionage fusion.

Through a year of intense controversy, including President Trump
placing Huawei on the ‘entity list’, which bars US companies from
supplying Huawei without government approval, Huawei benefited
from the public backing of friends of China.As we have seen,
John McCallum, Canada’s ambassador to Beijing, took Huawei’s side
when Meng Wanzhou was arrested. Well-known US economist Jeffrey
Sachs has loudly denounced the ‘war on Huawei’ (see chapter eleven).
Peter Mandelson, president of the Great Britain-China Centre and
fellow of the 48 Group Club, accused the US of ‘fomenting hysteria’
about Huawei, and argued that the criticisms of the company were
driven by Trump’s campaign against China—this despite the fact that
criticisms had been made by a wide range of intelligence and industry
sources in other countries, and before Trump became president.

Huawei s presence in Britain had been built over some years.

It made large donations to the Conservative and Liberal Democrats

P g^ve £50,000 to the all-party Parliamentary Group on East

rese" '' f°'' numerous trips by MPs to tour China’s

M^er n ^012 it secured a meeting with Prime

board’ (wh^' "’T"’"' ~ ‘international advisory

(whose members are paid handsomely to do little other than

160

THE HUAWEI CASE

give the company respectability) Lord Clement-Jones, former chair of
the Liberal Democrats; Sir Andrew Cahn, former head of UK Trade

Investment, a government department; and Baroness Wheatcroft, a
Tory peer.''*' Today, Huaweis UK board is chaired by the former CEO
of BP, John Browne. It all paid off in January 2020 when, to the dismay
of Five Eyes partners, the British government gave the green light for
Huaweis participation in Britain’s 5G network. It was a decisive victory
for Beijing.

In Western countries, corporate boards of prominent people are an
important part of Huawei’s program of cultivating friends and building
influence. Huawei’s foreign board members often speak to the media,
repeating the company’s denial of connections to the Chinese govern¬
ment. They deny evidence of espionage and testify to the all-round
good citizenship of Huawei. They have what two experts call a ‘limited
view of Huawei’s inner workings’'"*^ but they provide an acceptable face
for the company.

In Australia the chair of Huawei’s board is a former rear admiral,
John Lord. In Canada, in the midst of the crisis over Meng Wanzhou’s
arrest, Huawei appointed Alykhan Velshi, formerly a top adviser to
Prime Minister Stephen Harper, to be its government adviser and
public face.''*^ In Germany Huawei is represented in more than twelve
industry lobby groups.''*'* In December 2018 Huawei sponsored the
annual convention of the ruling party, the Christian Democratic Union,
an opportunity for the company’s executives to develop warm personal
relations with Germany’s leaders.'"*^

In a move not available to Western companies wanting political

influence, the CCP mobilised its united front organisations in Canada

to defend Huawei during the 2019 crisis. The media conference at

which John McCallum spoke out in support of Meng was organised by

a prominent Toronto figure in the Chinese community, Tao (Thomas)

Qu, who is well known for his participation in pro-Beijing community

organisations, including events to ‘protect the image of China’, such as

emonstrations against a visit by the Dalai Lama and against the raising
of the Tibetan flag. *'*6

^ on after Mengs apprehension, a Vancouver-based group held
conference at which its two spokespersons denounced the

THE ECOLOGY OF ESPIONAGE

arrest and parroted Beijing’s talking points.The ruse worked, with
Canadas state broadcaster, CBC News, reporting that ‘some members
ot Vancouvers Chincse-Canadian community are rallying in support
ot Meng Wanzhou Tom Blackwell of the Windsor Star investigated
the two women behind this group, the United Association of Women
and Children of Canada. One, Hong Guo, migrated from China to
Canada in 1993 and was now running a law firm in Richmond, a city
with a high concentration of ethnic Chinese. She first attracted public
attention in 2018 when she ran for mayor and claimed, in reply to a
question from the media, that there were no human rights abuses in
China. In fact, she said, ‘China has lots of freedom of speech.’Hong
Guo has made donations to the Liberal Party, scoring a photo-op with
Prime Minister Trudeau.

The second woman who spoke at the press conference was Han
Dongmei. She had migrated to Canada five years earlier and now man¬
aged an investment fund, which she’d launched in the Great Hall of
the People in Tiananmen Square. Her company donated C$100,000 to
the Liberal Party. The United Association of Women and Children of
Canada is clearly a front organisation that acts as a vehicle for Guos and
Hans influence work.

Huawei has done what many big corporations do to bolster their
image—sponsor high-profile sporting events, such as the high-rating
‘Hockey Night in Canada. In New Zealand Huawei rolled out an
advertising campaign comparing itself to the nation’s iconic All Blacks
rugby team. In Australia the Huawei logo is emblazoned on the jerseys
of the Canberra Raiders rugby league club, whose board includes former
top intelligence and security officials.The company has made itself a
substantial revenue source for New Zealand and Canadian media, even
sponsoring New Zealand’s premier journalism awards, at a time when
news and opinion sites are heavily involved in debate over Huawei.

In striving to gain access to elites, Huawei does not neglect high
culture. In addition to promoting classical music concerts in Europe, it
has used its artificial intelligence capability to complete the remaining
movements of Franz Schubert's Symphony No. 8, the ‘Unfinished

tCLT's^’ ‘n London to perform

162

THE HUAWEI CASE

HuavNcis campaign to win friends extends to universities. Its research
budget in 2017 was an astonishing $13.3 billion, a large part of which
It spends in scores of universities across the Western world.'” It funds
work at over 150 universities, including twenty-three research and
development facilities in fourteen European countries.'” In Canada it
has built a dense network of research collaboration, often with the best
IT people. This money buys a cohort of elite supporters, from professors
to senior executives, who speak out on the benevolence of Huawei and
its contribution to the nation.

But with understanding spreading of the risks of dealing with
Huawei, prestigious universities have been cutting their ties. Oxford
University, Stanford University, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
and the University of California, Berkeley have announced they will no
longer accept funding from Huawei.'”

Huawei has begun playing hardball. When French researcher Valerie
Niquet told an interviewer that Huawei is ‘directly’ under the control
of the Chinese state and the Party and has ‘a real strategy of power’, the
company sued her for defamation.'” Such a use of the law, whatever its
legal basis, is likely to deter other critics of the company.

163

9

Media: ‘Our surname is Party’

Media discourse

The CCP’s massive push into the global media landscape is another
element of its strategy for shifting the international discourse about the
CCP, China, and Chinas place in the world. By discourse we mean the
frames, themes and words used to talk about a certain topic, as well as the
beliefs, attitudes and sentiments embedded in language. For some years,
CCP leaders have maintained that China, in order to upend the balance
of power in what they call the ‘global public opinion environment’,
needs its own CNN—that is, a highly influential media organisation
that is the first to report events and shape how people think about them.

In an important speech in 2016 Xi Jinping emphasised the need to
create a Chinese ‘flagship media with strong international influence’.'
Enormous resources have been devoted to this, estimated by some
exceed $10 billion annually.^ Earlier, in 2011, the then president of Xinh^„
News Agency, Li Congjun, wrote an op-ed that was published on the
website of The Wall Street Journal calling for a ‘new media world order.^

propaganda retailed by official
CW : as coo

CCP i:; 1 closed space '

P«ate at home. But this underestimates the

to

ua

in

many

164

PARTY ABOVE ALL

subtle elements of the CCP’s strategy to control the global discourse.
Returning to Germany after many years in China and Hong Kong,
Didi Kirsten Tatlow wrote of how radically discussion about China
had changed, with enthusiasm for China evident everywhere.'* Chinas
media have the advantage of substantial financial backing from the state
or state proxies, while media in the West are facing a severe financial
squeeze. With a great deal of assistance from Western media specialists.
Chinas media have not only expanded massively but also been shrewder
with the content aimed at foreign audiences.

At the same that Chinas media has been expanding, the CCP has
been strategically using foreign media to place its own content and also
influencing coverage in Western media, through persuasion techniques,
financial incentives, or threats to uncooperative outlets and foreign cor¬
respondents. The CCP has partnered with some foreign outlets to spread
‘positive news’ about China, including Xi Jinping’s signature policy and
prime vehicle for discourse control, the Belt and Road Initiative.

The Party’s determination to shape global conversations, combined
with the lack of funding many media face, also risks undermining the
ethical rules that Western journalists are obliged to follow. Western media
organisations can be judged against this code of ethics, and there are many
serious media outlets that do their best to adhere to it. News organisations
under Xi Jinping, as David Bandurski and Qian Gang at the invaluable
China Media Project have explained, are instead expected to adhere to
‘Marxist news values’ and pledge their loyalty to the Party.^ In the concept
of journalism it promotes, the Party is the sole arbiter of truth.

The CCP continues to profit from a unidirectional flow of infor¬
mation across China’s borders. While the Party spreads its message
abroad through its own media, the Chinese market, tightly quarantined
by the Great Firewall, remains largely closed to foreign media, with
social media also blocked. Large Western media conglomerates can sell
selected products in China, but as we will see, this may serve to increase
the leverage Beijing’s censors have over them.

Party above all

Media in China are an arm ol the Party. They must serve the Party’s
purpose and spread positive energr^’. The infamous Document No. 9 of

165

media: ‘our surname is party’

2013, which marked a decisive defeat for Chinas liberals, explicitly bans
the promotion of ‘the Wests idea of journalism’.^ Media, according to
the document, ‘should be infused with the spirit of the Party and guided
by a Marxist view of news; furthermore, those not complying can expect
to be punished. In case Document No. 9 was not clear enough, Xi gave
an ‘important speech’ in February 2016 in which he said that ‘the media
must be surnamed Party’. The Chinese term for surname, xing, implies
more than the English translation conveys, and ‘being surnamed party’
means that the media are part of the patriarchal Party family headed by
Xi Jinping.^ Media organisations across the country subsequently held
political study sessions to absorb the ‘spirit’ of Xi’s speech.

The CCP’s demands for media loyalty are not abstract pleas, but are
enforced through an intricate system of control, before and after pub¬
lication or broadcast. Propaganda departments regularly send orders
to media in China regarding the topics that must be highlighted and
those that must not be covered. On some topics, media are instructed
to strictly follow the coverage of Xinhua, the official mouthpiece.
Designated political editors closely inspect content for political mis¬
takes. After news items have been aired or printed, they are checked
again for deviations from the Party line. Any political mistake results
in fines and demotions for those deemed responsible.® In 2015 four
journalists were punished for a minor typo that resulted in a speech of
Xi’s being referred to as his resignation.'^ It was corrected after forty-five
minutes but to no avail. New laws also punish ‘fake news’. In 2015,
during the Chinese stock-market crash, financial journalist Wang
Xiaolu was arrested for ‘fabricating news’. (He reported the facts.)
Wang was paraded on television where he confessed that he should
not have published his reports ‘at such a sensitive time’ and begged
for leniency.

Party media aimed at a foreign readership and published in
languages other than Chinese, such as the China Daily, are subject
to similar political restrictions. Their journalists must display high
political literacy’, and some positions require CCP membership." As of
2019, journalists are required to study Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism
with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, and to pass a test proving
their proficiency.'^

166

A GLOBAL MEDIA FORCE

In recent years, the Party has also been training journalists from
developing countries.'^ According to Reporters Without Borders, tens
of thousands have been so trained,Since 2009, Xinhua has organ¬
ised and funded the World Media Summit, which has attracted major
Western players such as The New York Times, the BBC, Reuters, and
Associated Press.Another platform is the Media Cooperation Forum
on Belt and Road, held by the People’s Daily in cooperation with local
governments since 2014.'^ Its 2018 forum was attended by officials
from the Central Propaganda Department, as well as media from ninety
countries.'^ When engaging with foreign journalists, CCP cadres don’t
highlight the need to be loyal to the Party, but instead promote a vision
of the media as ‘bridges’ between countries, furthering harmonious
relations and mutual understanding.'*

A global media force

The idea of globally influential Chinese media is almost as old as the
PRC itself As early as 1955, Mao Zedong instructed Xinhua to ‘manage
the globe’ and ‘let the whole world hear [China’s] voice’.Under Mao,
Xinhua was instructed to focus first on Asia and Africa, before trying
to win over Europe and America."® And indeed, Louisa Lim and Julia
Bergin argue persuasively that Africa has served as the ‘testbed’ for
Chinese media expansion.^'

The creation of ‘international first-rate media’ was accelerated in
2008 when the CCP began pouring money into global expansion.
In January 2009 the South China Morning Post reported that China
planned to invest 45 billion RMB (US$6.6 billion) in global media,
after the Party pledged to increase China’s ‘international communication
capabilities at the Third Plenary Session of the 17th Party Congress in
late 2008.23

Since then, all the CCP s central media have expanded at a rapid
pace. In March 2018 the CCP merged its national TV broadcaster
China Central Television, its national radio network China National
Radio, and its international radio service China Radio International into
the China Media Group, also known as the Voice of China. Although
this is formally placed under the State Council, it takes its orders from
the Party’s Central Propaganda Department.^^ The international arm

167

media; 'our surname is party’

of China Central Televusion was rebranded China Global Television
Network in late 2016. It broadcasts in English, Spanish, French, Arabic
and Russian.Headquartered in Beijing, CGTN has production
centres in Nairobi, Washington D.C. and London.China Radio
International has thirty-two correspondents’ bureaus, and broadcasts in
more than sixty languages.It also distributes its programs through a
glob;iI network of radio stations and cooperation agreements, on which
more later.

Xinhua, or New China News Agency, has also been expanding rapidly
since 2009.^® It now has over 180 bureaus outside China, with regional

headquarters in New York City, Brussels, Hong Kong, Moscow, Cairo,
Nairobi, Vientiane and Mexico City.^^ It also has a 24-hour English-
language news channel, CNC World, launched in 2010. Like China
Radio International, it distributes its content through partnerships, and
through stations that it owns.^°

Another major player is the China Daily Group. Its flagship publi¬
cation, China Daily, is China’s oldest English-language daily, founded
in 1981 with the assistance of Australian paper The Age and funding
from the Australian government.^* The China Daily Group takes its
orders from the State Council Information Office, the name used by the
CCP’s Office of External Propaganda when interacting with the outside
world.^^ It has forty bureaus overseas, including in the US, Canada, the
UK, Germany, France, Belgium and Australia.In 2018 it employed
921 people worldwide.^'*

The funding injection of2009 also created a second English-language
paper, the Global Times, whose Chinese edition was launched in 1993.
The Global Times is a subsidiary of the People’s Daily Group and serves
as an outlet for the more jingoistic and hawkish positions that the CCP
does not want to run in its more official media, a tactic that allows the
latter to sound reasonable by comparison.The editor-in-chief of the
Global Times, Hu Xijin, is well known for his nationalistic outbursts.

While China’s media are mostly Party-owned, they have been advised
to ‘appear with their commercial face’, especially when working with
foreign counterparts.^^ When the China Global Television Network reg¬
istered in the United States, under the Foreign Agents Registration Act, it
asserted its ‘editorial independence from any state direction or control’.^^

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A GLOBAL MEDIA FORCE

As CG FN is part of the China Media Group, which is led by the Central
1 ropaganda Department, this claim is demonstrably false. It has also
been disputed by current CGTN America employees, who confirm that
Beijing calls the shots. Clips of Xi Jinping with messy hair cannot be
aired, and images showing Taiwanese flags are cropped.^®

A former employee of Xinhua has told of being asked to use his press
credentials to spy on a media conference of the Dalai Lama in Canada
in 2012. When it was confirmed that his observations would not be
used in a public report he resigned.Other Xinhua employees admit
to having written reports intended for internal consumption by Chinas
leaders only.'^° Xinhua has from the 1950s served as a source of low-level
intelligence for Chinese officials.'^'

In order to better appeal to the tastes of its international audiences.
Chinas state media have been pursuing a strategy of ‘media localisa¬
tion’—hiring foreigners, adjusting content, and launching more
regional editions and programs.The China Daily has a global edition
as well as special daily editions for the United States and weekly editions
for Europe and Asia. CGTN has been hiring local anchors, much like
Russia Today has done. More importantly, the station has been able to
attract journalists, reporters and producers who have previously worked
for oudets like CNN, NBC and the BBC.The Party believes that news
reported by people with Western faces is more credible. By contrast,
foreign media in China are not allowed to hire Chinese citizens except
as assistants.

CCP media have a strategy of letting foreigners speak on topics that
China does not wish to comment on itself, and also to add legitimacy
to its views on other topics. This strategy has a long tradition. In 1968,
at the height of the Cultural Revolution, Mao Zedong warned Chinese
media across the country that they had gone overboard in repeatedly
declaring China ‘the centre of world revolution’. That was, of course,
precisely what Mao himself believed, but as it was unhelpful for China
to be praising itself, he instructed media to instead quote foreigners
making this point.'*^

Attacks on Western media’s ‘anti-China bias’ are often outsourced
to foreigners.Foreigners are also brought out for issues the CCP cares
about strongly, and to praise China’s contributions to the world. After

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media: 'our surname is party’

the Hague IribuiuiLs ruling on the South China Sea in 2016, Nirj
Deva, director of the European Parliament’s EU-China Friendship
Group, mouthed the CCP’s view that the Philippines should have
resolved the issue through bilateral discussions.'*^ British journalist and
author Martin Jacques, who is frequently interviewed on CGTN, said
in a 2017 interview that the West must learn from China, and that
the shift to a China-led world is an ‘unalloyed good thing’ and ‘one
of the greatest periods of democratisation the world has ever seen’.'**
One scholar who appeared on a CGTN program was warned not to be
too critical if she wanted to be invited back. She was given the name
of another foreign interviewee and advised to be ‘more like him’.'*’
(As do some other media, CGTN offers money to foreign experts
for interviews.)

Westerners finetune CCP propaganda

Western institutions have long helped the CCP’s media to expand and
improve their global coverage. When China Radio International went
digital in the late 1990s, this was made possible in part by a loan from
the Austrian government and equipment provided by Siemens Austria.^®
The Netherlands’ national research institute for mathematics and com¬
puter science. Centrum Wiskunde & Informatica, is helping Xinhua
to build an ‘advanced user experience laboratory’, exploring the use of
sensors to measure audience attention levels, among other things.^*
Propaganda cadres are also getting expert advice on how to navigate
the Western media landscape. The China Media Centre at the University
of Westminster in London has hosted three-week training courses for
Chinese propaganda officials.The centre was founded in 2005 by
journalism professor Hugo de Burgh, and launched by Sun Yusheng,
then vice president of China’s state broadcaster CCTV, and Jeremy
Paxman, sometimes described as Britain’s most respected journalist.^^
Its training programs are targeted at Central Party School cadres and
defence officials, employees of state-owned enterprises and official
media.^'* The courses are partly funded by British taxpayers through
the UK’s foreign ministry. The centre’s director, Hugo de Burgh, is an
honorary fellow of the 48 Group Club, a board member of the Great
Britain-China Centre, and a professor at Tsinghua University. This last

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westerners finetune ccp propaganda

^ I *'^ 1 ^*^** under the Chinese Ministry of Education’s 985 Program,
w tic i aims to bring international talent to China.He is a strong
advocate of closer ties between Britain and China.^^^

According to the CCP, the University of Westminster program
has been very successful. The head of spokesperson development for
the Central Office of External Propaganda wrote: ‘Chinese officials’
understanding of the functions of the media in Western countries and
their ability to respond to and interact with the media has been much
enhanced by the excellent intensive 3-week briefings designed and exe¬
cuted by the China Media Centre and provided to ministries, provinces
and cities over the past 7 years.

As part of the 2018 training course, the China Media Centre organ¬
ised a roundtable on ‘China’s international relations and economic
strategies: Perceptions of the UK and China’, with five senior cadres
from the Central Propaganda Department.^® The centre has brought
many Party officials to Britain to mingle with the media and political
elite, including five seminars at 11 Downing Street, at the invitation
of the chancellor of the Exchequer.Boris Johnson, whose first trip to
China was joined by Hugo de Burgh, has participated in the centre’s
courses and has declared that he can think of no-one better than
de Burgh to teach us about China’s media.^°

Those arguing in favour of these kinds of training courses maintain
that they will help bring about a more open media in China, In fact the
opposite is the case: they help the CCP finetune its propaganda and use
it more effectively across the globe. 1 he courses teach techniques used
by Western journalists to extract answers, and also how government
officials can handle adversarial questions in press conferences.^^ At a
time when official Chinese spokespeople are regularly under fire for
the Party’s concentration camps in Xinjiang, and other human rights
violations, teaching them how to ‘handle’ questions seems to be more in
the CCPs interest than the British public’s.

While there are serious Chinese journalists who want to do proper
journalism, the space for them has shrunk dramatically over the past six
years, and such journalists are not the ones sent on training programs
abroad. The participants instead come from the Party, its agencies, and
those TV shows and national newspapers notable for their compliance.®

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media: our surname is party'

Crossing the Great Firewall

Since the unrest in Xinjiang in July 2009. almost all Western sori i
media have been blocked in China. A prominent exception, becac^
It complies with censorship demands, is Microsoft-owned LinkedI
which has over 40 million users in China.In December 2018 Linkedin
blocked the account of dissident Fengsuo Zhou, informing him that
while we strongly support freedom of expression, we recognised when
we launched that we would need to adhere to the requirements of
the Chinese government in order to operate in China In the same
month. Linkedin also blocked the account of Briton Peter Humphrey, a
corporate-fraud investigator imprisoned in China for what he said were
false charges and who was forced to make a televised confession.^^

Despite this domestic ban, all of Chinas media targeted at foreigners,
such as Xinhua and the Global Times, have a vigorous presence on social
media—on Facebook, Twitter and YouTube. On these platforms, CCP
media offer content in many languages, some targeted at specific coun¬
tries, though the most important languages are English and Chinese.
According to reports in the People’s Daily, in 2015 Xinhua established
a team of over a hundred people to exclusively manage its presence on
Western social media, a number that has likely ballooned since then.^

Western social media are another means for the CCP to spread mis¬
leading information. The Twitter account of the People’s Daily claimed
Taiwan’s 2019 legalisation of gay marriage as a progressive success of
the PRC, tweeting: ‘Local lawmakers in Taiwan, China, have legalised
same-sex marriage in a first for Asia.’^^ (LGBTQ rights have arguably
deteriorated in China under Xi. Just a few months after Taiwan legalised
gay marriage, the PRC explicitly ruled out doing the same.^®) Also on
Twitter, in 2019 the China Daily presented protesters against the Party’s
proposed extradition bill in Hong Kong as supporters of the plans,
with headlines such as ‘800,000 say “yes” to extradition bill’, and ‘HK
parents march against US meddling’.In the same year, Xinhua used its
Facebook page to label the Hong Kong protesters ‘cockroaches’.^® China

ailys European bureau chief, who is very active on Twitter, referred to
them as ‘rats’

Paid ads are also used
and the CCP’s line on

on Twitter to promote China’s political system
Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and other sensitive

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CROSSING THE GREAT FIREWALL

topics. In August 2019, after CCP media paid for ads condemning
the Hong Kong protests, Twitter announced it would no longer allow
state media to place paid content, but only after a public outcry.

On YouTube, Party-state media have posted clips in formats meant
to appeal to younger watchers. One such clip presents Chinas political
system as a meritocracy, in which the office of president is earned through
hard work and experience, as opposed to the United States, where the
candidate with the most money wins.^‘‘ If the second half of this claim
is partly true, the first is wholly false, unless merit is concentrated solely
in the ruling families. While clips like this have been dismissed by the
Western press, not much is known about who views them and how
they’re received.^^

The fact that the CCP has been using these platforms while simul¬
taneously blocking them in China is another example of how it exploits
the openness of democracies. It has intensified the crackdown on
‘unauthorised’ (that is to say, private) Chinese users of Twitter, and also
censors Chinese social media like WeChat, which has over one billion
active users per month, including millions in the diaspora around the
world. Politicians in the West keen to attract ‘the Chinese vote’ have set
up WeChat accounts to appeal to them. As a result, the communica¬
tions of political candidates in democratic countries are monitored and
censored in Beijing.^*"

The CCP also mobilises a vast cohort of internet trolls on Western
social media, known colloquially as the ‘50 cent army’. Many of these
trolls are government employees masquerading as private citizens. The
best estimate we have is that these 50-centers generate 450 million
comments on social media each year (including Chinese social media).
Attacks on Taiwanese or Uyghur sites on Facebook, flooding them with
P^-^'CCP comments, have become common.^** When a group known in
China as Diba’ attacked a Uyghur activist site, the Global Times praised
the action as patriotic’.In 2019 Twitter took down 1000 accounts, and
suspended an additional 200,000, which it linked to a state-organised
disinformation campaign against Hong Kong.®° A preliminary analysis
of these accounts by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute showed
many of them had previously won followers by tweeting about
nrelated topics in a number of different languages, before going

173

MEDIA: 'OUR SURNAME IS PARTY'

dormant and then re-emerging in June 2019 to tweet in Chinese ntni
English about the Hong Kong protesrs."'

While Facehook, Twitter and YoiTTuhe routinely claim to .support
free speech, they have an ambivalent relationship with Beijing, All
haw stakes in China and hope to get access to the Chinese market,
Facelxwks Mark Zuckerberg has tried to ingratiate himself with Chinas
leadership by doing a ‘smog jog’ in Beijing, meeting with several
top propag-anda officials, and asking Xi Jinping to name his unborn
daughter.'^* On Google-owned YouTube, clips produced by the Hong
Koft^ Press^ and an interview with pro-democracy activist Denise
Ho produced by China Uncensored, have been demonetised, mean-
in<^ the creators cannot earn money by allowing ads on their videos.*^
Similarly* on Twitter, images of the Hong Kong protests were frequently
marked as ‘sensitive content’ and thereafter not displayed.®** While this
is likely a result of CCP-coordinated mass reporting by Beijing’s trolls, it
shots's that these platforms are ill-equipped to deal with crowd-sourced,

state-sponsored attacks on content.

Borrowing boats

The CCP’s practice of using channels other than Party-state media to
amplify its message is known as ‘borrowing a boat to sail the sea’.®^ One
example, often timed to coincide with an official visit, is publishing
op-eds written by Chinese leaders in the host country’s media.®^

A bigger ‘borrowed boat’ is the international network used by the
CCPs China Radio International to distribute content. This network
consists of a number of local companies whose common denominators
are that they work for CRI and, as researcher Jichang LaUu has pointed
out, have the word ‘global’ in their Chinese names.®^ A 2015 Reuters
report identified on the network at least thirty-three radio stations with
coven Chinese government involvement.®® In the United States, CRI is
leasing local channels through the Los Angeles-based EDI Media Inc.®^
Its founder and president, James Su, is a vice president of the All-China
Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese, a united front agency; Su is
also a senior consulting member’ of the Beijing municipal government.^®
In Europe, CRI works primarily through the Finland-based
company GBTimes (not to be confused with the Global Times),

174

BORROWING BOATS

bridge bctAvccn China and die rest of the world’. Founded in 1994
by Chinese entrepreneur Zhao Yinong, it was rebranded several
times before changing its name to GBTimes in 2014.^' The company
is a joint venture, 60 per cent owned by Guoguang Century Media
Consultation Co., which is directly owned by CRI.^^ While Zhao claims
that his company does not try to hide its ownership by CCP media, it
certainly does not highlight the fact.^^ According to official Chinese
media, the company has over 200 employees and provides services in
twenty different languages.In Australia, Melbourne-based CAMG
Media fulfils a similar role for CRI.^^ Like GBTimes, it is 60 per cent
owned by Guoguang Century Media. CAMG journalists have been
criticised by foreign journalists in Beijing for asking soft-ball questions
of officials at Chinas National People’s Congress.^*’

Another instance of boat-borrowing is China Watch, a supplement
that has been produced by the China Daily since 2010 and is inserted in
Western newspapers. Chinese analysts believe the 2008—09 global finan¬
cial crisis was a boon for China, as all Western media were struggling
to stay in the black. The list of papers that include China Watch reads
like a who’s who of the industry— The New York Times, The Wall Street
Journal, The Washington Post, The Daily Telegraph, The Sydney Morning
Herald, The Age, Le Figaro, El Pals and Handelsblatt, among others.
Some also publish China Watch content on their website. The annual
budget has been revealed for only one paper— The Daily Telegraph in
London receives £750,000 (US$1 million) per year to publish the insert
and content.’®

The relationship between The Daily Telegraph and Chinese author¬
ities seems to go beyond carrying the China Watch insert. In 2019 the
Chinese ambassador to the UK, Liu Xiaoming, praised the Telegraph
Media Group for ‘playing a positive role in enhancing the mutual
understanding between China and western countries’.The praise
has been earned. Telegraph executives are happy to meet with Chinese
officials.'®’ Editor emeritus Ian MacGregor even participated in the
April 2019 symposium, Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy, held by the
Chinese embassy in the UK (discussed in chapter three).'®'

When China Watch content is featured on a website such as those of
The Tekgraph and The Wall Street Journal, it is marked as ‘paid content’.

175

MEDIA; 'OUR SURNAME IS PARTY'

But when these articles are re-posted on social media, the distinction
is lost, making them look like proper articles rather than paid content.
Another reason why arrangements like China Watch arc worrying is the
incentive they create for newspapers to stay within the CCP s bounds
in its main pages. However, as Peter Mattis argues, the biggest effect is
diat association with major papers around the world lends credibility to
China Watch's content.'”^

Cooperation agreements

CCP media are increasingly signing cooperation agreements with
foreign media organisations. When the New York—based global news
agency Associated Press signed an agreement with Xinhua in 2018 to
expand ‘mutually beneficial cooperation, it caused concern in the US,
with members of congress demanding AP make the content of the
agreement public.'®^

The AP—Xinhua agreement is not unique.'®'^ The London-based
Reuters, a rival of AP s, has had a long relationship with Xinhua, sign¬
ing its first agreement in 1957.*°^ When Tom Glocer (a fellow of the
48 Group Club) was CEO of Reuters, its ties with China grew closer.
In a meeting with then ambassador Fu Ying, Glocer promised to report
China ‘comprehensively and objectively ... [and] to carry forward the
long-term friendly cooperation with China’.In 2009 Reuters joined
the Xinhua-organised World Media Summit. When Xi visited Britain
in 2015 to inaugurate the ‘Golden Era’ of the Sino-UK relationship, he
gave an exclusive interview to Reuters.

In 2017 Xinhua’s China Economic Information Service signed a
deal with media outlets in Europe, including tlie German-Austrian
financial-news agency DPA-AFX, Italy’s C>lass Editori, the Polish
News Agency, the Greek Athens News Agency, Belgium’s Le Soir, and
British Metro, to establish the Belt and Road Economic and Financial
Information Partnership.Portugal signed a media cooperation
agreement as part of its BRI deal in 2019, which commits parties to
organize mutual visits of news agencies, carry out joint media coverage
[and] hold seminars as well as training for journalists’.Xinhua also
has cooperation agreements with Agence France Press (the third of the
big three, along with AP and Reuters), German news agency DPA, the

176

CHINESE-LANGUAGE MEDIA

Macedonian News Agency, Australian Associated Press, the
U\tvian state news agency LETA, and Italian news agency ANSA."*’
China Media Group and Italys Class Editor! also signed an agreement
that, aside from content sharing, involves a new news column called
I ocus Cinitalia, joint television productions, and a joint work group
to carry out the planned projects.'"

While these arrangements are unlikely to result in uncritical reprint-
ing of CCP talking points on highly political topics, in the words of
the director of the National Endowment for Democracy, Chris Walker,
with Chinese state media can induce self-censorship on
certain issues or the unwitting carrying of CCP propaganda lines’."^

Chinese-language media

As a result of concerted efforts by Beijing, nearly all Chinese-language
media in Western countries are now directly or effectively under CCP
control, with only a few noteworthy exceptions, such as Mingjing News,
the Falun Gong-linked Epoch Times, and New Tang Dynasty TV.

Such control is vital to the Party. If it cannot (yet) convince the main¬
stream press in foreign countries, it can at least push its views through
Chinese-language media. As we’ve seen, these media also help promote
nationalistic responses, such as the 2016 demonstrations against The
Hague Tribunal’s ruling on the South China Sea, and the Chinese
students’ complaints about ‘anti-China’ comments."’ Responsibility
for media lies with the Propaganda Department of the CCP’s Central
Committee, and may also be shared with the United Front Work
Department, which manages China’s second official news agency, China
News Service (see the organisation chart on pages 124—5).“'* CNS
directly operates some media (in Australia, For example) and works with
other overseas Chinese media."’

Over the past two decades, many independent media companies in
the West have been taken over by pro-Beijing businesspeople."*’ Several
Chinese-language papers in the United States are owned by the Asian
Culture and Media Group, reportedly set up by the Overseas Chinese
Affairs Office in 1990."'' New media companies have also been set up
by patriotic businesspeople. Criticism of CCP policies is excluded. John
Fitzgerald reports that official Paru'^ media representatives have been

177

media: 'our surname is party*

pix'itcnt ii\ Melbourne radio studios to instruct producers on when to cut
od callers to talk shows who stray from a Beijing-friendly viewpoint."*
Residual independent outlets have come under intense pressure to
toe the Party line. Companies that advertise in independent outlets
are threatened with being shut off from the Chinese market, and their
owners ostracised from the community. At times, consulates make threats
to punish die ftunilies of media owners and journalists back in China,"’
In Canada journalists have reported being pressured to temper
their criticism of the Chinese government and to promote its view.
The freelance writer Jonathan Fon has said that whereas he once got
his opinion pieces published without difficulty, now they are routinely
rejected.'^’ In 2019 a radio talk-show host in Toronto was fired after
doing a robust interview with a pro-Beijing community leader.'^’ The
host, Kenneth Yau, said that after expressing support for Hong Kong
protesters he received threats to kill his family and rape his daughter. In
response, the radio stations manager, Louisa Lam, said that 'protecting
freedom of speech has been one of our company’s objectives’, but pre¬
sumably it wasn’t the most important one.'^^

Overseas Chinese media liaise through various CCP-directed global
and regional organisations. One is the World Association of Chinese Mass
Media, founded in Toronto in 1998, which now has over 160 members.
In addition to conferences outside China, overseas Chinese media are
often invited by official united front bodies to events in China, where
they receive guidance’ and make speeches demonstrating their loyalty
to the motherland.

The equivalent for Europe, the Association of Overseas Chinese
Media in Europe, was founded in 1997 and has a membership of over
sixty Chinese-language media organisations.It is based at the Paris
office of Nouvelles d’Europe (the Europe Times), the flagship publication
of the pro-CCP Guanghua Culture and Media Group. In 2011 Nouvelles
dEuropeheg^n a major expansion across the continent, with editions now
produced in London, Vienna, Frankfurt, Rome, Istanbul and Madrid. It
is also engaged in non-media activities through its subsidiaries, like the
Chinese culture centres in the same cities.'"’ Guanghua cooperates with
all major CCP media, but also lists Le Figaro, Agence France Presse, The
Daily Telegraph, Die Welt and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung as media

178

BUYING BOATS

partners. In addition, it formally cooperates with Chinese embassies in
France, Britain, Germany, Austria, Italy and Spain.

The websites and online communities owned by Guanghua are
operated in accordance with Chinese law. The terms of service of its
website (oushinet.com) state that in addition to respecting the laws of
the country in which the user is based, users may not ‘engage in activity
that endangers national security or divulges national secrets or harms
the legitimate rights and interests of the country [meaning China],
society, the collective or citizens’.Guanghua is not an exception in
this regard. The website of the Italy-based EZ TV even provides links
for readers to report content to China’s online police, just as any PRC-
based news site would.

The Nordic Chinese Times, founded in 2009 and based in Stockholm,
is run by the Nordic Chinese Chamber of Commerce (Nordic Chinese
Ekonomisk Forening). It has a strategic partnership with China News
Service, which targets overseas Chinese. Its president, He Ru, has par¬
ticipated in several sessions of the Guangxi Committee of the Chinese
People’s Political Consultative Conference, and facilitated cooperation
agreements between Chinese and Nordic media.The Nordic Chinese
Times has also received ‘professional guidance’ from various Chinese
media officials on how to better convey China’s voice and tell China’s
story well.

The Ouhua Group in Spain is a good example of how Chinese
media abroad are tied into larger united front networks. Its honorary
chairman is Marco Wang, an influential Spanish-Chinese businessman
who is also the executive chairman of the Spanish-Chinese Chamber of
Commerce.The CCP’s trust in him is manifested by his service as
an overseas Chinese representative to the CPPCC.'-^' Ouhua partners
with Xinhua, China News Service and other CCP media, but also with
provincial branches of the former Overseas Chinese Affairs Office.

Buying boats

After the 2008 global financial crisis, Chinese officials and analysts
evaluated the possibility of buying cash-strapped media in the West, a
strategy known as ‘buying a boat to sail the sea’.'^^ According to a 2018
Bloomberg report, Chinese investors have spent almost US$3 billion

179

media: ‘our surname is party’

buying media shares and ads in Europe since 2008.'^'* The Macau
based Chinese fund KNG, for example, owns 30 per cent of th
Global Media Group, which in turn owns the Portuguese newspaper
DUrio (if NoHciiis^-'^ Some media companies have been bought outright
London-based Propeller TV, launched in 1993 with British government
Rinding and broadcast by BSkyB, was bought by the Chinese Xijing
Group in 2009. The station operates under the motto ‘Bringing the
WArrld to China and China to the World’.

While not a major broadcaster. Propeller TV has helped to organise
high-level events, such as the China UK Film and TV Conference, which
was attended by government representatives from both China and the
UK and aimed at promoting partnerships with Chinese media compa¬
nies. In the same year. Propeller TV organised the China-UK Media
Roundtable, attended by the deputy head of the CCP’s Propaganda
Department, to celebrate the beginning of‘a golden age of the Chinese
and British media’.

In 2014 the influential American business magazine Forbes was
bought by a Hong Kong—based investment consortium known as
Integrated Whale Media, which is owned by Yam Tak-cheung and
Taiwanese businessman Wayne Hsieh.’^® In 2017 a regular column in
Forbes by Anders Corr was terminated after he wrote an article about
the influence of tycoon Ronnie Chan in the Asia Society’s Hong
Kong branch. This society, co-chaired by Chan, had cancelled a talk
by democracy activist Joshua Wong. According to emails sent to Corr,
Chan personally contacted ForbesF'^

The first major takeover of an English-language newspaper by a
private Chinese company came in late 2015, when the Alibaba Group
acquired Hong Kong’s venerable South China Morning Post. It was
revealed in 2018 that Alibaba’s CEO, Jack Ma, a revered figure in
China, was a longstanding member of the CCP.'^« Alibaba took down
the paywall on the Post, making it more accessible around the world.
Unnoticed in the Western press, they also took down the paper’s popular
Chinese-language website.*^' While the South China Morning Post still
contains some good-quality journalism, it is also giving a platform to

Ko ermr*! Hong

g ament the passing of the once independent newspaper. ^

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SELF-CENSORSHIP BY FOREIGN MEDIA

The SCMPv/iis heavily criticised in 2018 for accepting an ‘exclusive
interview, arranged by Chinas Ministry of Public Security, with Gui
Minhai, the kidnapped Swedish citizen and Hong Kong bookseller.
Gui was critical of the Swedish government and declared that if Sweden
didnt stop causing trouble’ he might renounce his citizenship.''*^ While
arguably not as bad as the forced confessions co-produced by CCTV
and Chinese authorities, interviewing’ a person under these circum¬
stances would appear to be a violation of journalistic ethics.

Self-censorship by foreign media

The CCP uses rewards and punishments to control how foreign media
report on China. As more and more Western media become invested in
the Chinese market, there are added incentives to lean on correspondents,
so as to not jeopardise their access. Thus the CCP’s leverage will grow.

A number of Western media organisations have tried to circumvent
restrictions on reporting in China by creating Chinese-language web¬
sites. Despite early difficulties, some are still developing their Chinese
web presence. Others try to profit from the Chinese market by offering
to mainland customers subscription-based products and services (such
as Bloomberg Boxes, specialised computer terminals for delivering
financial information). Increased reliance on the Chinese market is
perhaps the biggest threat to the editorial independence of these media,
as Beijing can block their online content in China and cancel subscrip¬
tions to their services.

PEN America has noted that news outlets appear to omit stories
from their Chinese-language websites that could anger Chinese author¬
ities.'“'^According to online magazine S/ate, Bloomberg News has used a
code to prevent sensitive news from showing up on platforms targeting
mainland audiences.

In a case of flagrant censorship in 2013, Bloomberg News toned
down an investigative piece by Michael Forsythe on the wealth of
^ Jinping and his family. It then refused to publish another piece
ccause executives were afraid the stor\^ would jeopardise the company’s

stantial business interests, mainly the sale of Bloomberg Boxes.

tak became a public scandal only because Forsythe decided to

^ e t e story, and the stor>^ of the story, to The New York Times.

181

MEDIA: 'OUR SURNAME IS PARTY*

The CCP regularly organises tours for foreign correspondents based
*n China and for foieign journalists outside the country. The itineraries
are carefully put together, often in conjunction with the All-China
Journalists Association, a Party organisation committed to ‘Marxist
news values, and the tours themselves are also organised by front
groups. Tung Chee-hwas China U.S. Exchange Foundation, discussed
earlier, has organised visits for US journalists. One arranged for a dele¬
gation from The Philadelphia Inquirer., the Chicago Tribune, National
Public Radio, Vox and Forbes to China in October 2018, to visit various
government departments and research institutions, so they could ‘better
understand the political and economic relations between China and the
United States’ in the time of the trade war.’"*'^

Journalists like to flatter themselves that their views cannot be influ¬
enced this way, but these highly choreographed tours often have the
desired eflPect. In 2016 a number of Australia’s most seasoned journalists
travelled to China on one such tour and returned to write glowing
reports about how in the New China ‘people seem taller, more ani¬
mated, healthier, louder and happier’, and that there is no ‘sense of an
Orwellian 1984 emerging. One of the group urged Australia not to say
anything to upset Beijing. Soon after they left China, an article by the
All-China Journalists Association was published through Xinhua. Titled
‘Why Australian journalists were moved to say their “expectations were
exceeded’”, it crowed that the reporters had informed their readers about
the historical opportunity that China’s economic development gives to
Australia, and impartially conveyed “China’s voice’”. The idea for the
trip had come from Bob Carr, Australia’s former foreign minister, who
became an enthusiastic China-booster after being picked by a Chinese
billionaire to head a think tank he funded at an Australian university.

(The billionaire has now had his Australian visa cancelled because of his
links to the CCP.)

The granting or denial of visas is a powerful instrument of control
or the CCP. When correspondents apply for visas, Chinese officials
requently tell them that they want to see more positive or ‘balanced’
coverage from foem. And it’s not only journalists who are pressured in
t IS way. Swedish China expert Ola Wong recounted how a Swedish
nessman m the PR industry, when applying for a visa, was called

182

SELF-CENSORSHIP BY FOREIGN MEDIA

^ or a meeting at the Chinese embassy in Stockholm, His Chinese
interlocutors asked him whether he wanted to use his position in the
Swedish mediasphere to change how China was being portrayed,’'**

Once in the country, journalists are often threatened with denial
of future visas, A1 Jazeeras Melissa Chan, French journalist Ursula
Gauthier, Buzzfeed s Megha RajagopaJa, ABC correspondent Matthew
Carney, and The Wall Street JournaTs Chun Han Wong, among others,
have all been effectively expelled through the authorities refusal to
renew their visas,Bethany AJlen-Ebrahimian was appointed Agence
France Press’s China correspondent but could not take up the job
because she could not obtain a visa. After Le Monde covered a scandal
about China’s spying at the African Union, the newspaper was told by
angry Chinese embassy officials in Paris that its journalists need not
apply for visas.The practice has also spread to Hong Kong, with
Victor Mallet, a Financial Times journalist and vice president of the
Foreign Correspondents Club, denied a visa after the club hosted a
talk by independence activist Andy Chan Ho-tin.’^ It only takes a few
refusals for the message to be received by all foreign correspondents in
China—don’t cross the red line.

Although visas have so flu been refused only in respect of issues
the CCP considers particularly sensitive, officials also pressure foreign
media over smaller issues. The Financial Times was contacted by Chinas
Ministry of Foreign Affairs after it referred to Xi Jinping as the core’ of
the CCP. This expression had been used by Chinese media in the past
but had come to be associated with Xi’s cult of personality. Pressure
to change terminology has also been applied to several other news
organisations.’^'

In 2019 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a letter to more than
thirty foreign media outlets, including the BBC, NBC, Bloomberg and
Asahi Shimbun, asking for ‘neutral, objective, impartial and compre¬
hensive’ coverage of the Hong Kong protests.This is code for sticking
closer to the CCP’s narratives, and is a common request when Chinese
officials meet with media representatives.’^'*

When renewing his visa in 2017, veteran China correspondent Kai
Strittmarter, who reports for the German daily Suddeutsche Zeitung,
expected the usual threats of having his visa denied or delayed if he

183

media; 'our surname is party’

did not start reporting more positively about China. Instead, the
official told him, ‘1 have to warn you; it can be dangerous.’ He elabf>
rated that ‘ordinary Chinese people’ could be very emotional, even
Violent’ at times, and indicated that if they were to react with violence
to his reporting, there was not a lot the Chinese authorities could do
to protect him. Strittmatter left China in September 2018.'” Other
journalists, including Bloomberg’s Michael Forsythe and The New
York Timess David Barboza, among others, have received death threats
via anonymous letters, or relayed through third parties in response to
stories the CCP did not like.'”

The pressures facing foreign journalists pale in comparison to those
experienced by Chinese journalists, many of whom have been fired,
arrested, forced into confessions, or disappeared for reporting inde¬
pendently. The situation has become much worse under Xi Jinping.
The 2019 Press Freedom Index prepared by Reporters Without Borders
ranked China 177th out of the 180 countries it assessed. More than
sbcty bloggers and journalists, according to the index, are ‘currently
detained in conditions that pose a threat to their lives’. The CCP is now
exporting a ‘new world media order’ that seeks to make this kind of
assault on press freedom and freedom of expression acceptable.

184

10

Culture as battleground

Political culture

Culture, too, has always been political for the CCP. In the turbulent
1960s and 1970s, it attacked almost every element of traditional
culture as feudal, bourgeois or otherwise oppressive, and discouraged
or banned its practice. Yet with the waning of Maoist ideology in the
1980s and 1990s and the opening of the economy, the Party needed a
less revolutionary justification for its rule. It chose a nationalism built
around the uniqueness of China and its people, and their mission to
overcome historical humiliation by the colonial powers and to take their
rightful place as a great nation on the world’s stage. As Janette Jiawen
Ai argues in her study of the political use of China’s heritage, ‘China’s
traditions are deemed by the party-state to fill the void in the ideological
system left by a decline in the official political doctrine in general, and
to combat the influence of Western liberalism on Chinese politics and
society in particular.’’

But the Party, especially under Xi jinping, was not content to allow
traditional culture to be disinterred without making itself the legitimate
custodian ol culture. The Party would decide what is authentic Chinese
culture so that there could be no culture outside politics.

The CCP’s ‘Culture Going Global’ strategy, set out in documents
emerging from Party congresses starting in 2011 and ramped up under Xi

185

CULTURE AS BATTLEGROUND

Jinpmg, IS designed to export not Chinese culture, but ‘red culture’- in oth
words, CCP values. As the Peoples Daily put it, ‘Building leadership pow ;
over culture is one of the CCP’s cultural missions.’^ In a 2017 article I iu
Runwei—former deputy editor-in-chief of the flagship journal of

the CCP s Central Committee—made a distinction between ‘traditional
Chinese culture’ and revolutionary ‘socialist advanced culture’. Liu, also
president of the Chinese Red Culture Research Association, wrote that
the former must succumb to the latter. ‘The traditional Chinese culture,
once it has gone through the party’s innovative transformation, will
change into red culture”, too.’^ Red culture is at the centre of realising
the great rejuvenation of the Chinese people.

A 2017 article in Qiushi titled ‘Use cultural identification to achieve
the greatest united front mobilisation’, written by Yang Lin of the
Central Institute of Socialism, stressed ‘the strategic role of cultural
identification’ in united front work.'^ Two years later, a theorist affiliated
with the Central Institute of Socialism, Lin Jian, described how the
Party uses cultural diplomacy to deepen its influence abroad: ‘Its goal is
to build our country’s image, raise our country’s status and to increase
our influence globally’ Cultural exchanges are an element of‘big united
front’, using ‘shared values in bringing people’s hearts together’ to
enhance China’s influence overseas.^

Poly Culture

In recent years, the company Poly Culture has become known in the
high culture scene of Western capitals. In 2005 it organised a tour
by the China Philharmonic Orchestra to the United States, Canada
and Europe.*^ In subsequent years it sponsored performances by the
London Philharmonic Orchestra, the Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra,
and the Vienna Johann Strauss Orchestra. In 2017 it co-produced an
opera with the San Francisco Opera Company.^ When it sponsored
the 2018 London Design Biennale as a ‘headline and medal ceremony
partner, Poly Cultures executives and friends attended a ‘prestigious
^ ception at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, followed by an
^hor-party at The Groucho Club’.® All of this would be
Chin ’ -I- ^ Poly Culture is inseparable from

Ch.nasm,l,tary intelligence apparatus.

186

POLY CULTURE

Poly Culture is a subsidiary of China Poly Group, an opaque
conglomerate ranked on the Fortune 500 list. It had assets in 2018
of almost $140 billion.^ China Poly Group began life in 1984 as Poly
Technologies Co. Ltd., a state-owned weapons-making company linked
to China International Trust and Investment Corporation, another
state-owned investment company and one that had a strong presence
in Canada, among other places. Like CITIC, Poly Technologies was
a front company for the PLA’s General Staff Department (now the
Central Military Commissions Joint Staff Department), a role it con¬
tinues to serve.Poly Technologies became a subsidiary of the larger
China Poly Group in 1992." The conglomerate has interests ranging
from arms manufacturing to trade to real estate, and, in more recent
years, all aspects of high culture.*^ Poly Culture was founded in 2000
and listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in 2014.*^ (It was advised
by the London-based global law firm Clifford Chance, which also does
work for Huawei.''^)

From the outset, the top echelons of China Poly Group have been
dominated by princelings, cementing the groups Party connections but
also giving it a degree of independence within the Party. While its a
state-owned company, the red aristocracy has financial interests in it.*^
China Poly Groups first CEO, now honorary chairman, was He Ping.’*^
The son of a veteran PLA commander, he served as an attache (intelli¬
gence officer) in the Washington embassy and rose through the ranks
to become a major general in the PLA. He is married to Deng Rong,
daughter of paramount leader Deng Xiaoping, for two decades the most
powerful man in China. (Deng Rong also worked in the Washington
embassy, from 1979 to 1983.'^)

The current chairman of both China Poly Group and Poly Culture
is Xu Niansha, a former navy captain and real estate developer. He’s a
top Party cadre, serving as a senior member of the national committee
of the Chinese Peoples Political Consultative Conference and its for¬
eign affairs committee.*® (Curiously, in 2017 the Italian government
bestowed on Xu the Order of the Star for his ‘contribution in promoting
the exchange and cooperation between China and Italy’.‘^) The general
manager of Poly Culture, and chairman of several of its subsidiaries,
Jiang Ymgehun, is also a representative of the Beijing People’s Congress,

187

CULTURE AS BATTLEGROUND

the dtys equivalent of Chinas rubber-stamp parliament, the National
Peoples Congress.^"

As well as making money for China Poly Group, Poly Culture’s
role includes befriending and co-opting elites and raising China’s
global profile in cultural affairs. Poly Culture can be seen as part of the
Culture Going Global arm of the Belt and Road Initiative, working
with artistic groups in BRI countries to stage 500 performances each
year.^' Poly Culture has also cooperated with renowned institutions
like Columbia University, the Lincoln Center, Yale University, and the
Metropolitan Museum of Art.^^ In 2017 a youth orchestra belonging to
Poly Culture held a ‘China-Germany Friendship Concert’ in Cologne
Cathedral, hosted by the chairwoman of the German Overseas Chinese
Federation, Li Aiping. The orchestra also visited the United Nations
headquarters in Vienna.

Poly Culture owns over a hundred subsidiaries, including an art
auction business. Poly Auction, now the third-largest in the world; a
theatre management business; and a subsidiary that owns cinemas.
Another subsidiary. Poly Art, is devoted to ‘providing professional
corporate art solutions for corporations’. Its strategic art planning helps
‘corporate culture building, business performance promotion, and
social responsibility expression’.Poly Art aims to ‘nurture and amass
high-net-worth customers’. Its museum in Beijing specialises in Chinese
art retrieved from abroad.

In 2015 Poly Culture established its North American headquarters
in Vancouver, where it also opened an art gallery. Fhe company was
reportedly lured to Vancouver by strong lobbying from the province’s
trade minister, Hong Kong-born d’eresa Wat.^^’ A base there was also
likely to attract less scrutiny than one in the United States, given the
company’s PLA links and the fact that Poly Technologies, the China
Poly subsidiary, was sanctioned by Washington in 2013 for selling arms
to Iran, North Korea, Syria, or possibly all of them (the US did not
specify).^^ Poly Culture North America set up its office on the same
floor in the same building as Wat’s constituency office.^^ The company’s
CEO is Yi Chen, whose background is obscure.

At the Vancouver launch. Poly Culture and China Poly Group execu¬
tives mixed with the political and business elite of British Columbia.

188

POLY CULTURE

In 2017 the Vancouver Symphony Society signed a memorandum of
understanding with Poly Culture North America to work together on
co-presentations and promote Chinese performers and artists. The
orchestras board is packed with Vancouver’s business elite.^^

With its large Chinese-heritage population, initially dominated
by migrants from Hong Kong but more recently by mainlanders,
Vancouver has been a hotbed of united front activity, not least in the
cultural sphere. In July 2019, in the presence of CCP propaganda offi¬
cials, various British Columbian politicians launched a new united front
group, the Vancouver Association for Promotion of Chinese Culture.^®
The PRC’s consul general Kong Weiwei, vice consul Wang Chengjun,
and the consulate’s UFWD team were there to oversee proceedings.
Federal Canadian politicians included Jenny Kwan and Joe Peschisolido
(the latter under fire in newspapers for alleged links to Chinese organ¬
ised crime), and from the provincial legislature there was Teresa Wat.

When the city of Vancouver and the province of British Columbia
decided to establish a Chinese Canadian Museum with the help of
Simon Fraser University, united front forces coLild not keep their
hands off. The project is headed by George Chow, Minister of State for
Trade in the BC government.^’ Chow is a past president of Vancouver’s
Chinese Benevolent Association, a well-known united front organi¬
sation that in 2019 organised over 200 Chinese community groups
to take out advertisements in newspapers condemning Hong Kong
‘radicals’ and supporting the Beijing-backed Hong Kong government.

In September 2019 the association hosted a gala event in Chinatown
to celebrate the PRC’s seventieth birthday. Chow was in attendance, as
was Canadas defence minister, Harjit Sajjan, who was heavily criticised
for celebrating the anniversary while Michael Kovrig and Michael
Spavor, the Canadians detained in response to the Huawei crisis, were
rotting in China’s jails.

In December 2018 Chow had reportedly gone to Guangzhou to
discuss plans for the new museum with CCP officials.When the
museum set up a timeline of the important events in the history of
Chinese immigrants in Canada, some events that most affected local

mese people, such as the Tiananmen massacre and the handover of
ong Kong to China, were missing.^^ timeline focused instead on

189

CULTURE AS BATTLEGROUND

cwnts important to the CCP’s narrative, highlighting tacist mearur«
like the head tax and other forms of colonial humiliation. Chincsc-
Canadians from Hong Kong took it upon themselves to fill in som^ raf
the gaps.37

The China Arts Foundation

The foreign influence function of Poly Culture is indicated by its links
to the China Association for International Friendly Contact, which
as we saw in chapter four is a front organisation for the International
Liaison Bureau of the Political Work Department of the Central
Military Commission. The Liaison Bureau engages in intelligence
work, but also, in the words of CCP expert Geoff Wade, ‘develops links
with global elites and aims at influencing the policies and behaviour of
countries, institutions and groups beyond China.The powerful Deng
Rong is a vice president of CAIFC and her husband He Ping serves as a
consultant, along with various Party heavyweights.^^

CAIFC has set up a number of front organisations.'^® It is behind
the Sanya Dialogue, the Nishan Forum on World Civilizations, and
the Centre for Peace and Development Studies, and has close relations
with the China-U.S. Exchange Foundation (see chapters three and
five).^' Many of its office holders are double-hatted senior PLA officers,
although their military positions are generally obscured, leading Wade
to observe; ‘This intense engagement by senior members of the PLA in
CAIFC activities clearly shows the degree to which it is a covert arm of
the PLA, engaged in intelligence and propaganda work.’'^^ CAIFC and
its front groups invite members of Western elites to a broad range of
activities. The First China Philanthropy Forum in November 2012, for
example, was attended by Bill Gates and I’ony Blair, along with some
forty CAIFC consultants and directors. In the same year, it joined
with the China Arts Foundation to invite Bill Clinton to give a speech
Clinton pulled out when the State Department baulked at it.'^'^

The China Arts Foundation was set up in 2006 by Deng Rong, with
the backing of CAIFC, ostensibly to ‘create awareness about Chinese
culture, history and politics through music’.« The foundation ‘acts as

PhT"’"2010 it brought together the New York
hatmomc and the Shanghai Symphony Orchestra for a concert in

190

THE CHINA ARTS FOUNDATION

Central Park, which featured superstar Chinese pianist Lang Lang/^
(The following year, at a White House state dinner for visiting President
Hu Jintao, Lang Lang played a well-known anti-American propaganda
song.**®*) The director of the Shanghai Symphony, Yu Long, is a member
of China Arts Foundations board.Before the Central Park concert,
the foundation hosted a private VIP reception that included author Ron
Chernow, high-society interior designer Geoffrey Bradfield, and billion¬
aire investor and philanthropist Theodore Forstmann.^® The following
year, the two orchestras signed an agreement to host touring exchanges
and to collaborate on a new orchestral training institute in Shanghai.^’
In 2014 the China Arts Foundation established a New York branch,
known as the China Arts Foundation International, to promote
cross-cultural artistic events.CAFI’s president is Angela Chen. Chen
attended Harvard Business School and made her name in the US finance
industry, first at Merrill Lynch, then as vice president at Prudential,
Americas largest insurance company.She also runs Global Alliance, ‘a
boutique business relationship consultancy for US companies seeking
to establish a presence in mainland China’.

Global Alliance and CAFI both operate out of an apartment at
502 Park Avenue in New York, that is. Trump Tower. After living for
some years in a less opulent condominium in the tower, in early 2017
Angela Chen paid president-elect Donald I rump $15.8 million for
a penthouse.^^ An investigation by Mother Jones noted that both her
jobs entail connecting elites in the US to elites in China.Chen uses
CAFI to build guanxi\ real estate mogul Larry Silverstein and fashion
guru Giorgio Armani have featured at C'AFI events.In 2014 Chen
was appointed co-chair of the international advisory board of the New
York Philharmonic.^*^ In that same year, CAM’s Chinese New Year Gala
welcomed philanthropist and banker Steven Rockefeller, and Stephen
Schwar2man of the Blackstone Croup, a Frump confidant and Beijing
favourite.CAFI has also held a reception in conjunction with
Tiffany s to welcome the National Ballet of China.*"** (In October 2019
Titfanys expunged an ad featuring a model posed with her right hand
covering her eye. which ultra-nationalist Chinese netizens interpreted
as a reference to a young women who was wounded in the eye by a
beanbag round fired by Hong Kong police.) CAFI’s Chinese New Year

191

CULTURE AS BATTLEGROUND

Cuxlx ikxr 2015 brouglu together former US ambassador to Q '
Huntsman, fnrmer president of the Asia Society Nicholas PlatJ
previous managing editor oi' Fortune, Andrew Serwer. Platt
are memhers of CAFPs board/’’ " cfwcr

So CAFI, an afliliate of Chinas military intelligence service has b
an cxc^ptioitally rich network among Americas corporate, politi^) a^d
cultural elites. Along with the US members, CAFPs board includ
\V;utg Boming, editor-in-chief of Caijing, the influential finance jour
nal, who is said to be close to Wang Qishan, one of seven members
of the supreme Standing Committee of the Politburo and Xi Jinping’s
right-hand man.^^

Cultural monopolisation

During his 2017 visit to Italy, the boss of the CCPs Overseas Chinese
Affairs Office, Qiu Yuanping, urged overseas Chinese to contribute to
the Belt and Road Initiative by participating in the work of the Huaxing
Arts Troupe.^^ This project is one of eight launched by the OCAO
in 2014 to ‘help Overseas Chinese’.'^'^ By 2019 there were forty-two
Huaxing Arts Troupes in twenty-five countries, performing various
‘red concerts and ‘songs and dances in praise of the heroic journey of
Communism in China. xhe Frankfurt Huaxing Arts Troupe’s 2018
Spring Festival gala was planned by the OCAO and supported by the
consulate.^^ In February 2018 the Chicago Bulls basketball team hosted
a performance by the city’s Huaxing Arts Troupe as part of the Chinese
New Year festivities directed by the local consulate.^’^

In Australia, Melbourne’s Huaxing Arts Troupe is also officially
endorsed by the OCAO and holds many extravagant ‘red’ cultural events.
It appears to be involved in low-level intelligence gathering. In 2018 it
prepared a ‘work report’, sent to Huaxing headquarters in China, in
which it boasted of having ‘established a database that contains contact
information of important political figures, important Chinese commu¬
nity groups, celebrities, and artists’.*’® Events hosted or co-hosted by the
troupe attract a range of politicians, including state premiers and federal
parliamentarians, as well as officials from the Chinese consulate. The
Melbourne Huaxing troupe is headed by Tom Zhou (Zhou Jiuming or
Mr Chmatown’), a businessman and casino-junket operator, who in

192

CULTURAL MONOPOLISATION

2019 emerged as a central figure in a money-laundering scandal at the
city’s Crown Casino.*^’

Most governments use their national culture for the purpose of
public diplomacy, but the Chinese government uses it covertly to
exert influence, including over the diaspora. In 2008 a Party website
explained the goal as being to ‘fully utilise the function of traditional
festivals Chinese New Year, Qingming tomb sweeping festival. Dragon
Boat festival. Mid Autumn festival and Chongyang Festival—that can
stimulate patriotic feelings for China and channel ethnic sentiment’.^®
Lunar New Year, for decades celebrated by people of Chinese heritage
around the world, has in recent times been appropriated by Party
sympathisers and used to impress on political leaders the views of ‘the
Chinese community’.

No expression of China’s culture, even the most innocuous, escapes
the Party’s determination to monopolise it. The qipao (or cheongsam)
is an elegant, close-fitting dress regarded as traditionally Chinese. In
fact it is neither Chinese nor traditional, but owes its origins to the
Manchus and was first worn by women in China some years after the
fall of the Qing dynasty in 191 1.^' The qipao was vilified as bourgeois
during the Cultural Revolution and was not worn, but in recent years
it’s made a comeback and is popular among middle-class women.

Societies to celebrate the qipao have sprung up all over the world.
In 2015 China Daily reported that about 150,000 qipao enthusiasts
had gathered at events around the world ‘as a demonstration of tradi¬
tional Chinese art’. ^ I he president of the China Qipao Association,
Swiss-Chinese businessman Wang Quan, said he wanted to impress
the world with exquisite Chinese traditional dress’.^'*

Howexer, the qipao movement has been turned into a global propa¬
ganda weapon. 1 he Ministry of Culture has a committee to oversee it.^^
NX’hen Qi Quansheng, deputy director of the All-China Federation of
Returned Overseas Chinese (part of the United Front structure), hosted
a propaganda seminar in Tianjin in 2018, the influence of qipao culture
was one of the topics for discussion.Later that year, Jinan University
ran a qipao!i\\ chi training class for overseas Chinese community groups;
It was attended by a phalanx of Parrv' officials, including a top official
from the 10th Bureau of the UFWD, who reminded those present of

193

CULTURE AS BATTLEGROUND

Xi Jinpings injunction to use traditional culture to spread his Chinese
Dream7^ In the same year, the Wuhan office of the UFWD reported
a promise made by the vice chairman of the China Qipao Society
Global Alliance, Li Ye, that his organisation would closely unite around
the Party’/®

It therefore comes as no surprise that the chairman of the China
Qipao Society, Wang Quan, is an overseas representative of the Chinese
People’s Political Consultative Conference/^ The society he chairs
receives the full backing of the Ministry of Culture, and its activities are
being integrated into the Belt and Road Initiative.

The German branch of the World Qipao United Association,
established in 2018 in Neuss near Diisseldorf, is one of the most
important local hubs for overseas Chinese in Germany.®® Its
inauguration ceremony had the support of the Chinese consulate in
Diisseldorf®' It is presided over by Jiang Haiying, who is also president
of the Chinese Women’s Association of Germany, which reports to
the Chinese embassy.®^ As a reward for her loyalty, Jiang Haiying was
invited to attend the PRC’s seventieth anniversary celebrations in
Beijing.®^ In 2015 Jiang was elected an executive vice president of the
Qingtian Hometown Association of Germany, whose special advisors’
include senior Chinese United Front officials.®'*

In Australia, a senior office holder in a ‘peaceful reunification’ group
is also president of the Qipao Society of Australia, leading to its politi¬
cisation. In 2016 the society signed a declaration supporting Beijing’s
defiance of The Hague Tribunal’s ruling that China had no basis for its
claim over the South China Sea.®^

So the Party exploits the qipao movement to carry out united front
work ‘in a more friendly way and relaxed cultural atmosphere’.®® The
glamour of the qipao attracts foreign audiences, raises the profile of
united front groups and legitimises them as ‘cultural ambassadors’, in
the process enabling access to elites in fashion, business and politics. All
this points to the Party’s determination to present itself as the legitimate
custodian of Chinese heritage and to mobilise its notion of Chineseness
to win loyalty among ethnic Chinese at home and abroad. The tragedy
is that it makes it difficult for overseas Chinese who do not support the
CCP to share in the revival of qipao.

194

CRUSHING CULTURAL DEVIANCE

Crushing cultural deviance

While promoting those expressions of Chinese culture that it controls,
the Party also tries to suppress those it does not control. When Beijing
attempted to brush up Chinas image with some cosmopolitan glamour
by hosting the Miss World contest in 2015, the case of Anastasia Lin
injected a sour note. A Chinese-Canadian actress and activist for human
rights in China, Anastasia Lin had won Miss World Canada and was
due to compete for the Miss World title, to be held on Hainan Island.
But she was declared persona non grata and denied a visa to travel to
the competition venue. The Global Times explained that the decision
was taken because Lin had been misguided by her values’. She was not
evil-minded, it wrote, but simply ‘lacks reasonable understanding of
the country where she was born’.®^ Prejudiced Westerners, the paper
believed, were likely to be swayed when ‘a 25-year pretty girl grumbles’.

For Miss World contestants, speaking about their commitment to
a social cause—girls’ education or world poverty—is usually a sine qua
non for success, but Lin picked the wrong one. (It didn’t help that she
was a practitioner of Falun Gong, which she described as ‘fancy yoga’.®®)
Because of her advocacy, her father in Hunan has been harassed by MSS
agents, and now on their phone calls ‘he always mentions how great the
Chinese president is’.®^

Petty censorship on behalf of Beijing has been taken up by officials
in the Western mainstream. At a dragon-boat festival in Ottawa, the
organiser ordered a man to take off a T-shirt promoting Falun Gong.^°
The Chinese embassy was one of the festival’s sponsors. Another Falun
Gong practitioner outside the venue, in a public park, was threatened
with removal. He expressed the view of many when he said, ‘Canadians
should not be taking directions from the Chinese embassy.’

In early 2019 an arts centre in Cary, North Carolina, which was about
to stage an exhibition of works by US-based Chinese artist Weng Bing,
decided not to wait for an objection from Beijing and pre-emptively
excluded three paintings it deemed ‘political’.^' Two of the paintings
depicted Xi Jinping unflatteringly. Lyman Collins, cultural arts manager
of Cary, told the artist that he personally liked the paintings and wanted
to protect free speech, but he wanted to ‘take all views into account’,
presumably including those of the CCP. Meng said she had been

195

CULTURE AS BATTLEGROUND

inspired to paint the works after watching Dong Yaoqiong, a Chinese
artist in Shanghai, livestream herself splashing ink on a poster of Xi at a
protest ag*ainst ‘tyranny’. In a chilling reminder of the Soviet practice of
defining political opposition as a psychiatric disorder, Dong Yaoqiong
ms sent for ‘compulsory treatment’ to the psychiatric ward of Hunan’s
Zhuzhou No. 3 Hospital. Meng said that after watching the video she
‘a)uldn’t stay silent any longer’, but, like Dong’s, her protest was also
muzzled by officials.

Film and theatre censors

As a city that has attracted a large number of Chinese dissidents, Berlin
receives disproportionate attention from Beijing’s cultural police, and
with some success. The organisers of the 2019 Berlin International
Film Festival announced that two Chinese films, including one by
famous director Zhang Yimou set in the politically sensitive period
of the Cultural Revolution, had to be pulled for ‘technical reasons’.^^
Technical reasons’ has become the default excuse when managers of
venues and theatres give way to political arm-twisting.

One theory is that the films may have failed to garner approval, and
thus an exit permit, from Chinas state censors, particularly given that
in 2018 the CCP, in a bureaucratic restructuring, had taken more direct
control over the entertainment sector.Another possibility is that the
festival organisers may have been pressured by German car-maker Audi,
the festival’s principal sponsor.^^ Audi’s sales had just reached record
levels in China, its biggest market. The company had sponsored a new
Confucius Institute in Ingolstadt in 2016.^^

At the same time, news broke that a segment made by dissident
artist Ai Weiwei had been cut from the film Berlin, I Love You under
pressure from distributors, who said they would not buy the film with
the segment included.^^ Ai, who helped design Beijing’s famous ‘Bird’s
Nest’ Olympic stadium, earned the ire of authorities when he criticised
the cover-up of the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, which killed thousands
of children. In 2018 one of his Beijing studios was demolished without
notice. One of the producers of Berlin, I Love You, Emmanuel Benbihy,
claimed that Ai’s segment was removed for ‘artistic reasons’. However,
two other producers told The New York Times they had fought to keep

196

FILM AND THEATRE CENSORS

the segment in, but were forced to remove it due to pressure from
distributors.'^* Ai, who had not been informed of the excision of his
segment, believes it was a pre-emptive buckle: ‘Most of this censorship
actually originated witli Western organizations. They are engaged in
self-censorship so as to comply with China’s censorship regime. This
is internalized political pressure, not necessarily something that the
ChinCvSe government has told them directly.’’^'^

Ais identification of Western cowardice was confirmed by Edda
Reiser, another ol the film’s producers, who was privy to the backroom
dealing. She admitted, ‘We underestimated not the influence of China,
but the fear. The fear of China in the free world.’

Film festivals in Copenhagen and Melbourne have come under
similar pressure. In the past, Beijing’s attempts to exclude certain people
or films in the West were seen as clumsy, and gave inadvertent publicity
for the film. Not anymore; now a growing number of organisations
are willing to comply with Chinese government requests and to blame
technical difficulties’ for their timidity.

The incorporation of culture into the Belt and Road Initiative is
deepening Beijing’s political influence.^®' The Ministry of Culture
formalised it in the One Belt and One Road Cultural Development
Action Plan (2016-20).'“^ By the end of 2016, over sixty countries
along the Silk Road route had signed cultural exchange and cooperation
agreements with Beijing.

The CCP’s tightening grip on culture also means the Party controls
the construct of‘Chineseness’; it is replacing a multiplicity of voices and
styles with an increasingly monolithic one. British-Chinese artists, for
example, have complained that ‘international’ Chinese artists—that is,
those sent from China and with the blessing of Beijing—have increas¬
ingly marginalised the art of British-Chinese.

In London, the Southbank Centre’s ‘China Changing Festival’,
run over three years from 2016, has been accused of putting artists
from mainland China centre-stage and keeping those from Britain in
the wings.'®^ The Southbank Centre is one of a handful of Western
cultural institutions to sign on to the Silk Road International League
of Theatres, approved by the Ministry of Culture as part of its Belt and
Road Cultural Development Action Plan.'"^’ Reporting on the league.

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CULTURE AS BATTLEGROUND

the Peoples Daily quoted a former vice chancellor of the Central Party
School saying that the BRI aims to build not just ‘the bond of interest’
through the economy and trade, but also ‘the bond of the human heart’
through cultural ties.'”^ In addition to theatres, the action plan has
established international alliances of libraries, museums, art museums,
art festivals and art colleges.'*”*

A number of theatres in Russia, Japan, Eastern Europe and the
global South have signed agreements. The French National Theatre
Union (Association des Scenes Nationales) signed a memorandum of
understanding with the Silk Road International League of Theatres in
2016, as did the Minneapolis-based Arts Midwest.Another Western
institution to join the league is the Royal Theatre in Madrid, the venue
for one of the most blatant, Beijing-inspired acts of cultural censorship
seen to date. It’s a story worth telling as it’s an increasingly common
one. First, some backstory.

Some of the Falun Gong practitioners who fled China after the 2001
crackdown created the Shen Yun dance troupe to perform ‘classical
Chinese dance’ and to promote Falun Gong’s principles and draw
attention to its persecution by the CCP."° The Chinese government
has been determined in its efforts to prevent performances by Shen Yun
everywhere. By early 2019 over sixty attempts had been documented
worldwide, including in Europe and North America.'"

A first wave occurred in 2008 but largely failed. Then, in 2010,
pressure from Chinese authorities saw shows in Romania, Greece,
Moldova and Ukraine cancelled. In 2011 the Chinese consul general
in Auckland, New Zealand wrote to city councillors telling them not
to attend a forthcoming Shen Yun performance. ‘This consul general
has no right to tell me not to go to a production in Auckland,’ said one
indignant council member. ‘Flow dare they.’"^

In 2012 Chinese authorities failed to stop a Shen Yun show at the
London Coliseum, and in 2014 the consulate in Barcelona tried unsuc¬
cessfully to block a performance by pressuring the National Theatre
of Catalonia and Spain’s Foreign Ministry. The consulate threatened
repercussions for relations between Spain and China if Shen Yun were
allowed to perform."^ In the same year, the Chinese embassy in Brussels
demanded that a Shen Yun performance, due to take place during

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FILM AND THEATRE CENSORS

Xi Jinpings visit to the city, be cancelled. The Belgian National Theatre
rehiscd to cxiinply. In Berlin in 2014 the Chinese cultural attach^ visited
.Idrvs Scefcid, the marketing and sales manager of the Stage Theatre,
which Nwas due to host a Shen Yun event, and told him that unless he
cancelled the performance Chinese theatre troupes would not use the
theatre, and that if he ever wanted to visit China he would be denied a
visit. Sc'efeld, who had been imprisoned in East Germany, was unmoved
bv the threats."'*

In Niarch 2015 the director of the Chinese-language program at the
Urah Srate Office of Education, Stacy Lyon, emailed principals of Utah’s
language-immersion schools urging them, in effect, to reject approaches
bv the Shen Yun dance troupe to stage performances in their schools.
Lvon wrote that funds awarded to schools for Confucius Classrooms
were not to be used to support Shen Yun events."^

As Chinas power kept growing, its censorship attempts had more
success. In 2017 the Chinese embassy in Copenhagen successfully pres¬
sured the Royal Danish Theatre to refuse to host Shen Yun,"*^

Which brings us back to Madrid. The Royal Theatre had joined the
Silk Road International League of Theatres in 2016, after which visits
and exchanges began to occur. In November 2018 President Xi’s wife,
Peng Liyuan, paid a visit to the theatre, accompanied by the Queen
of Spain.In January 2019 China’s diplomats were upset that the
theatre had scheduled performances by the Shen Yun troupe, and began
pressuring the general manager to cancel them. The ambassador is a
member of the theatre’s ‘Diplomatic Circle’.

The Royal Theatre cancelled the shows, even though 900 tickets
had been sold. Management cited ‘technical difficulties’. The Falun
Gong—aligned Epoch Times reported that someone posing as a high-
level Chinese government official phoned the Chinese ambassador in
Madrid a few days after the cancellation,"^ The ambassador bragged
about having personally put pressure on the theatre’s general manager,
suggesting that if the performances went ahead the theatre would lose
access to China’s market. The ambassador reminded this alleged official
of the Royal Theatre’s agreement with the Silk Road International
League of Theatres. The general manager, who had just returned
from a trip to China, was initially worried about reputational damage.

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CULTURE AS BATTLEGROUND

according to the ambassador, but gave way, agreeing to use the amba.s-
sadors suggested excuse of technical difficulties.

Two months after the cancellation, the theatre’s managing director,
Ignacio Garcia-Belenguer, signed a cooperation agreement with Chinas
National Center for the Performing Arts,"^ He said it was ‘another
step towards greater collaboration between the two institutions which
have enjoyed a close relationship for several years’. He noted that the
relationship had been boosted as a result of the visit to the theatre of
Peng Liyuan in November 2018.

The Marxist view of art and culture’

It’s often observed that China has little cultural soft power to deploy
This is not because China’s cultural traditions do not have great appeal
but because China’s culture has been thoroughly distorted by the
Communist Party, overlaid by a thick coating of propaganda. Soft power
grows organically from civil society and typically loses its authenticity
when governments become too involved, all the more so when they
attempt to manipulate it to serve political ends.

If the CCP has been unable to benefit much from China’s soft power,
Beijing has been highly effective at regulating America’s chief source of
cultural influence: Hollywood. The self-censorship by Hollywood film
producers in order to ensure access to the huge Chinese market has
often been reported in newspapers, but we’ll give just one illustration:
‘... when the creators of “Pixels” wanted to show aliens blasting a hole
in the Great Wall of China, Sony executives worried that the scene
might prevent the 2015 movie’s release in China, leaked studio emails
show. They blew up the Taj Mahal instead.’

Indian sensitivities don’t rate, it seems. Zhang Xun, a top movie
regulator, made China’s position clear to American producers: ‘We
have a huge market, and we want to share it with you ... We want to
see positive Chinese images.’’^! Now, when American films are being

r ’ and scripts written, Beijing’s censors are always

the ron, of ,he of producers, directors and scriptwriters.

thebackoflvlTreri^sle**'^^

Japanese and Taiwanese '"‘u

g dding to the pressure to self-censor in

‘THE MARXIST VIEW OF ART AND CULTURE'

this cas'C, one of the movies producers was a film company owned by
the Chinese internet giant Tencent.

T he same thing is happening in Bollywood, because Indian films
a1s\> attract large audiences in China. The actor Aamir Khan has made
millions from Chinese viewers and has become a strong advocate of
friendly relations between India and China.

In July 2019 Xi Jinping sent a congratulatory letter to the China
Writers Association and the China Federation of Literary and Art Circles,
fumouring the seventieth anniversary of their formation. Read out by
the head of the CCPs Propaganda Department to writers gathered at
a s)Tnposium, the letter expressed Xi s view that the ‘development of
literature and art is an important cause of the Party and the people, and
the literary and art front is a vital front of the Party and the people’.
Fn’e years earlier, Xi had been plainer: ‘Art and culture will emit the
i^reatest positive energy when the Marxist view of art and culture is
firmly established and the people are their focus.

The China Writers Association is a state organisation whose first
duty is to ‘organize writers to study Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong
Thought, and Deng Xiaoping Theory, and to study the guiding policies
of the party’. In more liberal times, some writers wanted to use the
association to foster greater creative freedom, and in 2016 two vice
presidents of the Suzhou branch resigned in what was seen as a protest
against tightening control.

When, in the spirit of cross-cultural exchange. Western writers
festivals and writers organisations team up with the China Writers
Association—as did the University of Waterloo in 2014 and the
Melbourne Writers’ Festival in 2015, and as the International Writing
Program at the University of Iowa does on a regular basis—they are
teaming up with writers guided by the CCP, authors approved by the
Party who will not risk deviating from Party ideology.Dissident
Chinese writers are not allowed to participate in these events, and any
who arrive craving open exchanges with their foreign counterparts find
they are closely chaperoned by Party minders. Chinese writers drawn
from the diaspora are excluded or marginalised, unless they are members
of a local Chinese Writers Association, under United Front guidance,
their good intentions, these festivals are not free exchanges.

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CULTURE AS BATTLEGROUND

The ‘Chinese culture that Westerners hear about at them is a version
circumscribed by the Party.

Many Westerners are by now familiar with the CCP’s crackdown
on religious worship in China, which includes the use of CCTV
cameras in churches and mosques and forcing believers to practise in
approved ways. The 11th and 12th Bureaus of the United Front Work
Department devote extensive efforts to this repression, setting up ‘rep¬
resentative organisations’ for each religion.It was reported in 2019
that Tibetan nomads had been told they would continue to receive state
subsidies only if they ‘replaced their altars devoted to Buddhist deities
with images of Chinese political leaders’.'^” Christians have been pres¬
sured to replace images of Jesus with photos of Xi Jinping. In a move
that resonated with its position in the 1930s, the Vatican reached an
agreement with Beijing to allow the Party to choose Catholic bishops.

Even more surprising are the Party’s efforts to spy on, infiltrate,
guide or control religious groups of Chinese people in the West. Space
limitations preclude a full discussion, but we note reports of Chinese
Christian churches being monitored and infiltrated. Pastors believe that
among their congregations are spies for the local consulates, who report
on any criticism of the Party.

The CCP has made even more extensive efforts to control Buddhism
in the West, including the formation of tame Buddhist associations.'^^
In 2018 Shi Xuecheng, secretary-general of the Buddhist Association of
China and a member of the CPPCC, arrived in Sydney to oversee the
launch of the Australia China Buddhist Council. He was flanked by
diplomats and top united front figures, among them Huang Xiangmo,
a wealthy political donor soon to be banned from the country because
of his Party links.'^^* The Party-endorsed Master Shi agrees with the
CCP’s ambition to ‘Sinicise’ religion. (However, Beijing lost a useful
functionary when Shi Xuecheng was forced to step down after he was
accused of molesting nuns.)'^^

Among the ‘red Buddhists’ sheltering beneath the Limbrella of the
Australia China Buddhist Council is Wang Xinde, head of a wealthy
Holy Tantra Buddhist sect based in Tasmania that has a worldwide
following, especially in Canada. Wang also serves as president of the
Tasmanian branch of the Australian Council for the Promotion of

202

'THE MARXIST VIEW OF ART AND CULTURE’

Peaceful Reunification of China, the foremost united front body.'^*^
Wang is frequently pictured with local politicians, and his website is
unabashed about his desire to promote Xi Jinping’s ‘China Dream’
and to tell a good China story, propagate Chinese voice’. He has said,
‘We will hold the latest policies enacted by the motherland as guidance
for everything we do.’’^^ In 2019 he re-posted an article calling for pro¬
democracy protesters in Hong Kong to be killed.'^®

Of course, the Party has also worked hard to take control of Tibetan
Buddhism. When the Panchen Lama, whose spiritual authority is
traditionally second only to that of the Dalai Lama, met Xi Jinping
in 2015 he proclaimed that under the leadership of the Party Central
Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping as its core, our future is bright,
and our tomorrow is glorious’. When the previous Panchen Lama
died, the successor nominated by the Dalai Lama in 1995, Gedhun
Choekyi Nyima, aged six, was kidnapped and disappeared. The Party
installed its own boy.

Perhaps the most intriguing example of the Party’s determination to
control China’s culture is the story of Xu Xiaodong, which is brilliantly
told by Lauren Reixera in an article titled ‘He never intended to become
a political dissident, but then he started beating up tai chi masters’.
Xu is an expert in mixed martial arts (MMA originated in Japan and
Brazil and became enormously popular in the US in the 1990s). He
owned a gym in Beijing and over the years he’d built a following on
social media. But he also earned the ire of authorities for ridiculing
practitioners of traditional Chinese martial arts, especially revered tai chi
masters, as ‘fakes’. They can do tricks, he’d say, including amazing feats
on popular TV shows, but they can’t fight. When more than a hundred
outraged masters challenged him to fight, he picked the best seventeen
and sought them out. It would be MMA versus tai chi. YouTube clips
show him defeating all seventeen, often in very short, brutal fights.

Xi Jinping’s direction to use culture as part of the great rejuvenation
of the Chinese nation includes heavy promotion of tai chi and tradi¬
tional Chinese medicine. When Xu exposed so many tai chi masters as
‘fakes’ with his foreign fighting techniques, he embarrassed the Party.
‘The Chinese government would really like for him to stop his war
against tai chi’, wrote Reixera, and it has taken all kinds of measures to

203

CULTURE AS BATTLEGROUND

Stop him, putting him on a social cicclit backlist. Banned from hying
and taking fast trains. Xu had to take a 36-hour slow train to Xinjiang
to fight a fiunous kung fi« pressure point’ master. (He pummelled hirn
into submivssion in less than a minute.)

When the American MMA promoter Ultimate Fighting
Championship decided to extend its reach into China, it was happy
to build on Xu’s years of hard work in building a large fan base for this
martial art. Bur when it stages fights in China, Xu Xiaodong is not on
the invitation list.

204

11

Think tanks and
thought leaders

‘Eating the CCP’s food’

Because of the political and business leaders linked to them, think tanks
ate an ideal target for both short- and long-term influence operations.
Winning them over is vital to the CCP s intention to change the debate
\sdthout having to directly inject their own voice’.’ It is no exaggeration
to say that whenever an influential think tank works on China-related
topics, the CCP will take a keen interest.

The think tank world is closely linked to philanthropy, making it
difficult to disentangle the manifold interests that shape an institu¬
tion. Many of those in the United States working on China issues are
sponsored by business elites close to China. While some funding also
flows directly from the Chinese government and Chinese companies,
endowments from ‘friends of China’, like Goldman Sachs and Tung
Chee-hwa, play a bigger role.

Think tanks always insist on their independence. Like political
panies that accept corporate donations, they cannot do otherwise. But
the reality is closer to the adage of not biting the hand that feeds you, or
in Xi Jinping’s words, ‘We must not allow the eating of the CCP’s food
by those who smash the CCP’s cauldron.Giving money creates obli¬
gation: you made me happy, so I am obliged to make you happy, or at
least not unhappy. Some researchers are unswayed by expectations that

205

THINK TANKS AND THOUGHT LEADERS

they wont smash the cauldron, but few can resist pressure from thei
employers, even in universities. That’s not to say all think tanks will
turn into propaganda organs churning out nothing but the Party’s mes¬
sage; fir from it. Yet investment in research typically pays off in one way
or another, which is why the Party’s International Liaison Department
emphasises interacting with think tanks. The Silk Road Think Tank
Association has over a hundred Chinese and foreign members.^

So it is a problem that many think tanks in the West accept funds
from wealthy ‘friends of China’ or companies whose bottom line depends
on good relations with the CCP. This colours the work emanating from
them, including from some of the most authoritative and influential.
Several Western think tanks have opened branches or representative
offices in China, giving the CCP additional leverage over the content
produced. The result is a picture of China that is on the whole arguably
more positive than it would be without financial ties. Again, a compre¬
hensive review is beyond this book’s scope, but some illustrations make
the point.

The Brookings Institution is one of the largest and most renowned
think tanks in the United States. It describes itself as nonpartisan, and
people across the political spectrum rely on its work. But funding for
its China research comes from a well-known ‘friend of China, John
L. Thornton, a former president of Goldman Sachs. Thornton, who
endowed the eponymous China Center at Brookings, is so important
to the institution that he chaired Brookings’s board of trustees until late
2018 and remains on it.

In 2008 Thornton received the highest honour bestowed on foreigners
by China’s government, the Friendship Award.He is chairman of the
board of the Silk Road Finance Corporation, a Hong Kong-based invest¬
ment firm that facilitates Chinese investment in Belt and Road countries.^
Its CEO, Li Shan, is a member of the CPPCC.^’ Thornton is a friend of
Wang Qishan, a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo
and Xi Jinping’s enforcer and firefighter.^

Thornton also holds a professorship at Tsinghua University, where
he is director of its Global Leadership Program, which he founded
after retiring from Goldman Sachs in 2003.* The Brookings Institution
itself is in partnership with Tsinghua: the Brookings-Tsinghua Center

206

'EATING THE CCP’S FOOD’

tv>r l\iblic Policy was opened in 2006.’ To coincide with Xi Jinping s
visit to the US in 2015, the think tank launched its Brookings China
Council, straddling its Washington D.C. Thornton Center and the
BitH)kings-Tsinghua Center in Beijing, with Thornton co-chairing with
(he president of Tsinghua University, Qiu Yong.'° Xi Jinpings nephew
reportedly interned at Brookings."

Brookings has accepted sponsorship from Huawei. Between July
2016 and June 2018 it received at least $300,000 from the company’s
US-based subsidiary, Futurewei Technologies. Huawei also paid
for Brookings’s research on safe city technology; the resulting report
failed to disclose that some of the technology it commended is made
by Huawei. In the words of Isaac Stone-Fish, who broke the story in
The Washington Post, ‘Brookings praised Huawei’s technology in a
report sponsored by Huawei.’’^

A similar entanglement of elites exists at the UK’s most renowned
think tank, Chatham House. It accepts money from a broad range of
sources, including the Chinese government and Chinese companies
such as the China International Capital Corporation and Huawei.
While the financial contributions from China are relatively minor,
Chatham House has received praise from China’s ambassador to the
UK, Liu Xaoming, for its ‘positive contribution ... enhancing mutual
understanding and cooperation between China and the UK’.''‘

Liu is not wrong that Chatham House has been good for the CCP.
In 2019 its director, Robin Niblctt, urged new prime minister Boris
Johnson to draw Britain closer to China, building on the work of the
May government and David Cameron’s ‘Golden Era’ of Sino-British
relations.'^ Niblett backs the City of London’s project of making London
the finance hub for the BRl. Chatham House’s go-to expert on China,
Yu Jie, has urged the UK government to stop sending mixed signals on
China, to nurture the relationship between the two countries, and to
get over its security concerns and realise that ‘China is an indispensable
partner if a post-Brexit “Global Britain” is to succeed’.'^’

The Party’s biggest asset at Chatham House may be its chair, Jim
O’Neill, former chief economist at Goldman Sachs. O’Neill has urged
Britain to create ‘more and more win-win situations between Britain and
China’ and for Britain to become a ‘great trusted partner of China’.

207

THINK TANKS AND THOUGHT LEADERS

He has spoken alongside ambassador Liu Xiaoming and friendly British
journalist Martin Jacques at Vision China, an event hosted by the
China Daily, where he praised the BRI as possibly the most importan^t
thing for the future of world trade’."* O’Neill is also a welcome guest
on Chinas Party-state media, where he waxes enthusiastically about
Chinas economy."^ He has joined the 48 Group Club’s Stephen Perry to
heap praise on Xi Jinping Thought.^” In keeping with the overall tone
that a chair like Jim O’Neill sets for the think tank. Lord Browne of
Madingley, the chairman of Huawei Technologies (UK), is on Chatham
House’s Panel of Senior Advisors.^'

Chatham House also joined hands with top Chinese think tank the
China Centre for International Economic Exchanges to co-author an
upbeat, pro-BRI report called ‘EU-China Economic Relations to 2025;
Building a common future’, a title that genuflects to Xi’s terminology.
Aside from the questionable decision to partner with a think tank led
by the CCP (more on which below), the funding for Chatham House’s
contribution came from Huawei.^^ Chatham House has also partnered
with the Institute of World Economics and Politics, a Chinese govern¬
ment think tank, and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences to
research the use of the renminbi to finance BRI projects.^^ The report
talked up the role of London as the global renminbi hub and centre of
BRI financing.

The Chicago-based Paulson Institute is another prime example of
China-friendly business elites sponsoring research on China. Founded
in 2011 by Henry Paulson, former secretary of the US Treasury, and
the former chairman and CEO of Goldman Sachs, the institute is
‘dedicated to fostering a US-China relationship that serves to maintain
global order in a rapidly evolving world’.One way it has done this is
by helping Beijing to incorporate green investment principles into the
BRI (with the cooperation of the City of London).Its Macro Polo
economics blog argues for continued economic cooperation and has
a tendency to emphasise the stability of the Chinese economy and the
consistency of its reforms.

Like Thornton, Paulson is very well connected to the CCP leader¬
ship, dating from his time at Goldman Sachs. In April 2019 he met
with Politburo Standing Committee member Han Zheng to discuss

208

’EATING THE CCP’S FOOD’

biUlcral tics between China and the US.^^ A report published on the
IWijing municipal governments website referred to Paulson as an ‘old
friend' of Beijirig mayor Chen Jining.^” The Paulson Institute has also
signcvl a memorandum of understanding with the Beijing govern¬
ment.^'* I he institute’s representative office in Beijing, along with the
W'orld Eaiiiomic Forum (a Party favourite), were among the first batch
of foreign NGOs to register under China’s new foreign NGO law,
allowing each to continue operating in China.^°

Perhaps the most shamelessly pro-Beijing think tank is the Los
Angeles-based Berggruen Institute, founded in 2010 by German
American billionaire Nicolas Berggruen. From its earliest days, the
Berggruen Institute has expressed sympathy for the CCP’s authori¬
tarian ideals and has enjoyed good relations with China’s elite. China
Central Television has featured Berggruen opining that the Party and
the Chinese government aim to do one thing, ‘serve the citizens’.^*
His colleague, Nathan Gardels, has praised the one-party state as the
best form of government and said that democracy is unsuited to Hong
Kong.^^ Articles written by Berggruen-affiliated analysts often promote
or defend China’s political model. For instance, a Berggruen take on
China’s political system asserted that the legitimacy of the CCP in China
‘flows from prosperity and competence’.Through the Understanding
China conference series, organised by the former acting head of the
CCP’s Central Propaganda Department, Zheng Bijian, members of the
Berggruen Institute have met with Xi Jinping and other top leaders.
(Zheng has also met with Berggruen’s leadership on other occasions.
The conference has attracted high-level participants, such as former UK
prime minister Gordon Brown, former Danish prime minister Helle
Thorning-Schmidt, and Huffington Post founder Arianna Huffington.^*’
In December 2018 the institute collaborated with Peking University to
found the Berggruen Research Center, based at the university.

The Berggruen Institute has partnered with The Washington Post
to publish The WorldPost, edited by Nathan Gardels, with op-eds and
feature articles from ‘contributors around the world’.A similar partner¬
ship appears to exist with The Huffington Post}^ One such article in The
WorldPost contends that Western companies need to adjust to Chinese
people’s ‘different understanding’ of privacy—that is, no ‘privacy from

209

THINK TANKS AND THOUGHT LEADERS

government’—so as to arrive at truly global privacy norms, even if they
look different from what we are used to’.^^ Another article, written by
Song Bing—a former Goldman Sachs executive, now vice president of
the Berggruen Institute and director of its China Center—describes
how the West has misunderstood Chinas social credit system.'*"

Song Bing is married to Daniel Bell, who is director of the Philosophy
and Culture Center of the Berggruen Institute, which collaborates with
prestigious universities to promote ‘cross-cultural’ work on governance
and other questions.'*' A most enthusiastic CCP apologist. Bell is best
known for his book The China Model: Political meritocracy and the limits
of democracy, which heaps high praise on the CCP.'*^ Bell argues that the
West should learn from the CCP’s ‘meritocratic rule’ and he interprets
Xi Jinping’s rise as a product of that meritocracy.'*^ Daniel Bell also has
a position as chair professor of the Schwarzman Scholar Program at
Tsinghua University in Beijing.

The China Daily also claims to have a partnership with the Berggruen
Institute, with the goal, according to an article published on the website
of China’s Cyberspace Administration, to assemble a team of overseas
commentators ‘to let China’s positive energy “go out’”.'*'* Through the
partnership, which the China Daily also reports it has with several other
think tanks, the paper has published 300 signed opinion pieces on its
website, from almost 200 overseas think tank experts, to ‘influence
more audiences abroad and explain Chinas story well .

The Hong Kong connection

CCP-linked money has been finding its way into the coffers of influ¬
ential think tanks via the China-United States Exchange Foundation,
which also funds the United States Heartland China Association, and
the Sanya Initiative (see chapter three). CUSEF was founded in Hong
Kong in 2008, and its chair is shipping magnate Eung Chee-hwa. Tung
was Hong Kong’s first chief executive (1997—2005) and is also a major
funder of CUSEE'*'* The foundation has links to China’s military and
also cooperates with the PLA front organisation the China Association
for International Friendly Contact (see chapters three and ten).'*^

Tung Chee-hwa is also vice chairman of the Chinese People’s Political
Consultative Conference, and in 2019 he accused the US and Taiwan of

210

THE HONG KONG CONNECTION

‘orchestrating’ the protests in Hong Kong.'*® CUSEF’s vice chairman is
Victor Fung, Group Chairman of Li & Fung, a supply-chain manager
h)r US and EU companies, and another important united front figure
in Hong Kong. Fung, too, is a member of the Chinese People’s Political
Consultative Conference, and an adviser to the mayor of Beijing and
the Nanjing municipal government.'*** His Fung Foundation funds
China research.’®

CUSEF’s special representative in the United States is Fred Teng.
Teng is president of the America China Public Aifairs Institute, whose
mission is to increase knowledge, understanding, and more accurate
perceptions about China within the US government and among key
policy and opinion leaders’.’* It works closely with the CCP and the
Chinese government to organise delegations of US leaders to China,
and advocates a bilateral free trade agreement and a security partnership
between China and the US, covering anti-terrorism, cybersecurity and
law enforcement.’^

CUSEF’s New York PR company is BLJ Worldwide (whose web¬
site states: we develop sophisticated and intelligent communications
campaigns’). It is registered as a foreign agent under the Foreign
Agent Registration Act}^ To influence Congress on China issues, it
has hired lobbying firms, including the Podesta Group,’'* which in
2016 and 2017 also lobbied on behalf of Ch inese telecom-equipment
maker ZTE.” One of the Podesta Group’s former principals was
John Podesta, a powerful player in Democratic Party politics. After
leaving the group in the hands of his brother, John Podesta became
chief of staflF to President Bill Clinton, and later, in 2016, chairman of
Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaign. From 2003 to 2011 Podesta
was president of the Center for American Progress, a Washington think
tank sometimes regarded as a parking lot for senior Democrat staffers
during Republican presidencies. As such, it’s an excellent target for CCP
influence, and its staff have had a high-level visit to Beijing brokered
by CUSEF. The two organisations have had a partnership since 2011,
occasionally working with the Shanghai Institute for International
Studies,’^ which is attached to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.’^ In
2015 the Center for American Progress and CUSEF jointly organised
a high-level dialogue in Beijing.’®

211

THINK TANKS AND THOUGHT LEADERS

In addition to providing funds to the Brookings Institution, the
Atlantic Council, the Carter Center, and the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace,^^ CUSEF has endowed a chair in China Studies at
the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, one of
Americas foremost international-relations schools. Together with the
Kissinger Institute, CUSEF also jointly runs the Pacific Community
Initiative at Johns Hopkins SAIS. Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian notes that
graduates of SAIS ‘feed into a variety of government agencies, from the
State Department to the CIA, and the military’.

Party-linked money in Brussels

The Chinese Mission to the European Union has emerged as a major
donor to think tanks working on China or on topics of interest to the
CCP. As Francois Godement and Abigad Vasselier write in their assess¬
ment of Chinas power in Europe, ‘a list of conferences and seminars
in Brussels will immediately reveal that almost all think-tanks dealing
with international relations and economics or Asia receive Chinese
sponsorship’.*"®

The Madariaga - College of Europe Foundation was one Brussels-
based think tank partly funded by China’s government. It later merged
with the Bruges-based College of Europe—according to one observer,
the ‘Harvard for Europe’s elites’.®' The foundation was set up by Pierre
Defraigne, former director of the European Commission’s trade depart¬
ment. According to him, Madariaga ‘developed a constructive and
balanced working relationship with the Chinese Mission’, facilitating
visits between high-ranking Party leaders and their counterparts in the
European Parliament, the European Commission, and the EU’s foreign
and defence ministry.®^ In 2014 the foundation received 20 per cent
of its budget from the Chinese Mission to the EU. More importantly,
40 per cent of its budget came from a company called Beijing Peace
Tour Cultural Exchange Center.®^ The Chairman of Peace Tour, Shao
Changchun, had to leave Belgium after Belgian state security investi¬
gated his organisation and reportedly found evidence of interference
and espionage.®^ Shao also runs several other foundations, including the
China-Europe Culture and Education Foundation, and the Silk Road
Peace Prize Foundation.®^ Even Defraigne eventually grew wary of Peace

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PARTY-LINKED MONEY IN BRUSSELS

rtMirs liiiuiing. admitting that he put an end to it as I realised that we
vvuld haw hccn used as a lobby for special interests’.^<^

Madariag-a closed shop in Brussels, but the College of Europe, which
jtKNX'Hxxl it, and the colleges EU-China Research Center, founded in
\) 14 , tx>ntinuc to work closely with the Chinese Mission to the EU,
.wrpting financial sponsorship and jointly organising seminars and
a^nfcrcnces on the BRI and Sino-European relations.*"^ The College of
Eun)f>e also hosts the Europe-China Seminar on Human Rights, founded
bv the China Society for Human Rights Studies. This society, which is
linked to the CCPs Office of External Propaganda, was set up in 1993
to defuse criticism of Chinas human rights record by shifting the global
debate away from individual and political rights (see chapter thirteen).*'®
Shortly before the EU-China summit of June 2017, the Brussels-
based European media network Euractiv published a report titled
‘EU-China: Mending differences’.*^^ It was sponsored by the Chinese
Mission and featured an interview with China lobbyist Luigi
Gambardella, in which he praised the BRI and said that ‘China has
been insisting on mutually benefitting policies’.^*’ In 2015 Gambardella
founded ChinaEU, whose official mission is to promote cooperation
between the EU and China in the digital economy.^' Dubbed by
Politico ‘Europe’s Mr. China’ and Brussels’s ‘most visible lobbyist’,
Gambardella meets with members of the European Parliament to push
for more cooperation between China and the EU.^^ Like other ‘friends
of China, he frequently writes for and is cited in Party-state media,
and has become a regular at China’s annual World Internet Conference
in Wuzhen.^'^

Together with the Chinese Mission, the Brussels-based think tank
Friends of Europe organises the Europe-China Forum, as well as the
Europe-China Policy and Practice Roundtable.In March 2019
Friends of Europe, the Chinese Mission, and the CPPCC’s China
Public Diplomacy Association jointly organised a high-level EU—China
event called ‘Can cooperation trump competition?’^*' The think tank’s
director of policy, Shada Islam, is frequently cited in Party-state media.^^
The picture for other Brussels-based think tanks working on Asia
is similar. The EU-Asia Centre, for instance, accepts money from
the Chinese Mission and works closely with Beijing authorities.^®

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THINK TANKS AND THOUGHT LEADERS

Its founder and director, Fraser Cameron, is a former British diplomat
and EU official, whose opinions are promoted by the China Daily. In
the paper he declared the EU to be a ‘strong supporter of the Belt and
Road Initiative’7'’ In 2015 the European Institute for Asian Studies
rejected a proposal to host a talk on Tibet by Australian expert Gabriel
Lafitte, claiming ‘a public seminar on Tibet is not possibility [sic] for
ELAS’. Yet weeks later it organised a talk on economic development in
Tibet by a senior CCP official and military officer.

In Switzerland, Beijing has a friend in the World Economic Forum,
which it has used to create a tight network of connections with the
global business elite. In a paid advertisement in The New York Times, the
China Daily announced that the forum’s founder and chairman, Klaus
Schwab, was one of only ten foreign experts to receive the prestigious
China Reform Friendship Medal—for backing ‘Chinas efforts to re¬
engineer the global economic order’.®' Schwab, who praised Xi’s ‘open
and collaborative spirit’, said the forum will continue to help China
‘realize the shared dream of world peace, happiness, justice, equality and
love triumphing over poverty’.®^

Beijing appears to have neutralised or captured substantial parts
of think tanks across Europe, cultivating sympathetic voices and
muting critical ones, including those studying its interference activities
in Europe.

Other forms of pressure

Money is not the only leverage Beijing has over think tanks in the West.
In 2019 Isaac Stone-Fish reported that the Chinese embassy in the
United States was working on a ‘white list’ of persons to receive pref¬
erential visa treatment.®^ Staff in think tanks working on China-related
issues are as prone to this form of pressure as journalists (and academics,
as we shall see in the next chapter), and even without Chinese financing
or other ties to the CCP they feel the heat. Researchers interviewed for
a Hoover Institution report said they had been informed by visa agents
that listing their think tanks as their place of employment could make it
more difficult to obtain a visa, even impossible.®'*

In a different move, in 2019 Huawei sent a letter to the sponsors
Australian Strategic Policy Institute, which include Boeing and

214

OTHER FORMS OF PRESSURE

Google, accusing the think tank of having ‘an unhealthy fixation on the
company. Huawei, according to the letter, was ‘extremely disappointed
in the \viiy ASPI has conducted itself’. It had ‘become the “go to” organ¬
isation for all things anti-China’, and the letter insinuated it would be
bad tor sponsors to be associated with such an institution.®^

Europe’s only think tank devoted exclusively to China, the Mercator
Institute for China Studies in Berlin, has also faced pressure. In 2017
the CCP’s nationalistic Global Times published a series of articles
railing ag-ainst the institute for nurturing ‘misguided academics’ and
tor its ‘j>oliticised’ research. The paper ran a personal campaign against
MERICS’s then director, Sebastian Heilmann. Beijing was especially
unhappy in early 2018 when MERICS, jointly with the Global Public
Iblic}' Institute, released a report critical of the CCP’s growing influence
actiGties in Europe. The report, ‘Authoritarian Advance’ (of which
Mareike Ohlberg was a co-author), called on Europe’s leaders to take
measures to resist Beijing’s push into Europe. When Heilmann left
MERICS soon after, the Global Times claimed credit for his departure,
su^esting that its criticisms of the institute had ‘put pressure on’ its
funding foundation, the Mercator Stiftung.®*"

While there is no basis for this claim, Heilmann’s replacement as
director, Dutch Sinologist Frank Pieke, has voiced a number of posi¬
tions that are considerably more friendly to the CCP. He has said, for
instance, that Huawei has been demonised, and described concerns
about the company as ‘paranoia’.®^ In 2019 Pieke argued that China
had ‘enormously underestimated the violent nature and intolerance to
genuine competition of Western civilization’; further, whereas previ¬
ously ‘Beijing thought the West would accept a much bigger Chinese
role in the world’, it has had a rude awakening so that now, Beijing’s
diplomacy ‘is no longer driven by the assumption that people are fully
rational’.®® The root of the problem, Pieke claims, is not the rise of an
increasingly aggressive authoritarian power, but ‘Western attitudes to
communist China’. Western anxiety, he says, is a projection, one that
‘says more about the West’s fears about its own future than about what’s
happening in China’.

This rosy picture of the CCP as a naive global actor, full of good
intentions and taken by surprise by irrational Western hostility.

215

THINK TANKS AND THOUGHT LEADERS

ignores thirty years of Party writings that illustrate how, even when
relations with the West were at their best, the CCP never abandoned
its Cold War thinking.

After his appointment as the new director of MERICS, but before
he had taken up his new position. Pieke criticised the ‘Authoritarian
Advance report in an interview with Chinese media.«’ After a scries of
comments about erroneous Western views of China, he said the report
had mistakenly made China into an enemy and was based on weak evi¬
dence. It was clear from the interview that a report like this one would
not emerge from MERICS under his watch. However, despite Pieke’s
stance, some of his statements, and MERICS itself, continue to attract
the ‘ire of the Chinese authorities’.^® In January 2020 the think tank
announced that Pieke had resigned from his position ‘due to differences
in opinion about the strategic development of MERICS’.®'

Opinion-makers

Those Western intellectuals and opinion-makers who express views
that buttress the legitimacy and global ambitions of the CCP do so
in ways both blatant and subtle. In an example of the former, Tom
Plate, vice president of the Pacific Century Institute, argues that the best
ideas for solving the world’s problems come from professors at Beijing’s
Central Party School, along with the ideas of Singapore author Kishore
Mahbubani and Australian strategic thinker Hugh White.®^ China’s
ambassador to Canada agrees: after denouncing Western critics of the
CCP, he urges us to listen to ‘level-headed statesmen’ like Jimmy Carter
and to read Mahbubani’s new book, which describes Xi Jinping as an
exemplar of‘rational good governance’.'®^

When Huawei’s Meng Wanzhou was arrested in Canada, Jeffrey
Sachs, Columbia University’s eminent economics professor, wrote an
opinion piece titled ‘The war on Huawei’ in which he characterised the
action as ‘almost a US declaration of war on China’s business commu¬
nity’, and an instance of‘Trump’s gangster tactics’.‘®‘^ Sachs declared that
‘today’s greatest threat to the international rule of law’ is not the CCP
regime in China, but the United States.

Sachs s attack on US hypocrisy—he pointed out that the US govern¬
ment has not arrested the CEOs of American companies that violated

216

OPINION-MAKERS

rhc same laws—would have carried more weight if he did not have
such close ties to Huawei, as Twitter users quickly pointed out.^^ In
November 2018 Sachs endorsed ‘Huawei s vision of our shared digital
future fas] powerful, exciting, and uniquely well informed’.’*^ These
NV'cre the opening words in a page of platitudes from Sachs praising
Hiuuvci as the company leading us to the future.^^

According to Chinese state media, Sachs has extolled Xi Jinping’s
grand Belt and Road Initiative as ‘one of the most important economic
development initiatives in the history of contemporary economics’. It’s
visionary and ‘full of wisdom’, he said, ‘a building for a humanised plat¬
form to promote peace and cooperation between Europe and Asia’.^®
The cultivation of Jeffrey Sachs appears to have taken place over some
years, via his links to a number of Chinese state bodies as well as the
private energy corporation CEFC, at whose functions he has spoken.^^
(The top leaders of CEFC have since been charged with corruption.)
On CNN he reprised his criticism of the arrest of Meng Wanzhou. On
Canada’s CBC he praised Huawei and defended China’s incarceration
of two Canadian citizens in retaliation. Echoing Beijing’s propaganda
tropes, he said that Meng’s arrest reflected the ‘US Cold War mentality’,
for which he was featured on China’s state television channel.

After Sachs was roundly criticised for defending Huawei, and his
links to Beijing exposed, the Global Times leapt to his defence, insisting
on his right to free speech.Sachs closed his Twitter account after his
mauling, but he was soon earning nods of approval in Beijing, appear¬
ing there in March 2019 at a Chinese government jamboree, where he
attacked Donald Trump for the ‘economic illiteracy’ of the trade war.'*^^
The CCP’s legitimacy is also bolstered by the voices of the rich and
influential Chinese-Americans who make up the Committee of 100.
According to ClOO’s website, the idea for the group was conceived
in 1988, when co-founder I.M. Pei and Henry Kissinger discussed
‘organizing an influential group of Chinese-Americans to address issues
of international concern between the United States and China’.The
committee was then set up in 1990, a time when the CCP suffered inter¬
national isolation after the Tiananmen Square massacre, ‘with a sense
of urgency to build bridges between China and the United States’.
Today its official mission is twofold: ‘promoting the full participation of

217

think tanks and thought leaders

(^{jjriesc-Anicricaiis in A.merictin society And Advancing constructive
dialogue and relationships between the peoples and leaders of the United
States and Greater China In theory, this could allow a broad range of
activities; it could allow the Cl00 to support reciprocity in US-China
trade relations, and the rights of minorities in China; it could alhnv
the Cl00 to speak out on behalf of Chinese-Americans whoVe been
trapped in China under exit bans.'«^

However, any analysis of Cl00 s public statements shows that its
focus is much narrower, and often aligned with the interests of the CCP.
It appropriately defends any ethnic Chinese person whose rights have
been violated in the United States but is silent on the gross violation of
human rights in China. As Mark Simon puts it, ‘In their discussions
about the US-China relationship it is difficult to find any significant
objection to the actions of the CCP.

Several of Cl00 s more prominent members have extensive business
and personal links with the CCP leadership and its united front appa¬
ratus. Founding member C.B. Sung was an adviser of the Shanghai
Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese.Also a member is the
co-founder of HNA Group, the conglomerate linked to red aristocrats,
as is the president of Baidu, the giant internet company involved in
the CCPs censorship regime. Cl00 delegations and leaders frequently
meet with high-ranking CCP officials from the United Front Work
Department and the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office.'®^ In a 2007 meet¬
ing with then head of the UFWD, Liu Yandong, the former chair of
Cl00, John Fugh, assured her that ‘the Committee of 100 will continue
working towards Chinese modernization, China’s peaceful reunification
and good Sino-US relations’.

Former Cl 00 vice president the late Charles Sie advised high-ranking
United Front officials visiting Los Angeles on how to make propaganda
on Tibet more effective. One suggestion was to bring former Tibetan
‘serfs’ to LA to meet Hollywood stars, so the latter could learn about the
progress the CCP had achieved in Tibet.*”

Victor Fung, whose Fung Foundation funds think tanks, is a member
of ClOO, as is another Hong Kong businessman, Ronnie Chan, who
holds positions in think tanks in both China and America. Chan is
chairman of the strategic advisory board of the CCP-aligned Center

218

THE PARTY’S DOMESTIC THINK TANK EXPANSION

for China and Globalization, and an adviser to the State Council’s
China Development Research Foundation. In the US he is a director
of the China-friendly Peterson Institute, a senior associate in CUSEF,
md co-chair of the advisory board of the joint-publication project of
\’;ile University and the CCP’s Foreign Languages Bureau, among other
piwitions.'’^ Ronnie Chan also chairs the board of trustees of the Asia
Society’s outpost in Hong Kong, which refused to allow student activist
Joshua Wong to speak at a book launch in 2017.“^ Chan donated
US$350 million to Harvard University in 2014.*'^

While it’s possible that there are some Cl00 members who disagree
widi the pro-Beijing leaning of its leaders, it’s hard to avoid the con¬
clusion that the committee is uncomfortably close to the CCP, and as
a result much less representative of the concerns of Chinese-Americans
than it could be.

The Party’s domestic think tank expansion

Under Xi Jinping China has redoubled its efforts to build up think
tanks in China that can lend support to the Party. China’s Thirteenth
Five-Year Plan, published in 2015, outlined plans to establish between
fifty and a hundred ‘high-end think tanks’ in the humanities and social
sciences, to enhance the credibility of China’s political and economic
system."^ From the outset, the aim was to amplify China’s voice
internationally. A central document on ‘new types of think tanks with
Chinese characteristics’ explained their importance to the promotion
of Chinese values in the world, to building new ‘discourse systems’ and
to increasing China’s international influence."'’ In March 2019 Huang
Kunming, director of the Propaganda I9epartment, reminded China’s
top think tanks of their responsibility to expand international exchange
and cooperation in order to ‘tell China’s story well’ and to ‘disseminate
China’s point of view’."^ The creation of these think tanks thus serves
the CCP’s goal of changing global perceptions—and it’s working.

While some think tanks are overtly attached to government or Parry
departments, many founded in the last decade are framed as ‘inde¬
pendent’ and ‘non-governmental’. The Charhar Institute, for example,
describes itself as a ‘non-governmental and non-partisan think-tank’."**
But its founder, Han Fangming, is vice chairman of the Foreign Affairs

219

THINK TANKS AND THOUGHT LEADERS

Committee of the CPPCC. He also holds appointments in the united
front body the Chinese Peoples Association for Friendship with Foreign
Countries (see the organisation chart on pages 124-5), and at a research
centre at the Central Party School.”^

Charhars claims of independence are misleading not only because of
personal ties to the Party apparatus, but because CCP control of think
tanks is enshrined in policy documents. These make it clear that ^//think
tanks must uphold Party leadership’ and ‘uphold the Party managing
think tanks’.'^" National guidelines stipulate that think tanks ‘should
carry out activities for the purpose of serving the Party and government
decision-making’.’^' Think tanks that strive for independence come
under intense pressure. Foremost among them recently was the Unirule
Institute of Economics, which closed down in 2019 after being harassed
and impeded by authorities for several years.

Despite this Party mandate. Western think tanks have been eager to
join high-level meetings with China’s think tanks and to partner with
them. One prominent example is the Beijing-based Center for China
and Globalization, which as we saw in chapter six is tightly linked into
the Party structure. It was founded in 2008 by Wang Huiyao (also
known as Henry Wang), a united front person who holds a number of
positions in governments and CCP departments. Since 2008, Wang has
been on the Central Committee of the Jiusan Society, one of China’s
eight recognised ‘democratic parties’, and he is deputy director of a
special committee of the All-China Federation of Returned Overseas
Chinese (see the organisation chart on pages 124—5).'"^

The CCG is active in its outreach. Wang Huiyao has spoken at
the Committee of lOO’s yearly meeting in China. He was a panellist
at the 2019 Munich Security Conference,'"'' at which CCG organised
its first side event on the Wang is also a member of the steering

committee of the Paris Peace Forum, Emmanuel Macron’s ‘Davos for
democracy, where he rubs shoulders with Pascal Lamy and world
leaders, from Angela Merkel to Vladimir Putin.When Wang was
scheduled to speak at a conference on foreign influence, organised by
the Wilson Centers Kissinger Institute, the organisers were called out by
enator Marco Rubio for failing to disclose Wang’s political affiliations.

Wang pulled out.

220

THE PARTY'S DOMESTIC THINK TANK EXPANSION

Anorlier important Chinese think tank is the China Center for
International Economic Exchanges, established in 2009 ‘following the
instructions of Premier Wen Jiabao. Its role is to be ‘the highest-level
think tank established in China The centre is supervised by Chinas
central planning and macroeconomic agency, the National Development
and Reform Commission, and headed by former vice-premier Zeng
Pei)"an.’^® The CCIEEs personnel office doubles as the office of its Party
committees Discipline Inspection Committee.Experts working at
CCIEE are de facto government officials with little latitude to think
outside the Party’s parameters.

CCIEE is well funded and an active participant in global economic
debate. It partnered with Bloomberg to plan a major international con¬
ference aimed at making the national goals of China and the United
States compatible, in the words of its advisory board chair, the ubiq¬
uitous Henry Kissinger.’^' In addition to Kissinger, the conference’s
board is stacked with other friends of China, including former US
treasury secretary Henry Paulson, former White House chief economic
adviser Gary Cohn, former Australian prime minister Kevin Rudd, and
Tung Chee-hwa, the Hong Kong billionaire who funds the China-U.S.
Exchange Foundation.

In 2016 CCIEE partnered with the East Asian Bureau of Economic
Research at the Australian National University to write a report on
the future of the economic relationship between the two nations.
The report was touted as ‘the first major independent study’ of the
relationship, and it called for it to be ‘turbocharged’ through larger
flows of Chinese ‘tourists, students, investors and migrants’ into
Australia. But instead of calling on China to open up its markets.
Professor Peter Drysdale, the report’s lead author, wrote that Australia’s
‘sheltered industries’ needed more Chinese competition, even though
Australia has one of the most open economies in the world. Australia’s
problem—and the report is replete with Australia’s problems—is that
the public ‘does not grasp the benefits of foreign investment’ from
China and is often motivated by xenophobia. The report recommends
the abolition of Australian restrictions on Chinese investment,
including those pertaining to critical infrastructure. The problem, the
report suggests, is not that in China important business decisions are

221

THINK TANKS AND THOUGHT LEADERS

often intimately tied to the interests and strategic aspirations of the
Party-state, but that the Australian public is ignorant. The ‘joint report’
reads like a Beijing wish list, but at ANU the Party was pushing on an
open door.

In 2017 CCIEE did a similar joint report with Bruegel (a Brussels-
based economic think tank), Chatham House, and the Chinese
University of Hong Kong. Partly funded by Huawei and titled ‘EU-
China Economic Relations to 2025: Building a common future, the
report calls for free-trade and investment agreements between the EU
and China, embracing of the BRI, and greater cooperation in science,
technology and innovation. The senior advisory group for the report
included Peter Mandelson of the 48 Group Club; Huang Ping, director
of Chinas first Europe-based think tank, the China-CEE Institute in
Budapest; CUSEF founder Tung Chee-hwa; and CPPCC member
Victor Fung.'^^

The Taihe Institute is another Party-linked think tank masquerading
as independent. Founded in 2013 in Beijing, it claims to have research
centres in Europe and the United States. In Germany the director
of the Taihe Institute’s Europe Centre is Thorsten Jelinek, formerly
associate director at the World Economic Forum. Nothing is officially
known about who is responsible for the Taihe Institute in the Party
hierarchy, but it employs a large number of researchers from the China
Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, a large think tank
at the Ministry of State Security.’ ’^ Taihe’s highest-profile event is the
Taihe Civilizations Forum, the first of which was held in 2017. Among
the speakers that year were former Czech prime minister Jan Fischer;
the Brookings Institute’s Cheng Li; the president of the National
Committee on U.S.-China Relations, Steve Orlins; and the Wilson
Center’s Robert Daly.

In her study of BRI-themed infiuence operations, Nadege Rolland
describes the Silk Road Think Tank Association, the Silk Road Think
Tank Network and the Belt and Road Studies Network (the last
mentioned is run by Xinhua).* ’^ The Silk Road Think Tank Association
operates under the auspices of the International Liaison Department
of the CCP, and is coordinated by the department’s in-house think
tank, the China Center for Contemporary World Studies.The Silk

222

THE PARTY’S DOMESTIC THINK TANK EXPANSION

Rvwd riiiiik Tank Networks secretariat is located in the Development
Rox'arcli Center ot the State Council. Renowned European institutions
haNX joined the Silk Road Think Tank Network, including Chatham
1 louse, the Elcano Royal Institute in Madrid, the German Development
Institute, and the OECD Development Centre. These think tanks
declared their allegiance {biaotai) when they endorsed the following
joint declaration, complete with CCP slogans:

In 2015, based on the common understanding that the Belt and
Road Initiative is an important endeavor to promote world economic
growth, deepen regional cooperation and improve the wellbeing of
people around the world, adhering to the Silk Road spirit of peace
and cooperation, openness and inclusiveness, mutual learning and
mutual benefit’, and adhering to the principles of extensive consul¬
tation, joint contribution and shared benefits’, we jointly launched
the Silk Road Think Tank Network (SiLKS).’^®

Beijing has also set up its own think tank in Washington D.C.'^^ The
Institute for Chinese-American Studies was established in 2015 as
an outpost of the Chinese government’s National Institute for South
China Sea Studies. It aims primarily at ‘sending a clear message’ about
Beijing’s claims on the South China Sea.'‘‘° Henry Kissinger, ever ready
to lend his authority to CCP-backed initiatives, sent a video message
welcoming the initiative. Kissinger is a revered figure in CCP circles.

It’s said that at the Central Parry School in Beijing there is only one
picture of a foreigner adorning the walls, that of Kissinger.

There’s a widespread view in D.C. that the Institute for China-
America Studies has proved ineffective.''^^ Its profile has been low and it
seems to have produced no policy papers, nor done any lobbying. But
there’s more than one way to skin a cat. ICAS is a means of organising,
encouraging and rewarding its friends. Among its board members is
Myron Nordquist, associate director of the Center for Oceans Law and
Policy at the University of Virginia School of Law. An expert in the
law of the sea, Nordquist wrote a detailed dissection of The Hague
Tribunal’s ruling that China’s occupation of islands in the South China
Sea had no basis in law. He concluded that the tribunal erred in its

223

AND THOUGHT LEADERS

interpretation of the law and was motivated by political factors. 'Ihw
provided Beijing with ammunition to defend its actions,'^^

Another ICAS board member is Sam Bateman, a former Australian
navy officer and now a visiting fellow in ocean security at the University
of Wollongong in New South Wales. He is a regular apologist for
Chinas expansionism, arguing, for example, that US Vice President
Pences 2018 speech calling out Beijing took Sinophobia to new
heights.'^’ Bateman also argues that tensions in the Asia-Pacific are due
to American aggression, and has produced a series of specious argu¬
ments about why The Hague Tribunal’s ruling on the South China Sea
was unimportant and not in Australia’s interests. Echoing the CCP’s
position, he wrote that Australia should instead aim ‘to help promote
cooperation and build trust’.

A third ICAS board member is Gordon Houlden, a former diplo¬
mat who spent many years in China and is now director of the China
Institute at the University of Alberta. He has been more independent
than Nordquist and Bateman, writing soon after The Hague decision
that ‘Canada has an abiding interest in negotiation and arbitration
within the ambit of international law’, and urging the Canadian govern¬
ment to make a statement ‘reaffirming our commitment to rule-based
governance of maritime issues’.ICAS has also found supporters in
Michael Swaine and Susan Thornton, two of the principal drafters of
the ‘China is not the enemy’ letter mentioned in chapter three. They
have spoken at a number of events organised by the institute.’^®

In Budapest, the China-CEE Institute is headed by Huang Ping,
who is also the director general of the Institute of European Studies
at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Even though the China-
CEE Institute is registered in Hungary as a non-profit corporation, it’s
embedded in the Chinese bureaucracy, with its website stating that it
is organised and managed by CASS.^'^^ The system of‘organising units’
and managing units’ in China ensures political compliance and loyalty
to the CCP by establishing a chain of responsibility. The China-CEE
Institute is noteworthy primarily for the fact that it is the first branch
iu Europe. It has held a number of high-profile conferences
ffie BRI, and celebrates the good relations and cooperation beuveen
China and Central and Eastern European nations.

224

THE PARTY’S DOMESTIC THINK TANK EXPANSION

\Xc might finally mention the World Forum on China Studies.

I he K>rum is organised by the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences.
Sponsored by the CCPs Office of External Propaganda, and the
Shaitghai municipal government, the forum has been held in Shanghai
cN'ery two years since 2004.'5' In recent times it has expanded abroad—
in 201*) it held events at the Asia Society in New York City and at
the Otrtcr Center in Atlanta.In 2017 the forum organised an event
in Berlin titled ‘China and Globalization: New Era, New Challenges’.
It?; co-hosts for this were the prestigious German Institute of Global
and Area Studies, and the Bertelsmann Foundation (Bertelsmann
Stiltung).'^^ Not bad for an event sponsored by the CCP’s top external
propaganda body.

225

4*m

12

Thought management: CCP
influence in Western academia

Universities as a political battlefield

While Confucius Institutes are often reported by Western media as
channels for the Party-state to exert influence at foreign universities, the
CCPs global ‘thought management’ project is much more ambitious
and is pursued through many channels. In this chapter we examine the
CCP’s engagement in the disciplines of social sciences and humanities
in Western universities (having considered scientific and technological
research in chapter eight).

Pressure on universities to conform to the CCP’s view of the world
is intensifying, and is applied not only through Confucius Institutes,
but also by direct lobbying by Chinese embassies and consulates; by
encouraging Chinese students to report on university activities and to
organise protests; by threats to choke the flow of Chinese students to
those universities that depend on their fees; and by threats to cancel
joint programs and executive training classes. Along with these forms

of coercion, researchers are kept wondering whether their Chinese visas
will be denied.

The CCP systematically pushes its official ‘China narratives’ and
other academic ideas through its ‘Chinese scholarship going global’
strategy. As countries around the world try to close their knowledge
gap on China, cash-strapped university administrators have structural

226

UNIVERSITIES AS A POLITICAL BATTLEFIELD

inccntiNrs to seek out cooperation agreements with Chinese institu-
tk'ns. But they do so knowing very little about the CCP s objectives and
methovls. 1 he Party frames the understanding of ‘Chinese perspectives’
as an imj>ort;uit part of academic exchange, and of making international
academia more equitable and less Western-centric. The problem is that
X'hinese perspectives’ are really the CCP’s perspectives. While there’s
nothing wrong with presenting the Party perspective per se—after all, the
CCP has some 90 million members and is a global force to be reckoned
\nth—conflating this with the Chinese perspective without a disclaimer
about the underlying agenda (to create a ‘global discourse system with
Chinese characteristics’ in order to secure the Party’s continued rule) is
at best misleading. Worse, it results in the exclusion of alternative voices,
including those of ethnic Chinese scholars critical of the CCP.

The CCP believes that ideas are central to the contest for political
power, and academia therefore has a vital role to play in the ideological
struggle. Universities in China have become much more tightly con¬
trolled by the Party under Xi. In order to understand what the Party is
trying to achieve globally, it will help to take a brief look at its project
of building ‘systemic confidence’ through academic research at home.
As in other arenas, changing the international academic landscape is an
extension of this domestic project. Here too, the goal is to mute criticism
of the Party, export its censorship norms, and promote research that
boosts the ‘Chinese path’, the ‘Chinese system’ and ‘Chinese theories’.*

For many decades, the CCP has been obsessed with the potential
for Western academic ideas to weaken belief in the Party and cause
instability in China. According to a volume on Deng Xiaoping’s
thoughts on propaganda, published shortly after the suppression in
1989 of the democracy movement. Western ‘cultural infiltration’ has
two levels.^ The first is the distribution of hostile political views by
foreign media, which can be fairly easily monitored and countered. The
second is ideological and academic infiltration, whereby ‘hostile forces’
deploy modern, social-science theory and values to win over Chinese
intellectuals. This kind of infiltration, the author argued, is much
harder to defend against.^

Almost thirty years later, an opinion piece in the Peoples Daily
echoed the point: ‘Clearly explaining the China path is both a very

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THOUGHT management: CCP INFLUENCE IN WESTERN ACADEMIA

important political responsibility and a very serious academic research
task for Chinese academics’/ The task is not left to the inclinations and
initiative of scholars; ideological research is coordinated through the
National Office for Philosophy and Social Sciences, which takes orders
from the Leading Small Group for Philosophy and Social Sciences,
as well as from the Central Propaganda Department/ Xi Jinping has
highlighted the importance of the humanities and social sciences for
increasing Chinas international influence/

Recently updated foreign-language curricula for Chinese secondary
schools now include classes designed to inoculate students against
infection by Western ideas and strengthen confidence in the Chinese
system. Students learn to compare the two systems in order to ‘inde¬
pendently arrive at the conclusion that the Chinese system is superior.^
The seven ‘false ideological trends’ forbidden to Party cadres, as
outlined in Document No. 9 (see chapter two), apply also to academics.
Students have been encouraged to report on their professors. In Wuhan
a professor was fired after her students denounced her for making
‘incorrect’ comments about the lifting of presidential term limits.*
Others have been fired or suspended for criticising China’s leaders, or
for lesser ‘thought crimes’, including remarks made in chat groups.’

Confucius Institutes

Confucius Institutes were conceived under the Hu-Wen (Hu Jintao/
Wen Jiabao) administration and initiated in 2004 as an innocuous way
to spread the Party narrative while simultaneously gaining entry to
foreign universities. They are a product of the CCP’s fascination with
‘cultural soft power’.

Although the institutes are ostensibly devoted to teaching Chinese
language and promoting Chinese culture, they are, as former propa¬
ganda chief Li Changchun put it, ‘an important part of China’s overseas
propaganda set-up’.” The institutes are managed by the Office of
Chinese Language Council International, known as the Hanban, in
the Ministry of Education. However, the prominent US Sinologist
David Shambaugh has claimed that the funds are actually provided by
the CCP’s Propaganda Department and are ‘laundered’ through the
Ministry of Education.’*

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CONFUCIUS INSTITUTES

In the Western world, the largest number of Confucius Institutes is
m Ik' found in English-speaking countries. As of July 2109 the United
vSrates had about ninety, although there has been a wave of closures.'^
Great Britain has about thirty and Canada thirteen.'^ In Europe the
majorit)' are in France, Germany and Italy. The countries of Central and
Bstern European, often seen as the primary target of CCP influence in
Europe, each host one to four Confucius Institutes, though the overall
number has been growing as institutes in Western Europe close.

Unlike Goethe Institutes and British Councils, Confucius Institutes
are mostly located within foreign universities.*”^ This gives them lever¬
age over the host institutions. The selection of staff for the institutes,
and their curricula, are decided in Beijing, leading China scholar John
Fitzgerald to observe: ‘Universities that accept [Confucius Institutes]
on Beijing s terms, with all the compromises they entail, signal they
are willing to set aside academic principles to build good relations with
China [and] indicate normal due diligence does not apply to relations
with Chinese universities and firms.’

In the United States, the conservative National Association of Scholars
commissioned a thorough review of Confucius Institutes in 2017.'*^ It
reported that many professors associated with the institutes felt ‘immense
pressure to stay on the good side of Confucius Institute directors and
university administrators affiliated with the Confucius Institute’.The
boards of the institutes often include people with close links to United
Front organisations.*® Articles published on the UFWD’s website have
discussed how Confucius Institutes can be used to carry out united front
work.*^The NAS report called for them to be shut down. 1 here are also
been credible reports that some institutes facilitate spying.'**

Interference by Confucius Institutes in academic freedom, freedom
of expression, and other personal rights has been documented in a large
number of countries. One of the most egregious instances occurred
at the 2014 annual conference of the European Association of China
Studies, in Portugal. The conference was sponsored by the Hanban
and the Taiwanese Chiang Chingkuo Foundation. Unhappy with the
mention of the foundation and other Taiwanese organisations in the
conference program, Hanban director general Xu Lin ordered that all
conference programs be confiscated and the offending page torn out.^*

229

THOUGHT management: CCP INFLUENCE IN WESTERN ACADEM

While the incident caused shock among confetence pattidnants
were no repercussions for the Hanban or Confucius InLtuteL Euro"'
Censorship is not unknown in other works sponsored by the imt"
tutes. Topics like the ‘three Ts’—Taiwan, Tibet and Tiananmen—ale
excluded from discussion at most Confucius Institutes.^^ Journalist
Isabel Hilton noticed that a section in an article she’d written for a
volume sponsored by a Confucius Institute had been deleted; the
offending text concerned a Chinese environmental activist.^^

The institutes have been involved in behind-the-scenes lobbying to
cancel events. In Melbourne in 2018 the screening of a documentary
critical of Confucius Institutes was cancelled by Victoria University,
which had hired out one of its theatres for the purpose.^'* The university
was warned of an impending problem by the director of the campus’s
Confucius Institute, Professor Colin Clark, and the university caved in
when the Chinese consulate applied pressure. When it was contacted

by the film’s promoter, the university lied, claiming that the theatre had
been double-booked and no other was available. On the scheduled day,
a number of suitable rooms were empty. The irony was not lost: a docu¬
mentary arguing that Confucius Institutes have political leverage over
their hosts was banned because of the political leverage of a Confucius
Institute over its host. Victoria University’s code of conduct declares the
university to be ‘a place of independent learning and thought, where
ideas may be put forward and reasoned opinion expressed freely while
maintaining respect for others’.

In 2013 the prestigious University of Sydney was accused of cancel¬
ling a visit by the Dalai Lama to avoid damaging its ties with China,
including the funding it received for its Confucius Institute. WTien
the event was pushed off-campus, and use of the universitys logo for¬
bidden, vice chancellor Michael Spence said it was ‘in the best interests
of researchers across the university’.Some five years later Spence said
that government statements and media reports about CCP influence in
Australia were no more than ‘Sinophobic blathering’, following this up
the next year by accusing those expressing concern about CCP influence
of wanting a return to the ‘White Australia Policy’.^^

banning of any discussion of Chinese politics, including topics
e three Ts, has led to the bizarre situation where universities in

230

DIRECT PRESSURE

Australia have registered their American studies centres (partly funded
by Washington) under the new foreign-influence transparency scheme,
hut do not see the need to register their Confucius Institutes because
'they do not discuss politics’—even though they host seminars extolling
the benefits of the Belt and Road Initiative, and the ‘culture’ they teach
is shaped by the Party’s ideology.

Some Confucius Institute contracts have been found to contain
clauses that are illegal in their host countries or clash with the values of
their host universities. For instance, they often stipulate that the insti¬
tutes may not engage in any activities that break Chinese law, which
can be interpreted to include vague, catch-all laws against ‘endangering
national unity’ and ‘endangering national security’.^” The Confucius
Institute at McMaster University in Canada explicitly forbade its
employees from practising Falun Gong, a form of discrimination that
is illegal in Western democracies. When McMaster University failed to
have the clause removed, it closed down the institute. Understanding
how widespread this problem is can be difficult, as terms of agreement
are typically secret. The University of Edinburgh refused a request
for information on potentially discriminatory clauses in its contract,
citing confidentiality.^’

Confucius Institutes vary in their transparency and in how much they
interfere in their host universities. Bigger and more influential univer¬
sities have more bargaining power than smaller or less prestigious ones.
When the Chinese side was negotiating an agreement for a Confucius
Institute at Stanford University, it tried to exclude all discussion of
sensitive issues like Tibet. When Stanford refused, the Hanban backed
down.^^ Prestigious universities that agree to host Confucius Institutes
should understand that they lend legitimacy to an arrangement that
may be used to exert pressure on smaller players.

Direct pressure

Chinese embassies and consulates frequently attempt direct interfer¬
ence in Western universities. In 2018 the University of Salamanca in
Spain cancelled its Taiwan Cultural Week after the Chinese embassy
complained that the representative of Taiwan had been referred to as
ambassador’. The embassy made it clear that China did not ‘consent’

231

THOUGHT management; CCP INFLUENCE IN WESTERN ACADEMIA

to the event.« In Hungary, the University of Debrecen was pressured
by the Chinese embassy to exclude Taiwanese students from participat¬
ing in the university’s international food day, just a few hours before
the start of the event.^*-* And when in April 2019 the Chinese studies
department at the Vrije Universiteit Brussels organised an event with a
Kazakh national who had been detained in one of Xinjiang’s infamous
‘re-education camps’, the Chinese embassy sent letters to the organisers
and prospective attendees asking them not to go. The event went ahead
as planned, but with heightened security.^^

Sometimes, events are rejected under what look like pretexts. In 2014
a faculty member at an Ivy League university had a suggestion for an
event on Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement rejected on the grounds that
it was not ‘substantively academic enough’, even though the institution
often hosted activists.^^The administrator hoped that the faculty member
understood ‘the complexity’ of the university’s East Asian engagement.

Chinese students are another pressure point on campuses. At the
seminal 2015 United Front Work Conference, Xi Jinping described
Chinese students studying abroad as one of the ‘three new focuses’ of
united front work.^^ Anxious to prevent them being ‘infected’ with
Western ideas, the CCP makes extensive efforts to keep them in line.
Many students are loosely organised through Chinese Students and
Scholars Associations (see the organisation chart on pages 124-25).
Some CSSAs state on their websites that they are recognised by, registered
with or even subsidised by the local Chinese embassy or consulate. The
CSSA UK describes itself as an official organisation ‘under the guidance
of the Education Department of the Chinese Embassy to the UK’.^^
The CSSA of Boston University states that it’s registered with the
Chinese consulate in New York, and the CSSA at Vanderbilt University
in Nashville claims to receive ‘subsidies and support’ from the Chinese
embassy.Chinese students in the US and the UK have even established
Party cells at some universities.

There has been heated debate about the extent to which CSSAs are
controlled by Beijing. Much of the activity of the associations revolves
around social events and student support, but the CSSAs do have
ties to the Party and the Chinese government. Some receive funding
from Chinese embassies.'^' Their office holders typically owe allegiance

232

DIRECT PRESSURE

to the CCP and liaise regularly with the local embassy or consulate.
It is through the CSSAs that Chinese students on campuses can be
mobilised to demonstrate ‘patriotic support’ during visits of China’s
leaders, or to counter activities that the CCP considers hostile. In
2016 the Chinese government pressured Chinese students and scholars
in the Netherlands to demonstrate in support of China’s position
on the South China Sea."^^ In 2019 pro-Beijing Chinese students in
Canada, Australia and Britain confronted, at times in aggressive and
intimidating ways, students engaged in public support for Hong Kong
democrac)' protesters. At the University of Queensland, one pro-Hong
Kong student was assaulted. The next day, the Chinese consul general
issued a statement praising the patriotic actions of the Chinese stu¬
dents, drawing a rebuke from Australia’s foreign minister,

XiCTien students at the University of Toronto elected Tibetan-
Canadian Chemi Lhamo as president of the student union, she was
severely harassed, receiving threats of death and rape from Chinese
students on campus, possibly prompted by Chinese diplomats.An
online petition on Change.org labelled her pro-Tibet activism as clearly
against Chinese history, Chinese laws and Chinese students’ rights’,
arguing that China’s Anti-Secession Law of 2005 obliged all Chinese
citizens to protest against Chemi Lhamo’s actions."^^

While some activities like this may be organised independently by
smdents, in other cases they are clearly initiated by or coordinated with
Chinese embassies and consulates. Students at McMaster University
contacted the Chinese embassy to report a planned talk by Uyghur
activist Rukiye Turdush, and later sent photos of the talk to the embassy.
The Washington Post, which reviewed some of the WeChat messages
concerning this incident, called it a Vivid example of how Chinese
students have grown into a vocal and coordinated force on Western
campuses’McMaster University subsequently stripped the CSSA of
its status as a student club.^^

While the Chinese students at McMaster had been tasked by embassy
officials to check if any Chinese students were involved in organising
the talk,^^ a more general concern is when PRC students surveil each
other, including in class, of their own accord. In recent studies, several
professors across the US reported that they assumed their Chinese

233

THOUGHT management: CCP INFLUENCE IN WESTERN ACADEMIA

students were reporting on each other. Some said that Chinese students
had approached them directly with concerns about being denounced.-*’
European academics interviewed for a study by the Leiden Asia Center
shared similar concerns.^® At the Australian National University, a com¬
ment made in class by a Chinese student was reported to the embassy,
and her parents in China received a visit from the Ministry of State
Security, warning them about their daughters behaviour. The MSS visit
came two hours after she made the comment.^'

Self-censorship

A much-cited 2002 article by Perry Link (who has for many years been
blocked from entering China) likened the CCP to ‘the anaconda in the
chandelier’: ‘Normally the great snake doesn’t move. It doesn’t have to.
It feels no need to be clear about its prohibitions. Its constant silent
message is “You yourself decide”, after which, more often than not,
everyone in its shadow makes his or her large and small adjustments—
all quite “naturally .

While Link was primarily talking about the effect of the great snake
on Chinese academics, he argued that the effect was beginning to be felt
abroad as well. These days it is apparent that the anaconda is hovering
over China scholars in the West and many are ‘naturally’ adjusting what
they write and say. Some just want to protect their access to China to do
research; others consider it politeness towards their Chinese partners,
or they want to protect their contacts and sources.According to a
2018 academic study, 68 per cent of 500 interviewees agreed that self¬
censorship is a problem among China scholars.^”*

The topic is a sensitive one that arouses passionate responses. Western
scholars tend to wear their intellectual independence proudly and few
admit to engaging in self-censorship, although many claim to see it in
others. A study by Anastasya Lloyd-Damnjanovic on Beijing’s political
influence on US campuses observed:

It is telling that in a few cases, faculty agreed only to be interviewed
off the record, i.e., on the condition that the information con¬
veyed could not go down on paper. In one case, a faculty member
insisted the interview be conducted at a time when she could access

234

SELF-CENSORSHIP

a hotel landline because she feared her cell phone was monitored.
Many faculty expressed anxiety about being publicly identified in
this study for fear that the PRC government might retaliate or that
some social progressives in the United States might perceive criti¬
cisms of the PRC as racist. This was true even among respondents
who claimed they do not self-censor.^^

As Perry Link noted, if we were to omit all issues that are sensitive to
the CCP Tibet, Tiananmen, Taiwan, Xinjiang, the wealth amassed
by the families of top leaders—‘we are left with a picture of China that
is not only smaller than the whole but crucially different in nature’.
This picture is particularly distorting in places where there are few or no
alternative sources of knowledge about China.

As with journalists, visas are one of the most effective means of keep¬
ing researchers in line, especially those who rely on access to China for
their living.Scholars who have spent decades building their expertise
can have their careers stymied if access is denied. Young academics
without tenure and those with family ties in China are particularly
vulnerable to CCP pressure.

More common than denying a visa is to let the application hang.
Applicants must list the date of their flight to China on the visa form,
and consular officials will simply not respond to the application before
that date.^^ In addition to the few who have been explicitly blacklisted,
a much larger pool of researchers live in constant uncertainty, not fully
welcome but not obviously banned. The problem is compounded by
the fact that few people like to talk about the denial of a visa, making it
difficult to gauge the full extent of the practice.

As the debate over CCP influence and interference in Australia
reached a high point in early 2018, some seventy China scholars signed
an open letter stating that the discussion was ‘sensationalist’, and just
another manifestation of the nation’s long history of anti-Chinese
racism.^® The scholars claimed to ‘see no evidence’ of Beijing inter¬
fering in Australia, despite widely reported incidents to the contrary.
As in the case of the group of US scholars cited in chapter three,
the Australian scholars shifted the blame from the CCP to their own
nation’s moral faults. While those faults certainly exist, ignoring the

235

thought management: ccp influence in western academia

agency of the CCP betrays the commitment to the truth that the
Western academy is meant to stand for. The Global Times warmly
welcomed the Australian scholars letter as proof that the debate over
CCP influence should be ended, as it is only ‘fanning the flames’ of

racial animosity.^*

Financial dependence

The Western tradition of free intellectual inquiry, of following the truth
wherever it leads, has always faced corruption by money; in recent times,
some of that corruption has followed Chinese money. One problem is
what Christopher Hughes of the London School of Economics calls
the ‘enterprise university’ model.“ If a university runs research projects
with Chinese counterparts for profit, or depends on tuition fees from
PRC students, this creates structural incentives to stay on China’s good
side. Where decision-making is centralised, individual researchers can’t
push back against attempts at interference, nor can they shut down
ethically dubious cooperation with Chinese institutions.'^^ ^ Hughes
puts it, ‘If you are someone who raises questions or works on something
sensitive ... you will not make yourself very popular with the people
whose job it is to get the balance sheets right ... I am speaking from
direct experience of myself and colleagues who have spoken out, who
have been marginalised, or taken aside for cups of tea and told, “Stop
stirring things up.’”^'^

For many universities, enrolments from China have proven highly
lucrative, especially when governments cut back education funding.
More than 360,000 Chinese students were studying at US universities
in 2018,*^^ and Canada had over 140,000.“ In the United Kingdom,
with over 100,000 enrolled, Chinese students easily make up the largest
group of foreign students.“ Australia, with over 150,000 Chinese stu¬
dents enrolled in 2018,*'® has proportionally the highest dependence on
fees from China, by a wide margin.

As a rule, Chinese parents want to send their children to the most
highly ranked universities abroad and are avid readers of university
league tables. When prestigious Western universities become dependent
on Chinese fees, they are more sensitive to pressure from the embassy or
consulates. The threat of being cut off from this money stream has been

236

RESHAPING CHINESE STUDIES

used frequently by the Chinese government to try to bring Western
universities into line. Few such threats ever make it into the public
domain. By publicising them, university administrators would cause a
seNTre loss of fiice. By acceding to them, they open themselves to stern
criticism for abandoning their principles. But some cases have surfaced.
After the Dalai Lama visited the University of California, San Diego in
2017, the Chinese government informed the university it would refuse
to fund Chinese scholars who wished to study there.*"^

Research partnerships, academic exchange agreements and training
programs in China are also used as bargaining chips. Some universities
have scores of such arrangements, and developing a deep network of
institutional and personal links with China has become a mark of pro¬
fessional success. Executive training programs have become lucrative
business for Western universities. The University of Cambridge hosts
the China Executive Leadership Program, which is co-sponsored by
the CCPs powerful Organization Department and the State Councils
China Development Research Foundation. The program trains senior
executives from large state-owned corporations selected by the Party to
spend three weeks at Cambridge. Such programs can become another
Beijing pressure point. An executive training program at the University
of Maryland was reportedly suspended after a speech by the Dalai Lama
on campus in 2013, and again after Yang Shuping’s 2017 graduation
speech (see chapter five).^“

Many university leaders in the West have shown by their actions
that they are not committed to academic freedom, and often do not
understand what it is. There are many instances of university executives
buckling to Beijing’s pressure and using phrases like ‘we understand the
concern, but the situation is complex’, or ‘the university must balance
the freedom of our academics against the other goals of the university’.
The principle of academic freedom is worth nothing if universities are
not willing to protect it actively.

Reshaping Chinese studies

In the CCP’s campaign to reshape global debate, an essential target is
the field of China studies itself. As we’ve seen, Confucius Institutes are
one channel for this, as is the World Forum on China Studies, launched

237

thought management: ccp influence in western academia

in 2004 by propaganda authorities to foster a community of foreign
researchers sympathetic to the Party/' ^

Another is the three-week Visiting Program for Young Sinologists,
run by Chinas Ministry of Culture and Tourism and advertised through
ChinaWatch on The Telegraph website/^ In June 2019 the program was
hosted by the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, to ‘let foreign
scholars tell Chinas story well’/3 The Chinese government also provides
special scholarships for students from Central and Eastern Europe/''
The goal is not to reap immediate benefits, but to make sure that the
next generation of China experts in these countries is positively disposed
towards the CCP.

Its not unknown for China to pay Sinologists to promote China.
The American political scientist Edward Friedman reported that in the
early 2000s he was offered $25,000 by officials from the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs to write a book on how China was succeeding in its
foreign relations.^^ He declined. Today, there is an official ‘Foreigners
Writing on China Programme’, which provides funding for ‘foreign
sinologists, writers, media professionals, scholars and other notable
public figures’ to write books on China, at the invitation of domestic
Chinese publishers, to ‘spread the voice of China’.^'^

Around 2011 Wen Ruchun, the daughter of former Chinese premier
Wen Jiabao, donated £3.7 million to endow a professorship at The
University of Cambridge through her mysterious Chong Hua founda¬
tion. The first Chong Hua professor, Peter Nolan, had previously taught
Wen Ruchun and co-authored a book with her husband.^^ The uni¬
versity apparently did not go through a formal process of appointment
to fill the chair. A former Cambridge academic, d’arak Barkawi, wrote:
‘Nolan has very close links with the Chinese government and appears to
have played a central role in organising the donation.Nolan no longer
holds the chair, but remains at Cambridge as director of the Centre of
Development Studies, and director of the university’s China Executive
Leadership Program.^^ He is a fellow of the 48 Group Club.

In 2017 the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns
Hopkins University announced the newly created C.H. Tung professor¬
ship, named after former Hong Kong chief executive Tung Chee-hwa.
The new professor would also be director of a research program called

238

UNIVERSITY COOPERATION

the l\»cific Community Initiative. The professorship and the research
pix>gram arc partly funded by the China-United States Exchange
Ixnmdation, the Hong Kong-based organisation founded by Tung in
2008.*® Tung, as we’ve seen, is a vice chairman of the Chinese People’s
IVlitical Consultative Conference, one of the Party’s important influ¬
encing bodies and a prominent Party activist. In 2018 the University of
Texas at Austin turned down a proposed donation from CUSEF to fund
its China Public Policy Center because of the foundation’s links with the
CCP, although some faculty members supported the proposal.**

In 2019 the Financial Times reported that the London School of
Economics had planned to establish a new China program with funding
from Eric X. Li, a venture capitalist and staunch supporter of the CCP.
The program would have been overseen by an advisory group from
China, but it was cancelled after a backlash from academics.*^

University cooperation

Opening campuses in China has become a popular way for Western
universities to internationalise themselves while at the same time gen¬
erating new sources of revenue. One of the earliest joint initiatives, well
before the current wave, was the Hopkins-Nanjing Center, founded in
1986 by Johns Hopkins University and Nanjing University. After the
Chinese government began encouraging cooperation in education in
1995, several Western universities established joint institutes. These are
based at and function like colleges of Chinese universities.*^ Since 2003,
foreign universities have been able to open full universities in China by
forming a joint venture with a Chinese university in which the Chinese
side owns 51 per cent.*”* This makes them Chinese legal entities subject
to Chinese law, with all that this entails for academic freedom.*^

Several renowned universities have accepted this arrangement,
including New York University (establishing NYU Shanghai), Duke
(Duke Kunshan), the University of Nottingham (Nottingham Ningbo),
the University of Liverpool (Jiaotong-Liverpool University), and the
University of California, Berkeley (Tsinghua-Berkeley Shenzhen
Institute). Others, like the University of Cambridg e, are still negoti-
ating.*^ Occasionally, wholly American-owned universities have been
allowed to operate in China. Sias University, which was originally

239

THOUGHT management: CCP INFLUENCE IN WESTERN ACADEMIA

founded as a joint project by Fort Hayes State University and Zhengzhou
University in 1998, is an example.”^ Over 2000 university partnerships
of various forms currently operate in China.**®

Foreign-owned and partially foreign-owned universities have been
presented as rare zones of academic freedom in China by their supporters,
but they come with a host of problems, including limitations on aca¬
demic freedom. In 2010, when an American student tried to launch the
first academic journal at the Hopkins-Nanjing Center, administrators
prevented its circulation outside campus, on the grounds that academic
freedom was to be limited to the classroom. Most Chinese students
involved in the journal asked to have their names removed, and one was
pressured to withdraw an article.®*^

In 2018 the University of Nottingham Ningbo removed Stephen
Morgan from his role as associate provost after he wrote an article
criticising the outcomes of the 19th Party Congress in 2017.^° In 2019,
when classes resumed for the fall semester at NYU Shanghai, one topic
that could not be addressed on campus was the Hong Kong protests.
‘Most of us are on guard about what we say even when we talk about the
weather,’ a faculty member was quoted as saying.^' Professor Rebecca
Karl, who teaches at NYU’s home campus in New York, has been black¬
listed from the Shanghai campus. She said she had ‘faced pressure from
multiple fellow professors in New York not to organise a panel on the
Hong Kong protests this semester out of concern that it would “hurt
the feelings of my colleagues in Shangahi”.” Karl said she did not trust
her university to stand up for academic freedom in Shanghai: ‘They
have too much at stake.

In fact, by establishing campuses in China, Western university execu¬
tives knowingly agree to sacrifice the principle of academic freedom. In
2011 NYU president John Sexton reportedly told Bloomberg News that
‘students and faculty at the new [Shanghai] campus shouldn’t assume
they can criticise government leaders or policies without repercussions.’
He added, ‘I have no trouble distinguishing between rights of academic
freedom and rights of political expression.

In a move that reflects the overall tightening of ideological screws
on Chinese campuses, new regulations introduced in 2017 require
joint-venture universities to set up a Party committee and appoint a

240

UNIVERSITY COOPERATION

Party secretary.’"* According to the Financial Times, university adminis-
tnttors are not given a written copy of these new regulations but receive
only an oral briefing on them.’^ In 2018 the University of Groningen in
the Netherlands cancelled an agreement (the signing of which had been
attended by Xi Jinping and the Dutch king) to offer full degrees at a
campus in Yantai after the Chinese government announced that a CCP
official must sit on the board of all foreign-funded universities. Large
parts of the campus had already been built.’*’

Groningen’s reaction distinguishes it from the capitulation of other
Western universities. While nearly all joint ventures list the Party secre¬
tary on their foreign websites as well as their Chinese-language sites, only
the latter provide information on ‘Party building’ activities and ‘Party
mass relations’. These activities include ‘theory study sessions’ on Xi
Jinping Thought, CCP discipline, and the latest Party documents and
slogans.’^ At the Chinese campus of Leeds University, Party-building
includes training Chinese staff to ‘do ideological work well’.’® Even
wholly American-owned public universities like Sias (the China branch
of Fort Hayes State University) are not exempt from Party-building
activities; there, on the occasion of the ninety-eighth anniversary of
the CCP, Chinese staff renewed their oath to the Party.” And it’s not
only staff and Party members who are affected. Chinese students at
NYU Shanghai, for example, also have to rake classes on Mao Zedong
Thought and other mandatory ‘political studies’ courses.*”

Some joint-venture universities employ their faculty locally,
meaning foreign faculty arc no longer employed by foreign univer¬
sities but by the Chinese government. NYU Shanghai and Duke
Kunshan reportedly quietly switched to this model several years
ago.”' (According to Duke’s mission statement, it will ‘promote an
intellectual environment built on a commitment to free and open
inquiry’.”’) At Kean State, an American public university in New
jersey, a plan to switch to local employment at its China campus
in Wenzhou caused a backlash when the university’s union became
aware of it. The Wenzhou-Kean campus had previously posted
job advertisements stating that applicants who were CCP members
d be j,hen preference."^ Like all joint ventures, Wenzhou-Kean
sity has a Party secretar}’, who is also chairperson of the board

241

THOUGHT management: CCP INFLUENCE IN WESTERN ACADEMIA

of directors overseeing the university.CCP policy initiatives like
the BRI are openly promoted at some joint education institutions^

In 2018 the French EMLYON Business School, together with the
East China Normal University, founded the Asia Europe Business
School in Shanghai. According to its website, its mission is to create
‘Belt and Road entrepreneurs’.The French government has rejected
participation in the BRI, while EMLYON Business School is helping
create BRI champions to send back to France.

Once cooperation agreements are in place, it is very rare for Western
universities to terminate them. One exception occurred in 2018, when
the School of Industrial and Labor Relations at Cornell University ended
its cooperation with Renmin University’s School of Labor and Human
Resources, and with its Business School. The decision was prompted
by the kidnapping of Chinese students who had engaged in activism at
Renmin University, but it followed mounting concerns about the deteri¬
orating academic environment in China. In the words of Eli Friedman,
director of Cornell’s School of Industrial and Labor Relations, who
personally made the decision to terminate the exchange, ‘Foreign
institutions have long hoped that engagement and quiet diplomacy in
China would eventually lead to an expansion in academic, and possibly
political, freedoms. It is increasingly clear that precisely the opposite has
happened ... The actions we took at Cornell ILR may or may not turn
out to be effective, but doing nothing was not an option.’'®"

The setting-up of campuses abroad has also gone in the other
direction. In 2013 Fudan University established the Fudan-European
Centre for China Studies at the University of Copenhagen, as ‘a stra¬
tegic initiative of Fudan University to meet the growing demand for a
more nuanced and balanced understanding of Chinas development.
Some of its key events have served to promote Beijings positions,
including such insights as the recent worsening of cross-strait relations
are due to the [2016] election of Isai Ing-wen in laiwan , and without
intervention from the US, there would be no laiwan Issue .'®* (In
2016 the Universirv' of Copenhagen joined the US-based Scholars at
Risk organisation, which helps protect any scholars facing threats and
imprisonment around the world. The university has not yet provided
sanctuary to any Chinese scholars.)

242

academic publishing

Another European-based institution is the Brussels Academy for
China-Europcan Studies, opened in 2014 as a cooperative venture
between Renmin University of China, Sichuan University, Fudan
University, and Vrije Universiteit Brussels. It works closely with the
Confucius Institute at Vrije Universiteit Brussels.In October 2019
the director of this Confucius Institute, Song Xinning, was barred for
eight years from entering the European Union because of his alleged
espionage activities. VUB had reportedly ignored previous warnings
from Belgium’s intelligence service. Song had built up an excellent net¬
work of contacts with thinks tanks across Europe, including the College
of Europe, ‘the Bruges elite school for Eurocrats’."”

In 2018 Peking University opened a campus of its HSBC Business
School near Oxford, initially backed by British bank HSBC. At the
inauguration, Chinese ambassador Liu Xiaoming stressed that the
campus should become a platform ‘to tell the China story’.'" And later
that year the University of Coimbra in Portugal announced it would
host a Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Chinese Studies Center."^

Academic publishing

Translations of Chinese academic work are centrally planned and
subsidised through a number of programs. In 2010 the National
Social Science Fund of China set up a translation program in order
to ‘raise the international influence of Chinese humanities and social
sciences’. To give the translated works legitimacy, they are published
through ‘authoritative publishing institutions’ and ‘enter mainstream
distribution channels’ abroad."^ This means that Chinese publishers
are encouraged to seek out partnerships with renowned international
publishers, something they have done quite successfully.

In 2017 Cambridge University Press decided to exclude several
journals containing articles critical of CCP positions from the package
it offers universities in China. This caused outrage among scholars, and
the press eventually backed down. But other publishers have managed
to fly under the radar and continue to censor material that is to be
used in China. The big Stuttgart-based academic publisher Springer
Nature (publisher Scientific American and Nature, among many other
titles) allowed Chinese authorities to decide which articles would be

243

THOUGHT management: CCP INFLUENCE IN WESTERN ACADEMIA

unavailable on its online platform in China, justifying its censorship
by saying it affected just one per cent of its content in China (the
one per cent the CCP did not like)."^ Apart from a few news reports,
Springer Nature received limited backlash, although a petition calling
for a peer-review boycott of all humanities and social science journals
published by Springer Nature and its subsidiary Palgrave Macmillan
received 1200 signatures.The editors of the journal Transcultural
Research at the University of Heidelberg terminated their relationship
with Springer Nature in protest over its decision, calling it an ‘unaccept¬
able breach of trust’.

The CCP took a slightly different approach with Taylor & Francis,
owner of the publisher Routledge. Rather than censoring individual
articles, Chinese import agencies simply excluded eighty-three of the
1466 journals in the publishing group’s package for libraries.'*^

Exactly how many publishers and journals are subjected to CCP
censorship is unknown. An argument commonly used to justify such
censorship is that it only affects publications distributed in China, not
global offerings. Publishers defend themselves by saying they have to
abide by local laws. Individual authors who have accepted censorship in
the Chinese translation of their work have argued that the loss in con¬
tent is outweighed by the benefit of making most of their work available

to Chinese readers.'

Leaving aside this dubious justification for acceding to censorship,
some authors with an eye on sales in China are tempted to circumscribe
what they write. And publishers may accept and reject manuscripts
based on their acceptabilit)- to Party censors. PEN International, which
defends the free speech of writers, has expressed concern that the
promise of large advances for Chinese translations may steer authors
away from potentially controversial topics.

However, there mav be an even more fundamental problem. In
2019 an agent for Chinese printing companies handed Australian
publishing houses a list of words and topics that could not appear
in any books that were to be printed in China.*"® The list contained
names of Chinese dissidents and also political figures, including
^ Jmpmg. Publishers in New Zealand face che same prohibitions.'^'
rn publishers print a large share of their titles, particularly

244

ACADEMIC PUBLISHING

illustrated books and those with high print-runs, in China, which has
the most advanced and cheapest printing processes. These publishers
must now either censor their books or pay more for having them
printed elsewhere. Its important to note that this ban applies not to
books for the Chinese market, but to those sold in any other market.
When Australian publisher Allen & Unwin cancelled the publication
of a book critical of the CCP in 2017, one of its concerns was that
it might be banned from all access to Chinese printers.While the
censorship guidelines have been in place for some time, they were not
enforced until 2019, according to Chinese printing companies.In
deciding whether to offer a book contract to an author, publishers
must now take this factor into account.

The Party also uses publishing collaborations to spread its voice.
Yale University collaborates with the Foreign Languages Bureau of
the CCP, which interacts with the outside world under the nameplate
China International Publishing Group. When the project was launched
at the Great Hall of the People in 2006, Yale University’s leaders
appeared alongside high-ranking officials from the CCP’s Propaganda
Department.And in 2017 the China Social Sciences Press established
a branch at the Institute of Political Studies in Bordeaux (Sciences Po
Bordeaux), to facilitate long-term, institutionalised partnerships with
foreign publishers and to ‘raise China’s academic influence in Europe’s
main countries and international society’.'’^

In the UK, the dual-language Global Century Press, a subsidiary of
the UK-based Global China Academy, has been publishing titles like
Chinas Role in a Shaircl Human Future: Fuwards theory [r/V] for global
leadership (2018) by British sociologist Martin Albrow,'"^’ and Walk for
Peace: Transcidtural experiences in China (2016) by Lord Michael Bates
and his wife Lady Xuelin Bates (whom we met in chapter seven).
Both books are instances of influential people in the UK lending their
names to key CCP talking points and terminology.

Most large Western publishing houses have cooperation agree¬
ments with Party-state institutions to distribute English-language
translations of Chinese academic research (both actual research and
Party talking points). This includes books and journals paid for by
Chinese institutions, such as the Chinese Academy of Sciences and

245

esc

in

thought management: ccp influence in western academia

the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, or co-publishcd with Chine.i
publishing houses. Springer Nature publishes dozens of journals i„
this way, including China International Strategy Review, produced
by the Institute of International and Strategic Studies at Peking
University; Frontiers of Education in China, co-published with the
Higher Education Press; and the Journal of Chinese Sociology, which is
under the auspices of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and is
mainland Chinas first English journal in sociology’. Springer Nature
and its subsidiary Palgrave Macmillan also launched the Belt and Road
Initiative a bundle of works on the BRI by authors from various dis-

• tnanv of these works are the product of highly politicised and

• h 1 controlled environments at Chinese universities.Routledge
reLntly%blished the Routledge Handbook of the Belt and Road (2019),

sisting of articles translated from Chinese and co-edited by the vice
•dent of CASS, Cai Fang, and Cambridge professor Peter Nolan.'^^
The Dutch company Elsevier publishes journals supervised by the
Chinese Academy of Sciences.

Making available Chinese research in the humanities and social
sciences, much of which is high quality, is generally a valuable con¬
tribution. But few readers are likely to be aware that most publishing
collaborations are not initiated by individual Chinese institutes or
Western publishers, but by the Party-state, with the explicit aim of
spreading concepts and theories ‘with Chinese characteristics’. The series
Key Concepts in Chinese Thought and Culture, published by Palgrave
Macmillan in partnership with Beijing Foreign Language Teaching and
Research Press, is part of a top-down ‘translation and communication’
project run by China’s State Council.

As the boundaries between Chinese and international publishing
continue to blur, Chinese censorship becomes increasingly normalised.
Foreign readers see the name of a renowned publishing house on
a book about China and are unaware that the content accords with
Beijing’s line.

In another instance ol non-capitulation, however, Dutch publisher
Brill terminated an agreement to publish four journals in cooperation
with a publisher owned by Chinas education department. Though
the reason was not stated, this happened shortly after an article in one of

246

ACADEMIC PUBLISHING

rhe journals was removed at the request of censors. The article in ques¬
tion, ‘Subversive writing’ by Jin Liu, an associate professor at Georgia
Tech, was tor a special issue of the journal Frontiers of Literary Studies in
0}ifui~> and had been peer-reviewed and accepted before being removed.
The journal’s editors, who had not been consulted, only found out
when they were reviewing the proofs; moreover, their introduction had
been edited to delete reference to the censored article.

When the editors contacted the editor-in-chief, Xudong Zhang,
they were told that the removal of the essay ‘should come as no sur¬
prise, since has its editorial office in Beijing and so must abide by
normal Chinese censorship’.Zhang rebuked the editors, telling them
they should never have accepted the article in the first place. When
the editors sought support from a member of the editorial board, a
prominent professor at a prestigious US university, ‘he merely shrugged:
what did we expect?’The editors went public about the incident and
published the special issue elsewhere. Asking around, they uncovered
similar instances of censorship of academic journals that had been
kept private.

The editors of the special issue wrote that they had trained them¬
selves ‘to read between the lines of work published on the Mainland,
noting and compensating for the telling absences’.*’^’ However, they
asked, ‘What happens when it is no longer obvious where something
was published and according to which rules?’ For people who are not
China-focused academics, the problem is compounded; they likely
don’t know they’re expected to read between the lines.

China’s unlawful territorial claims are another thing being subtly
endorsed and reinforced by prestigious Western journals.Articles
have been published that incorporate maps of China showing the Nine-
Dash Line. This line, first drawn in 1947, marks our China’s claim to
virtually all of the South China Sea and the islands and reefs within
it. \(ffien the Philippines, whose fisherman had been bullied off their
traditional fishing grounds, challenged China’s jurisdiction within the
line, a tribunal was convened in The Hague under the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea. In 2016 it ruled that there is ‘no
legal basis for China to claim. The map appears in articles that have
nothing to do with the South China Sea, such as on the distribution of

247

thought management: ccp influence in western academia

butterflies or trees and grasses in China, and arc purely political jtatc-
ments. When Western authors question the inclusion of the map in
their articles, their Chinese co-authors say they can do nothing because
the authorities require it, or they repeat the CCP line that the South
China Sea is part of their homeland.

248

Reshaping global governance

‘Champion of multilateralism’

At the 2018 Central Foreign Affairs Conference, Xi Jinping called
on China to ‘lead the reform of the global governance system.' This
marked a shift from the careful terminolog}^ he had used at the same
conference in 2014, where there was no talk of China ‘leading’.^ The
more forthright language reflects Beijing’s increasingly robust efforts
to reshape international institutions and global regimes to suit the
CCP’s interests.

However, the CCP wants China to be seen as a protector ol multi¬
lateral institutions, presenting itself as a much-needed counterweight to
‘US unilateralism’. In 2018 at the United Nations General Assembly,
foreign minister Wang Yi called China a ‘champion of multilateralism’.^
The following year, at the G20 Summit in Osaka, Xi Jinping ‘led a
chorus for safeguarding multilateralism’,'' while a joint EU—China
statement in April stressed that both sides ‘share common ground in
upholding multilateralism’.^

The CCPs discontent with the present order should not come as a
surprise; after all, it did not have much of a say in creating it, joining
only in the 1970s. But when China’s leaders speak of making the inter¬
national order more inclusive, what they are calling for is acceptance of
authoritarian systems, and for their values to be given the same status

249

RESHAPING GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

as democratic ones.*’ The CCP also wants to create new international
organisations, with norms that stress national sovereignty and thereby
impose minimal accountability on China.

The Party’s modus operandi is to strengthen its position in large
multilateral organisations, such as the United Nations, and chip away

at those of its mechanisms it does not like, while simultaneously
creating parallel institutions that China can dominate. Where it can,
it will split nations off from multilateral groups and engage in bilateral
relationships in which China will almost always be the stronger party.
Pseudo-multilateral institutions (discussed below) follow the same
approach. Beijing’s position at the United Nations has been bolstered
by its growing financial contribution, at a time when that of the US is
declining, and by its large number of allies among developing countries

and the non-Western world.

Through international bodies the CCP can set technical standards,
ain support for policies like the BRI, insert ‘Xi-speak’ into discussions—
s like community of shared future for mankind’—and spread
L alternative definitions of ‘human rights’, ‘terrorism’ and ‘internet
ernance’. This makes these bodies ideal platforms for increasing
the Party’s global ‘discourse power’ {htmyuquan) and for spreading the

‘China model’.

Sinicising the United Nations

China is a permanent member of the UN Security Council and under
Xi Jinping has been actively expanding its infiuence there. It pursues
the strateg)' of‘using the countryside to surround the city’, challenging
the established order by gradually building up bases on the periphery,
rhe most prominent example is C.hinas approach to the UN Human
Rights Council, where it has been criticising ‘Western’ conceptions
and promoting human rights with C hinese characteristics , persuading
other countries to praise its humati rights record. VCe look at this in
detail later this chapter, but meanwhile there are many other signs of
China's surging infiuence at the UN.

The Ciroup of 77 (G77) w'as founded in 1964 to represent the
interests of developing nations at the UN, and although China does
not consider itself a member of the group it often works with it.

250

SINICISING THE UNITED NATIONS

Membership of the G77 has grown substantially since its founding
and today it numbers 134 countries, nearly 70 per cent of the UN’s
membership countries, giving China a substantial pool of allies with
whicli to coordinate activity/Though G77 countries do not always vote
as a bloc, China can often mobilise enough of them to speak up on its
behalf and to represent its interests in UN bodies.

Four of the UN’s fifteen specialised agencies—the Food and
Agriculture Organization, the International Telecommunications
Organization, the International Civil Aviation Organization, and the
UN Industrial Development Organization—are now run by Chinese
nationals (by contrast, the US, the UK and France each head one).®
Beijing has also gained effective control of large UN departments
neglected by Western nations. One is the UN Department of Economic
and Social Affairs, which is responsible for all kinds of activities, from
the Sustainable Development Goals to following up on actions man¬
dated by UN conferences and summits. It is headed by Liu Zhenmin,
previously China’s vice minister for foreign affairs, who also advises the
UN secretary-general on internet governance.^ A European diplomat
has described the department as ‘a Chinese enterprise ... Everybody
knows it and everybody accepts ir.’'°

The Department of Economic and Social Affairs has worked closely
with Chinese organisations to push the BRl onto the UNs agenda,*'
Its economic and policy division is implementing a major project
linking the BRl to the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals, part of
its high-profile Agenda for Sustainable Development.*’ A Dutch think
tank has written of China employing the UN to ‘internationalise and
legitimise its own domestic interests’.*^ A slew of UN agencies, includ¬
ing the World Meteorological Organization, the International Labour
Organization, the International Civil Aviation Organization, and the
International Telecommunication Union, have signed BRl agreements,
all feeding into the CCP’s narrative that the BRl is a global initiative
rather than a Chinese one.*^

The UN Development Program was the first at the UN to sign
a BRl memorandum of understanding with China, in September
2016.*’ Helen Clark, former New Zealand prime minister and the
administrator of the UNDP, lauded the BRl as ‘a powerful platform

251

reshaping global governance

for economic growth’ and ‘an important catalyst and accelerator for the
sustainable development goals’.The memorandum was followed in
May 2017 by an action plan for cooperation between the UNDP and
the Chinese government. The UNDP stressed that it ‘commends the
Government of China for enacting this initiative, and acknowledges the
role of China in leading by example and reaffirms its desire to support
China in its efforts’.'^

Even UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres has praised the BRI,
in opening remarks at the 2019 Belt and Road Forum for International
Cooperation, held in Beijing. (He was accompanied on this trip by his
under-secretary, Liu Zhenmin.*®) Guterres commended China ‘for its
central role as a pillar of international cooperation and multilateralism’.’’

China has also been wielding influence at the Economic and Social
Council, one of the UN’s six main bodies; it’s been a member since 1971.
Through its membership of the council’s NGO accrediting committee,
Beijing has blocked organisations it deems unfriendly. It prevented the
Committee to Protect Journalists from being accredited as an NGO
for four years. (The situation was only resolved when the United States
called for a full vote.‘°) China also tried to have the consultative status
of the Germany-based Society for Threatened Peoples withdrawn.^' By
contrast, CCP front groups like the Cliina Foundation for Peace and

Development were approved without delay.'

Beijing has also regularly used the accreditation process to demand that
NGOs remove material it does not like from their websites, and to inform
them that they must refer to laiwan as laiwan, Province of China. Such
orders are put even to NGOs that ha\'e nothing to do with China.^^ One
NGO told Human Rights Watch that China complained about material
concerning dissident Nobel Laureate Liu Xiaobo on its website. The
NGO removed some of the oflensive’ material, but continued to see its
application deferred by China when it did not comply with reejuests for
information that would have put sources in China at risk.^‘*

In 2015 UN headquarters in both New York and Geneva began to
refuse entry to Taiwanese nationals, and even Taiwanese diplomats if
they were carrying onlv their Taiwanese passports.'^ Whether this was
done at Beijings request or was a pre-emptive act, it indicates that
Chinas efforts to erase Taiwan as a de facto independent nation are

252

PUSHING TAIWAN OFF THE INTERNATIONAL STAGE

succeeding. 1 he UN explained it only accepts documents issued by
member states. (Taiwan hasn’t been a member of the UN since it was
replaced by the PRC in 1971. Its bids to join have been rejected several
times.) Documents issued by Taiwan have often been accepted in prac¬
tice, but refusal of Taiwan-issued identifications seems to be on the rise.
In 2017 a group of Taiwanese students were denied entry to the Geneva
headquarters to observe a session of the UN Human Rights Council,
They were told that to be able to enter they needed to show ‘Taiwan
Compatriot Travel Documents’, a type of permit issued by Chinese
authorities to Taiwanese citizens wanting to travel to China.And in

2018 a Taiwanese journalist was refused entry even after presenting this
permit; she was told she needed a PRC passport to enter.

Others have been ejected from UN premises under direct orders
from Chinese members. Former UN Under-Secretary General Wu
Hongbo admitted on Chinese national television that he had used his
position to have the head of the World Uyghur Congress, Dolkun Isa,
removed from UN premises during a forum on indigenous issues in
April 2017, despite the fact that Dolkun was accredited as an NGO
participant. Dolkun was given no reason for his expulsion and was not
allowed to re-enter the premises.'*^

Pushing Taiwan off the international stage

Beijing has successfully pressured Western companies to treat Taiwan, a
countr)^ of 23 million, as if it were a parr of the PRC. Over the course of

2019 it aggressively courted those countries that still recognise Taiwan,
leading some to switch recognition within a very short period.^*'’ For
a long time, China has resisted the inclusion of laiwan in the World
Health Organization, thereby impeding the global fight against diseases.
During the 2003 SARS epidemic, Taiwanese health organisations only
received information about the dangerous disease through contacts
at the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. After SARS
broke out in a Taiwanese hospital, the WHO finally dispatched some
experts to Taiwan, the first time in thirty-one years.Following this
debacle, Taiwan was occasionally allowed to participate in the WHO,
with Chinas permission.^" During the rapid spread of the novel corona-
virus in early 2020, at Beijing’s insistence WHO excluded Taiwan

253

RESHAPING GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

from meetings of countries affected by the outbreak.^^ Chinas f '
ministry claimed that China would tell Taiwan what it needed toTmw
about the epidemic. Taiwan’s foreign ministry said that China was not
passing on all information, impeding its ability to protect its citizens.”
At the same time, Nikkei Asian Review reported a diplomatic source in
Beijing noting that China and the WHO have extremely close ties’.”
China is the world’s second-largest financial contributor to the U.N,
Previously, Nature reported that the WHO’s relationship with China
grew especially close during the tenure of Margaret Chan, who led the
organisation from 2006 to 2017. (Chan was rumoured to be in the
running for the position of Hong Kong chief executive, but Beijing
chose Carrie Lam instead.^^ During the corona virus crisis, WHO’s
director-general Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus was criticised for back¬
ing Beijing’s initial resistance to travel warnings and for giving high
praise to President Xi’s response. (Xi’s wife, Peng Liyuan, is a longtime
WHO goodwill ambassador.)

After Tsai Ing-wen was elected president of Taiwan in 2016, Beijing
began blocking the country’s participation in the World Health Assembly,
presumably to punish it for electing a politician the CCP dislikes.^^ The
WHA in Geneva has refused to accredit Taiwanese journalists trying
to cover it for several years in a row.’^ Canadian journalist Yuli Hu was
prevented from covering the assembly of the UN International Civil
Aviation Organization in Montreal in 2016 because she was working
for Taiwan’s Central News Agency.

Taiwan’s Red Cross Society has not only been excluded from the
WHO, it is not recognised by the International Committee of the
Red Cross, which has been trying hard to ingratiate itself with Beijing.
In March 2019 the committee signed an agreement with a Chinese
Chamber of Commerce to pool and share their resources [to support]
Chinese companies operating in complex environments abroad N The
committee’s special envoy to China, Jacques Pellet, praised Chinas
contributions to humanitarian relief on China’s international TV broad¬
caster CCTN."*® In Xinjiang, where over a million ethnic minorities have
disappeared into concentration camps, the International Committee
has worked with China’s Red Cross Society on a development project.'^*
While the outcome may be beneficial to some, the presence of the

254

POLICING GOES GLOBAL

international organisation lends legitimacy to policies that are, in effect,
cultural genocide and crimes against humanity in the region.

Beijing's implacable campaign against Taiwan sends an unambigu¬
ous message to the world that Taiwan belongs to China. It is intended
U) intimidate Taiwan, showing the cost of refusing to follow the CCPs
wishes. It is also meant to erode international resistance to Beijing’s
plan to incorporate Taiwan into the PRC, possibly by launching an
armed attack, something that the hawks inside the CCP have long
wanted to do.

Policing goes globai

Around the world, the United Front Work Department has sponsored
or encouraged the creation of Overseas Chinese Service Centers,
known in some places as Chinese Community and Police Cooperation
Centres.'^^ Set up to protect overseas Chinese, whatever their citizen¬
ship, and to bring them together to ‘share in the dream of national
rejuvenation’, they are also a means of keeping watch on the activities
of dissidents and critics.^'* With the support of Chinese embassies, some
sixty centres operate in forty countries, including the United States,
Canada, France and Britain, and these have, according to a report from
the official China News Agency, ‘gradually penetrated into overseas
Chinese communities’."^^ The centres work with local police, offering
liaison and translation services, among other things, but they also spread
the message that the CCP is everywhere. In Melbourne, for example, on
the seventieth anniversary of the PRC, police in a district with a high
ethnic Chinese population raised the Chinese Hag over the station. The
action was widely criticised, with one radio commentator saying, ‘It’s a
police station honouring a police state.’ Local Taiwanese, Uyghurs and
Tibetans also objected."^^

China has been expanding its cooperation with international
organisations engaged in crime control. In April 2015 alone, Chinese
authorities asked Interpol to post 500 red notices—requests for law
enforcement agencies around the world to arrest those accused of
crimes. This number was the same as the total for the prior thirty years
combined."*^ Beijing is known to issue red notices for political dissidents.
In 2016 Meng Hongwei became the first Chinese president of Interpol,

255

RESHAPING GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

and in April 2017 Europol, the EU’s police cooperation aecn •
a strategic agreement with China’s Ministry of Public Sccuri^’ *'^"'**
sented by Meng Hongwei, who was then still vice minisKr'rf Zu
security.® Since then. Europol (which facilitates cross-border opcrLiom
against criminals) has received Chinese representatives of the MPS to
discuss closer cooperation.'^®

These developments have had noticeable eflFects. When in 2017
Italian police detained Dolkun Isa, president of the Munich-based World
Uyghur Congress and a German citizen, they reportedly did so following
a request from China, which had issued a red notice for Dolkuns arrest
back in 2006. According to a Western diplomat, the Chinese government
regularly requests European states to arrest Dolkun.^’ Interpol revoked
his red notice in February 2018, and six weeks later the Party committee
at Chinas Public Security Bureau expelled Meng Hongwei.’® On a visit
to Beijing a few months later, Meng simply disappeared, leaving Interpol
mystified. Its unclear whether his disappearance was related to the red
notice or some other infraction, but Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian wrote
that CCP disciplinary authorities ‘were treating Meng first and foremost
as a party member who had strayed from the straight and narrow’, rather
than the leader of an international law enforcement agency.’* In January
2020 after a one-day trial, he was convicted of bribery and sent to

prison for thirteen and a half years.'

Extradition treaties are another way for the Chinese state to extend
its long arm. The people of Hong Kong understand all too well what it
means to be extradited to China, which is why they protested so vehe¬
mently in 2019 against a proposed extradition hill. 1 he Beijing-friendly
government was forced to abandon it. By contrast, seven EU countries
have signed and ratified extradition treaties with China—France, Spain,
Italy, Portugal, Romania, Bulgaria and Lithuania.”

Spain was the first Western country to sign such a treaty, which
it ratified in 2007.” In December 2016 a joint Spanish—Chinese
operation resulted in the arrest of 269 people accused of running a tele¬
communications fraud ring from Spain. Most of them were Taiwanese
nationals, but because Spain does not formally recognise Taiwan, they
were treated as Chinese nationals’ bv Spain’s courts.” As of July 2019,
Spain had extradited 218 of the arrested Taiwanese citizens to China,

256

POLICING GOES GLOBAL

Nv here tliey will not face a fair trial,Kenya, Malaysia and Vietnam have
ulso extradited Taiwanese citizens to China,

Italy ratified an extradition treaty with China in 2015, In addition, a
2016 police cooperation agreement sees Chinese police officers patrolling
popular tourist spots in Rome, Venice and Prato,^^ Prato (near Florence)
has a large ethnic Chinese population, many of whom work in textile
and clothing factories. Although the ostensible purpose of the joint
patrols is to protect Chinese tourists, the presence of Chinese police
abroad is another means of sending the message to overseas Chinese
that the state goes wherever they go. But for Beijing, the primary benefit
of these police cooperation agreements is their role in helping tie foreign
law enforcement into a network of obligations, information sharing,
and possibly looking the other way when Beijing acts unlawfully.

France ratified an extradition treaty with China in 2015, and in
September of the following year, Chinese national Chen Wenhua
became the first person to be extradited under it.^^ Under the terms of
the treaty, French nationals are protected from extradition to China,
but citizens of other European nations have no such protection.After
France granted asylum to Grace Meng, the wife of Interpol president
Meng Hongwei, China suspended all police cooperation with France.

Despite the extradition treat)^ Chinese authorities have kidnapped
suspects in France. Unwilling to wait and go through the extradition
process, Chinese authorities ‘repatriated’ Zheng Ning in February 2017
without informing French authorities.^’' A red notice had been issued
for Zheng, who was accused of ‘economic crimes’, but undercover
agents ‘persuaded’ him to return to China as parr of Xi’s notorious
Operation Fox Hunt, the global extension of his anti-corruption cam-
paign.^^ In fact, far more Chinese fugitives are ‘[)ersuaded’ to return to
China than are extradited or deported. I bis persuasion often involves
threats to punish families in China, and to broadcast the photos and
alleged crimes of the accused across the nation. Such was the case of
‘Melbourne grandmother’ Zhou Shiqin, accused of graft by the Party,
who returned to China after her photo was plastered across state media
and her sister’s assets were frozen.*’^

This kind of extrajudicial intimidation is not uncommon and to
date has been met with little resistance from Western countries when

257

RESHAPING GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

Chinese officials harass and threaten dissidents and ethnic minorities,
China’s security services have tried to intimidate Uyghurs living
in Belgium, France, Germany, Canada and many other countries,'^
In October 2017 the US State Department blocked the FBI from
arresting four MSS officials who had entered the US on false pretenses
and tried to ‘persuade’ wealthy dissident Guo Wengui (also known as
Miles Kwok) to return to China.*’^

When Xi Jinping went to London in 2015, police arrested Chinese
and Tibetan dissidents protesting his visit, and searched their homes/’^
A year earlier, when Xi visited Brussels, demonstrations were forbidden
and pro-Tibet protesters were arrested,^^ The pattern was repeated in
Switzerland in 2017.*^® Western governments are in this way allowing
their police forces to assist the CCP in suppressing dissent. Tiananmen
survivor Shao Jiang, whose London home was one of those searched,
compared it to his experience in China: ‘every time I was arrested the
Chinese police would search my rooms and take things. It reminded
me of that.

But a growing number of countries are declining to cooperate with
Chinese authorities. In 2017 the Australian parliament stopped a move
by the government to push through an extradition treaty with China,
with members citing tlie corruption of China’s judicial system, the fact
that China’s courts have a conviction rate of more than 99 per cent, and
the widespread violation of human rights. In 2019 Chinese authorities
celebrated Sweden’s decision to extradite former Chinese official Qiao
Jianjun. Sweden has no treat)’ with Cdiina, and the decision was based on
the UN Convention against Corruption.^*^ But a Swedish court blocked
the extradition because of tlie ‘real risk that the person will be subjected
to persecution for political reasons in China’, citing torture, degrading
punishment and executions. ' In recent times, Sweden has shown itself
less easily cowed than others by Beijing’s bullying. Perhaps it was this
that led China’s ambassador in Stockholm to comment, ‘We treat our
Iriends with good wine, but lor our enemies we got shotguns.

Exporting Beijing’s definition of ‘terrorism’

Regional organisations in which China dominates provide an excel¬
lent opportunit)’ to exert influence through cooperation agreements.

258

CREATING PARALLEL AND PSEUDO-MULTILATERAL ORGANISATIONS

bypassing larger international organisations where China does not yet
cdl the shots. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and especially
its Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure, is a prime example. The SCO is a
China-dominated political, economic and security alliance with Russia,
the Central Asian states and, since 2017, India and Pakistan. It was
founded in Shanghai in 2001.

The organisation has adopted Beijing’s Three Evils doctrine, which
conflates terrorism with anything the CCP considers to be ‘religious
extremism’ or ‘separatism’.^^ Ethnic Uyghurs in Xinjiang have discovered
that the CCP’s current definition of‘religious extremism’ includes grow¬
ing a beard, reftising to eat pork, declining alcohol and praying, any of
which can result in practitioners being sent to a concentration camp.^*^

The Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure has been stepping up cooper¬
ation with the UN Security Council’s counterterrorism committee and
has signed a memorandum of understanding to enhance the exchange of
information.^^ The Structure has participated in Interpol activities, such
as Project Kalkan, a working-group meeting used to exchange informa¬
tion on terrorist activities, where it reports on its work on countering
the Three Evils.^^ In March 2019 the Structure signed a cooperation
memorandum with the UN’s Counter-Terrorism Committee.^^

Memorandums like this are a way for the Party to legitimise its
repressive interpretation of terrorism. Its efforts to brand dissidents as
terrorists have already paid off. I he Clermanv-based World Uyghur
Congress has been listed as a terrorist organisation on World Check,
a database used by governments and banks to screen for terrorists and
people linked to financial crime.As a result, Deutsche Bank and
Western Union have blocked international money transfers of WUC
president Dolkun Isa, without giving a reason. Dolkun was also pre¬
vented from exchanging money in Ceneva while attending a meeting
of the UN Human Rights Commission. Other members of the World
Uyghur Congress have experienced similar obstacles.

Creating parallel and pseudo-multilateral organisations

As we have seen, the Belt and Road Initiative is one example of how the
CCP is trying to change the international order while simultaneously
making use of existing organisations to promote it. Some have argued

259

RESHAPING GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

that the BRI is an ill-defined, disorganised ‘package of everything and
nothing, driven by vague and confused domestic policy.Of cour«:
the BRI serves domestic goals, such as generating growth in GDP at
a time when Chinas infrastructure needs have been met, but it’s also
part of Beijing’s strategy to create parallel global institutions that it
dominates. The domestic and international aspects are united by the
fact that the CCP, despite its claims to the contrary, is the architect and
the primary beneficiary of both.

China expert Alice Ekman has argued, ‘China is unhappy with the
current security governance architecture and has the political determi¬
nation ... to restructure it.’®' Beijing invites everyone to join China’s
‘circle of friends’, including security allies of the United States.
Ekman points out that China is the clear beneficiary of the ambiguity
that results when old, formal alliances are supplemented with new,
informal ones.®^

Europe now plays a prominent role in the CCP’s strategy of grad¬
ually chipping away at the existing international order. Long seen by
the CCP as the United States’ largely irrelevant junior partner, the con¬
tinent is now a crucial player to be won over. Beijing wants to deepen
the divide across the Atlantic, while at the same time use European
support, or at least lack of public criticism, to give it legitimacy in
the developing world. Parallel organisations help Beijing deal with EU
countries one on one, and play them against one another.

Beijing is redrawing borders in Europe itself with the 17+1 summit, a
pseudo-multilateral framework that could more accurately be described
as seventeen bilateral relationships between European countries and
their much bigger ‘partner’.®^ Launched in Budapest in 2012 to deepen
relations benveen China and Central and Eastern Europe and to promote
the BRI, its secretariat is based in Beijing. Under the framework, the
heads of government of the seventeen participating states meet annually
with China's prime minister. The summit poses a challenge to the EU
because it mixes EU member states and EU accession candidates with
non-member states. Its parallel economic summits are attractive oppor¬
tunities for countries that crave Chinese investment and are willing
to stand up for China' in return.®^ However, the larger significance of
17+1 is the challenge it poses to the established order, the EU.

260

HUMAN RIGHTS WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS

China has succeeded in derailing a number of EU initiatives by
convincing individual member countries to boycott them. Due to the
principle of unanimity, just one dissenting country is often sufficient
to scotch a joint statement or policy. Under pressure from China, in
July 2016 Hungary and Greece prevented the EU from speaking out
on the South China Sea, and in March 2017 Hungary derailed the EU
from signing a letter denouncing the torture of lawyers in China. In the
same year, Greece blocked the EU from releasing a statement criticising
the state of human rights in China.®*’ In March 2018 the Hungarian
ambassador to China was the only one of twenty-eight EU ambassadors
not to sign a statement critical of the Belt and Road Initiative.®^

Human rights with Chinese characteristics

In the early 1990s the CCP embarked on an aggressive mission to
promote its own concept of human rights—namely, that the ‘right
to development’ trumps all other rights. In 1991 the Party published
its first white paper on human rights through the newly founded Office
of External Propaganda, also known as the State Council Information
Office.®® The office has a Human Rights Bureau, currently headed by
Li Xiaojun, dedicated to spreading the Parry’s notion of human rights.
The basic idea is to downplay individual and political freedoms and
focus instead on ‘social and economic rights .

The China Society for Human Rights Studies was founded in 1993
as one of the public faces of the Office of External Propaganda. It poses
as an NGO and is a member of the United Nations Conference of
Non-Governmental Organizations.®'^ Its first director, Zhu Muzhi,
also headed the Office of External Propaganda. 1 he institutional link
to the propaganda office is confirmed by the fact that Cau Yuying,
former deputy director of the Propaganda Department and the Office
of External Propaganda, served concurrently as deputy director of the
China Society for Human Rights Studies.

The strategic importance of the society became a[>parent in 1998
when it was among the first Chinese organisations to set up an English-
language website.^' The society publishes an annual report on human
rights in China, and since 1998 has also published an annual report
on human rights in the United States, a tit-for-tat response to the US

RESHAPING GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

annual report on human rights in China.« However, the main function
of the China Society for Human Rights Studies is to spread a discourw
that favours China.

In 2006 the UN Human Rights Council replaced the UN
Commission on Human Rights, which had been criticised for having
members with poor records on human rights, and for its criticism of
Israel. China was active in the setting up of rules for the new UNHRC,
trying to ensure that country-specific resolutions would need to obtain
a two-thirds majority, and arguing that country-specific reviews should
be abolished, or at least radically limited.’^ While China failed to
have the two-thirds rule made official, country-specific resolutions at
the UNHRC are often voted down by the large number of Asian and
African countries on the council.

Beijing has also been very adept at suppressing criticism of its human
rights record at the UNHRC. Whenever its human rights record is
reviewed at the UN, it works hard to fill speakers’ spots with countries
willing to praise that record. In 2019 the human rights ‘recommen¬
dations’ China received from these sympathetic countries included
‘Continue to promote the Belt and Road Initiative to help other devel¬
oping countries in their development endeavours, (Pakistan), ‘Work on
strengthening international cooperation in the field of human rights
through [China’s] National Human Rights Action Plan 2016-2020’
(Turkmenistan), and ‘Continue to fight against terrorism and extrem¬
ism and separatist tendencies to safeguard its sovereignty and territorial
integrity’ (Syrian Arab Repiiblic).'^^ d'here were many similar points of
praise for China disguised as recommendations. In July 2019 Hong
Kong activist Denise Ho addressed the UNHRC. Overriding interrupt¬
ions by China’s delegates, she called for China’s membership of the
council to be suspended.But China is too deeply embedded in the
UN system for any such call to be heeded.

To spread its vision of liuman rights, the CCP has launched its own
forums to normalise its repressive policies. For instance, Xinhua reported
that at the sixth Beijing Forum on Human Rights, ‘foreign experts
agreed with Chinese experts that regulating the internet is important
for safeguarding human rights, thereby legitimising China’s censorship
policies.'^' The experts—Tom Zwart, director of the Netherlands School

262

HUMAN RIGHTS WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS

of Minnan Rights Research, and Kate Westgarth, former director of
Chinese Affairs of the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office—may
not support the level of censorship the CCP promotes, but their
participation in these dialogues and their apparent endorsement of
Chi nas policies through published statements like these lend the
CCP legitimacy.

Human rights dialogues, like the annual EU-China Human Rights
Dialogue and the Sino-German dialogue on human rights, also serve
to legitimise the Party’s position without improving human rights
in China. In 2017 ten human rights organisations called on the EU
to suspend its human rights dialogue with China until such time as
the country undertakes meaningful reforms in the field.Western
governments have been reluctant to do so. However, in 2019 China
cancelled its human rights dialogue with Germany, citing the ‘lack of a
constructive atmosphere’ on the German side.^^

When the CCP holds dialogues with Western partners on topics like
human rights and the media, the West is not the only target audience.
While Europe and North America have been weakening their pressure
on China to respect human rights, the Party is well aware that it will not
win over these countries for some time. And meanwhile the West can still
undermine Beijing’s claims in the eyes of countries in the global South.

In recent years, the CCP has been ramping up the promotion of
its concept of human rights through Beijing-organised dialogues, UN
resolutions and international meetings. In 2011 China published
its first Human Rights Action Plan. In June 2017 it brought its first
resolution to the UNHRC, called ‘The contribution of development
to the enjoyment of all human rights’.In March 2018 it brought a
second resolution, titled ‘Promoting mutually beneficial cooperation in
the field of human rights’.Both resolutions were passed comfortably.

In December 2017 China hosted the ‘South-South Human Rights
Forum’ in Beijing, resulting in the ‘Beijing Declaration’ that endorsed
Xi’s ‘community of shared future for mankind’ as central to human
rights in the developing world.The China Society for Human Rights
Studies has been touring Europe to promote the CCP’s version of human
rights, and to defuse criticism of its system of concentration camps.
China argues that the camps holding a million-plus Uyghurs and other

263

RESHAPING GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

minorities, interned since 2017, are necessary in the fight against terror¬
ism.The society has also organised events at the UNHRP tU..
the improvement in human rights in Xinjiang.'o^ if ^he current state of
Xinjiang is any indicator. Chinas ‘community of shared future is bad
news for anyone who genuinely cares about human rights.

Exporting ‘Internet sovereignty’ and standards for new technologies

The CCP s concept of ‘internet sovereignty’ replaces the idea of an
open, borderless internet that promotes the free flow of informa¬
tion. Domestically it involves a censorship regime unparalleled in
history—manipulation of search engines to block specific terms, an
army of online censors, and tight regulation of internet companies.
When Chinese government think tanks call for a ‘democratic’ global
internet-governance system, this is simply another way of calling for
‘internet sovereignty’ by making the norms of autocratic countries equal
in status to those of democratic countries, allowing each country to
censor the internet within its borders as it pleases.

Since 2014 China has organised the annual World Internet
Conference in Wuzhen. Far from being a fringe event, the conference
attracts high-profile participants, such as Apple’s Tim Cook and Google
CEO Sundar Pichai, both of whom have delivered public addresses.
Cook said he was proud to ‘help build a community that will join a
common future in cyberspace’.'°n'he Cdiinese translation sounded very

close to Xi’s ‘shared future for mankind’.

To spread ‘internet sovereignty’ globally, Beijing trains officials
from other countries. In November 2017 China hosted a ‘Seminar on
Cybersp.ace Management for Officials of Countries along the Belt and
Road Initiative’, giving sessions on how to monitor negative public
opinion and then spin it in a positive direction.

While the Parn' is unlikely to win over the entire world to its ideas
ol internet governance, it has celebrated some successes. Vietnams
highly restrictive cyberspace law is modelled on China’s.*'® Russia has
backed the idea of'internet sovereignty’ with a 2019 law giving the
government sweeping powers over what people can see on the internet
inside Russia’s borders."* Perhaps more importantly, China is exporting
not just the concepts and expertise but the technology that enables

264

exporting 'internet sovereignty’ and standards for new technologies

titc CCPs censorship and surveillance regime. The ‘safe cities’ that are
being built around the world use the surveillance technology of com¬
panies like Huawei."^ Huawei provided the ‘safe city’ infrastructure for
Lusaka, where its employees have also reportedly helped the Zambian
government track political opponents.

Finally, China has paid close attention to the role of international
standard-setting; that is, setting the requirements, norms and techni¬
cal specifications for products or tasks. In 2015 it created a Leading
Small Group for standardisation along the Belt and Road."'* It has
also secured leadership positions in the International Organization
for Standardization, the International Electronic Commission, and
the UN’s International Telecommunication Union, among others.'*^
Through the latter body, Chinese companies, including ZTE and the
state-owned China Telecom, have proposed new facial-recognition
standards, according to leaked documents first reported by the Financial
TimesF^ Being able to set global standards based on their own propri¬
etary technologies gives companies a distinct advantage in expanding
their market share. In June 2019 ZTE and China Telecom proposed a
standard to add video monitoring to smart street lights, precisely what
protesters in Hong Kong have been concerned about. The standard
was accepted."'

265

Afterword

How should the West respond to these threats to individual freedom
and human rights? How are democracies to become more resilient?
How can they better equip themselves to deal with interference
by the CCP and other authoritarian regimes without coming to
resemble them?

An active pushback strateg)^ is required, not mere talk or wishful
thinking. Democracies won’t be able to change China, but they can
defend their most important institutions. Elective responses will differ
from country to country, but all must draw on the strengths of open
societies while simultaneously addressing their weaknesses. Countries
will be required to accept the short-term costs that will come with the
end of unrestrained engagement with China. And better coordination
among allies is vital.

The CCP prefers to operate in the shadows, and sunlight is often the
best disinfectant. The responsibility for shedding light on the Party’s
activities lies with the news media, government agencies, scholars and
political leaders. Of these, the media ought to be at the forefront. Free
speech and a free media are the enemies of the Chinese Communist
Part) and must be protected at all costs. Tantrum diplomacy and fear
of economic retribution must not be allowed to prevent governments
and others from calling out Beijing for its interference activities.

267

afterword

Scholars, too, must step up, because the very idea of the univettitv
is under threat. Attacks on academic freedom, whether in the form of
insidious self-censorship or institutions leaning on employees to temper
their work, need to be called out vigorously. Remaining silent when
acts of interference, censorship and harassment occur is the greatest

danger. There ought to be zero tolerance from academics and students.

/

If enough universities invited the Dalai Lama to speak, Beijing’s threats
would prove hollow.

Civil society also has a leading role to play in exposing the CCR
Political, business and university elites who acquiesce to or actively
support Beijing deserve public scrutiny and robust criticism. Theatres,
filmmakers, publishers—all cultural organisations in fact—should be
exposed and condemned whenever they censor material under pressure

from Beijing. Boycotts are often effective.

People of Chinese heritage have a vital role in the pushback against
the CCR It cannot be emphasised too strongly that the Chinese
diaspora must be engaged, not least to neutralise the underhanded
accusation that resistance to CCP influence is motivated by racism
or is somehow ‘anti-China’. Chinese-heritage people in the West,
elsewhere, are the foremost targets of CCP intimidation. The threat
to conform to Beijing’s wishes or be punished is often sever
rights of these people need protection; those among them willing
speak out must be supported, and those who thieaten them shou

prosecuted. ^

The language used in the pushback should never fall into the trap

conflating the CCP with the Chinese people. More people of Chines
heritage who are committed to democracy need to be involved in
civic and political organisations, in order to counter the CCPs huaren
canzhang of promoting its own people. Political parties should

be encouraging ethnic Chinese people with democratic values to run
for office, and politicians must stop legitimising united front groups by
associating with them.

The defence of democratic institutions rests with political parties,
public service agencies, law enforcement, universities, cultural institu¬
tions, media organisations and businesses, all of which need to define and
nforce clear rules for dealing with authoritarian regimes. In the political

268

afterword

domam, nuich can be acliicvcd by legislating for transparency in lobby¬
ing and by fixing loopholes in campaign-financing laws, thus preventing
cev pmxies f>om buying political influence with donations, backing
their favoured candidates, suppressing critical voices, and engaging in
infiirmation campaigns to swing elections. Parliaments must also enact
foreign interference laws where needed, to protect against new forms
of political warfare and to defend against organisations and individuals
that actively seek to subvert democratic institutions. Another weakness
that urgently needs to be addressed is the underfunding of universities,
many of which are now led by profit-oriented people who believe their
success depends on good relations with Beijing. Academic freedom is
more difficult to uphold when doing so risks financial punishment.
Universities need more money to fund independent experts on China
who will help the public understand the CCP s strategies.

Similarly, greater investment in public media will help counter
those proprietors who have a financial interest in staying on Beijing’s
good side. Measures to expose and disable CCP control of Chinese-
language media should include overcoming advertiser boycotts, which
have driven many from the market. New companies may need public
financial support.

The costs entailed in a nation reducing its vulnerability to CCP pres¬
sure will be worth it in the long run. Beijing wields its economic power
like a great weapon. Its economic blackmail has proven highly eflPective,
distorting decisions made by elected governments, frightening bureau¬
crats, silencing critics, and making countless companies beholden to it.
That power is only amplified when Chinese companies answerable to
Beijing own critical infrastructure in other countries. The West needs to
inoculate itself against these pressures where it can, but where it can’t it
needs to make some hard choices and walk away.

All industries, including the education and tourism sectors,
must understand the political risks of becoming heavily reliant on
revenue flows from China. Shorr-term profit-making exposes them
to long-term damage. When considering partnerships with Chinese
organisations, much better due diligence is required, by people who

are fluent in Chinese and have a strong understanding of how the CCP
system works.

269

AFTERWORD

Governments need to make it clear that all companies that expose
themselves to risk by becoming too dependent on Chinas market must
bear the costs. Companies should not expect their governments to com¬
promise human rights and civil freedoms to appease Beijing. As long as
the current CCP regime rules China, prudent corporate management
requires diversification of markets.

The United States cannot succeed in countering the CCP’s spread¬
ing influence alone. By going it alone, it is playing into Beijing’s hands.
At the same time, other Western nations need to realise that a CCP-led
China is not and never will be its friend. Other than those it controls,
Beijing abhors alliances and does all it can to break them up. Democratic
nations around the world must unite to protect universal human rights
and democratic principles, and in this endeavour, alliances with devel¬
oping nations will be as important as those among developed nations.

Despite the grim picture painted in this book, we remain hopeful
that democracy and the will to freedom can prevail. In Hong Kong
and Taiwan, people are fighting back against the CCP’s attempts to
control and intimidate them. It’s true that many in the West are beset
by cynicism and exhaustion when it comes to their own governance
systems, yet more and more can see that the CCP represents a profound
threat to the rights and freedoms that are frequently taken for granted.
And it is reassuring to note that opposition to the CCP’s influence,
interference and intimidation crosses traditional political boundaries.
People on the left and on the right who have opened their eyes to the
threat posed by the CCP, including those who have left China to escape
it, are banding together. The pushback is growing by the day and the
Party bosses in Beijing are worried.

270

Acknowledgements

Dozens of people have helped improve this book vs^ith their generous

contributions of time and know^ledge.

We are especially grateful to those who read and commented on

all or part of the manuscript—John Fitzgerald, Helena Legarda, Katja

Drinhausen, Alex Joske and Matthew Turpin. GeofF Wade provided

invaluable advice along the way. An academic colleague in Melbourne

who wishes to remain anonymous made an enormous contribution to

the research and carefully read each chapter.

Clive Hamilton would particularly like to express his thanks to the

many people in Canada and the United States who met with him and

volunteered their expertise: David Kilgour, Winnie Ng, Alex Bowe,

Matt Southerland, Daniel Peck, Tom Mahnken, Toshi Yoshihara,

Ely Ratner, Josh Rogin, Isaac Stone-Fish, Andrew Erikson, Joanna Chiu,

Jeremy Nuttall, Ina Mitchell, Jonathan Manthorpe, Perrin Grauer!

Calvin Chrustie, John Fraser, Reverend Dominic Tse, Joel Chipcar,

Craig Offman, Dick Chan. Dimon Liu, Bob Suettinger, Vincent

Chao, Russell Hsiao, Chris Walker, Jessica Ludwig, Orville Schell and
Ian hasten.

guiUnS'''' rf Natalie Hui for

271

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In Australia, in addition to those mentioned already, amversation*
with a number of colleagues added information and understanding to
the subject: Charles Edel, Catherine Yeung, Nick McKenzie, Matthew
Robertson and John Garnaut. In the UK. Keith Thomas, Martin
Thorley and Charles Parton have been very helpful sources. In Europe,
the contributions of Pradeep Taneja, Lucrezia Poggetti, Thorsten
Benner, Rog^'' Jichang Lulu have all found their way into

Vareike Ohlberg would like to thank her colleagues at MERICS
who have provided invaluable feedback and support. The views
ssed in this book do not necessarily reflect the views of any of her

..rc She would also like to thank the participants of dozens of
empioy^*^' ^ . I • T-

conferences, workshops and seminars on the topic across Europe. Many

conversations on the side helped her draw new connections, gain new

insights, and refine her understanding of CCP interference. Finally, she

would like to thank her family and friends. Without their support, the

completion of this book would not have been possible.

Our work has built upon the labours of a number of China scholars
and analysts, and we hope that we have adequately reflected our debts
to them in the text and the endnotes. We would particularly like to
acknowledge the seminal work of Anne-Marie Brady, which has had
a big influence on our understanding of the CCP’s united front work.

Of course, all views expressed in this book are our own and should
not be attributed to any of those named above. All remaining errors are

also our own.

272

Glossary

Biaotai

Short for biaoshi taidu, literally
‘expressing one’s attitude’. Can be used
to refer to the politically significant act
of expressing allegiance to the CCP
by repeating and affirming its political
phrases.

Big externa]
propaganda

Propaganda work targeted at foreigners
that is done not just by propaganda
departments but by all Party and
government agencies, as well as society
more broadly.

Borrowing boats

Literally ‘borrowing boats to go out to
sea’: refers to using others (like foreign
media) to spread the CCP’s message.

China case

Icrni used co describe the Chinese
model ot aiithoricarian government,
which can be exported for other
coumries to learn from.

Document No. 9

9'-im

rhe colloquial term for an internal
communique called Notice on the

Current State of the Ideological Sphere,
circulated by the Party Center in April
2013; it outlined seven ‘false ideological
trends’.

Enemy of the
people

A category of person that the CCP
considers irrevocably hostile to its own
goals. The\' are not part of‘the people’;
i.e., the broad masses that the Party
claims to speak for. A different set of
rules applies to how the CCP treats
anyone it considers an enemy.

273

GLOSSARY

Great Firewall

Colloquial term for the regulations and
technologies used to censor the internet
in China.

Huaqiao

A person of Chinese ethnicity living
outside China.

Huaren canzheng

Literally ‘ethnic Chinese participation

in politics’, a united front strategy
to maximise political influence in
democracies by promoting trusted
people of Chinese heritage.

Huayuquan

Literally ‘discourse power’, a CCP
term that refers to the ability to set the
agenda and steer the direction of public
discourse.

Kouhao

p-t

A political slogan, very common in

Chinese politics.

Lao pengyou

‘Old friend of China’, an appellation used
for foreigners of a certain standing who
help the strategic interests of the CCP.

Leading Small
Group

A common coordinating and consulting
mechanism used in the Chinese political
sTstem whereby leaders from different
departments and ministries come together
,o coorditiate their work in a specific area.

iiyong (iijang
huowei zhongyang

‘Using the local to surround the centre ;
one way of describing the tactic of
using good relations with local actors to
pressure national governments._

Nongcun baouri
chengshi

‘Using the countryside to surround the
city’: using a place where the enemy is
weak to surround the enemy’s stronghold.

Peaceiul evolution

A CCP theory of the supposed attempt
bv W escern governments to cause
political change in China through
peaceful means, most importantly the
spreading of ideas that undermine
the Chinese system from within
(see Document Xo. 9).

274

GLOSSARY

IVaccfvil rise

A theory, coined by political adviser and
former acting head of the Propaganda
Department, Zheng Bijian, asserting
that Chinas growing influence in the
world would be peaceful; later changed
to ‘peaceful development’.

People-to-people

diplomacy

A form of international engagement
used by the CCP since the 1950s.
Originally used to bypass China’s
diplomatic isolation, it was maintained
after China was fully recognised by
other countries. Although ostensibly
undertaken by ordinary people, it is
carefully orchestrated by the Party
through united front bodies. The

Party considers itself to be the ultimate
representative of‘the people’.

Positive energy

A term used by Xi Jinping and the Party
to demand that media and others spread
positive content rather than critical or
‘negative’ news.

Qiaoivu

in^

Overseas Chinese affairs’, a type of
united front work targeted at overseas

Clii nese.

Thousand Talents
Plan

T-Ail-i^J

A program launched by the Chinese
government in 2008 to recruit leading
international researchers to come to

China.

United front work

tm (t^L
m :v.W

d T he political work ol building

relationships with groups and individuals
outside the Party. The goal is to build
the broadest possible coalition against
the principal enemy.

Wat yturn nei fang

Round outside, square within’, a united
front principle that allows flexibility in
strateg)' without compromising one’s
principles.

275

GLOSSARY

Xiao ma da
bangmang

‘Big help with a little baclmouth’, a
strategy of offering a little criticism on
smaller issues in order to appear more
credible when supporting the CCP (or
another organisation) on larger issues.

Xinqiao

People of Chinese ethnicity who have
recently settled outside China,

Yi shang hi zheng

Using business to pressure the
government; i.e,, getting foreign
businesses to lobby their governments on
Chinas/the CCPs behalf.

Youyi

‘Friendship’, a term associated with
winning over foreigners to defend and
advance the CCP’s interests.

276

Acronyms

2PLA

The Second Department of the
former General Staff Department
of the PLA. Its successor is the
Intelligence Bureau of the Joint
Staff Department of the Central
Military Commission.

3PLA

The Third Department of the
former General Staff Department
of the PLA; it was responsible for
signals intelligence.

ABP

Advanced
Business Park

A Beijing-based property
development company which
was granted a £1 billion deal to
redevelop part of London’s

Royal Albert Dock by then
mayor Boris Johnson.

ACPAI

America China
Public Affairs
Institute

A not-for-profit group that builds
US—China relationships. Its
president is bred Feng, who is
also the special US representative

ofCUSi:F.

AfD

Alternative for
Germany

A German far-right party.

AFROC

All-China

A united front body, established

Federation
of Returned
Overseas
Chinese

in 1956, whose target groups
are foreign nationals of Chinese
heritage who have moved to

China and Chinese nationals
who have returned after living
overseas.

277

ACRONYMS

ANU

Australian

National

University

The national university of

Australia, based in Canberra,

BC

British

Columbia

The westernmost province of

Canada.

BRI

Belt and Road
Initiative

^^P2iiJ±iay®

A major Chinese government
program that funds infrastructure
projects worldwide. Also known
as the Silk Road, and One Belt,

One Road.

ClOO

Committee of
100

An organisation of prominent
Chinese-Americans, founded in

1990, officially committed to
advancing the full participation
of Chinese-Americans in

American society and promoting
constructive relations bet^veen
the US and Greater China.

CAFI

China Arts

Foundation

International

^ im'o

The New York branch of the

China Art Foundation; it was
established in 2014 to exert
influence and gather intelligence
through cultural activities. The
China Art Foundation was set
up in 2006 by Deng Xiaoping’s
daughter, Deng Rong, with
the backing of the PLA-linked
CAIFC.

CAIEP

China

Association for
International
Exchange ol
Personnel

A Chinese organisation officially
dedicated to professional
‘people-to-pcoplc’ exchange, with
offices in the US, Canada, Russia,
Germany, the UK, Australia,

Israel, Japan, Singapore and

Hong Kong.

278

ACRONYMS

CAIFC

China

Association for
International
Friendly
Contact

A united front organisation under
the Liaison Department of the
Political Work Department of the
Central Military Commission. It
gathers intelligence and engages
in propaganda campaigns.

CASS

Chinese
Academy of
Social Sciences

Chinas principal national-level
organisation for research on
the humanities and social
sciences, founded in 1977. It has
ministerial rank and is directly
under the State Council.

CBBC

China-Britain

Business

Council

A British lobby group promoting
trade and investment between the
UK and China. It was founded as
the China-Britain Trade Group
in 1991 with the backing of the

48 Group Club.

CCG

Center for
China and
Globalization

A Beijing-based think tank
with strong united front ties,
founded in 2008 and headed by
Wang Huiyao.

CCIEE

China

Center for
International
Economic
Exchanges

A Beijing-based, high-level think
tank founded in 2009, supervised
by the National Development
and Reform Commission and
headed by former vice premier
Zeng Peiyan.

CCP

Chinese

Communist

Part)'

rhe sole governing party of the
Peoples Republic of China.

acronyms

CCPIT China Council ' |^ U\ H |5^- ^

for the

Promotion of

International

Trade

CCPPNR China Council
for the

Promotion

of Peaceful

National

Reunification

CCTV

China Central
Television

CEIBS China Europe
Iniernational
Business
School

CETC China >1'I *'1'li J f Mi

Elecironics HiHI

technology
Group
Corporation

•n 952 on the instructions of
lormcr Chinese premier Zhou
Enlai. Its task at that time was

to persuade foreign governments
to trade with China, which was
subject to a trade embargo after
the 1949 communist takeover.

Today it continues to promote
trade between China and foreign
countries and builds political
networks.

A united front body dedicated
to promoting the CCP s position
on Taiwan and suppressing
alternative voices, but also serving
wider political goals of the Party.

The principal national television
broadcaster in China. In 2018
it merged with China National
Radio and China Radio
International to form the China
Media Group, which is under
the leadership of the CCP’s
Propaganda Department.

A Shanghai-based business school
established in 1994 under an
agreement between the Chinese
government and the European
(Commission.

A (Chinese state-owned
conglomerate specialising in
conuminications etjuipment,
computers, software and other
electronic equipment, whose
purpose is ‘leveraging civilian
electronics for the gain of the
Pl-A’.

280

ACRONYMS

aiiN

China Global

television

Network

MN

The global arm of CCTV,
with production centres in
Washington D.C., Nairobi and
London. Formerly known as
CCTV International, it was
rebranded in 2016.

CIC

China

Investment

Corporation

4'IS® PI

Sovereign wealth fund managing
part of the PRC’s foreign
exchange reserves.

CICIR

China

Institutes of
Contemporary
International
Relations

A Beijing-based think tank
founded in 1965 and overseen by
the Ministry of State Security.

CIPG

China

International

Publishing

Group

4'H[SPtl4}|;S

Mm

The external nameplate used by
the CCP’s Foreign Languages
Bureau, an organisation under
the Propaganda Department of
the CCP Central Committee. It
also goes by the name of China
Foreign Languages Publishing
Administration.

CITIC

China

International
Trust and
Investment
Corporation

A state-owned investment
corporation with links to the

PLA.

CMC

Central

Military
Commission
of the

Communist
Party of China

Fhe CX^P commission
commanding the People’s
Liberation Army. It also goes by
the name of CX-mral Military
Commission of the PRC.

281

ACRONYMS

CMG

China Media

Group

I Xj A media organisation formed

In 2018 throu^i the merger of
China Central 'rdevision, China
National Radio, and China Radio
International, In China, it is
usually referred to as the Central
Broadcast and Television General
Station, It takes orders from the
_ CCPs Propaganda Department,

CNS

China News

Service

Chinas second official news
agency. It is part of the CCP’s
united front outfit and mainly
targets overseas Chinese, as well
as the people of Taiwan, Hong
Kong and Macao,

CPAFFC

Chinese
People’s
Association
for Friendship
with Foreign
Countries

A united front organisation
founded in 1954 and now
headed by Li Xiaolin, the
daughter of former Chinese
president Li Xiannian,

CPPCC

Chinese

People’s

Political

Consultative

Conference

The united front equivalent of
the National People’s Congress.

Both the NPC and the CPPCC
meet once every year in March
in what is known as the Two
Sessions.

CPSU

Communist
Part)' of the
Soviet Union

The ruling party of the former
Soviet Union.

CRI

China Radio
International

111 ft

China’s official international
radio broadcaster, since 2018 part
of China Media Group.

CSSA

Chinese
Students
and Scholars

Association

KX (i'll) if

United front organisation for
Chinese students and scholars
studying abroad. CSSAs on
campuses around the world
are usually linked to the local
Chinese embassy or consulate.

282

ACRONYMS

c:usEn

China-
United States
Exchange
Foundation

A Hong Kong-based foundation
founded in 2008. It is chaired
by former Hong Kong chief
executive Tung Chee-hwa,
an important united front
personage. It also has links to
the PLA.

EDI

Media

A Los Angeles—based Chinese-
American multimedia company
with links to China Radio
International. Its vice president
James Su is also vice president
ofAFROC.

G77

Group of 77

A coalition of 135 developing
nations at the United Nations,
named after its 77 founding
members. China, while not
a formal member, regularly
coordinates with it, so that joint
statements are often issued under
the name ‘the Group of 77
and China’.

HNA

Group

Hainan

Airlines Group

A Haikou-based Chinese
conglomerate involved in various
industries, including aviation,
real estate and financial services,
and believed to have links to top
Party officials.

ICAS

Institute for

China-America

Studies

A think tank based in

Washington D.C^ It was founded
in 2015 as an outpost of the
Chinese government’s National
Institute for South China

Sea Studies and is funded by
the Hainan Nanhai Research
Foundation.

ICPT

International
Committee for
the Promotion
of Trade

A Soviet front group created
in 1952 to find ways around
restrictions on trade with the

Soviet Union.

283

ACRONYMS

ILD

MPS

International'

Liaison

Oepartment

of the

Communist

Party of

China (also

known as the

International

Department)

™ .n.v5 land tasked with

••a'S'ng with foreign political
parties. Initially focused on
communist parties, it broadened
its mandate in the 1980s and
started liaising with non¬
communist parties too.

Ministry of

Public Security

The principal police and
domestic-security authority
in China.

MSS

Ministry of
State Security

The principal government
authority in China in charge of
intelligence work and political
security.

NAS

National
Association of
Scholars

A conservative advocacy group
in the US with an interest in
education.

NUDT

National
Universin-
of Defense
Technology

One of Chinas key universities;
it is under the leadership of the
C'entral Military Commission
and is based in Changsha,

1 lunan.

NYU

New York

Un i versin'

A private research university
based in New York City and with
degree-granting campuses in
Shanghai and Abu Dhabi.

OhOR

One Belt. One
Road

l orincr Hnglish acronym for
what is now called the Belt and
Road Initiative (see BRl).

OOU)

(.)vcrse.is

Chinese .Atlairs
t^rtiee

A former C'hinese government
agency in charge of managing
relations with overseas Chinese.

It was merged into the United
front Work Department in

2018, although the name is still
used in public.

28 ^

ACRONYMS

PL‘\

Peoples

Liberation

Army

'l'|S|AK:M

The armed wing of the
Communist Party of China.

PLMEU Peoples

Liberation
Army Strategic
Support Force
Information
Engineering
University

liAftSlIi

A^

A military academy based in
Zhengzhou, Henan.

PRC

People’s
Republic of
China

The official name of China, not
to be confused with the Republic
of China (ROC), which is the
formal name of Taiwan.

RMB

Renminbi

A^ffi

The currency of the Peoples
Republic of China, also known
as the Chinese yuan.

SAFEA

State

Administration
of Foreign
Experts Affairs

® A"

An agency, under the State

Council, responsible for
certifying foreign experts working
in the PRC. It is in charge of
granting the Friendship Award.

SAIS

School of
Advanced

International

Studies

A top US graduate school
of international relations at

Johns I lopkins University.

SARS

Severe acute

respirator)'

syndrome

A viral respiratory disease.

SASTIND State

Administration
lor Science,
Technoloo\-

o.

and Industry
for National
Defense

1 .

A Cdiinese government agency
subordinate to the Ministry
of Industry and Information
lechnology. It superseded
the Commission for Science,
Technology and Industry for
National Defense (COSTIND).

285

ACRONYMS

SCO

SCOBA

SOE

SPD

UFWD

UNDP

Shanghai

Cooperation

Organization

.1

A European security organisation
dominated by China. Pounded in
Shanghai in 2001, its members
also include Russia, Kazakhsun,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Uzbekistan, India and Pakistan.

Silicon Valley

Chinese

Overseas

Business

Association

State-owned

enterprise

Social
Democratic
Party of
Germany

United
Front Work

Department

i An association of businesspeople
and technical experts, including
both mainland Chinese and
Chinese-Americans. Some
members serve as advisers to
Chinese national and provincial
government agencies.

H enterprise with majority

government ownership.

A centre-left German party.

An agency of the CCP that
manages relations with
organisations and individuals
outside the Party, both
domestically and internationally,
largei groups include religious
organisations, industry
federations, minorities,
overseas Chinese, and people
in Hong Kong, Macau and
I'aiwan. Its mandate has been
expanded in the Xi era, and in
2018 it absorbed a number of
government agencies.

United

Nations

Development

Program

l{)-fl

The UN’s global-development
network.

286

ACRONYMS

UNHRC

United

Nations
Human Rights
Council

A UN body tasked with
promoting and protecting
human rights. It was founded
in 2006 and replaced the UN
Commission on Human Rights.

USCPFA

U.S.-China
Peoples
Friendship
Association

US-based ‘friendship’
organisation founded in 1974.

USSR

Union of

Soviet Socialist
Republics

The official name of the former
Soviet Union.

WHA

World Health
Assembly

The forum through which the
World Health Organization is
governed; it is composed of health
ministers from member states.

WHO

World Health
Organization

An agency of the United Nations
concerned with international
public health.

ZJUKA

Zhejiang UK
Association

A hometown association (united
front body) for people from the
province of Zhejiang now living
in the UK.

287

Notes

3 Norman

An overview of the CCP’s ambitions

Rein, China Market Research Group, Shanghai, quoted by Anon.,

^ ‘Beijing’s new weapon in economic war: Chinese tourists’, Inquirer.net,

Silent Invasion: Chinas influence in Australia, Melbourne:
' Sie cTan. Boob. 2018. p. 145.

lan Lebrecht, ‘Eastman dean explains why he dropped Korean students
from China tour’. Slipped Disk, 26 October 2019.

• r Hernandez, ‘Caught in U.S.-China crossfire, Eastman Orchestra
^*cels tour’. The New York Times, 30 October 2019.

James Palmer, ‘The NBA is China’s willing tool’. Foreign Policy, 7 October
2019.

Ben Cohen, Georgia Wells and Tom McCinty, ‘How one tweet turned pro-
China trolls against the NBA’, The WallStieet Journal, 16 October 2019.

Deb, ‘N.B.A. commissioner defends Daryl Morey as Chinese
companies cm ties’, The New York Times, 8 October 2019.

Ben Mithis-Lilley, ‘ I he NBA forgot that it has American fans too’. Slate,

7 October 2019.

Perry I ink, ‘China: the anaconda in the chandelier’, Chinajile, 11 April 2002.
Jason rhomas. ‘China’s BRl negatively impacting the environment’, Asean

Post, 19 February 2019.

Devin Thorne and Ben Spevack, ‘Harbored ambitions: how China’s port
investments are strategically reshaj>ing the Indo-Pacific , C4ADS, 2017,

7 Sopan

8

9

10

II

p. 19.

12 Nadege Rolland, ‘Beijing’s vision for a reshaped international order’, China
IhiejX/amesrown Foundation), 26 l el)ruary 2018.

13 The le.Kling intellectual Zheng Wang observes, ‘the Chinese feel a strong
sense of chosenness and are extremely proud of their ancient and modern
achievements'. Zheng W ang, AV/rr Forget National Humiliation: Historical
memory in Chinese politics and foreign relations. New York: Columbia
University Press, 2012, p. 1 .

14 Martin H,ila and Jichang Lulu, Lost in Translation: “economic diplomacy”
with Chinese characteristics'. Sinopsis, 10 March 2019, p. 7.

NOTES TO PP. 4-8

15 Qiao Liang, ‘One belt, one road’, Limes (Revista Italiana di Geopolitica),
17 July 2015.

16 Tom Wright and Bradley Hope, ‘China offered to bail out troubled Malaysian
fund in return for deals’. The Wall Street Journal, 7 January 2019. The projects
turned into a major graft scandal.

17 Ben Blanchard and Robin Emmott, ‘China struggles to ease concerns over
“Belt and Road” initiative as summit \ooms, Japan Times, 11 April 2019.

18 Nayan Chanda, ‘The Silk Road - Old and New’, YaleGlobal Online,
26 October 2015.

19 Ariana King, ‘China is “champion of multilateralism,” foreign minister says’,
Nikkei Asian Review, 29 September 2018.

20 Zhonggong zhongyang xuanchuanbu ganbuju 4^

[Cadre Bureau of the Central Propaganda Department of the CPC Central
Committee], ed., Xin shiqi xuanchuan sixiang gongzuo Ifrlft

[Propaganda and thought work in the new period], Beijing: Xuexi
chubanshe, 2006, p. 2.

21 Melanie Hart and Blaine Johnson, ‘Mapping China’s global governance
ambitions’. Center for American Progress, 28 February 2019. The CCP’s
switch to attack as the best form of defence is discussed in chapter two.

22 Anon., ‘Why does the Western media hate the GFW so much?’. Global Times,
11 April 2016. Like many other Global Times editorials that are dismissed as
radical or only representing a fringe opinion inside the Chinese government,
we’ll see that it actually represents mainstream thinking inside the CCP
leadership.

23 Part)' theorists have studied Michel Foucault. See ‘Guoji huayut]uan jianshe
zhong ji da jichuxing lilunxing wenti’ hJlvJ''

[Some big basic theoretical questions in building international
discourse power]. State Council Information OlHce, 27 February 2017,
<http://archive.is/jIjRm>.

Chapter 2 A Leninist party goes out to the world

1 ‘China urges US to abandon zero-sum Cold War mindset’, CX'/FN You lube
channel, 19 December 2017, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zZ-
yPDLJmZE>; ‘China calls on US to “cast away Ck)ld War mentality’”,
AP Archive YouTube channel, 6 February 2018, <https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=ZYdaY8Ptp78>. For official news agency Xinhua, the US
Department of Delense’s 2018 National Defense Strategy was also a sign of
America’s ‘Cold War mentalit)’’. Anon., ‘“Cold War” mentality for U.S. to
play up “Chinese militar)- threat”: spokesperson’, Xinhua, 1 January 2018.

2 Anon., ‘Huawei victim of high-tech McCarthyism’, Global Times, 1 July 2019.

3 LiuXiaoming, ‘“Gunboat diplomacy” does not promote peace’, The Telegraph,
20 March 2019. It is not just the United States that suffers from a ‘Cold War’
mindset. Germany has the same problem, if the Global Times is to be believed.

289

NOTES TO PP. 8-10

and Australia. Li Chao, ‘Germany’s skepticism of China unfounded’, Global
fimei’ 1^ March 2018. When Lithuania included China in its 2019 National
Threat Assessment, the Chinese ambassador ‘reminded’ Lithuania ‘not to
look at Chinese investment through the lens of “cold war”’. Joel Gchrkc,
‘China lashes Lithuania for sounding alarm on espionage’, Washington
8 February 2019.

X Anon., ‘China rejects U.S. accusations on human rights’. People’s Daily

^ Orf«'.'5Ma‘ch2019.

Laurie Chen, ‘Overreaction to China threat could turn into McCarthyite Red

^ Scai«, says former US official’. South China Morning Post, 31 March 2019.
Chen, ‘Overreaction to China threat could turn into McCarthyite Red Scare’.

7 John Kennedy, ‘Xi Jinping s opposition to political reforms laid out in leaked
internal speech’. South^ China Morning Post, 28 January 2013; Gao You
‘Nan’er Xi Jinping’ ^ [Real man Xi Jinping], Deutsche Welle,

25 January 2013.

g E.g., Angus Grigg, How did we get Chinese leader Xi Jinping so wrong’.
Financial Review, 18 January 2019.

a Xi Jinping ‘Guanyu jianchi he fazhan Zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi

ji ge wenti’ [A few issues

regarding upholding and developing socialism with Chinese characteristics],
Qiushi, no. 7, 31 March 2019, <htrp://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2019-
03/31/c_l 124302776.htm>.

10 For a translation, see Anon., ‘Document 9: a ChinaFile translation’,
ChinaFile, 8 November 2013, <http://w'\N'w.chinafile.com/document-9-

chinafile-translation>.

11 Carry Huang, ‘Paranoia from Soviet Union collapse haunts China’s
Communist Party, 22 years on’, South China Morning Post, 8 November
2013. In the same year, cadres were asked to watch a documentary, jointly
produced by the CCP’s Central Disciplinary Inspection Commission and
flic Cdiinese Academy of the Social Sciences, called In Memory of the Collapse
of the Communist Part}’ of the Sovtet Union. Just like Xi Jinping’s speeches, it
blamed the fall of the Soviet Union on the loosening of Party control in the
ideological spliere.

12 Also see Jeremy Coldkorn, Silent Contest’, I'he China Story, 2014.

13 Huang Jingjing. '“Silent Contest” silenced’. Global limes, 17 November
2013.

14 For campaigns at universities, sec lorn Phillips, ‘“It’s getting worse”:
China's liberal academics tear growing censorship’. The Guardian, 6 August
2015: lorn Phillips, 'China universities must become Communist party
“stamgholds”, says Xi Jinping , The Guardian, 9 December 2016; Steven
Jiang, 'Communist Parrs’ cracks down on China’s famous Peking University’,
CNN, IS November 2018. For tightened controls over media, see David
Bandurski. '1 he spirit ot control'. Medium, 24 Februarv’ 2016.

290

IS

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

NOTES TO PP, 10-12

John Garnaut, 'Engineers of the soul: ideology in Xi jinpings China by John
Garnaut’, republished in Sinocism Newsletter, 17 January 2019, <https://
nb.sinocism.com/p/engineers-of-the-soul-ldeoIogy-in>.

Garnaut, ‘Engineers of the soul’.

Anne-Marie Brady, Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and thought work in
contemporary China, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008, pp. 51 IF.
Joseph Nye, Bound to Lead: The changing nature of American power. New
York: Basic Books, 1990.

Meigtio dingyxenglingdaoshijie ma ?[Is It Certain that
America Can Lead the World?], trans. He Xiaodong and Gao Yuyun

^$5, Beijing: Junshi yiwen chubanshe, 1992, p. 4.

Meigtio dingneng lingdao shijie ma?, pp. 2-3.

Sha Qiguang ‘Dui shiji chu guoji yulun xingshi ji yingdui cuoshi

de ji dian sikao’ M Jl

[Reflections on form of international public opinion and response measures in
the beginning of the century], Duiwai xuanchuan cankao, no. 12, 2000, p. 9.
Zhang Guo^ ‘Zenme kandai yishi xingtai wenti’

H]

[How to view the question of ideology], Qiushi, 23 April 2015,
originally published in Hongqi tuengao, no. 8, 2015, <https://web.archive.
org/web/20191205120449/http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/hqwg/ 2015-
04/23/c_l 115069696.htm>.

See for example chapter 4, ‘The Chinese discourse on Communist party-
states’, in David Shambaugh, China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and
adaptation, Berkeley: University of California Press; Washington, D.C.:
Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2008.

Bruce Gilley and Heike Holbig, ‘In search ol legitimacy in post-revolutionary
China: bringing ideolog}'and governance back’, GIGA Working Paper no. 127,
8 March 2010, available at SSRN: <lutps://ssrn.com/abstract=1586310 or
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn. 1586310>.

‘The west is strong and China is weak’ is an assessment ol the state on the
‘public opinion front’ that both top party leaders and others have

made repeatedly. See for example Zhang Zhizhou ‘jlCiL'fJii, ‘Qieshi gaibian
guoji huayuquan “Xi qiang wo ruo” gejii’

[Thoroughly change the pattern ol 'the West is strong and Cdiina is weak
in international discursive power], People’s Daily Online, 20 September 2016,
<http://theor)'.peop]e.com.cn/n 1 /2016/0920/c40531 -28725837.html>.

Yang Jinzhou and Yang Cuoren ‘Xingshi, renwu, tiaozhan,

jiyu - xie zai xin shiji kaiyuan zhi ji’

[The situation, responsibilities, challenges, opportunities—Written on
the occasion of the new centur)’], Duiwai xuanchuan cankao, no. 1,2001, p. 4.
Wang Huning ‘Zuowei guojia shili de wenhua: ruanquanli’

[Culture as a part of a country’s power: soft
power], Fudan xuebai (shehui kexueban), no. 3, 1993, p. 91.

291

notes to PP, 12-13

28

29

30

31

32

33

34

35

See Banyan, ‘The meaning of the mm i r-.- .

2 November 2017. 7Ar

In .he eorly 2000s .he CCP s.ill pushed .he idea of ■Chinas peaceful rise’
an ,de, proposed by former depu.y diree.or of .he Cen.ral P.opagand;
Depar.men. Zheng B.j.an, and no. to be confused with 'peaceful evolution’
The slogan was later turned into 'Chinas peaceful developmen.’_.o avoid
the threatening connotations of the word 'rise—and then dropped entirely.
See for example R.L. Suettinger, ‘The Rise and descent of “peaceful rise’”,
China Leadership Monitor, no. 12, 2004.

Zhonggong zhongyang xuanchuanbu ganbuju

^ [Cadre Bureau of the Central Propaganda Department of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of China], ed., Xin shiqi xuanchuan
sixiang ^ongzuo 0fll'|]{lj [Propaganda and thought work in

the new period], Beijing: Xuexi, 2006, p. 188. A few months later, in April
2004, China upgraded the External Propaganda Work Small Group to the
status of Leading Small Group in order to better coordinate policy-making
and implementation. Zhu Muzhi Fengyun jidang qishi nian JA.'ZX

[Seven turbulent decades], vol. 2, Beijing: Wuzhou chuanbo
chubanshe, 2007, p. 248. The group may have been merged with the Leading
Small Group for Propaganda and Thought Work under Xi, but since neither
is officially publicly acknowledged, that’s unclear.

‘Ouansheng duiwai xuanchuan gongzuo huiyi tichu: jianli da waixuan geju
kaichuang waixuan gongzuo xin jumian’

T/t province’s foreign propaganda
work meeting suggests: establish a big external propaganda pattern to create a
new situation of external propaganda work], Jinri Hainan, no. 7, 2004, p. 7.
Anne-Marie Brady, Magic Weapons: China’s political influence activities under
XiJinping, Washington D.C.: Wilson Center, 2017, p. 9.

Wu Nong ‘Lun duiwai xuanchuan yu jiaqiang dang de zhizheng nengli

jianshe’ Vij/z [On external propaganda

and building the ability of the Party to rule], Duiwai xuanchuan cankao, no.

4, 2005, p. 17.

Joseph Fewsmith. ‘Debating “the China Model’”, China Leadership Monitor,
no. 35, summer 2011.

Chen F'engying ')i, ‘Shijiu da baogao quanshi quanqiu zhili zhi Zhongguo

lang’an: Zhongguo dui quanqiu zhili de gongxian yu zuoyong’ I'm

[The 19th

Paru’ Congress Report explains the China Case for global governance. Chinas
contribution and lunction lor global governance]. Peoples Daily Online,
14 December 2017, <https://\veb.archive.org/web/20191205121135/http://
theory, people, com.cn/n 1/2017/1214/c40531 -29706473. html>; Tegao:
Zhongguo lang'an de shijie huixiang—xie zai renlei ming)mn gongtongti
linian shouci zairu .■\nlihui jueyi zhi ji’

292

NOTES TO PP. 13-16

rt-: A ^ l^^r jl- N w &. t\ VK M a :& m^ '/k IX Z ISpecial report-,

the worlds echo of the China Case—Written on the occasion of the first
inclusion of the idea of the concept of the community of shared destiny
for mankind in the Security Council], Xinhua, 23 March 2017, <https://
web.archive.org/web/20180725121415/h ttp://www.xinhuanet.com/2017-
03/23/c_l 29516885.htm>.

36 'Chinese democracy in the eyes of an American’, New China TV
YouTube channel, 2 March 2019, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
AUxbZ07q7j0>.

37 ‘Pojie quanqiu zhili 4 da chizi, Xi Jinping zai Bali jichu “Zhongguo fang’an’”

[To break

through the four major deficits of global governance, Xi Jinping offers the
‘China case’ in Paris], China Peace Net, 27 March 2019, <https://web.archive.
org/web/20190404193447/http://www.chinapeace.gov.cn/2019-03/27/
content_l 1513080.htm>.

38 Juan Pablo Cardenal, Jacek Kucharezyk, Grigori] Meseznikov and Gabriela
Pleschova, Sharp Power: Rising authoritarian influence, Washington D.C.:
International Forum for Democratic Studies, 2017.

39 Jasmin Gong, Bertram Lang and Kristin Shi-Kupfer, ‘European crises through
the lens of Chinese media’, MERICS China Monitor, 12 July 2016.

40 Peter Mattis, ‘China’s “three warfares” in perspective’. War on the Rocks,
30 January 2018.

41 ‘Zhonggong zhong)'ang yin “Shenhua dang he guojia jigou gaige fang’an’”

[The Central Committee

of the Communist Part)' of China issues the ‘Plan to deepen the reform of
party and state organisations’], Xinhua, 21 March 2018, <https://web.archive.
org/web/20191 1301 14748/http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2018-03/
21/c_1122570517.htm>.

42 Tasking a party member with keeping an eye on Chinese delegations going
abroad is not an entirely new phenomenon, but it appears to be more strictly
enforced under Xi Jinping.

43 David Shambaugh, ‘China’s “quiet diplomacy”: the International Department
of the Chinese Communist Party’, China: An International Journal, vol. 5,
no. 1, March 2002, pp. 26—54.

44 Larr)' Diamond and Orville Schell, eds, China's Influence & American Interest:
Promoting constructive vigilance, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2018,
pp. 160—1. As part of a large-scale restructuring in 2017 and 2018, the ILD
was merged with the Office of the Central Leading Group on Foreign Affairs.
Anne-Marie Brady, ‘Exploit ever)- rift: United Front Work goes global’. Party
Watch Anntuil Report 2018, p. 35.

45 Julia G. Bowie, ‘International liaison work for the new era: generating global

consensus?’, Party Watch Annual Report 2018, p. 42, cited from ‘Xi Jinping:
nuli kaichuang Zhongguo tase dagga w-aijiao xin jumian’ ^

293

46

47

48

49

50

51

52

53

54

55

56

57

58

59

notes to PP, 16-19

of grcac power relat.on. w„l. Ch,„^ charaac,i«ics), X,nhua. 23 ,„„o 20. B.

com/20l8-06/23/c_l 123025806.htm>. ^ www.xmhuanct.

Brady, ‘Explo't every rift’, pp. 35-6.

See Michael Martina, Exclusive; In China, the Party’s push for influence
• side foreign firms stirs fears’, Reuters, 24 August 2017.

^ex Joske, ‘The Party speaks for you’, Canberra, Australian Strategic Policy
Institute, 2020.

Brady, ‘Exploit every rift’, p. 34. Also see Charlotte Gao, ‘The 19th Party
Congress: a rare glimpse of the United Front Work Department’, The

Diphmat.l^Oaoh€, 20\7.

Gerry Groot, ‘The expansion of the United Front under Xi Jinping’, in The
China Story, Australian Centre on China in the World, ANU, 2015, p. 168.
See also Gerry Groot, ‘The long reach of China’s United Front Work’, Lotuy
, r-, November 2017, and Gerry Groot, ‘United Front Work after the

I9th Party Congress’, China Brief {Jamestown Foundation), 22 December 2017.
Anon ‘Tongyi zhanxian shi yi men kexue de youlai’ ■l'1^4

fThe origin of united front as a science], United Front News Net,

ri20.4,<hctps://nnMcom/uv.6iwex

Anon ‘Woguo shou jie tongzhanxue shuoshi biye—lai kan yixia ^mmm

^ [China’s first batch of United Front master

«udems graduated—take a look], Sohu, 4 July 2018, <https://web.archive.
or /web/20191130134628/hrtp://m.jo/i«.com/a/23931286l_358054.>
AnnI-Marie Brady, ‘Chinese interference: Anne-Marie Brady’s full

submission’, 8 May 2019. ^

Groot ‘The expansion of the United Front under Xi Jinping , p. 168.

Gerry’ Groot, ‘The United Front in an age of shared destiny’, in Shared
Destiny: The China Stoiy yearbook, ed. Geremie Barme et al., Canberra; ANU

Press, 2015, p- 130.

Magic Weapons,

Zheng Bijian, ‘China’s “peaceful rise” to great-power status, Foreign Ajfatrs,

September/October 2005. /v

‘Zheng Bijian; jiefitng “san ge li” zhiguan quanju’ — I

[Zheng Bijian: liberating the ‘three forces’ matters to the big
picture], originally published in Tong zhou gong jin, no. 12, 2008, <https.//
tinyurl.com/srcg\\y2>; Zheng Bijian, Bo ao Forum for Asia, 17 December
2013, <https://tinyurl.com/\v\vt5bmj>. A 2015 article outlined the varying
roles of six former senior advisers to Chinese leaders, including Zheng Bijian,
<https://tinyurl.com/qoc5u\vl>.

Lii Jianzhong <https://tinyurl.com/u3zzbpd>. Baidu Bailee is

Chinas equivalent of Wikipedia. See also ‘Xi’an Datang Xishi wenhua chanye
touzi youxian gongsf S

294

NOTES TO PP. 19-21

(I.ii Jianzliong, Chairman of Xi’an Datang West Cultural Industry
Investment Co., Ltd.], ifeng.com, 20 March 2013, <https://tinyurl.com/
qnc7n6|> and ‘Lii Jianzhong shou yao danren Zhonguo guoji wenti yanjiu
jijinhui teyao fu lishizhang’ B S § [5^

[Lii Jianzhong invited to be Vice Chairman of the China
Foundation for International Studies], Jin Merchants Club, 12 August 2016,
<https://tinyurl.com/surttjk>.

60 See Russell L.C. Hsiao, ‘Chinese political warfare in the 21st century’, Asia
Dialogue, 21 October 2013. The PLA’s General Political Department was
disbanded as part of the military reform of 2015—16 and superseded by the
Political Work Department of the Central Military Commission.

61 Previously, the State Council Information Office and the Office of External
Propaganda were referred to as ‘one organisation with two nameplates under
the Central Committee’. See ‘Guowuyuan guanyu jigou shezhi de tongzhi’

[Notice by the State Council on organisational
set \ip]. People’s Daily Online, 24 April 2008, <https://tinyurl.com/w23mode>.
According to the official website of the Chinese government, the State Council
Information Office now has a nameplate under the Central Propaganda
Department. See ‘Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guowuyuan’

[State Council of the People’s Republic of China], website
of the Chinese government, <http://www.gov.cn/guowuyuan/zuzhi.htm>.
According to David Shambaugh, ‘As a result of the sweeping reorganisation
of the State Council at the 13th National People’s Congress (NPC) in March
2018, it appears that the EPLG [External Propaganda Leading Group] has
been reabsorbed back within the Central Propaganda Department—thus no
longer enjoying its semi-autonomous status—but this is not entirely clear.’
David Shambaugh, ‘China’s external propaganda work: missions, messengers,
mediums’. Party Watch Annual Report, October 2018, p. 29.

62 ‘Xueyuan jieshao’ ift" [Introduction to the institute], website of

the Central Institute of Socialism, 25 June 2018, <https://tinyurl.com/
vm5v3h9>; Website of the Academy of Chinese Culture, <https://tinyurl.
com/utz]pha>.

63 Quote: ‘1^:Sy:^-^:^['l3'^'f1^l>l.|ltl)lk|fl||!'ilfliJW.’. Benkan teyue jizhe hi

‘Tixian shidaixing, bawo guiltixing, fuyu chuangzaoxing: ji 2003
nian quanguo waixuan gongzuo huiyi’

Tatt—ifi 2003 [Embody the characteristics of the

times, grasp the rules, be rich in innovation—Notes from the nationwide
work meeting for external propaganda in 2003], Duiwai xuanchuan cankao,
no. 2, 2003, p. 3.

64 Peter Mattis, ‘Everything we know about China’s secretive State Security
Bureau’, The National Interest, 9 July 2017.

65 Anon., ‘Guo Yezhou: quan fangwei, kuan lingyu, duo cengei de zhengdang
waijiao xin geju yijing xingcheng’

295

notes to PP. 21—22

67

68

69

some
to

san

70

1 \

72

(Guo Yo-.h„,u n new nn„c„, , , n ,
wide-ranging and multi-level government-party diploma ha< dr
,Hnpe]. Xiuhuu. 21 October 20,7, ehttp.t^Lnyurl'co.wXX'”*'’'

^ Anne-Marie Brady. Making the Foreign Serve China: Manarim 'lvrelvner. /»

“ People’s Republic, Lanham MD: Rowman Sc Lirtlefield, S
grady, Making the Foreign Serve China, p. 8.

See Nick Knight, Marxist Philosophy in China: From Qu Qiubai to Mao Zedonz,
1923-1945, Springer, 2005 p. 149. It wasn’t published until 1952, and son
scholars have argued it wasn’t written in 1937 but was used retroactively
justify the alliance with the KMT with the benefit of hindsight.

‘Xinhuawang: dangqian yishi xingtai lingyu hongse heise huise
ge didai jiaoshi’ ^ HU ^

[Xinhuanet: in the ideological field, the red, black and
grey zones are intertwined], CCTV, 7 September 2013, <https;//web.
archive.org/web/20191130 l45054/http://news.cntv.cn/2013/09/07/

ARTI1378549535599959.shtml.>. Also see Binchun Meng, The Politics of
Chinese Media: Consensus and contestation. New York: Palgrave Macmillan,

2018, p. 131.

The latter instruction is from a speech from late 2015. See ‘Xi Jinping: zai
quanguo dangxiao gongzuo huiyi shang de jianghua’

[Xi Jinping: speech at the national party school
work conference], Qiushi, republished on CPC News, 1 May 2016, <https://
tinyurl.com/rd5fckq>.

See ‘Zhonggong zhong>'ang guanyu jiaqiang he gaijin duiwai xuanchuan

gongzuo de tongzhi’ -]'^Jll ® 6^^

Jill [Note by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on
reinforcing and improving external propaganda work]. Central Circular No.
21 (1990) in Dang de xuanchuan gongzuo wenjian xuanbian (1988-1992),
1922; and ‘Zeng Jianhui tongzhi tan waixuan gongzuo de ji ge wenti’

[Comrade Zeng Jianhui talks about

a number of problems in external propaganda work], Duiwai baodao cankao,
no. 7, 1990, p. 3.

Although in recent years. Party theorists have argued again that some
arguments that are presented as academic issues are in fact political issues
‘dressed up’ as academic issues. Phis is part of the politicisation of an
increasing number ol issues under Xi, which means there is an ever smaller
number ol topics on which academics can dissent from the Party line. See
Zhou Liangshu M] [\1 jli, ‘Ruhe qufen zhengzhi yuanze, sixiang renshi he
xueshii guandian wenti’ (Ul ("/[K J)" irf Ihi WO ' 1*^

[How to distinguish between issues ol political principles, ideological
grasp and academic views], Banyuetan, 12 December 2017, <https://tinyurl.
com/qmlrswx>. Banyuetan (‘Bimonthly commentar)'’) is a journal run by
Xinhua News Agency on behalf of the Central Propaganda Department.

296

NOTES TO PP, 22-25

See i^hou Li.tngslui, Ruhe qiifcii zhengzhi yuanze, sixiang renshi he xueshu
gu.uuiian wciui’.

'A See Anon., Chinese consulate general praises "patriotism” of pro-Beijing
students in clash at New Zealand university over extradition bill’, South
Chiuu Morning Post, 1 August 2019.

75 Wang Ping , Jue bu rongxu waiguo shili gaolun Xianggang’

[Never allow foreign forces to cause chaos in
Hong Kong], Xinhua, 24 July 2019, originally published in the Peoples Daily
Overseas Edition, <https://tinyurl.com/su6xoak>.

76 A chilling account of how enemies’ are treated and talked about was given
by lawj^er Teng Biao in detailing his own detention and interrogation at the
hands of Chinese police. See Teng Biao, ‘“A hole to bury you’”. The Wall Street
Journal, 28 December 2010. The distinction between the people and their
enemies also comes up in Simon Cheng’s account of his detention in China:
Cheng Man Kit, ‘For the record: an enemy of the state’, personal Facebook
page, 20 November 2019, <https://www.facebook.com/notes/cheng-man-kit/
for-the-record-an-enemy-of-the-state/2490959950941845/>.

77 The distinction is explicitly mentioned in Article 6 of the Communist Party’s

Regulations on Political and Legal work from January 2019. See FP

^ {4^ IS A7«/;Krt, 18 January 2019, <http://www.

xinhuanet.eom/politics/2019-01/18/c_l 124011592.htm>. We are indebted
to Katja Drinhausen for bringing this to our attention.

78 See Valerie Strauss and Daniel Southerl, ‘How many died? New evidence
suggests much higher numbers for the victims of Mao Zedong’s era’. The
Washington Post, 17 June 1994.

79 ‘Mayor Chen Xitong’s report on putting down anti-government riot’, 7 July
1989, available on China Daily, <https://tinyurl.com/u9hvclu>.

80 Hua Chunying, ‘Open letter adds insult to injury in extradition case’, China
Daily, 24 Januar)' 2019.

81 Fan Lingzhi, ‘Billionaire political donor Huang Xiangnio decries cancelation
of his permanent visa by Australia’, Global limes, 1 1 February 2019.

82 ‘The Chinese embassy spokesperson: no freedom is beyond the law’, website
of the Chinese embassy in Sweden, 3 May 2019, <http://www.chinaembassy.
se/eng/sgxsv/11660497. h tm >.

83 ‘China urges U.S. commission to stop interfering in HK affairs’, Xinhua,
4 May 2017, <https://tinyurl.com/v6uke89>.

84 David Shambaugh, ‘China’s external propaganda work: missions, messengers,
mediums’. Party Watch Annttal Report, October 2018, p. 28. For the
importance of this, also see Michael Schoenhals, Doing Things with Words
in Chinese Politics, Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of
California, Berkeley, 1992.

85 In the words of the Silk Road Think Tank Network Declaration on Joint
Action, website of the Silk Road Think Tank Nersvork, 16 May 2017,

297

NOTES TO PP. 25-30

86

87

88

89

90

^httPs://'ve6.archivc.oig/wcb/2() 191205130057/lutp://www,c*ilk».ofe/

about/declaration>.

Due to its Marxist origins, the CCP views history through the lens of
teleological determinism. Human society is heading towards a specific
outcome. When the party speaks of multipolarity as an irresistible trend,
it means that the world is heading in that direction regardless of what
humanity might do. Nevertheless, human agency remains, having an impact
on how quickly and smoothly humankind moves in the correct historical
direction. Whether individuals inside the CCP ‘really’ believe this is a
different question, but this is the official position that cannot be contradicted

publicly.

Rush Doshi, ‘Xi Jinping just made it clear where China’s foreign policy is
headed’. The Washington Post, 25 October 2017.

C ‘Mao Zedong yong “tongqian waiyuan neifang” miaoyu na xiang
ongzuo’ [For which work

did Mao Zedong use the metaphor of ‘copper coin round outside square
within’] originally published in Zhongguo zuzhi renshi bao, republished on
'wenmingwang, 13 March 2017, <https://tinyurl.com/uk41bjd>. Wenminwang
(Civilisationnet) is a website run by the Central Propaganda Department and
the Central Office for Civilisation.

For the origin of this translation for xiao ma da bangmang, see Xudong
Zhang, Chinese Modernism in the Era of Reforms, Durham and London: Duke

University Press, 1997, p. 119. w • n j •

Using the local to surround the centre is explained by Anne-Marie Brady m
‘Chinese interference: Anne-Marie Bradys full submission .

Chapter 3 Political elites at the centre: North America

1 Based on expert interviews. . , t’/ c ^

2 John Garnaut, ‘China gets into the business of making friends , The bydney

Morning Herald, 25 , ti •

3 Richard Baum, China Watcher: Confessions of a Peking tom, Seattle: University

of Washington Press, 2010, pp. 152-3.

4 Baum’s taxonomy is a little dated as it is based on information from a Chinese
diplomat who defected after 'fiananmen. 'I'oday’s categories differ somewhat
from chose used in rhe 1980s.

5 George H.W. Bush and Brent Scowcrolt, A World Transformed, New Yor .
Knopf Doubleday 2011, p. 94.

6 See Clive Hamilton, Silent Invasion: China’s injluence in Australia, Melbourne:
Hardie Grant Books, 2018, pp. 260-1.

7 Susan Thornton, Is American diplomacy with China dead? , The Foreign^
Service Journal, July/August 2019. The article was praised as ‘required reading
by Michael Swaine, one of the chief authors of the open letter mentioned in
chapter three.

298

NOTES TO PP. 30-33

8 M. 'laylor Fravel, J. Stapleton Roy, Michael D. Swaine, Susan A. Thornton
and Ezra Vogel, ‘China is not an enemy’. The Washington Post, 3 July 2019.

9 Anon., 'Objective, rational voices will prevail in defining China-U.S. ties:
FM spokesperson’, Xinhua, 4 July 2019.

10 Anon., ‘Better understanding can lower China-US mistrust’, Gbbal Times,
9 July 2019. Swaine was interviewed in Beijing at the World Peace Forum, a
front group of the PLA’s Political Department.

11 John Pomfret, Why the United States does not need to return to a gentler
China Policy’, The Washington Post, 9 July 2019.

12 James Jiann Hua To, ‘Beijing’s policies for managing Han and ethnic-minority
Chinese communities abroad’, of Current Chinese Affairs, no. 4, 2012,
p. 189.

13 Robert Fife and Steven Chase, ‘Canada’s China envoy John McCallum says
Huawei executive has good chance of avoiding US extradition’, The Clobe
and Mail, 23 January 2019.

14 Ian Young, ‘Does Canada really have more in common with China than with
the US?’, South China Morning Post, 1 February 2018.

15 Limin Zhou and Omid Ghoreishi, ‘The man behind McCallum’s contro¬
versial press conference that led to his removal as Canada’s ambassador to
China’, Epoch Times, 28 January 2019.

16 Anon., ‘Resignation reveals political interference’, Clobal Times, 27 January
2019.

17 Eugene Lang, ‘John McCallum’s China gaffe shouldn’t obscure his successes’,
Ottawa Citizett, 31 January 2019.

18 David Wertime and James Palmer, ‘1 think that Chinese official really likes
me!’. Foreign Policy, 8 December 2016.

19 Reported in an insightful, excellent article by Perrin Crauer, ‘John McCallum
fell victim to Beijing’s “inHuence campaign”, say former ambassadors’,
StarMetro Vancouver, 29 January 2019.

20 An academic from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Xu Piping,
unwittingly gave the game away in comments to the South China Morning
Post (‘Former Australian officials who participate in think tanks after
retirement can help speak for China, and reduce the Australian government’s
misjudgment of China’), Martin Choi and (kuherine Wong, ‘China-Australia
relations “will not be helped” by foreign influence register’. South China
Morning Post, 21 February 2019.

21 Email from David Mulroney to Clive Hamilton, 17 February 2019. I he
following sentences are paraphrases from the email.

22 Quoted by Perrin Crauer, ‘John McCallum fell victim to Beijing’s “influence
campaign’”.

23 ‘Jianade zhu Hua dashi “dao ge”: Meng Wanzhou you chongfen liyou
fandui yindu’

[Canada’s ambassador to China ‘defects’: Meng Wanzhou has good reason

299

NOTES TO PP. 3 ' 1-38

rn oppose extradition], Cnukao xiaoxi, 24 January 2019, <lmp»://wcb.
,rchivc.org/"'cl5/20 1 90215161644/littp://www.cankaoxiaoxi.com/cbina/

20 l 90 l 24 / 2369920 .shtml>.

- 7 X losh Rogin, ‘Chinas interference in US politics is just beginning’. The
WashinS^^" September 2018.

Earlier eftbrts are discussed in Section 1 of Diamond and Schell, eds. Chinas

l„fluence&Arnerkan Interests.

Diamond and Schell, eds. Chinas Influence & American Interests.

_ Pj .,1 5 teinhauser, Biden slams Trump over escalating trade war with China’,

Fox News online, 13 May 2019.

-ya David Nakamura, ‘Biden to attempt damage control in visit with Chinese
^ leader’. The Washington Post, 30 November 2013.

29 William Hawkins, Biden s embrace of globalism includes waltzing with
China’, blog post. Journal of Political Risk, vol. 7, no. 5, May 2019;

<https://global.upenn.edu/penn-biden-center/addressing-threats-liberal-

international-order>.

30 Peter Schweizer, Secret Empires, New York: Harper Collins, 2019, chapter 2.

31 Robert Farley, ‘Trump’s claims about Hunter Biden in China’, blog post,
Factcheck.org, 10 October 2019. Schweizer refined the story in a New York
Times op-ed: ‘What Hunter Biden did was legal—and that’s the problem’.
The New York Times, 9 October 2019.

32 Schweizer, ‘What Hunter Biden did was legal—and that’s the problem’.

33 Farley, ‘Trump’s claims about Hunter Biden in China’.

3 ,^ Sharon LaFraniere and Michael Forsythe, ^X^hat we know about Hunter
Biden’s business in China’, The New York Times, 3 October 2019.

35 Eric Levitz, ‘In appeal to hard left, Bloomberg praises Chinese Communism’,
Intelligencer {New York Magazine online), 2 December 2019.

36 Tory Newmyer, ‘Mike Bloomberg is likely the most China-friendly 2020
candidate. That could be a liability’, The Washington Post, 25 November 2019.

37 Alex Lo, ‘Follow Mitch McConnell’s money, not his tweets’. South China
Morning Post, 15 August 2019.

38 Eric Lipton and Michael Forsythe, ‘Elaine Chao investigated by House panel
for possible conllicts’. The New York Times, 16 September 2019.

39 Schweizer, Secret Empires, pp. 75-9.

40 Lee Fang, ‘Mitch McConnell’s freighted ties to a shadowy shipping company’,
The Nation, 30 October 2014.

41 Larry Getlen, ‘How McConnell and Chao used political power to make their
family rich’, The New York Post, 17 March 2018.

42 Anon., ‘Follow the Money', A report by Global Trade Watch, Washington:
Public Citizen. March 2019.

43 Anon., ‘Goldman Sachs, Chinas CIC to launch up to $5 billion fund:
sources’, Reuters, 6 November 2017.

44 Anon., ‘Follow the iMoney'.

300

I*

notes to PP. 38-41

Auoiu, White I louse hawks ratchet up trade hostilities with China’, Pinttncial
llmfs, 18 vSepteiuhcr 2018.

hdwaixl Helinorc, Jared Kushner’s company under renewed scrutiny over
C^hiuese and Israeli deals , The Guardian, 8 January 2018.

47 Matthew Carney, ‘Donald Trump heaps praise on Xi Jinping, makes no
hreakthrough on North Korea or trade’,online, 10 November 2017.

48 Mo Yu, ‘Chinese-American businesswoman accused of selling access to
Trump’, Voice of America online, 30 March 2019.

49 Lee Fang and Jon Schwarz, ‘A “desperate” seller: Gary Locke, while Obama’s
ambassador to China, got a Chinese tycoon to buy his house’. The Intercept,
4 August 2016. Locke had been described as ‘the most successful American
politician of Chinese descent in history’, and had been providing services to
the couple’s company for some years.

50 Jon Schwarz and Lee Fang, ‘Citizens united playbook’. The Intercept, 4 August
2016.

51

52

Fang and Schwarz, ‘A “desperate” seller’.

Lee Fang, Jon Schwarz and Elaine Yu, ‘Power couple’. The Intercept, 4 August

2016.

53 Dominic Faulder, ‘George H.W. Bush’s China connection’, Nikkei Asian
Review, 1 December 2018.

54 Maureen Dowd, ‘2 US officials went to Beijing secretly in July’, The New York
Times, 19 December 1989.

55 <https://www.aspph.org/texas-am-dean-narned-senior-academic-advisor-for-
the-bush-china-u-s-relarions-foundation/>.

56 <https://www.aspph.org/texas-am-dcan-named-senior-academic-advisor-for-
the-bush-china-u-s-relations-foundarion/>.

57 Anne-Marie Brady, Making the Foreign Serve China: Managing foreigners in
the People’s Republic, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003, p. 7.

58 Zhang Qi, ‘Ireland willing to help China reach out to EU—deputy PM’,
Xinhua, 25 May 2019.

59 Zhang Mengxu, ‘China, US have more in common than what divides them’,
People’s Daily, 24 June 2019.

60

61

62

63

CGTN, ‘Exclusive interview with Neil Bush’, CCl'N channel on YouTube,
27 August 2019, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I)NT7Hth6X2A>.

Lee Jeong-ho, ‘US must stop treating China as an enemy, says son of former
president George HW Bush’, South China Morning Post, 10 July 2019.
CGTN, ‘Exclusive interview with Neil Bush’, CGTN channel on YouTube,
27 August 2019, <https://wv\-w.youtube.com/watch?v=DNT7Hth6XzA>.

It was previously under the General Political Department of the PLA With
the restruccuring of the PLA in 2016, it seems likely that the functions

Department were assumed by the new Political
Work Department of the Central Militar>^ Commission. Alexander Bowe,
mas overseas United Front Work: background and implications for the

301

NOTES TO PP. /t1-43

United States’, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review CommiMion,
Washington, 24 August 2018, p. 9 note.

64 Geoff Wade, 'Spying beyond the facade’. The Strategist, Canberra: Australian
Strategic Policy Institute, 13 November 2013.

65 Mark Stokes and Russell Hsiao, ‘The People’s Liberation Army General
Political Department: political warfare with Chinese characteristics’. Project
2049 Institute, 14 October 2013, p. 15. See also Zheping Huang, ‘An
intricate web ties the woman who paid $16 million for Trump’s condo to
China’s power elite’. Quartz, 17 March 2017.

66 Stokes and Hsiao, ‘The People’s Liberation Army General Political
Department’.

67 Angela Chen’s Chinese name is Chen Xiaoyan but she also goes by

Chen Yu.

68 Andy Kroll and Russ Choma, ‘Businesswoman who bought Trump penthouse
is connected to Chinese intelligence front group’. Mother Jones, 15 March
2017.

(59 Wade, ‘Spying beyond the fa 9 ade’. See also Roger Faligot, Chinese Spies: From
Chairman Mao to Xi Jinping, London: Hurst & Company, 2019 (updated
from the 2015 second French edition), pp. 247-8. He writes that China’s
military intelligence ‘employs tens of thousands of agents—scientists,
students, tourists, shopkeepers and businessmen’ overseas. For links between
CAFI and CAIFC, see the detailed discussion in chapter ten.

70 Stokes and Hsiao, ‘The People’s Liberation Army General Political
Department’, p. 24. In 2015 the usually well-informed South China Morning
Post referred to CAIFC as ‘a Chinese military intelligence agency’. (Minnie
Chan, ‘Chinese military intelligence chief Xing Yunming held in graft
inquiry’. South China Mornitig Post, 4 March 2015.)

71 John Garnaut, ‘Chinese military woos big business’, The Sydney Morning
Herald, 25 May 2013; Bowe, ‘China’s overseas United Front work’.

72 John Garnaut, ‘China gets into the business of making friends’. The Sydney
Morning Herald, 25 May 2013.

73 Chan, ‘Chinese military intelligence chief Xing Yunming held in graft
inquiry'.

74 Wade, ‘Spying beyond the facade’.

75 Stokes and Hsiao, ‘The People’s Liberation Army General Political
Department’, p. 24.

76 Garnaut, ‘China gets into the business of making friends . For Owens s bio,
see <https://\\A\w.easnvest.ngo/node/2032>.

77 Garnaut, ‘China gets into the business of making friends’.

78 Garnaut, 'China gets into the business of making friends’.

79 Bill Gertz, 'Chinese communists influence US policy through ex-military
oflicials, Washington Free Beacon, 6 Februar)" 2012; Shirley A. Kan, ‘US-China
military contacts: issues for Congress’, report of the US Congressional

302

NOTES TO PP. 43-46

Rcv'tcarch Service, 25 October 2012; Bill Owens, ‘America must start treating
China as a friend’, Fiuancinl Times, 17 November 2009.

80 Gertz, ‘Chinese communists influence US policy through ex-military
olficials’.

81 Kan, ‘US-China military contacts’.

82 <https://web.archive.Org/web/20180508000126/https://red-bison.com/
about-us/>.

S3 Kan, ‘US-China military contacts: issues for Congress’.

84 Gertz, ‘Chinese communists influence US policy through ex-military
officials’.

85 Ralph Hallow, ‘Republicans fear exchange program put national security at
risk’, The Washington Times, 19 April 2012.

86 Jace White, ‘U.S.-China Sanya Initiative Dialogue: report from the
10th anniversary meeting’, EastWest.ngo, 17 January 2019, <https://
web.archive.org/web/20191208182022/https://www.eastwest.ngo/idea/
us-china-sanya-initiative-dialogue-report-10th-anniversary-meeting>.

87 Michael Kranish, ‘Trump’s China whisperer: how billionaire Stephen
Schwarzman has sought to keep the president close to Beijing’, The Washington
Post, 12 March 2018.

88 Kranish, ‘Trump’s China whisperer’.

89 Dasha Afanasieva, Blackstone sells Logicor to China Investment Corporation
for $14 billion’, Reuters, 3 June 2017.

90 Quoted by Kranish, ‘Trump’s China whisperer’.

91 Anon., Stephen Schwarzmans remarks from the Schwarzman Scholars
inaugural convocation’, website of the Schwarzman Scholars, 10 September

2016, <https://web.archive.Org/web/20191208182433/https://www.
schwarzmanscholars.org/news-article/stephen-schwarzmans-remarks-at-the-
schwarzman-scholars-inaugural-convocarion/>.

92 Kranish, ‘Trump’s China whisperer’.

93 ‘Schwarzman College’, website of Schwarzman Scholars, not dated, <https://

www.schwarzmanscholars.org/about/schwarzman-college/>: <https://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tsinghua_clique>.

94 Sam Dangremond, ‘Steve Schwarzman hosted an epic 70th birthday party in
Palm Beach’, Town & Country, 13 February 2017.

95 Tony Munroe, Refinitiv blocks Reuters stories on Tiananmen from its Eikon
platform’, Reuters, 4 June 2019.

96 Matthew Belvedere, ‘Blackstone’s Schwarzman: China’s economic “miracle”
came at the expense of the US and the West’, CNBC, 17 September 2019.

97 Jonathan Manthorpe, Claws of the Panda: Beijing’s campaign of influence and
intimidation in Canada, Toronto: Cormorant Books, 2019, pp. 157-67.

98 Nicholas Kristof, ‘Chinese bank is an anomalv’. The New York Times, 4 May
1987.

99 Faligot, Chinese Spies, pp. 203-4.

303

NOTES TO PP. 46-49

100 Faligot, Chinese Spies, p. 204. quoting from Agn6s Andrcsv I>ri ,

nouveawcpuissants de Chine. Paris: L’Harmattan, 2003 Cain N
Poly Group: the most important company you’ve never heard of" rv
25 February 2013. ^

101 Mark Mackinnon and Nathan Vanderklippe, ‘The inglorious
Xilai, Canada’s closest ally in China’s power structure’, The ^obTa^

102 Sandra Martin, ‘Behind the scenes, Paul Desmarais was a force i C a-
politics’. The Globe and Mail, 9 October 2013. For the paper mill,"sec Yol In
Zhang, China's Emerging Global Businesses: Political economy and institutSZl
investigations, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, p. 137.

103 Li Hede ‘Bo Guagua zai Jianada dagong qian chu yu Suoluosi

guanxi’ [Bo Guagua works^

Canada, pulls relationship with Soros], Next Magazine, 4 December 2018
<https.7/web.archive.org/web/20191208194657/https://hk.nextmgz.com/
znic\d2jSA 1390_0>.

104 Anne Kingston, ‘Brian Mulroney: from scandal-adjacent elitist to
magnanimous statesman’, Macleans, 19 February 2019.

105 Martin, ‘Behind the scenes, Paul Desmarais was a force in Canadian politics’.

106 Jason Kirby, ‘Chretien’s sell-out plan to keep China happy’, Macleans, 14 June
2019.

107 Manthorpe, Claws of the Panda, p. 127.

108 Geoffrey York, ‘Chretien builds links with Chinese conglomerate’. The Globe
and Mail, 6 February 2004.

109 Manthorpe, Claws of the Panda, p. 127.

110 Andrew Mitrovica and Jeff Sailor, ‘China set up crime web in Canada, report
says’, The Globe and Mail, 29 April 2000.

111 Manthorpe, Claws of the Panda, pp. 1 yj-Gl.

112 <htfps://www.primetimccrime.com/Articles/RobertRead/Sidewinder%20
page%201.htm>. Although the CCP’s use of triads in Taiwan and Hong
Kong is well known, the links between organised crime and Beijing’s political
influence operations in the West is little studied or understood.

113 Claws of the Panda, pp. 157—9.

114 Robert Fife and Steven Chase, ‘Influential Chinese-Canadians paying to
attend private fundraisers with rriidcau’, The Globe and Mail, 2 December
2016.

115 Fife and Chase, ‘Influential Chinese-Canadians paying to attend private

fundraisers with Frudeau’.

116 Jen Gerson, ‘At Toronto fundraiser, Justin Trudeau seemingly admires China’s
“basic dictatorship’”. National Post, 8 November 2013.

117 See the .account in Manthorpe, Claws of the Panda, pp. 179-81.

118 Craig Offman, ‘CSIS warned this cabinet minister could be a threat. Ontario
dis.agreed’, The Globe and Mail, 16 June 2015 (updated 15 May 2018).

304

notes to PP. 49-51

110 At the time of writing the case had not been concluded.
l*.0 C-taig Oltnian, Ontario minister Michael Chan defends Chinas human-
rights record’, The Globe and Mail, 8 June 2016.

121 lorn Blackwell, Former Ontario Liberal cabinet minister headlines pro-

Beijing rally near Toronto’, National Post, 20 August 2019; Xiao Xu, ‘Former
Ontario minister sides with Beijing, pins Hong Kong protests on “outside”
forces , 1 he Globe and Mail, 15 September 2019. Interviewed by China News
in September 2019, Chan said the Hong Kong police’s behaviour is ‘the most
non-violent violence’ <https://tinyurl.com/uot4t9p>.

122 Walt Bogdanich and Michael Forsythe, ‘How McKinsey has helped raise the
stature of authoritarian governments’. The New York Times, 15 December
2018.

123 Bogdanich and Forsythe, ‘How McKinsey has helped raise the stature of
authoritarian governments’.

124 GeofF Zochodne and Naomi Powell, ‘Will Dominic Barton’s experience
in China help or hurt him as Canada’s new man in Beijing?’, Leader Post,
6 September 2019.

125 Jeremy Nuttall, Chinese politician’s role on Teck board worries watchdog’.
The Tyee, 7 July 2016; <https://tinyurl.com/wdqtk7n>; for Quan’s bio see
<https.7/tinyurl.com/yx6cdjfk>.

126 Matthew Fisher, ‘Canada’s new foreign minister must figure out how to deal
with China’, Global News, 24 November 2019.

127 Steve Chase, ‘Fran^ois-Philippe Champagne takes helm at Department of
Global Affairs during critical period in Canada-China relations’. The Globe
and Mail, 20 November 2019.

128 Michelle Carbert, ‘Trudeau no-show le.ads to cancellation of Munk debate on
foreign policy’. The Globe and Mail, 24 September 2019.

Chapter 4 Political elites at the centre: Europe

1 For a good overview of the ILD, see David Shambaugh, ‘China’s “Quiet
Diplomacy”: the International Department of the ("hinese (xnnnuinist
Party’, China: An International Journal, vol. 5, no. 1, March 2007, pp. 26-54.
In English, the ILD is referred to as the International Department.

1’'’ ’, See Anon., ‘Guo Yezhou: hanwei guojia
liyi shi suoyou duiwai jiaowang gongzuo de yingyou zhi yi' |V-

Xinhua, 21 (October 2017,
<http://wv\'sv.xinhuanet.com/politics/19cpcnc/2017-10/21 /c_ 1 29724190.
htm>. According to an editor of Party Watch Initiative, Julia Bowie, the ILD
operates by ‘encouraging foreign political parties, politicians, and political
organizations to understand and respect China’s values and interests’. Julia
Bowie, ‘International liaison work for the new era: generating global
consensus?’, in Julia Bowie and David Gitter, eds, Party Watch Annual Report

305

notes to PP. 51-54

ina Rmarch, 19 iKuA^t

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

2018, Washington D.C.; Center for Advanced r\ ■

2018, p. 43 . '«''anccd China

Bowie, ‘International liaison work for the new era n a i
Congress in 2017, the deputy head of the ILD G Y ‘

maintains regular contact with over 400 Dolirir^l ., the CX:P

<http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/19cpcnc/zbrbT/*XTt’^^

Bowie, ‘International liaison work for the •nim>.

new era’, p. 44 ,

16

17

18

19

20

Bowie, ‘International liaison work for the new era’, p 44
Hu Ping, ‘Do “we”, the world’s political parties, know that “we” h. • ^

<http://language.chinadaily.com.cn/ 2017 - 12 / 04 /content_ 351 99254. htm>

Bowie, ‘International liaison work for the new era’, p. 48

See the banner at the top of their website, <http://www.idcpc.org.cn/english/>.

Meetings are recorded in English at <http://www.idcpc.org.cn/english/

news/>.

<http://www.idcpc.org.cn/english/news/20 1 905/t20 1 90523_10045 1 .html>.
Email to authors, 6 May 2019.

<http://www.idcpc.org.cn/english/news/201812/t2018121 l_ 99054 .html>.
<http://www.idcpc.org.cn/english/news/201905/t20 1 90505_100353.html>.
Examples include Hans-Peter Friedrich, vice president of the German
Bundestag and former minister of the interior, whom we will meet again,

<http://www.idcpc.org.cn/english/news/201904/t20190420_ 100067.

html>: Lars Klingbcil, general secretary of the Social Democratic
Party of Germany, <http://www.idcpc.org.cn/cnglish/news/201812/
t2018I22I_99l49.1itml>; and Morten Wold, vice president of the
Norwegian Parliament, <http://w\\'w.idcpc.org.cn/english/news/201812/
t20l8l2I I_9905I.lnnil>.

Bowie, ‘International liaison work lor the new era’, p. 47.
<hftp://www.gbcc.org.nk/a bout-us/oiir'board>.

<http.7/www. idcpc.org.cn/english/ news /20 1905/t2019051 5_100405.
html>.'rhese words are the ll.D’s, presumably paraphrased from Mandelson’s

comments
1),

21

.’eter Mandelson. ‘'rrump is wrong on (diina, and we must tell him’. The
SutuLiy limes. 16 June 2019.

Peter Mandelson is chairman and co-tounder of (jlobal Counsel, a consulting
firm, <https://tinvurl.com/qvhl94a>. On 7 May 2019 he went to Beijing and
met with senior members of the China Council for International Investment
Promotion (under the Ministrv of Commerce). Jin Ligang, a principal of
Albright Stonebridge Group (chaired bv .Madeleine Albright) joined them, as
did the chairman of .\SG China.

Angela Gui, 'Damned if vou do, damned if you don’tf I w'ont, Medium,
13 Februarv 2019.

306

NOTES TO PP. 54-57

12 Gui. ‘Datnncxl if you do, damned if you don’t?’

Gui. 'Damned if you do, damned if you don’t?’

24 Kris Cheng, Threats, verbal abuse, bribes, flattery” won’t silence me: Sweden
probes unauthorised meeting with daughter of bookseller detained in China,
Hong Kong Free Press, 14 February 2019.

25 Anon., Ex-Swedish envoy to China Anna Lindstedt suspected of crime
after setting up unofficial meetings over detained bookseller’, Hong
Kong Free Press, 10 May 2019; Iliana Magra and Chris Buckley, ‘Sweden
charges ex-ambassador to China over secret meetings’, The New York Times,
9 December 2019.

26 Anon., ‘Ola Wong: “Sverige har varit som en somngangare om Kina’”,
Expressen, 23 February 2019; Anon., Tung diplomat byter sida—hjalper
Ericssons arkerivaJ’, Dagens SP, 7 November 2012.

27 ‘Serge Abou’, Corporate Europe Observatory, <https://corporateeurope.org/
revolvingdoorwatch/cases/serge-abou>.

28 ‘Serge Abou’, Corporate Europe Observatory.

29 Ren Ke, ‘Interview: BRI to become model for culture exchanges: former
German ambassador to China’, Xinhua, 22 March 2019.

30 ‘Advisory Board’, Deutsch-Chinesische Wirtschaftsvereinigung e. V., <https://
www.dcw-ev.de/en/about-dcw/advisory-board.html>.

31 ‘Dr. Michael Schaefer’, MERICS, <https://www.merics.org/de/team/
dr-michael-schaefer>.

32 Michael Schaefer, ‘Co-driving the new silk road’, Berlin Policy Journal,
12 January 2016.

33 Philip Bilsky, ‘Schaefer: “Man tut sich sehr schwer’”, Deutsche Welle,
17 February 2015.

34 Bilsky, ‘Schaefer’.

35 David Bandurski, ‘China’s new science of sycophantology’, China Media
Project, 2 1 June 2018.

36 Peter Martin and Alan Crawford, ‘China’s influence digs deep into Europe’s
political landscape’, Bloomberg, 4 April 2019.

37 Martin and Crawford, ‘China’s influence digs deep into f’urope’s political
landscape’.

38 Martin and Crawford, ‘China’s influence digs deep into Europe’s political
landscape’.

39 Martin and Crawford, ‘China’s influence digs deep into Europe’s political
landscape’.

40 See for example, ‘International Conference: “EU-China 2020 Strategic
Agenda for Cooperation’”, <https.7/ww\v.coleurope.eu/events/international-
conference-eu-china-2020-strategic-agenda-cooperation>.

41 <https://www.vsse.be/nl/wat-we-doen/dreigingen/spionage>.

42 Christoph B. Schiltz, Hunderte Spione in Brussel—Vor dem Betreten einiger
Lokale wird gewarnt’, Die Welt, 9 Eebruan- 2019.

307

NOTES TO P. 57

43 <http://wvvvv.chinamission.be/cng/ryrjli/tl636626.htm>,

44 Jorg Diehl and Fidclius Schmid. ‘Ex-Diplomat .soil fUr China spionieff
haben. Der Spiegel, 15 January 2020. Matthew Karnitschnlg, ‘The man at
the center of Brus.sels spy probe’, Politico, 22 January 2020,

45 Alan Crawford and Peter Martin, ‘How Belgium became Europe’s den of
spies and a gateway for China’, Bloomberg, 29 November 2019,

46 ‘Ouzhou Huiyi Ou Zhong youhao xiaozu’ /J'^l

[EU-China Friendship Group of the European Parliament), website of the
EU-China Friendship Association, not dated, <https://web.archivc.org/

web/201 906 l6092022/http://www.eu-cfa.com/lists/OZYHOZYHXH,

html>; Zhang Jie ‘Ouzhou yihui yiyuan zhuli Gai Lin jiangshu ta de

gongzuo gushi’ PeopU’s Daily

Online, 27 March 2014, <https://web.archive.org/web/20191208211535/
http://world.people.com.en/n/20l4/0327/cl002-24756505.html>.

47 Jichang Lulu, ‘Repurposing democracy: the European Parliament China
friendship group’, Sinopsis, 26 November 2019.

48 ‘Ouzhou Huiyi Ou Zhong youhao xiaozu zhuxi: ceng dangmian bochi

Rebiya’ [Chairman

of the EU-China Friendship Group of the European Parliament: I once
refuted Rebiya in person], website of the EU-China Friendship Association,

17 October 2016, <https://web.archive.Org/web/20191020051201/http://

www.eU'cfa.com/detail/218.hrml>; Darren Ennis, ‘EU assembly to consider
Beijing Olympics boycott’, Reuters, 21 March 2008.

49

50

51

52

5.3

‘EU-China Friendship Groups visits Tibet’, China.org.cn, 27 August 2016,
<https://web.archive.org/vveb/20191208211327/http://www.china.org.cn/
china/2016-08/27/content_39179710.htm>.

Daqiong and Palden Nyima, ‘Friendship group praises Tibet after 3-day field
trip’, Chinn Daily, 27 August 2016.

The term used was Mhi'\ . Zhang Xiaofang

‘Ouzhou Huiyi Ou Zhong youhao xiaozu zhuxi: ceng dangmian bochi
Rebiya’ : f.’ '^1 iflRlx/F+Zat^E [Chairmanof

the EU-China Friendship Group of the liuropean Parliament: I once refuted
Rebiya in person], Huanqiuwang, 17 March 2014, <hitp://world.huanqiu.
com/exclusive/2014-03/4909357.html?agi=622>.

Anon., ‘Ceskv' europoslanec na 1 ledvabne siezce’, Sinopsis, 17 May 2019.

Gai Lin in Li Xia, ‘.Spotlight: two-year mark of global community

towards a shared future’, Xinhua, 20 January 2019; <http://vvww.europarl.
europa.eu/meps/en/4556/NlRJ_DEVA/assisiants#mep-card-content>. For
the claim that he became the first EU public servant of Chinese nationality, see
‘Ouzhou yihui Ou Zhong youhao xiaozu zhuxi: ceng dangmian bochi Rebiya’
M It 'I' k U 'b ^ Ai W AX if Huanqiuwang,

17 March 2014, <http://\\'orld.huanqiu.com/exclusive/20l4-03/4909357.
html?agt=622>: <https://tinyurl.com/sel\v'4g3>.

308

NOTES TO PP. 58-59

*>-\ 'C)U7.IU)U huiyi li clc Zhongguo miankong’ (The

Chinese face in the European Parliament], CRI Online, 19 October 2014,
<https://wcb.archivc.org/web/20191208205839/http://ncws.cri.cn/gb/420
7l/20l4/10/19/6891s4732552.htm>. ,

mi r o ’

55 Zhang Jic, Ouzhou yihui yiyuan zhuli Gai Lin jiangshu ta de gongzuo gushi’.

56 Zhang Jie, ‘Ouzhou yihui yiyuan zhuli Gai Lin jiangshu ta de gongzuo gushi’.

57 The ILD and the UFWD are listed on the Friendship Association’s Chinese
website as its ‘partners’, although this is not mentioned on its English site.
The Friendship Association is officially separate from the less transparent
Friendship Group but it is run by some of the same people, including Gai
Lin, <https://web.archive.org/web/20180824075929/http://eu-cfa.com/
lists/HZZZ-01 .html>.

58 On Fluawei, see Martin and Crawford, ‘China’s influence digs deep into
Europe’s political landscape’. On Xinjiang, see <https://www.youtube.com/
watch.'*v=AdWGS-_UHM8>; Zhang Xiaofang, ‘Ouzhou Huiyi Ou Zhong
youhao xiaozu zhuxi’.

59 Zhang Xiaofang, ‘Ouzhou Huiyi Ou Zhong youhao xiaozu’.

60 Yang Yi, ‘Chinese NPC Tibetan delegation visits European Parliament’,
Xinhua, 12 December 2018.

61 Martin and Crawford, ‘China’s influence digs deep into Europe’s political
landscape’.

62 EU-China relations: <https;//www.youtube.com/watch?v=IhLXWznZts4>;
Trade with China: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rTwvtA3ym_o>.
In March 2019 Nirj Deva’s organisation launched the Policy Coordination
Committee of the Belt and Road Initiative in Europe, <https://tinyurl.com/
yx4tgt25>.

63 New China TV (TV channel run by Xinhua News Agency), <https.7/www.
youtube.com/watch?v=aaAWl RVE9mM>.

64 Martin and Crawford, ‘China’s influence digs deep into Europe’s political
landscape’.

65 ‘About’, blog of EU-China Friendship Association, not dated, <https://
web.archive.org/web/2019120821 5049/hitps://euchinala .wordpress.com/
about/>; Zhang Xiaofang, ‘Ouzhou Huiyi Ou Zhong youhao xiaozu’.

66 Zhang Xiaofang, ‘Ouzhou Huiyi Ou Zhong youhao xiaozu zhuxi’.

67 Derek Vaughan has had a number of roles in pro-Beijing groups, such as
honorary president of the EU-China Joint Innovation Centre. ‘Derek
Vaughan zhuxi daibiao Oumeng Zhongguo lianhe chuangxin zhongxin wei
2019 Zhong Ou chengshi Keyan chuangxin chanye fazhan luntan kaimu
zhici’, Derek Vaughan^^ 111'I''LL' J''j2019'| '
^TtJ^4^]f&J0r/^^^^i^iETF=^3E5[Si(’[Chairman Derek Vaughan gives
opening speech on behalf of the EU-China Joint Innovation Center at
the opening of the 2019 China-EU Urban Scientific Innovation Industry

309

notes to PP. 59_g^

68

69

70

71

72

Development Forum], website of EU-Chini loint i

2019, <J^«ps://web.archive.org/wcb/20190827184207^”" ^*7

index.php;id.81>. ■^”“"'“‘'2''2'l'»pd/cn.c„iiic„,g/

Anon., ‘Cesky europoslancc na Hcdvdbn< stezee' Thr f-k-

by Sinopsis can be found at <h«ps://web.a,chive,o;g/v,cb/2T20«;o^^^^^^^^

http://www,zgqt.zj.cn/533764l.html>. 04212113/

Lulu, ‘Repurposing democracy’.

Lulu, ‘Repurposing democracy’, p. 13.

Screenshot of an em^l sent by Deva to prospective participants at .be
European Parliament. The committee is also referenced on the website of the
Chinese Mission to the EU, <https://tinyurl.com/rsj6fd2>.

European Commission, ‘Member States publish a report on EU coordinated
risk assessment of 5G networks security’, European Commission, 9 October
2019.

73 ‘A public debate: sustaining an open global digital ecosystem with Huawei: a
European perspective’, Huawei, 15 Otober 2019, <https://web.archive.org/

web/ 20 191016153007/https://huawei.eu/events/public-debate-huawei>.

74 In Belgium, the parliamentary group has facilitated trips to China for
parliamentarians. ‘Qian Hongshan meets with Belgian multi-party
parliamentarian delegation’, website of the ILD, 18 March 2019, <https://
web.archive.org/web/20191208220359/http://www.idcpc.org.cn/english/
news/201903/t20190322_99883.html>.

75 Alexei Chikhachev, ‘From apprehensions to ambitions: the French approach
to China’, Russian International Affairs Council, 11 April 2019.

76 ‘About us’, website of the All Party Parliamentary China Group, not dated,
<https://web.archive.org/w'eb/20191 208220625/https://appcg.org.uk/

about-us/>.

77 For members, see <https://\N'v.'w.the48groupclub.com/about-the-club/whos-
who/>; for history, see <https://tinyurl.com/uu3wu4d>.

78 li Chaozhu iJ'Ij'lilJwas an interpreter for Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and
Deng Xiaoping. He is the younger brother of Ji Chaoding, mentioned later.
On li Chaozhu see: David Barboza, ‘The Man on Mao’s right, at the center
of history’. The New York Times, 17 February 2012; <http://www.chinese-
embassy.org.uk/eng/ambassador/lrds/trans 1 /1229791 .htm>; Geoffrey Fowler,
'Reunion in Beijing’, Harvard Magazine, undated, <https://harvardmagazine.

coni/2000/01/reunion-in-beijing-html>.

79 <https://www.the48groupclub.com/about-the-club/>; Lord Davidson is
represented on the board of CBBC by Katie Lee of Ensis Strategic.

80 Anon., 'Lord Mayor of London leads fintech delegation to China to promote
trade and investment’, press release. City of London Corporation, 18 March
2019.

81 'Belt and Road report: a guide to UK services (April 2019)’, web¬
site of the China-Britain Business Council, <http://ww%v.cbbc.org/

310

NOTES TO PP. 61-63

hclt-aiKl-road-piiblic:itions-2019/>; <https://appcg.org.uk/about-us/>;
CUUC still hosting meetings with the CCPIT: see ‘Roundtable meeting
with CCPII Xiamen (London)’, <http://www.cbbc.org/events/2019/juiy/

roundtable-mceting-with-ccpit-xiamen-(london)/>.

82 'Xi reiterates China’s commitment to free trade, globalization’, Xinhua,
16 October 2018, <https://web.archive.Org/save/http://www.xinhuanet.
com/english/2018-10/l6/c_137537109.htm>. See also An Baijie and Cao
Desheng, ‘10 foreigners given medals for roles in reform, opening-up’, China
Daily, 19 December 2018.

83 Stephen Perry, ‘China and the world’, website of China Global Impact,
11 June 2019, <https://web.archive.Org/web/20191208221526/https://
chinaglobalimpact.com/2019/06/1 l/china-and-the-world-2/>; Stephen
Perry, ‘New China’, website of China Global Impact, 30 May 2019,
<https://web.archive.org/web/20191208221648/https://chinaglobalimpact.
com/2019/05/30/new-china/>.

84 Stephen Perry, ‘Stephen Perry, Chairman of the 48 Group Club, honoured
as one of ten foreigners who have supported and helped China’s reform
and opening up over the past 40 years’, website of China Global Impact,
24 December 2018, <https://tinyurl.com/tac8to6>.

85 <http://www.chinagoabroad.com/en/expert/dr-robert-lawrence-kuhn>;
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Lawrence_Kuhn>. When in August
2019 Xinhua reported Robert Kuhn calling for the Hong Kong protests
to be shut down, the Party newspaper described him as ‘an American
investment banker and author of a propaganda book eulogizing former
Chinese Communist Party chair Jiang Zemin’, <http://www.xinhuanet.com/
world/2019-08/14/c_l 124876756.htm>.

86 <https://chinaglobalimpact.com/>.

87 <https://chinaglobalimpact.com/>.

88 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PJl507uI lQw>.

89 The clues are all to be found in Tom Buchanan, East Wind: China and the
British leji, 1925-1976, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 156-8.
See also Wen-guang Shao, China, Britain and Businessmen: Political and
commercial relations, 1949-57, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991, pp. 148-9.

90 From a detailed account, published by the Peoples Daily, of the establishment
and early years of the CCPIT. ‘Maoyi xian xing yi min cu guan—Zhou Enlai
zhidao Maocuhui duiwai gongzuo de sixiang yu shijian’

B[d’rade advances first,
using the people to push the officials—thought and practise of how Zhou
Enlai guided the external work of CCPIT], Peoples Daily Online, not dated,
<https://web.archive.org/web/20191208222236/http://www.people.com.
cn/GB/shizheng/8198/9405/34150/2543935.html>.

91 <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP78-
00915R000600210003-9.pdf>, p. 63.

311

NOTES TO PP, 63-64

92

93

94

95

96

97

98

99

100

101

102

103

<https://www.cia.gov/library/rcadi„groom/d„c,/C|A.RI)P7i,

009l5R000600210003-9.pdf> p. 63; 'Chi Cha'„-,i„g’ .n,„ Ha

are listed as committee members, Ji Chaoding it ,he pinyi„ „an,lation
Chi Cha’o-ting

Nan Hanchen (1895-1967). This account is drawn in part from

Jiang Mengying ‘Huode guojia lingdaorcn huijian, Yingguo 48 Jia

jituan julebu you he lai tou’

[What is the origin of the 48 Group Club that revived
a meeting with national leaders?], The Paper, 17 October 2018, <https://
tinyurl.com/s4keutp>.

‘Nan Hanchen’, in Wolfgang Bartke, Who Was Who in the People’s Republic of
China, Miinchen: Saur, 1997, p. 347.

Joseph Needham quoted by Buchanan, East Wind, p. 96. See also this
obituary in The New York Times on 10 August 1963: <https://tinyurl.com/

yxwsky35>, p- 17.

Ch’en Li-fu, The Storm Clouds Clear over China: The memoir of Ch’en Li-fu,
l^00-1993y Sidney Chang and Ramon Myers, eds, Stanford: Hoover
Institution Press, 1994, pp. 181-2.

Peter Mattis and Matthew Brazil, Chinese Communist Espionage: An
intelligence primer, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2019.

Buchanan, East Wind, p. 155-7; <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/
docs/CIA-RDP78-0091 5R0006002 10003-9. pdf>, p. 63. In a now-
declassified telegram of May 1952 to the British embassy in Paris concerning
the Moscow conference, the Foreign Office wrote: ‘We must be careffil
not to let Communist propaganda persuade people to think of economics
a irt from politics and so obscure the real reasons for the limitations upon
East-West tnide’, telegram from UK Foreign Office Northern Department to
Commercial Department, British embassy, Paris, 14 May 1952.

Buch;inan, UTrW, pp. 1 56-7.

On Roland Berger, sec <https://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.Uk/details/r/
CKC8^412>. On Bernard Buckman, see Alan Campbell and John Mcilroy,
‘“ riie Trojan Horse”: Communist entrism in the British Labour Party,
,933_43’, Labor History, March 2018. Berger’s work for the BCPIT was
‘deemed so sensitive by the [British] Communist Party that the career of
his wife Nancy ... was deliberately held back for fear of jeopardizing it’.
Buchanan, East Wind, p. 1 56.

Ming Liu. ‘Buckman collection in spotlight at London auction’, China Daily,
14 November 2016. SOAS offers a Bernard Buckman Fellowship, <https://

www.soas.ac.uk/registry/scholarships/bernard-buckman-scholarship.html>.

<https://hansard.parliament.uk7commons/1953-02-05/debates/c06a6587-

h990-4iS7-a4ef-69ee2efbc909/CouncilForPromotionOfInternational

Trade>.

Buchanan. East Wind, p. 157.

312

NOTES TO PP. 64-67

104 Pave Renton, Fascism, Anti-Fascism and Britain in the 19d0s, Basingstoke:
Macmillan, 2000, p. 96. Jack Perry, who was Jewish, had battled Mosley’s
Blackshirts in the East End in the 1930s and he remained an antifascist
activist. When Perry died he was eulogised in the China Daily: Zhang
Haizhou, ‘Father-and-son team bridged Chinese business with West’, China
Daily, 3 December 2010.

105 See Anon., ‘The rise & fall of Maoism: the English experience’, p. 35, <https://
w'\^'\v.marxists.org/history/erol/uk.firstwave/uk-maoism.pdf>; Buchanan,
East Wind, p. 202.

106 <https://^vww.the48groupclub.com/about-the-club/>.

107 Jin Jing and Gu Zhenqiu, ‘The “icebreaker” who helps bond China with
West’, Xinhua, 23 October 2018.

108 <http.7/en.ccpit.org/info/info_4028811760d8d5d401668610b98301 d2.
html>.

109 Stephen Perry, ‘President Xi and Stephen Perry Meeting—Xi reiterates
China’s commitment to free trade, globalization’, 22 October 2018,
on Perry’s blog <https://chinaglobalimpact.eom/2018/10/22/
president-xi-and-stephen-perry-meeting-xi-reiterates-chinas-commitment-
to-free-trade-globalization/>.

110 Anon., ‘Three generations of British family play important role in warming
China-UK trade relations’. Global Times, 20 October 2015.

111 <https://web.archive.org/web/20191020112028/http://europe.chinadaily.
com.cn/epaper/2010-12/03/content_ 11993942.htm>.

112 <http://www.chinese-cmbassy.org.uk/eng/EmbassyNews/tl6557l4.htm>.

113 <https://web.archive.org/web/201910201 1 3023/http://www.chinese-
embassy.org.uk/eng/EmbassyNews/tl 652772.htm>.

114 See, for example, Cecily Liu, ‘New book explains role China is playing in
global development’, China Daily, 1 1 April 2018.

115 <https://www.amazon.com/Chinas-Role-Shared-Human-Future/
dp/1910334340>.

116 Anon., 'China Global FZdition wins admiration Irom acro.ss the world’,
China Daily, 11 January 2019.

117 <http://wsvw.martinjacques.com/articles7no-time-for-wishful-thinking/>.

118 Interview with Martin Jacques, ‘How to make sense of the Hong Kong
protests?’, CGTN online, 5 July 2019.

119 Ian McGregor organises visits by Chinese diplomats to The Telegraph Media
Group’s offices so that they may put their point of view: see for example

<https://ww^v.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/ceuk/eng/EmbassyNews/tl 677779. htm>.
At a meeting in January 2019 Ambassador Liu praised the The Daily
Telegraph and The Sunday Telegraph for playing a positive role in enhancing
the mutual understanding between China and western countries’, and The
Sunday Telegraph’s editor AUister Heath is reported to have replied that the
two newspapers attach great importance to China-related reports and stay

313

NOTES TO PP. 67-68

committed to covering Chinas development comprehensively to uwtrihufe
to the understanding and cooperation between China and the UK’, <htfp;//

www.chinese-embassy.org.uk/eng/ambassador/dshd/tl6336()6.htm>. The

Telegraph Group has struck a deal with Beijing according to which it revives
£750,000 each year to publish in The Daily Telegraph paid propaganda inserts
supplied by CCP news outlet China Daily. (Louisa Lim and Julia Bergin.
‘Inside China’s audacious global propaganda campaign’, The Guardian,

7 December 2018.)

120 With thanks to Lucrezia Poggetti for helpful comments on this section.

121 Andre Tartar, Mira Rojanasakul and Jeremy Scott Diamond, ‘How China is
buying its way into Europe’, Bloomberg, 23 April 2018.

122 Anon., ‘China, Italy sign BRI MoU to advance connectivity’, China Daily,
23 March 2019.

123 John Follain and Rosalind Mathieson, ‘Italy pivots to China in blow to EU
efforts to keep its distance’, Bloomberg, 5 October 2018.

124 Follain and Mathieson, ‘Italy pivots to China in blow to EU efforts to keep
its distance’. Geraci’s boss, minister of economic development and second
deputy prime minister Luigi Di Maio, leads the Five Star Movement. He has
been a firm supporter of closer ties with China. The BRI was opposed by the
foreign minister, Enzo Moavero Milanesi, and his officials.

125 Stuart Lau, ‘Italian PM Giuseppe Conte ignores US warnings and pushes for
closer cooperation with China’s belt and road plan’. South China Morning
/W, 12 March 2019.

126 Lau, ‘Italian PM Giuseppe Conte ignores US warnings’.

127 Lucrezia Poggetti, ‘Italy’s BRI Blunder’, Project Syndicate, 21 March 2019.

128 Philippe Le Corre wrote: ‘There is a strong possibility that Southern Europe
might become a zone of strong Chinese influence in the future. In an
economically weakened region with rising anti-European sentiment, citizens
might be looking at alternative options’, <https://carnegieendowment.
org/201 8/1 ()/ 30 /this-is-china-s-plan-to-dominate-southern-europe-pub-

77621>.

129 Franvois Godement and AbigaU Vasselier, China at the Gates: A new power
audit ofEU-China relations, London; European Council on Foreign Relations,
2017, p. 112.

130 Franv'ois Godement. ‘Hand-outs and bail-outs: China’s lobbyists in Italy’,
blog post, European Council on Foreign Relations, 12 October 2018.

131 Lucrezia Poggetti, 'Italv charts riskv course with China-friendly policy’, blog
post, Mercator Institute ot China Studies, 1 1 October 2018.

132 <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-655 1 '2019'ADD'2/
en/pdb>.

133 Godement, 'Hand-outs imd bail-outs'; Crispian Balmer, ‘Italy’s drive to join
Chinas Belt and Road hits potholes’, Reuters, 15 March 2019.

134 Giulia Pompili, 'Chi Mise la Cina al governo’, II Foglio, 7 March 2019.

314

NOTES TO PP. 68-70

135 Stuart I^ui, ‘I'hc Sinophilc driving Italy’s hopes of a New Silk Road deal with
China’, South Chinn Morning Post, 16 March 2019.

136 John Follain, ‘Trump’s Huawei threats dismissed in Italian pivot toward
China’, Bloomberg, 19 February 2109.

137 Pompili, ‘Chi Mise la Cina al governo’.

138 <http://www.beppegrillo.it/la-cina-e-il-governo-del-cambiamento/>.

139 Editors, ‘The Chinese panacea?’. Made in China, 19 March 2019.

140 Not all China experts at the University of Nottingham are CCP sympathisers.
Rian Thum, a senior research fellow, wrote in respect of the persecution of
Uyghurs, ‘Xi’s Communist Party is an organization that’s willing to go to
greater extremes of repression than I think any outside observer expected’,
Peter Martin, ‘Inside Xinjiang: a 10-day tour of China’s most repressed state’,
Bloomberg, 25 January 2019.

141 <https://web.archive.Org/web/20190620130525/http://www.globaIthink
tank.org.cn/Director/View.aspx?Id=4964>. See also Jonas Parello-Plesner,
‘The Curious case of Mr. Wang and the United Front’, blog post, Hoover
Institute, 11 May 2018.

142 Lau, ‘The Sinophile driving Italy’s hopes of a New Silk Road deal with
China’.

143 <https://tinyurl.com/rulzryq>; <https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/
italy-china-link-ecco-come-porteremo-investimenti-cinesi-maria-moreni>.

144 Anon., ‘Italy aims to develop closer trade ties with China through Belt and
Road’, China Daily, 16 May 2019.

145 <https://web.archive.org/web/20180819042607/http://agcci.com/trend/
info/772?cid= 19>; https://web.archive.org/web/20190406012753/http:/
agcci.com/style/info/742>.

146 <https.7/web.archive.org/web/20170829042923/http://www.chinaqw.com/
sqjg/2017/08-29/159363.shtml>.

147 Many overseas Chinese are concentrated in the industrial city ot Prato, with
a population of some 50,000 migrants from Cdiina, and many working
in fast fashion factories. A delegation of senior united front officials
visited in July 2019 to ‘promote the unity of overseas Chinese’, <http://
italiapratohuashanghui.com/a/info/2019/0718/424.html>.

148 <https://tinyurl.com/tzxe4wl>.

149 <https://tinyurl.com/tzxe4wl>.

150 <https://web.archive.org/web/20180903040709/http://oborit.org/about-us.
html>.

151 European Commission, EU-China — A strategic outlook, report, 12 March
2019, p. 1.

152 They can be found at <https://tinyurl.com/w22oe57> and <https://tinyurl.
com/ur7bnkx>.

153 Stuart Lau, Italy may be ready to open up four ports to Chinese investment
under Belt and Road Initiative’”, South China Morning Post, 19 March 2019.

315

NOTES TO PP. 71-72

154 <https://tinyurl.com/w22oc57>. Note also collaboration agreement between
private media conglomerate Class Editor! and China Media Group. C\m
Editori will jointly organise events with CMC and broadcast program*
produced by it, <https://tinyurl.com/u4m61dc>.

155 The League is part of Bannon’s coalition of European right-wing parties.
Earlier in March 2019 Bannon met with leaders of the League party and
warned against China’s ‘predatory capitalism’, including the BRI. Jason
Horowitz, ‘Defying allies, Italy signs on to New Silk Road with China, Thr
New York Times, 23 March 2019.

156 Elvira Pollina, ‘Huawei to invest $3.1 billion in Italy but calls for fair policy
on 5G: country CEO’, Reuters, 15 July 2019.

157 Juan Pedro Tomas, ‘Italy will not push emergency legislation on 5G “golden
power”: Report’, RCRWireless News, 19 July 2019. However, PM Conte was
reported to be cooling on the China relationship and making reassuring
comments to Europe. Stuart Lau, ‘Is Italy experiencing buyer’s remorse after
signing up to China’s belt and road scheme?’. South China Morning Post,
30 July 2019.

158 Anon., ‘Cai Mingpo: the financier helping to build bridges between France
and China’, Intelligence Online, 20 May 2019.

159 Bezard’s appointment to Cathay Capital attracted controversy because he
had been a member of the supervisory committee of a state-owned financial
institution involved in making a loan to the company. Laurent Mauduit,
‘Direction du Tresor: le sulfureux pantouflage de Bruno Bezard’, Mediapart,

25 May 2016.

160 Anon., ‘Cai Mingpo’.

161 Anon., ‘Cai Mingpo’.

162 Anon.,‘Cai Mingpo’. , r. ,

163 On united front ties, sec ‘Hubei Shengwei tongzhan fubuzhang Chen

Changhong dao Changjiang Guoji Shanghui diaoyan’

Changhong, vice head of the

United Front Work Department of Hubei Provincial Committee, inspects
the Yangtze River International Chamber of Commerce], Sina, 1 November
2019, <https.7/tinvurl.com/iiqkjct6>. Also see their website <https://tinyurl.
com/uortmoz>. Cai xMingpo is a friend of the renowned New York-based
artist Cai Guo-Qiang, and bankrolled the French publication of the artist’s
book. Cai Guo-C^iang is close to Rupert Murdochs former wife ^X/endi Deng,
who is suspected bv US intelligence—and by her former husband of being a
spy lor the MSS. Graham Ruddick and Nicola Slawson, US officials briefed
Jared Kushner on concerns about Wendi Deng Murdoch , The Guardian,
17 January 2018.

164 Anon., 'Cai Mingpo'.

165 Clive Hamilton, Silent Invasion: China’s influence in Australia, Melbourne:
Hardie Grant Books, 2018, p. 201.

316

NOTES TO PP. 73-74

166 <lutp://\v\\^v.ccibs.cdu/mcclia/ncws/events-visits/l4535>,

167 I be Russian political scientist Alexei Chikhachev has written: ‘Several
former politicians of difl'erent affiliations, including former ministers, are
now employed by Chinese companies, including Jean-Louis Borloo, who
is with Huawei, and Bruno Le Roux, who is with CRRC. Both houses of
the French parliament have France—China friendship groups ... However,
the key vigilantes when it comes to China are not individual politicians, but
some very reputable international experts. President of the French Institute
of International Relations (IFRI) Thierry de Montbrial says that China is
“playing the intra-European controversies,” using a “quasi-imperial” strategy
in its efforts to implement the Belt and Road Initiative and striving to become
the leading world power in the next few decades ... France is extremely wary
of potential Chinese espionage (including, but not limited to, industrial
espionage).’ Alexei Chikhachev, ‘From apprehensions to ambitions: the
French approach to China’, Russian International Affairs Council, 11 April
2019. For CEIBS, see their website, where all three are listed as distinguished
professors.

168 Steven Chase, ‘New Chinese ambassador praises Canadian communist
supporter Isabel Crook, jailed during Cultural Revolution’, The Globe and
Mail, 24 October 2019.

169 Anon., ‘Xi confers highest state honors on individuals ahead of National
Day’, Xinhua, 29 September 2019.

170 Anon., ‘France backs China on Taiwan’, Deutsche Welle, 21 April 2005.

171 Pierre Tiessen and Regis Soubrouillard, La France Made in China: la France
peut-elle resister a la puissance chinoise?, Paris: Michel Lafon, 2019; Philippe
Grangereau, ‘Le petit livre rouge de Raffarin’, Liberation, 'll October 2011.

172 Andrew Moody, ‘Raffarin supports ideas of president’, China Daily, 30 July
2018.

173 Philippe Branche, ‘Comprendre La Chine: questions/reponses a Jean-Pierre
Raffarin’, Forbes, 19 June 2018.

174 ‘France’s former prime minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin joins CEIBS’, website of
CEIBS, 23 February 2018, <https://tinyurl.coin/uxot3vy>.

175 Anon., ‘Cai Mingpo’.

176 Anon., ‘Patrice Cristofini, fondateur du club Paris Shanghai: “rapprocher la
France et la Chine va permettre d’apaiser les tentations protectionnistes’”,
Opinion Internationale, 13 June 2018.

177 On Raffarin’s role in the France China Foundation, see Anon., ‘China-
France meeting of minds calls for continued globalization’, Chinawatch, 19
October 2018; Bruna Bisini, ‘Qui sont les relais de I’influence chinoise en
France?, Le Journal du Dimanche, 30 October 2017. For the foundation’s
partnership with the CPIFA, see <https://tinyurl.com/s4rlf4b>. Raffarin is
also the chairman of Fondation Prospective et Innovation, responsible for a
stream of pro-Beijing books and commentary, along with various seminars

317

Notes to p, 74

and workahopa promoting the BRI, A a,i„a Daily ,cp„„ „„ , ,oi)l 'V,
Uaders Program tour organised by the France China Foundation and CVm
although painful to read, shows how easy it is for the CCP’s united front
operations to draw ‘young leaders’ into the Party’s worldview, with French
young leaders gushing about ‘people-to-people exchanges’ and a ‘community
of shared values’.

178 Diamond and Schell, eds, Chinas Influence & American Interests, p. 12. See
also Robert Fife, Steven Chase and Xiao Xu, ‘Beijing foots bill for Canadian
senators, MPs to visit China’, The Globe and Mail, 1 December 2017; Andrew
Tillett, ‘The new diplomatic dance with Beijing’, Australian Financial Review,
4 November 2018. The twitter hashtag #cpifa provides a useful insight into
the CPIFA’s global influence operations: see <https://twitter.com/hashtag/

CPIFA?src=hashtag_click>.

179 See ‘Partners’, website of the France China Foundation, capture from
26 January 2018, <https://tinyurl.com/wseqw28>.

180 ‘Strategic Committee’, website of the France China Foundation, undated,

<https://tinyurl.com/up8x\'wo>.

181 Anon., ‘In wolves’ clothing’. The Economist, 12 February 2015.

182 On ClTIC’s PLA links, see elsewhere in this book via the index. On Everbrights
PLA link see U.S-China Security Review Commission, documentary annex
to •Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Securiry Review', Washington D.C,

183 wfoHu« Groussa, 'Emmanuel Macron, membre du club des Young

\tzdcrsCh\nd,LeNouvelObservateur,Aku^usi20\9,.

184 CPIFA also sponsors a Young Leaders Program in Australia, <https://twitter.

com/EicluingerM/stacus/983464348671758336>.

185 <https://tinyurl.com/wa8by6z>. Financial supporters include retail gian
Carrefour, high-end jeweller Chau.net, and restauranteur Alain Ducass

186 Di3nd and Schell, eds, Chinas Influence & American Interests,^. l4.

187 The founder of the organisation is said to be Chinese-Frenc usinessman

Hua Bin French name Gerard Houa), <https://tinyurl.com/wa8by6z>.

Hua is a business partner of FINA Group. Anon., Aigle Azur. 1 actionnai

a I’origine du coup de force se dit soutenu par les deux autres , Le igar ,
1 Sepcember 2019.

188 One of the five honorary members is Frances former ambassador to China,
distinguished diplomat Jean-Pierre Lafon, <http://fondation-france'chine.
com/?page_id= 112>. (Directeur du Centre de R&D du Conseil des Affaires
d’Etat.)

189 <https://tinynrl.com/\va8by6z>. To further complicate matters, in 2011
Cathay Capital founded a third foundation with a very similar name,
the France Chine Entreprendre Fondation. It is chaired by Sciences Po
journalism professor, and brother of Cathay Capital s co-founder Edouard

318

NOTES TO PP. 75-77

Moinct, Paul-Henri Moinet. Paul-Henri Moinet Is also the editor of a French
website named Sinocle that promotes closer Sino-French connectivity and
aims to ‘remove the ignorance, prejudice and ideology that distort Europe’s
view of China’. Sinocle publishes endless puff pieces about the wonders of
the BRI, often quoting experts from the Peterson Institute for International
Economics. Its principal purpose seems to be to promote the New Silk Road,

<h ttp://jmof/f. info/en/2019/01/23/>.

190 Johnny Ehrling, ‘China trauert um den “alten Freund” Helmut Schmidt’, Die
Welt, 11 November 2015.

191 Anon., ‘Helmut Schmidt: “Wir sehen China ganz falsch’”, Westdeutsche
Zeitung, 13 April 2008.

192 Helmut Schmidt, Nachbar China: Helmut Schmidt im Gesprdch mit Frank
Sieren, Berlin: Ullstein, 2006.

193 Anon., ‘Altkanzler Schmidt verteidigt Tian’anmen-Massaker’, Welt,
13 September 2012.

194 Helmut Schmidt, Xi Jinping: the governance of China book review’. State
Council Information Office, 25 April 2017.

195 Anon., ‘Fufi gefaRt’, Der Spiegel, 11 June 1984.

196 Sabine Pamperrien, Die China-Versteher und ihre demokratischen Freunde’,
Deutschlandfunk, 3 October 2013.

197 David Charter, Ajigela Merkel benefits as Gerhard Schroder joins Rosneft
board’. The Times, 17 August 2017.

198 Andreas Lorenz, Hugging the panda: Gerhard Schroder opens doors for
German companies in China’, Der Spiegel, 6 November 2009.

199 Nina Trentmann, ‘Ex-Politiker als gut bezahlte Tiiroffjier nach China’, Die
Welt, 12 April 2012.

200 Lorenz, ‘Hugging the panda’.

201 Anon., ‘Keine bohrenden Nachfrageii’, Deutsche Welle, 8 April 2002.

202 Anon., Schroder calls for end to arms embargo against China’, Deutsche
Welle, 2 December 2003.

203 Lorenz, ‘Hugging the panda’.

204 Trentmann, Ex-Politiker als gut bezahlte liiroffner nach China’; Lorenz,
‘Hugging the panda’.

205 Matthias Kamp, ‘Altkanzler Schrbder verteidigt Seidenstraf^en-lnitiative’,
Wiwo, 26 November 2018.

206 Anon., Hamburger China-Konferenz mit Steinmeier und Ex-Kanzler
Schroder’, Business Insider, 20 November 2016.

207 ‘Die Laudatio der Verleihung des “China-Europe Friendship Awards” 2016
an Gerhard Schroder, Gesellschaft fur Deutsch-Chinesische Verstandigung
e.V., 30 March 2017.

208 Kamp, ‘Altkanzler Schroder verteidigt Seidenstrafien-Initiative’.

209 Anon., ‘Scharping: Sachsen mussen in China ihre Nischen suchen’, RND,
TJ November 2017.

319

notes to PP, 77—yg

210 Trentmann, ‘Ex-Politikcr als gut bczahltcluroffncr’.

211 Anon., 'Ludaofu Shacrping—Dcguo zhcngzhijia, Zhoru» k •- .

[Rudolf Scharping—German politician and promoter of Sino-German
cooperation and exchange], Sohu, 27 January 2018, <https: 11 v^vZ'^hu
com/a/2 19447838_99901145>; Zhu Dianyong ‘Wang Guoshcne

huijian Ludaofu Shaerping’ 3^11 [Wang Guoshcng

meets Rudolf Scharping], Henan ribao, 29 September 2018, <https;//
baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id= 1612940937639689321 &wfr=spider&for=pc>.

212 For example, ‘One Belt, One Road: die Neue Seidenstrasse’, <https://www.
bhv-bremen.de/tiding/one-belt-one-road-die-neue-seidenstrasse/>.

213 ‘Chinas neue Rolle in der Welt —die “Road and Belt” Initiative’, 11 July 2018,
<https://www.spdhessensued.de/2018/07/l 1/chinas-neue-rolle-in-der-welt-

die-road-and-belt-initiative/>.

214 ‘Introduction to China Economic Cooperation Center’, CECC, 6 June
2014, <http://en.cecc.net.cn/Detail.aspx?newsId=1026&:TId=44>.

215 See the programs at <https://bri-rsbk.de/de/>.

216 Cathrin Shaer, ‘Huawei can work on German 5G networks: here’s why critics
say that’s a very bad idea’, ZDNet, 16 October 2019.

217 Matthew Miller, ‘China’s HNA charity turns to former German official
for leadership’, Reuters, 14 December 2017; Anon., ‘Who owns HNA,
China’s most aggressive dealmaker?’. Financial Times, 2 June 2017. ‘Hainan
Cihang said it planned to contribute up to $200 million toward charitable
undertakings over the next five years, including $30 million in pledges to
Harvard University, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Calvary

Hospital in New York.’ r.. t-.

218 Anon., ‘Zeichen gegcn US-Eskalacion setzen-IUismngsexporce fur Taiwan
stoppen’, DieLinke, 21 August 2019.

219 Anon.. TrumpsTroibiagd niche unteratul/,en’. Die I.mke, 11 December 2018.

220 Anon., 'Was is, fiir Dicli links. Norberr?', Die Lmke. 9 July 2019.

221 ‘Besorgr liber die Lagc religiose, Minderlieircn in China. Bundestag,

8 May 2019, <https://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/20 9
kw 19-pa-menschenrechte-634964>.

222 Andreas Rinke, ‘Annaherung start Abgrenzung—Neues Netzwerk China-
Briicke’, Reuters, 15 January 2020. See also Torsten Rieke, ‘CSU-Pohtiker
Hans-Peter Friedrich schliigt Briicke zu China’, Handelsblatt, 15 January

2020.

223 Lyndon LaRouche is said co be che author of the most baroque conspiracy
theories ever put into circulation’. Scott McLemee, The LaRouche Youth
Movement’, Inside Higher Ed, 1 July 2007.

224 Anon., ‘Foreign experts applaud China’s development concepts , CCTV
Plus, 16 March 2019; Chen Weihua, 'Identifying with China’, China Dailyy
18 August 2017.

320

NOTES TO PP. 79-82

2*5 IWthuny Allcn-librahimina, ‘Lyndon LaRouche is running a pro-China party
in Germany’, Foreign Policy, 18 September 2017.

226 ‘Movisol conference on BRI in Milan’, <https://tinyurl.com/uo 8 xxvp>;
Anon., ‘Michele Geraci, from professor to Belt and Road player’, Belt &
Road News■> 18 April 2019; Stuart Lau, ‘The Sinophile driving Italy’s hopes
of a New Silk Road deal with China’, South China Morning Post, 16 March
2019.

227 ‘Ambassador Gui Congyou meets with head of the Schiller Institute
in Sweden’, Chinese embassy in Sweden, 26 July 2018, <http://www.
chinaembassy.se/eng/sgxw/tl 5803 l 6 .htm>.

228 ‘About us’, <http://brixsweden.com/what-is-the-brix/?lang=en>.

Chapter 5 Political elites on the periphery

1 Jichang Lulu, Confined discourse management and localised inter¬
actions in the Nordics’, Sinopsis, 22 October 2018. See also Jichang
Lulu’s revealing Twitter thread, <https://twitter.com/jichanglulu/status/
1059542849291726850>.

2 Anon., Prime hdinister Scott Morrison, Victorian Premier Daniel Andrews
clash over China deal’, ABC News online, 7 November 2018.

3 Gay Alcorn, ‘Victorian opposition will make Belt and Road deal with China
public if elected’, The Guardian, 7 November 2018.

4 Nanette Asimov and Rachel Swan, Amid protests, SF board names Chinatown
subway station after Rose Pak’, San Francisco Chronicle, 21 August 2019;
Mark Eades, ‘Beijing-by-the-Bay: China’s hidden Influence in San Francisco’,
Foreign Policy Association, 9 June 2016.

5 Asimov and Swan, Amid protests, SF board names Chinatown subway
station after Rose Pak’.

6 Asimov and Swan, Amid protests, SF board names Chinatown subway
station after Rose Pak’.

7 Lulu, ‘Confined discourse management’.

8 <https://twitter.eom/XHNews/status/ll 63352605420130310 >. See also

the follow-up Xinhua story: Anon., ‘U.S. state, local officials still eye China
opportunities despite trade tensions’, Xinhua, 17 August 2019.

9 <https://tsvitter.eom/XHNews/status/l 163352605420130310>.

10 Phila Siu, US-China trade war may cut Los Angeles’ economic growth
to zero, mayor Eric Garcetti warns during Hong Kong trip’. South China
Morning Post, 1 August 2018.

11 <https://twitter.eom/XHNews/status/l 163352605420130310 >.

12 May Zhou, Ex-Missouri governor: American heartland seeks China relations’,
China Daily, 15 Februars" 2019. Holden endorsed the efficacy of the CCP’s
tactic of use the countr}"side to surround the city’ when he told China Daily.
We are working with cities and states to have them actively involved in this.

I believe that the real changes come from the bonom up, not top down. After

321

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15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

notes to PP. B3-84

all, ail politics are local.’ Kong Wcnzhcnu ‘l-’v
us hemland, China', China Daily, 7 Angus, 1)19,"'” ”

Zhou, ‘Ex-Missouri governor’.

<https://usheartlandchina.org/about>.

Tung is vice-chairm^an of ,hc CPPCC. jeffie Urn and Peace Chiu,

Hong Kong leader Tung Chee-hwa blames liberal studies at secondary kHooU
for encouraging violent protests among young people’. South China Morning
Post, 3 July 2019.

<https://drive.google.eom/file/d/lvwkDkznV3dInH8ULSOdGBickOMpW

W3xF/view>.

<https://efile.fara.gov/ords/f?p= 181:130:6416909505612;:NO::P130_

CNTRY:CH>; Elizabeth Redden, ‘Thanks, but no, thanks: UT Austin says
it will not accept funding from a foundation, Inside Higher Ed, 16 January
2018. CUSEF’s ‘special representative is FredTeng, also the president of the
America China Public Affairs Institute (ACPAI), whose explicit aim is to
establish good relations with individual governors of states so as to encourage
all 50 of them to promote good bilateral trade ties with China. ‘America
China Public Affairs Institute’, Chinese language self-introduction, <https://
tinyurl.com/rybn978>. This statement is only on the Chinese-language
version of the website. Teng is also a council member of the United Front-
linked think tank the Centre for China and Globalization, <https://tinyurl.
com/sbg84zy>, and was honoured to be one of only 35 overseas members to
attend the CPPCC meeting in 2018, <https://tinyurl.com/vvwnqy6>.
Anne-Marie Brady, ^Magic weapons: Chinas political influence activities under
Xi linping, Wilson Center, September 2017.

Jichang Lulu, 'Repurposing democracy: the European Parliament China

friendship cluster', iVrrc/uri, 29 Novemher 2019. , , a

Anne-Marie Brady describes how various mayors in New Zealand were

co-opted by the CPAFFC. See her Magic Weapons, pp. 33-4.

Brady, Magic Weapons, p. 34. . . • i

See <h,tps://tinyiirl.com/iim3dhkm> where it says it organises

tours of China in conjtniction wiih the CPAFEC. See also May Zhou BilaterJ

relationship's benehts celebrated in Houston', Chma Daily, 29 October

<ht,p://n.„chinagarden.org/board-members/>. In 2018 the Houston chapter

of the USCPFA hosted a gala event at which Ed Gonzales, the s eri o
Harris County, which takes in Houston, was made a Friendship Amb^sador
by the CPAFFC. GonzHes heads the third-largest police force in the Unite
States and was a prominent member of the Houston City Council.

<https://\\’ww. cgccusa.org/en/us-china-governors-collab-summit/>.

John Dotson, ‘China explores economic outreach to U.S. states via united
Iront entities’, blog post, /amestown Foundation, 26 June 2019.

Quoted in Dotson, ‘China explores economic outreach to U.S. states via
united front entities’.

322

NOTES TO PP, 84-86

27 Owen Churchill and John Power, 'For US and Chinese regional officials,
economic summit was a chance to heal frayed ties. For the White House, it
rang alarm bells’. South China Morning Post, 9 August 2019.

28 Anon., ‘U.S. state, local officials still eye China opportunities despite trade
tensions’, Xinhua, 17 August 2019.

29 Anon., 'U.S. state, local officials still eye China opportunities despite trade
tensions’.

30 Dotson, 'China explores economic outreach to U.S. states via united front
entities’.

31 Churchill and Power, 'For US and Chinese regional officials, economic
summit was a chance to heal frayed ties’.

32 Quoted by Bill Bishop, Sinocism Newsletter, 30 July 2019. Original article:

Huang Renwei ‘Zhong Mei jinru zhanliie xiangchi jieduan, jiang

chong su daguo pingheng’A

[China and the United States enter a strategic stalemate phase which will
reshape the balance of powers], Guancha, 1 March 2019.

33 Kong Wenzheng and May Zhou, 'China, US city leaders gather’, China
Daily, 18 July 2019.

34 Wenzheng and Zhou, ‘China, US city leaders gather’.

35 Kyle Munson, Glad in Muscatine: what one Chinese businessman and his
millions mean to this Iowa river town’, Des Moines Register, 1 March 2018.

36 Kyle Munson, The rise of the “Iowa mafia” in China, from a governor to Xi’s
“old friends’”, Des Moines Register, 9 November 2017.

37 Munson, The rise of the Iowa mafia ” in China, from a governor to Xi’s “old
friends’”.

38 The CPAFFC sponsored the China International Friendship Cities
Association in 1992, a national civil organisation of the People’s Republic of
China with the status of a legal person, <https://tinyurl.com/wx2w33e>. See
the section headed sister cities seeking’, <https://tinyurl.com/yx5zwtej>.

39 Mike Ferguson, ‘Muscatine woman a friend of China’, Globe Gazette,
21 October 2013. Gary Dvorchak, who as a teenager in 1985 gave up his
bedroom for the visiting Xi to sleep in, was one ol only twelve foreigners
invited to the grand military parade in Beijing to celebrate the seventieth
anniversary of the founding of the PRC. Cate Cadell, ‘A dozen hand-picked
foreigners join China’s parade of soldiers and tanks’, Reuters, 1 October 2019.

40 Rusty Schrader, Lande resigns as director of Iowa Department of Natural
Resources’, Muscatine Gazette, 25 May 2012.

41 Cynthia Beaudette, Water under the bridge: Chinese students visit Muscatine
and put their finger on the pulse of one of America’s main arteries’, Muscatine
Gazette, 23 July 2012.

42 Beimeng Fu, A Chinese businessman wants to turn a small Iowa town into
the Midwest’s China hub’, Buzzfeed News, 3 Januar>^ 2017.

43 Brady, Magic Weapons, p. 34.

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55

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57

58

59

60

61

62

63

64

65

66

f^OTES TO pp, 86^

90

Melissa Nightingale, '$l()0k banquet in W.IP

Form’, Neiv ZeaLmd Herald, 5 April 2018. (^hinc»e Mayoral

Jeremy Nuttall, ‘Chinese government woos lor.l . i- • •

event’. The Tyee, 13 September 2017. 'f'cians with URCM

Observation to author.

Renee Bernard, ‘Delta mayor to boycott l

government’. Citynews, 28 June 2019. ^hine'e

Anon., ’Carried away by communism’. The Ckbe and Mail. 14Sep,ember2«lft
<https://tinyurl.com/uvxxkpc>. ^ ‘'

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xR9287AdGV4>.

Anon., ‘Nanjing Massacre Victims Monument launched in Canada, Xinhua
10 December 2018.

<https://tinyurl.com/rwxzymz>.

Paul Robinson and Emilia Terzon, ‘Taiwan flag design painted over by
council ahead of beef industry event’, ABC News online, 9 May 2018.

Didi Kirsten Tatlow, ‘Mapping China-in-Germany, Sinopsis, 2 October 2019.
Tatlow, ‘Mapping China-in-Germany’.

<https://www.dcw-ev.de/de/partner/ccpit.html>. The United Front links of
the CCPIT are especially conspicuous in New Zealand, <https://tinyurl.com/

qlpflfl>.

Tatlow, ‘Mapping China-in-Germany.

Tatlow, ‘Mapping China-in-Germany.

Tatlow, ‘Mapping China-in-Germany’. The agreement is available at <https://
tinyurl.com/ro84czp>.

‘One Belt One Road Forum 14.5.2017’, <https://tinyurl.com/rugjRvb>.
According to this 2019 post on the Chinese embassy website, <https://
tinyurl.com/we39krd>, Pflug was also a former chair of the German-Chinese
Parliamentary Group of the Bundestag. On China Bridge, see Andreas Rinke,
‘Annaherung start Abgrenzung—Neues Netzwerk China-Brucke’, Reuters,

15 January 2020. , i n

‘]oh.,„nes Pflug wird China-Beauferagter der Scad.’, 22 April 2016, <hctps://

tinyurl.com/ul8zev2>. -,ci \ a u

‘One Belt One Road—Die neue SeidenstraEe’, Rheinmaintv, 29 March

2018, <https://wsvw.youtube.com/watch?v=z6Cg_LMrlas>j Jeffrey Moller,

‘Johannes Pflug: China hat mich friihzeitig eingenommen’, Renmmwang,
28 June 2018, <https://tinyurl.com/u58owqp>.

‘CBND-China Business Network Duisburg’, <http://www.cbnd.de/de/
ueber-uns>.

‘Chinesische Unternehmen setzen weiter auf Nordrhein-Westfalen und
Diisseldorf’, Chinese General Consulate in Diisseldorf, 18 January 2019,

<http://dusseldorf.china-consulate.org/det/xwdt_6/tl630608.htm>.

AnnikaSchulz, ‘Huawei soil Duisburg digitalisieren, TagesspiegL 6 December
2018.

324

NOTES TO PP. 90-92

67 ‘Hiiawci vcrticft Koopcration mit Duisburg, um den deutschen
Industricstandort in cine ncue Smart City zu verwandeln’, Presseportal,
3 September 2018, <https://www.presseportal.de/pm/100745/4051263>.
Both Link and Pflug were interviewed in the March 2019 edition of the
journal of the Chinese Industry and Trade Association in Germany. See
<https://Nvww.cihd.de/de/leistungen/download/Magazin39-D.PDF>.

68 Anon., ‘Was vom Tage ubrig blieb: Huawei mauschelt mit Duisburg und
Cambridge Analytica rettet sich in die Pleite’, Netzpolitik, 18 April 2019.

69 Anon., ‘Chinese Chamber of Commerce opens office in Hamburg’, Hamburg
News, 20 March 2017.

70 ‘40 Jalire Offnungspolitik in China: Prasidentin Veit lobt Beziehungen zur
Volksrepublik’, website of the Chinese consulate in Hamburg, 29 January
2019, <https://tinyurl.com/v2ovou8>.

71 ‘Chinesischer Vize-Ministerprasident Liu He im Rathaus—Chancen fiir
Hamburg durch “Neue SeidenstraEe” von Asien nach Europa’, website of
the Chinese consulate in Hamburg, 27 November 2018, <http://hamburg.
china-consulate.org/det/lgxwldhd/tl 632457.htm>.

72 At least this is what the report written by the Chinese consulate that stands
online, unchallenged, claims, <https://tinyurl.com/yxy5z2o3>.

/3 Lulu, Repurposing democracy’, p. 21—2. See also Olga Lomova, Jichang
Lulu and Martin Hala, ‘Bilateral dialogue with the PRC at both ends:
Czech-Chinese “friendship” extends to social credit’, Sinopsis, 28 July 2019.

74 In Prague, for example. See Manuel Eckert and Richard Turesanyi, ‘Prague
vs. Beijing: estranged sister cities’. The Diplomat, 8 October 2019.

75 Brady, Magic Weapons.

76 Diamond and Schell, eds. Chinas Influence ^American Interests, pp. 20—1.

77 ‘^^*^^ps‘//cn. wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_federal_installations_iii_Maryland>.

78 In 1999, after complaints from Chinese diplomats, the governor of
Maryland rescinded a proclamation honouring Li Hongzhi, exiled leader
of Falun Gong. See Steven Mufson, ‘Falun Gong honors rescinded’. The
Washington Post, 11 December 1999. The mayors of Seattle, Baltimore and
San Francisco followed suit. For USA-China Sister School Association, see

<https://montgomerycountymd.galaxydigital.com/agency/detail/Pagency_
id=7684l#toggle-sidebar>. Rockville, Maryland has a sister-city

relationship with Yilan city in Taiwan, <http://www.rockvillesistercities.
org/wp/>.

79 Len Lazarick, ‘Chinese sister state promoting more trade with Maryland’,
Maryland Reporter, undated.

80 Lazarick, Chinese sister state promoting more trade w'ith Maryland’.

81 <https.//globalmaryland.umd.edu/ofPices/confucius-institute-maryland/
frequently-asked-questions>. For competing views on UM’s Confucius
Institute, see Don Lee, Confucius Institutes: do they improve U.S.-China
ties or harbor spies?’, Los Angeles Times, 23 January 2019.

325

82

83

84

85

86

87

88

89

90

91

92

93

94

95

96

notes to pp,

92-93

Bethany Allcn-Ebrahimian, 'China, Iona arm I

campuses’, Foreign Policy, 7 March 2018 Amerkan

23 May 2017. ’ Pm,

<ht,pst//www.umdrightnow.umd.cdu/newa/univer,i,y-„a,cmcn,-reea,dina.

2017-student-commencement-speaker>. ^ ^

Elizabeth Redden, ‘“A flood to a trickle”? Pence on Maryland’s China
Programs’, Inside Higher Ed, 8 October 2018. Student enrolments from
China have grown rapidly in recent years, reaching 2511 in 2017, making up
48 per cent of all international students and 6.2 per cent of the total student
body, <https;//tinyurl.com/ro5n41e>.

Although not named, the case of Columbia is discussed in Section 2 of
Diamond and Schell, eds, China’s Influence & American Interests.

<https://tinyurl.com/r3eb7ow>.

<https://www.sohu.eom/a/2 1 2396602_24608 1 >; <https://tinyurl.com/
vqfmo5r>.

<https://tinyurl.com/sw7qe29>.

<https://tinyurl.com/r3eb7ow>. ^ ^

Janene Holzberg, ‘Columbia poised to add Chinas Liyang as sister city,

fh!J“iturl'com/vqfl*5t>. Ms Han (^|i¥) has a number of united
r ^ I ni,. She is vice chair of the Chinese Alumni Associations of

G:::t WashX- ( 20.8 » 2020 ). <httpsi//web.atchive.org/web/

20 80902i04155/http://caagw.or8/node/227>, which is active in talen
t! fl <httpsi//tinyutl.com/ufgobj3>. She is also deputy --tary genetJ

lid2o'l l/20i6/l 1-09/1 132.shtn,l>, which is active in Ai^ren cWien^events.

(<httpsi//tinyntl.o,n/l8l4vt,,>t<h.tps.^^^^^^^^^^

Association for China’s Peaceful Unification in Wxshmgton ^

United Front group, <http://archive.today/CauBc>, < P'
todav/YQP6H>. Sun was president of the Hebei Association
Washington. ACM’s president, Wei Dahang, used to work tor CU 1 V a
editor/producer: see <htrp://drchive.rociay/EwV9k>.
<https://tinvurl.com/rejmmex>.

<https://web.archive.org/\veb/20 1 903 11 2237 1 7 /https. //chaowu.org m
chao-\\ai/>.

Information provided by Chinese-American residents of Mai^dand.

326

NOTES TO PP. 94-96

97 He Xiaoliui <https://dnyurI.com/so8sppc>. See also Bethany AJlen-

Ebrahimian, ‘China built an army of influence agents in the U.S.’, Daily
Bfost, 18 July 2018.

98 <https.7/tinyurl.com/y5yhs9ky>.

99 Allen-Ebrahimian writes: ‘Lily Qi, a current Democratic nominee for
Maryland state delegate, described He as “one of those great connectors to
pay attention to local level”’. (Allen-Ebrahimian, ‘China built an army of
influence agents in the U.S.’)

100 See this article on the CCPPNR website: <https://tinyurl.com/so8sppc>.

101 Manuel Eckert and Richard Turesanyi, ‘Prague vs. Beijing: estranged sister
cities’. The Diplomat., 8 October 2019; Stuart Lau, ‘Prague cuts sister-city
ties with Beijing amid “tangible anger” over pro-China policies’. South China
Morning Post, 8 October 2019; Lenka Ponikelska, ‘Beijing takes aim at Prague
after “One-China” dispute deepens’, Bloomberg, 9 October 2019.

102 Holmes Chan, ‘Prague ditches Beijing for Taipei in new sister city deal’, Hong
Kong Free Press, 5 December 2019.

Chapter 6 The Party-corporate conglomerate

1 Bonnie Girard, ‘The real danger of China’s national intelligence law’. The
Diplomat, 23 Febraury 2019.

2 George C. Chen, Le droit, e’est moi: Xi Jinping’s new rule-by-law approach’,
Oxford Human Rights Hub, 26 July 2017.

3 Jennifer Duggan, ‘China targets lawyers in new human rights crackdown’.
The Guardian, 13 July 2015.

4 Anon., ‘Xi stresses CPC leadership of state-owned enterprises’, China'Daily,
12 October 2016.

5 Zhang Lin, ‘Chinese Communist Party needs to curtail its presence in private
businesses’. South China Morning Post, 26 November 2018; ‘China says
foreign firms welcome benefits from internal Communist Party cells’, Reuters,
19 October 2017. Technically, Part)' cells have long been mandated in private
enterprises under Chinese law, but this has been enforced much more tightly
since ca. 2017.

6 In 2016 the respected Caixin finance news group reported on the ‘growing
number of Chinese state-owned enterprises that are merging the two roles’
of chairman and Parry secretary. Lu Bingyang and leng Jing Xuan, ‘Train
manufacturer merges jobs of chairman, parrv secretary’, Caixin, 28 November
2016.

7 ^ang Jiamei and Huang Ge, SOEs to unify Pary, board chairman posts’.
Global Times, 18 December 2016. See also Bingyang and Jing Xuan, ‘Train
manufacturer merges jobs of chairman, parts' secretars"’.

8 Patricia Adversario, Chinas Communist pary wTites itself into company
law’. Financial Times, l4 August 201~.

327

NOTES TO PP. 96-99

9

10

Alexandra Stevenson, 'China’s Communists rewrite the rule* fi
businesses’, The New York Times, 13 Ajji il 2018,

Yi-Zheng Lian, ‘China, the party-corporate compl
12 February 2017.

lex , The New York 'Jimes,

11 John Garnaut, ‘Chinese leader’s family worth a billion’. The Sydney Mornin
Herald, 30 June 2012; Anon., ‘Panama Papers: family of China’s President Xi
implicated’. Straits Times, 4 April 2016.

12 David Barboza and Michael Forsythe, ‘Behind the rise of China’s HNA* the
chairman’s brother’. The New York Times, 27 March 2018.

13 Ting Chen and James Kai-sing Kung, ‘Busting the “Princelings”: the
campaign against corruption in China’s primary land market’. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, vol. 134, no. 1, February 2019, pp. 185-226

14 Minxin Pei, China's Crony Capitalism: The dynamics of regime decay,
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2016.

15 Chua Kong Ho, ‘Huawei founder Ren Zhengfei on why he joined China’s
Communist Party and the People’s Liberation Army’, South China Morning
Post, 16 January 2016.

16 While this claim has been challenged by Huawei in a legal deposition,
Samantha Hoffmann and Elsa Kania have pointed out that the requirement
to assist in intelligence work is consistent across several laws. See Samantha
Hoffmann and Elsa Kania, ‘Huawei and the ambiguity of China’s
intelligence and counter-espionage laws’, ASPI Strategist, 12 September
2018.

17 Lin, ‘Chinese Communist Parry needs to curtail its presence in private
businesses’.

18 Lin, ‘Chinese Communist Parry needs to curtail its presence in private
businesses’.

19 Gwynne Guilford, ‘Jack Ma: mowing down demonstrators in Tiananmen
Square was the “correct decision’”. Quartz, 17 July 2013. On Jack Ma’s

wealth, see <https.7/w\\^v.yorZ»('r.com/profjle/jack-ma/#58d5da4flee4>.

20 Josh Horwitz, ‘China’s annual Communist Parry shindig is welcoming a
handful of new tech tycoons’, Quartz, 5 March 2018.

*.1 Aijun Kharpal, Alibabasjack jMa has been a Communist Party member since
the 19S0s , CNBC online, 27 November 2018.

22 Horwitz, ‘Chinas annual Communist Party shindig is welcoming a handful
of new tech tycoons .

23 Quoted by Elsa Kania, iMuch ado about Huawei (part 2)’, ASPI Strategist,
28 Mar 2018.

24 Greg Levesque, ‘C.hinas evolving economic statecraft’. The Diplomat, 12 April
2017.

*-3 Anon., Ci\il-militarv fusion: the missing link between China’s technological
and military rise'. Council on Foreign Relations, blog post, 29 January 2018.

328

NOTES TO PP. 99-103

26 Doug Palmer, ‘Navarro tells Wall Street “globalist billionaires” to end “shuttle
di|>lomacy” in U.S.-China trade war’, Politico, 9 November 2018. See also
<https.7/www.youtube.com/watch?v=PROpS3U_FlY>.

27 Alexandra Stevenson, Kate Kelly and Keith Bradsher, ‘As Trump’s trade war
mounts, China’s Wall St allies lose clout’. The New York Times, 16 September
2018.

28 Joseph Kahn, ‘China leader concentrates on capitalism in New York’, The
New York Times, 14 April 1999.

29 Stevenson, Kelly and Bradsher, ‘As Trump’s trade war mounts, China’s Wall St
allies lose clout’.

30 Kahn, ‘China leader concentrates on capitalism in New York’.

31 Stevenson, Kelly and Bradsher, ‘As trade war rages, China’s sway over the U.S.
fades’.

32 Josh Rogin, ‘China’s infiltration of U.S. capital markets is a national security
concern’, The Washington Post, 13 June 2019.

33 On the influence of Goldman Sachs in the Obama White House, see Michael
Sainato, ‘Trump continues White House’s Goldman Sachs revolving door
tradition’. The Hill, 12 December 2016.

34 Stevenson, Kelly and Bradsher, ‘As Trump’s trade war mounts, China’s Wall St
allies lose clout’.

35 Personal communication, April 2019.

36 William Stanton, ‘Another PRC sharp power: foreign “friends’”. Global
Taiwan Brief, vol. 3, no. 24, 12 December 2018.

37 Paul Blustein, ‘The untold story of how George W. Bush lost China’, Foreign
Policy, 2 October 2019.

38 Blustein, ‘The untold story of how George W. Bush lost China’.

39 ‘Professor John L. Thornton honored with friendship Award’, Tsinghua SEM,
13 October 2008, <https;//web.archive.org/web/20190824184433/http://
cms.sem.tsinghua.cdu.cn/semcms/News 1/36101 .htni?tempContent=full>.

40 \un Li, Utrry hink just revealed how BlackRock is going to keep growing
at its torrid pace: China’, CNBC, 8 April 2019; James Hatton, ‘Canadian
ambassadors marriage to BlackRock APAC boss raises conflict of interest
concerns’, Mingtiandi, 25 September 2019.

41 Tony Tang Xiaodong, l.inkedln; Anon., Larry kink says BlackRock focused
on onshore presence in China’, Reuters, 8 April 2019.

42 <https://cit}’\vireasia.com/manager/helen-7.hu/d26476>.

43 Barbara Demick, In China, red nobility ” trumps egalitarian ideals’, Los
Angeles Times, 4 March 2013.

44 Da\id Lynch, Jennfler Hughes and \lartin .Arnold, JPMorgan to pay $264m
in penalt)- lor hiring "princelings’”. Financial Times, 18 November 2016.

45 Jessica Silver-Greenberg and Ben Protess, ‘Chinese official made job plea to
JPMorgan Chase chief , The Hew York Times, 9 February 2014.

329

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47

48

49

50

51

52

53

54

55

56

57

58

NOTES TO PP. 103-105

Anon., ‘JP Morgan under scrutiny over hirine of Chinr-t^ .

WSJ’, Reuters, 6 February 2015. ""mtter't v/n;

Gwynn Guilford, ‘JP Morgan isn’t the only big financial firm to have hired
Chinese Communist Party scions’. Quartz, 20 August 2013,

Kris Cheng, “‘Little darlings summer camp”: CY Leung faces fresh questions
over his daughter’s JP Morgan internship’, Hong Kong Free Press, 24 November
2016.

Neil Gough, ‘Former top China JPMorgan banker said to be arrested in Hong
Kong’, The New York Times, 22 May 2014; Wang Duan, ‘Former JPMorgan
executive arrested by HK’s graft fighter’, Caixin, 24 May 2014; Cendrowski,

‘J.P. Morgan’s dealmaker in China steps down’, <https://huecri.wordpress.
com/tag/ fang-fang/ >.

As a postscript, in 2014 Fang Fang was arrested by Hong Kong’s anti-graft
agency. Although some said he had agreed to become a ‘tainted witness’,
spilling the beans on J.P. Morgan’s practice of hiring princelings, a more
plausible explanation may be that he was caught up in a CCP factional
struggle. (Some say he is aligned with former CCP boss Zeng Qinghong,
once aligned with Jiang Zemin and then a backer of Xi Jinping.) Whatever
the reason, it does not seem to have done him much harm. After leaving
J.P. Morgan he set up an investment group. He retains his prestigious role
on the CPPCC and remains a vice chairman of the advisory council of the

Center for China and Globalization. ^

Neil Cough, ‘Top China banker for JPMorgan to retire amid hiring inquiry’.

The New York Times, 15 UATc\^2i)\^. ^

Scott Cendrowski, ‘J.P. Morgan’s dealmaker in China steps down. Whos

next?’, Fortum’, 25 March 2014. i //

Cheng, “‘Little darlings summer camp”’. For Hua Jing Society, see <http://

www.htia-iing.org/defaulr.php>.

For example, <https://www.ntdtv.com/gb/20l4/05/26/al 111869.html>.

Cendrowski. ‘J.P. Morgan’s dealmaker in China steps down’.

<https://archivc.fo/201 9 . 05 . 0 1 -0 1 4840/http:/english.ccg.org.cn/Director/

Member.aspx?ld=1806>. The president of the Centre for China and
Globalization is Wang Huiyao, a senior fellow at Harvard Kennedy School,
and a CCP operative (see also Diamond and Schell, eds, China's Influence
C" American Interests, p. 64). CCG is funded by Ronnie Chan, also a big
Harvard donor. For the CCG’s tight Party links, see Tony Cheung, New
mainland think tank hopes to take “objective” view on Hong Kong issues ,
South Chifui Moiiiing Posty 12 November 2017.

Matt Levine, 'JP Morgan’s mistake was not hiring princelings fast enough ,
Bloombergy 30 December 2013.

G\v>mn Guihord, 'JP Morgan isn’t the only big financial firm to have hired
Chinese Communist Part}' scions’, QiiartZy 20 August 2013.

330

NOTES TO PP. 105-108

59 Its perhaps worth noting that Australia’s former finance minister and prime
minister Paul Keating was appointed to the CDB’s international advisory board
(whose membership included Kissinger and Dominic Barton). He became so
enamoured of Chen Yuan that he wrote the foreword to Chen’s book.

60 In 2011, Chen Xiaodan was courting Li Wangzhi, the son of Bo Xilai, a
potential ‘royal marriage’ (Peter Foster, ‘Photos leaked online fuel rumours of
romance between China’s red royals’. The Telegraph, 21 February 2011). Both
studied at Harvard. Bo Guagua went from Harrow to Oxford to Harvard and
drove a red Ferrari.

61 James Follows, ‘Internship at a Chinese bank? Only if you go to Harvard or
MIT’, The Atlantic, 20 February 2011.

62 Anon., ‘Heirs of Mao’s comrades rise as new capitalist nobility’, Bloomberg,
27 December 2012.

63 Edward Wong and Amy Qin, ‘Son of fallen Chinese official enrolls at
Columbia Law School’, The New York Times, 29 July 2013.

64 ‘Headhunter Tan says market knowledge and communication skills now
trump family connections when young mainland graduates apply to global
banks’, <https;//news.efinancialcareers.com/au-en/318785/finance-job-
princeling-asia>.

65 Michael Forsythe, David Enrich and Alexandra Stevenson, ‘Inside a brazen
scheme to woo China: gifts, golf and a $4,254 wine’. The New York Times,
14 October 2019.

66 Levine, ‘JP Morgan’s mistake was not hiring princelings fast enough’.

67 Forsythe, Enrich and Stevenson, ‘Inside a brazen scheme to woo China’.

68 Forsythe, Enrich and Stevenson, ‘Inside a brazen scheme to woo China’;
Anon., ‘Wang Xisha, daughter of Chinese vice premier Wang Yang; the
couple’s extravagant lifestyle has frequently caught the attention of Hong
Kong’s paparazzi and tabloids’. Bamboo Innovator, 23 June 2014.

69 Matt Robinson and Patricia Hurtado, ‘Credit Suisse to pay $77 million to
settle princeling probes’, Bloomberg, 6 July 2018.

70 Robinson and Hurtado, ‘Credit Suisse to pay $77 million to settle princeling
probes’.

71 Ale.\andra Rogers, City Corporation slammed for decision to ban laiwan
float from Lord Mayor’s show’, City A.M., 14 May 2019.

72 Wieland Wigner, Exchange rates and reserve currencies: China plans path to
economic hegemony’, Der Spiegel, 26 January 2011.

73 Martin Thorley, Shadow play: elite Chinese state influence strategies and the

internationalisation’, Parts 1 and 2, Asia Dialogue, 19 July

niiij^ currenev. the rise of the Renminbi’, Brookings website,
eld on Nosember 2016, <https://\s'wsv.brookings.edu/events/

gaintng-currenc)^-the-rise-of-the-renminbi- 2 />.

331

NOTES TO PP. 108-111

75 Anon., eds., Currency Internationalization and Macro I'inancial Hltk CjmiTfl

International Monetary Institute, London: Palgravc, 2018, ’

76 See <https://tinyurl.com/u4e2bc3 and https://tinyurl.com/vn4wqn3>.

77 <https:// twitter.com/OMFIF/status/1012246109413134336>,

78 <https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/2014-05-07/debatcs/140507960(X>3f)4/
ChinaInvestmentIntoTheUnitedKingdom>,

79 Quoted by Thorley, ‘Shadow play.

80 Nikou Asgari, ‘City of London cements dominance of renminbi trading’,
Financial Times, 17 April 2019.

81 Anne Peters, ‘Human rights a la Chinoise: impressions from the 6th Human
Rights Forum in Beijing on the eve of the second UPR of China, Part IP, blog
of the European Journal of International Law, 24 September 2013, <https;//

tinyurl.com/w49glern>.

82 Anon., ‘British Labour MP criticized for role in Chinas Tibet propaganda’,
Tibetan Review, 16 August 2014.

83 <https://www.theyworkforyou.com/lords/?id=2018-l l-01b.l428.2>.

84 Lord Woolf of Barnes, former Lord Chief Justice and chairman of the Bank of
England Financial Markets Law Committee, is also a fellow of the 48 Group

Club.

85 <https://www.parliament.uk/biographies/lords/lord-davidson-of-glen'clova/
3781 /register-of-interests>.

86 <https://www.berggruen.org/work/bcrggrucn-china-center/>.

87 Anon., ‘Lord Mayor of London leads fintech delegation to China to promote
trade and investment’, press release, Cit)' of London Corporation, 18 March
2019.

88 <https;//www.youtubc.com/waich?v=IrAz-lQDrAo>, minute 2.00 and

19.30.

89 Anon., ‘Lord Mayor of Ixmdon leads fintcch delegation to China to promote
trade and investment’.

90 Anon., 'China Daily Global Edition wins admiration from across the world’,
China Daily, 11 January 2019.

91 <littps://sgc.frankfurt-school.de/>; Zhou Wa, ‘Giving currency to yuan’s
spread’, China Daily, 2 October 2015.

92 Mark Sobel has written for the journal Shenglin edits, the International
Monetary Review (see the January 2019 issue).

93 Ben Moshinsky, 'TerriE'ing highlights from Ray Dalio’s note on the China
bubble'. Business Insider, 24 July 2015.

94 Alicia Gonzales, “‘China is dealing with a heart transplant,” says Bridgewater
head , El Pais, 26 .August 2015.

95 Alan Cheng, How Ray Dalio broke into China’, Institutional Investor,
18 December 2017.

96 Amanda Cantrell, Ray Dalio is worried about markets—but bullish on
C\\\nA, Institutional Investor, 15 November 2018.

332

NOTES TO PP. 111-114

97 Linctrc Lopez. 'Its time to stop listening to Ray Dalio on China, Institutional
Imrstor, 4 January 2019.

98 Cheng, 'How Ray Dalio broke into China’.

99 Samuel Wiide, ‘Minitruc: rules on stock-market reporting’, China Digital
Units, 9 July 2015.

100 Amie Tsang, ‘Caijing journalist’s shaming signals China’s growing control
over news media’, The New York Times, 6 September 2015.

101 PEN America, Darkened screen: constraints on foreign journalists in China’,
PEN America, 22 September 2016.

102 Based on discussions with financial market experts.

103 Anon., ‘UBS is curbing some China travel after banker detained’, Bloomberg,
20 October 2018.

104 Anon., ‘UBS is curbing some China travel after banker detained’.

105 Anon., ‘Lone analyst who cut Cathay to sell says he faces huge pressure’,
Straits Times, 23 August 2019.

106 Anon., ‘Lone analyst who cut Cathay to sell says he faces huge pressure’.

107 John Pomfret, ‘What America didn’t anticipate about China’, The Atlantic,
16 October 2019.

108 Brian Stelter, ‘ESPN faces criticism over its coverage of Hong Kong tweet
and the NBA’, CNN Business, 9 October 2019; Alex Lindner, ‘ESPN uses
map of China complete with nine-dash line, Taiwan, and Arunachal Pradesh’,
Shanghaiist, 10 October 2019.

109 Anon., ‘China takes a bite out of Apple privacy claims’, Deutsche Welle,
28 February 2018.

110 Frank Tang, ‘Apple CEO Tim Cook joins infiueniial Beijing university board
as company’s China woes continue’. South China Morning Post, 21 October
2019.

111 Martin Hala and Jichang Lulu, ‘1 he CCP’s model of social control goes
global’, Sinopsis, 20 December 2018.

112 <https://tariffshurt.com/>.

113 Scott Reeves, Tiriffs hurt “heartland” companies, letter says’, China Daily,
15 June 2019.

114 <https://tinyuri.com/w7hjs87>; Bethany Allen-l^brahimian, ‘Meet the U.S.
officials now in China’s sphere of influence’. Daily Beast, 23 July 2018.

115 Moritz Koch, Dietmar Neuerer and Stephan Scheuer, ‘Merkel offnet
5G-Netz liir Hiiawei [Merkel opens 5G nerwork for Huawei], Hanclelsblatt,
14 October 2019.

116 The Peoples Republic of China is again Germany’s main trading partner’,
German Federal Office of Statistics, <https://tinyurl.com/rco2uvo>; Mu

Xueqian, China remains Germanys most important trading partner’,
Xinhiuiy 18 Februan' 2019.

117 Ehsa Simantke, Harald Schuhmann and Nico Schmidt, ‘Wie gefahrlich

ina ur Europa wirkltch ist', Tagesspiegel, 15 September 2019. See also

333

NOTES TO PP. 114-116

<https.7/www.euronews.com/2019/04/09/bci-ching-tlic-figurcs-bchind-thc-

eu-s-tracle-with-china>.

118 See for example Matthias Breitinger and Zacharias Zacharakis, ‘Auto Macht
Deutschland’, Die Zeit, 24 July 2017; Martin Sciwert and Stefan Rcccius, ‘So
abhangig ist Deutschland von der Autoindustrie’, Wirtschaftswoche, 27 July
2017.

119 Anon., ‘VW, BMW und Daimler wachsen in China gegen den Trend’,

Manager Magazin, \0 YthTxizty 20\^.

120 ‘Weekly brief: BMW’s latest kowtow chasing Chinese driverless cash’,
TU-Automotive, 22 July 2019, <l^ttps://www.tu-auto.com/weckly-bricf-
bmws-latest-kowtow-chasing-chinese-driverless-cash/>.

121 Tim Bartz et al., ‘China pressures foreign companies to fall in line on protests’
Der Speigel online, 28 August 2019.

122 Interview with Robin Brant, ‘VW boss “not aware” of China’s detention
camps’, BBC News online (video), 16 April 2019.

123 Joe McDonald, ‘Mercedes-Benz apologises to China for quoting Dalai Uma
on Instagram’, The Independent, 6 February 2018.

124 Anon., ‘Audi apologizes for inaccurate China map’. Global Times 16 March
2017.

125 Gerhard Hegmann, ‘Siemens-Chef warnt davor. Chinas Fuhrung zu
kritisieren’. Welt, 8 September 2019.

126 ‘Siemens embraces Belt and Road Initiative’, Siemens website, 6 June 2018
<https://tinyurl.com/tfsw8ff>.

127 Anon., ‘Merkel will fricdliche Losung fiir Hongkong’, Frankfurter Rundschau,
8 September 2019.

128 ‘About APA’, <https://w'v.'\v.asicn-pazifik-ausschuss.de/en/about-apa>.

129 Julian Ropeke, 'China-Lobbyisten fordern Fndc dcutscher Werte-Politik’
7^/7^, 19 March 2019.

130 Author’s personal experience.

131 Andrew Chatzky and James McBride. ‘China’s Massive Belt and Road
Initiative’, Backgrounder, Council on Foreign Relations, 21 May 2019; see
also <https://tinyurl.com/r9ygvx2>.

132 Chatzky and McBride, ‘China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative’.

133 Raissa Robles, ‘China can turn olfthe Philippine national power grid, officials
say’. South China Morning Post, 20 November 2019.

134 Hamilton, SV/cwrpp. 121, 159.

135 Anon., ‘.As Trump bashed China, he sought deals with its government-owned
energ\’ firm State Grid’, South China Morning Post, 18 October 2016.

136 Andre Tartar, .Mira Rojanas.akul and Jeremy Scott Diamond, ‘How China is
buying its way into Europe’, Bloomberg, 23 April 2018.

137 Ronald Linden, ‘The new sea people: China in the Mediterranean’, lAI
Papers IS. Istuto .Aifari Internazionali, July 2018.

334

NOTES TO PP. 117-118

U'8

Irtriar, Rojanasakul and Scott Diamond,
Europe’.

‘How China is buying its way into

13*) Devin I home and Ben Spevack, ‘Harbored ambitions: how China’s port
Investments arc strategically reshaping the Indo-Pacific’, C4ADS, 2017, p. 4.

140 Quoted by Thorne and Spevack, ‘Harbored ambitions’, p. 19.

141 <https://iias.asia/the-newsletter/article/one-belt-one-road-chinas-
rcconstruction-global-communication-international> (Xiang Debao S )

142 See Nad^ge Rolland, ‘Beijing’s vision for a reshaped international order’,
China Brief, vol. 18, no. 3 {Jamestown Foundation), 26 February 2018.

143 Jing Xin and Donald Matheson, ‘One Belt, competing metaphors; the
struggle over strategic narrative in English-language news media’, International
Journal of Communication, no. 12, 2018, pp. 4248-68. The CCP’s ‘Culture
Going Global’ strategy is also tied into the BRI. As Party theorists put it in
2015, ‘the consensus on culture [that is, global acceptance of CCP values]
is the foundation for the BRI’. Anon., ‘Direction and aspects of the culture
industry’s development in BRI’, China Economy, 28 March 2015.

144 Haoguang Liang and Yaojun Zhang, ‘International discourse power: Belt and
Road is not starting from “scratch”’, in Anon., eds. The Theoretical System of
Belt and Road Initiative, Singapore: Springer, 2019, p. 52.

145 In a study of foreign media reporting of the BRI, Jing Xin and Donald
Matheson found that it often relies on metaphors of ‘vision’ and ‘dream’ to
describe the larger meaning of BRI in the world. While Pakistani media tend
to use phrases like ‘game changer’, ‘economic catalyst’ and ‘a new wave of
globalization’, India’s media are more likely to deploy the negative imagery
of ‘colonialism’ and ‘Trojan horse’. So, world media both reproduce Party
discourse and undermine it. Chinese-language media abroad mostly follow
three scripts: China as a historical victim committed to peaceful development,
the China Dream’ of returning to strength and sell-confidence, and ‘a new,
more collaborative style of great-power relations, in contrast to cold war
thinking . Xin and Matheson, ‘One Belt, competing metaphors’.

146 And to developing the sister-cit}' networks and people-to-people exchanges’.

( Belt and Road, here is the Italy and China memorandum ol understanding’,
Affaritaliani.it, 12 March 2019, <https://tinyurl.com/c|m8yeno>. Italy’s
accession to the BRI was welcomed enthusiastically by the Schiller Institute.
‘In an interview with Chinese journalists, Italian President Mattarella spoke
at length about the ancient bonds between Italy and China and the future
perspective lor cooperation’, <https://tinyurl.com/s3'/.h.39H>.

147 Dan Harrison, Victorian government releases agreement with China on Belt
and Road Initiative’, ABC News online, 12 November 2018.

148 ‘Joint communique of the leaders’ roundtable of the 2nd Belt and Road
Forum for International Cooperation, 27 April 2019, <https;//tinyurl.com/
qmn2fm8>.

335

notes to pp.

119-126

cnapter

1

5

James Jiann Hua To. •

Leiden: Koninklijke Brill,

.mportanc changer to united front "ructut« a„d o„ *""«

wrote his book. operations since James To

Matcel Angliviel de la Beauntellc, 'The United Front w, k n
magic weapon at home and abroad’ Chinn Rr- cn ^ ^ ^^^'pattmenf;
16 July 2017. * (J^^estown foundation).

To, Qiaowu.

James Kynge, Lucy Hornby and Jamil Anderlini ‘Inside ri,: '

weapon” for worldwide influence, Financial Tin,., 26 October X
To, Qiaowu, p. 188.

James To, 'Beijings policies for managing Han and ethnic-minority Chinese
communities abroad', Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, no. 4, 2012,
pp. 186-87.

7 Groot, ‘The expansion of the United Front under Xi Jinping’, p. 169.

8 For example, companies are threatened with loss of business in China and
official displeasure unless they withdraw advertising from Chinese-language
media that do not bend to Beijing’s will.

9 To, Qiaowu, p. 189.

10 <https://tinyurl.com/u24p6ud>.

11 <http://www.upholdjustice.Org/nodc/181#reportl81_24>; ‘Quan guo
Qiaoban zhuren huiyi jingshen chuanda tigang’

J/f [Main message from the directors’ meeting of China’s Overseas

Office], Chongqing Overseas Chinese Affairs website, 5 April 2007, <https://
tinyiirl.com/tfz5zfa>.

12 ‘(^uan guo Qiaoban zhuren huiyi jingshen chuanda tigang’ (paragraph 7).

13 With (hanks to Alex joske for advice on the chart.

14 joske, ‘'Fhe Party speaks for you’.

I 5 <lutps://web.archive.org/web/20 I 10801030857/http://www.gdsy.com.cn/
new7.1um>.

16 (.Quoted in <li( (p.7/ww\v. uphold just ice.org/sites/default/files/201709/
record/2()()H/18I-repori_a4_rcport.pdf>. See also Anne-Marie Brady, ‘On
the correct use of terms’, China Hric-J, vol. 19, no. 9, 9 May 2019.

17 jichang Lulu, ‘Repurposing democracy: the Furopean Parliament China
Iriendshiii cluster’, Sinopsis, 26 November 2019, p. 21, nl05.

18 ' The chiklren ol two other C,(.P grandees, (.hen Yi and Chen Yun, have also
held CdV\l-FC' posts. Lulu, ‘Repurposing democracy’, nl04.

19 16, Qiaowu, p. 76. ()iaowu work is a subset of UFWI ) work because it is limited
to intluencing ethnic Cdiinese, while united front work has a much broader

audience. (Officially, qiaouni policies and directives come from the OCAO.

20 .‘\lex joske. Reorganizing the United Front Work Department: new structures
for a new era of diaspora and religious affairs work’, China Brief, vol. 19,

336

notes to PP. 126—128

21

A. 4.

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

31

32

33

34

35

36

no. 9 (Jamestown Foundation), 9 May 2019. Joskc notes that some OCAO
staff were redeployed to AFROC or CPPCC positions.

For Australia, they are detailed in Clive Hamilton and Alex Joske, ‘Submission
to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security’,
22 January 2018, Submission No. 20 at <https://tinyurl.com/yd922bwz>.
Wei qiao^fuwu xingdong nian quanmian luoshi ba xiang huiqiao jihua’

^ [Action year for serving overseas

Chinese; fully implement the eight plans for benefiting overseas Chinese],
website of the Chinese government, 2 March 2015, <https://tinyurl.com/
)'x554pfv>.

Joske, ‘Reorganizing the United Front Work Department’.
<https://twitter.eom/geoflF_p_wade/status/l 116480563613851648>.
<https://tinyurl.com/s2ccyp6>.

<http://www.ejinsight.eom/20140805-chinese-french-citizenship/>. Some
500 people from China have obtained French citizenship this way. It’s

especially popular for young people from the city of Wenzhou. The first to
take this route was a student from Wenzhou on the advice of his professor at
the University of Paris 3 in 1979.

<https://www. youtube.com/warch i’v=NoWc3tEGuu4>.
<http://news.66wz.com/system/2015/04/02/10440428 l.shtml>.

‘Yingguo huaren laobing lianyihui Lundun “ba yi” da juhui’

Huashangbao, 1 August 2016, <http://archive.
today/BK0uo>. See also <https://tinyurl.corn/racdqwu>.

Tom Blackwell, ‘Canadian veterans of People’s liberation Army form
association, sing of China’s martial glory’, National Post, 30 October 2019.
<https://archive.today/wwuhs>. I

{[[/!</; <https://tinyurl.com/qom8evp>. Sec also Cl ive Hamilton,
Silent Invasion, p. 248.

<https://twitter.com/Annc_MarieBrad)7status/1 1 16473692345786370>;
<https://twitter.eom/xmyhm/status/l 1 1 5504 14 1 999022{)80>; <https://
nvitter.com/geoff'_p_wade/status/1 116480563613851648?lang=en>.

Cary Huang, ‘83 Chinese billionaires members of NPC and CPPCC:
Hurun, South China Morning Post, 8 March 2013. A more up-to-date figure
is not available.

Diamond and Schell, eds, China’s Injluence CT American Interests, p. 34.

^1'Niil'A?iif/fIjfel'L''17Jfl’JIHJII/}; see ‘I.iexi jinnian quango zhengxie
huiyi de 35 ming haiwai qiaobao dou you shc-i.^*’

website of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office,

3 March 2018, <http;//web.archive.org/web/20190803225827/http://www.
gqb.gov.cn/news/2018/0303/44447.shtml>.

John Dotson, The United Front Work Department goes global: the
worldwide expansion of the Council for the Promotion of the Peaceful
Reunification of China, Chimt Brief, vol. 19, no. 9, 9 May 2019.

337

^otes To

PP. 129^131

37

38

Dan Conifer and Stephanie Boryr ■*, ,

political donor Huano Y: ^ denip. i •

Aitn-r online, 6 April 2019“"®''’° PermariemTV"

For examole. Yancr r, /f

/in'.

39

40

41

42

43

44

45

46

For example, Yang Wentian of the Phn • ^

York City CPPRC. See 3'lJ/te-^lhliSf/'

fii<http://web.archive.org/web/20l9080^^^^^^^^

m <https://tinyurl.com/vo9y8nm>.

‘Ouzhou Zhongguo heping tongyi cuiinhi • u-

of appeal to all Chinese compatriots in Europe from rh P ^ ^ ^
for the Peacefirl Reunification of China], Qiaowang. H

wvm.chinaqw.com/hqhr/2019/05-14/222686.shtml> ^ <nttp://

Mark Eades, ‘Chinese governmenr front groups act in violation of U S I '
blog post, Foreign Policy Association, 9 May 2016. • • aw,

Eades, ‘Chinese government front groups act in violation of U.S. law’-
<https://tinyurl.com/qrhw5et>. ’

Benjamin Haas, “‘Think of your family”: China threatens European citizens
over Xinjiang protests’. The Guardian, 18 October 2019.

Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, ‘Chinese police are demanding personal
information from Uighurs in France’, Foreign Policy, 2 March 2018. For
Belgium, see Tim Nicholas Riihlig, Bjorn Jerden, Frans-Paul van der Putten,
John Seaman, Miguel Otero-Iglesias and Alice Ekman, eds, ‘Political values
in Europe-China relations’, report by the European Think-tank Network on
China (ETNC), December 2018, pp. 25-6.

<https://ww\v. rfa.org/cnglish/news/uyghur/threats-02272018150624.html>.
Paul Mooney and David Lague, ‘The price of dissent: holding the fate of
families in its hands, China controls refugees abroad’, Reuters, 30 December

2015.

Steve Chao and l.iz Gooch, ‘No escape: the fearful life of China’s exiled
klissitleius’, AlJazeera, 9 April 2018.

47 C'hao and Ciooch, No escape .

48 <https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/101 east/2018/04/chma-spies-hes-
blackmail-180404 145244034.html>.

40 <lutps://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/germany-agents-09132019l42817.

htnil>.

50 Didi Kirsten Tatlow, ‘Datenkolonialismus. Chinas Angriff auf die offene
Gesellschalt. Zentrufn Liherale Aloderne, 25 September 2018.

51 Camron Slessor, Claire Campbell and Daniel Keane, Fake Chinese police
cars spotted in Perth and Adelaide amid pro-Hong Kong rallies, ABC News
online, 19 August 2019.

52 In August 2004 the Chinese consulate in New York posted an article about
huaren canzFeng in the US. <http://archi\'e.today/2019.09.21-073907/

338

NOTES TO PP. 131-133

Iutps://mv\v.fmprc.gov.cii/cc/cgny/chn/lsyw/qwgz/tl47027.htin>. An article
about huaren appeared in the same year in Canada, <http://archive.

n)day/2019.09.21 -074432/http://goabroad.xdf.cn/200406/18502.html>.

5v^ For Canada, see for example Tom Blackwell, ‘MPP’s ties to China raise
questions about how close Canadian politicians should get to foreign powers’.
National Post, 6 September 2019. For New Zealand, see for example Tom
Phillips, ‘China-born New Zealand MP denies being a spy’. The Guardian,
13 September 2017. For Australia, see Anon., ‘ASIO identifies political
candidates with links to China’, SBS News, 9 December 2017; Wai Ling
Yeung and Clive Hamilton, ‘How Beijing is shaping politics in Western
Australia’, China Brief, vol. 19, no. 9, 9 May 2019; Clive Hamilton, ‘Why
Gladys Liu must answer to parliament about alleged links to the Chinese
government’, The Conversation, 11 September 2019. In the United States, the
Coordination Council of Chinese America Associations has organised many
huaren canzheng events. One example (in English) is at <https://web.archive.
org/web/20171111051835/http://www.cccaa.org/ch/inusa/election_5.
aspx>.

54 <https://tzb.jnu.edu.cn/f4/18/c5573al28024/page.htm>, Jinan University
United Front Department, 5 May 2010.

55 Xue Qingchao ‘Di jiu zhang: Mao Zedong “shuai shitou”, “can

shazi”, “wa qiangjiao’”

1^”, Peoples Daily Online, 29 October 2013, part 1, <https://tinyurl.com/
vgufwzw> and part 3, <https://tinyurl.com/tdac338>.

56 The claim that it is most advanced in Canada is our judgement, based on
close study.

57 Tom Igguldon, ‘Questions raised about Liberal MP Gladys Liu amid
claims of links to Chinese political infiuence operations’, ABC News online,
9 September 2019; Hamilton, ‘Why Gladys I -iu must answer to parliament
about alleged links to the Chinese government’.

58 Dan Oakes, Gladys Lius Liberal Party branch called to relax loreign
investment laws before she became federal MP’, /1//C’ Netvs online,
14 September 2019.

59 Rob Harris, Morrison defends great Australian” Gladys Liu against “smear”’.
The Sydney Morning Herald, 1 2 September 20 19 .

60 Nick McKenzie, Paul Sakkal and Grace lobin, ‘China tried to plant its
candidate in federal parliament, authorities believe’. The Age, 24 November
2019.

61 Yeung and Hamilton, ‘How Beijing is shaping politics in Western Australia’.

62 <https://web.archive.Org/web/20190921222515/https://world.huanqiu.
com/article/9CaKrnK5dp9>, Association des Chinois Residant en France

63 <l>tcp://archive.today/2019.09.:i-225007/http;//news.66wz.com/sysiem/
2018/09/06/105111657.shtml>.

339

notes to PP, 133-135

64 The COEA’s member organisations/provincial cli

website: <h«ps-//web.archlve.org/web/20190l I *‘*“^‘* Ott ifi

org.cn/xhgg/xhgg.d.html?nid=19>.

66

67

68

69

^cprojcct.or^

:hctp://archive.today/ 2019 . 04 . 06 - 004 l 52 /l,rr«.//

news/2018/0504/44842.shtml>.

<https://web.archive.org/web/20161203100337/h nn.//

about/#history>, Christine Lee ^ m.

Hamilton and Joske, ‘Submission to the Parliamentary loinr n
Intelligence and Security’, p. 27. ^nnttcc on

Lee’s website: <https://tinyurl.com/s5neovh>. See also bio at <htrn,.//.- i
com/vcze47o>. Christine Lee on YouTube (in English) <hrr '

youtube.com/watch.^v=piezUzwS3Hk>. ’ P*"

<https://web.archive.Org/web/20171009000710/http://uk peoole com cn/

GB/370630/370680/index.html>. ^ '

70 Hannah McGrath and Oliver Wright, ‘Money, influence and the Beijing
connection’. The Times, 4 February 2017.

71 <https.7/web.archive.org/web/20190405083748/http://www.bcproject.

org/michael-wilkes/>. Michael Wilkes on YouTube: <https://www.youtube.
com/watch.V=GEDeOioavdE>. This news story details Michael Wilkes’s
involvement in the British Chinese Project: <http://qwgzyj.gqb.gov.cn/
qjxy/187/2742.shtml>.

72 McGrath and Wright, ‘Money, influence and the Beijing connection’.

73 <htrps://web.archive.org/web/20181211111940/https://wvm.chinesefor

labour.org/cxccutive_commitrcc>.

74 Hu Yang, ‘UK law firm opens office in Beijing’, China Daily, 19 November
2011. Also, according to China Daily. ‘Ixx, an influential and active figure in
the Chinese comniiinit)'in the UK, ischicflegal advisor to the Chinese Embassy
in (he United Kingdom. Working with Chinese government departments, she
has made great efforts in promoting the rights of Chinese in the UK.’The firm
is also one of the legal experts recommended to overseas enterprises by the UK
Trade and Investment government agency. In 2001, China Daily znnoxxnccA
the opening of'an office ofTxe’s law firm in Beijing. On Lee’s legal services for
the OCAO aiul her meeting with senior OCAO officials, see <http://archive.
today/MM|Sa> and <https.7/tinyurl.com/v8rvjss>.

75 <http.7/archive.toda\720 1 9.09.2 1-1 1 3520/http://www.ihuawen.com/
article/inde.\/id/42470/cid/45>.

76 <htt[>s.7/weh.archive.org/web/201 9092 1 1 24029/http://paper.people.com.
cn/rmrhh\vh/ht ml/2016-02/19/con tcnt_ 1654994.htm>.

77 <https.7/\veh.archive.org/weh/2019071 1081020/http://www.chrisiine-lee.
com.cn/nd. jsp?id= 108>.

78 <http;//archive.toda\7i0wSS>; <https.7/tinyurl.com/wqbutsq>.

79 <https://tinyurl.com/w86f3eS>. .Also, ‘The British Chinese Project will open
the door to politics for young ethnic Chinese. It will help them see politics

340

NOTES TO PP. 135-137

can start with small things around them. It will help them master rules of the
game to better protect their rights and interests.’

SO <http://archive.today/dYWvh>. On Points of Light Awards, see <https;//
www.pointsoflight.gov.uk/> and Lee’s citation at <https://www.pointsoflight.
gov.uk/british-chinese-project/>.

81 <https://tinyurl.com/vqquzjo>; <https://tinyurl.com/vy3wmvm>; <https://
tinyurl.com/sm8huhk>. Other founders were Dr Stephen Ng MBE and
Dr Mee Ling Ng OBE.

82 <https://tinyurl.com/ue37f89>.

83 <https://tinyurl.com/ue37f89>.

84 <https://tinyurl.com/tkdjx23>.

85 <https://tinyurl.com/qk2vbrp>.

86 <https://tinyurl.com/tp3cxsd>.

87 <https://tinyurl.com/uj2oenu>; <https://tinyurl.com/s57cyu3>.

88 <https://tinyurl.com/v6as2v2>; <https://tinyurl.com/uggbtwg>; <https://
tinyurl.com/rzzc96s>.

89 <hrtp://archive.today/2019.07.07-113849/http://zjuka.blogspot.com/2009/

12/>.

90 <http://archive.today/2019.07.07-113529/http://zjuka.org.uk/old/Visiting
%20Qiao%20Lian%2002-07-10.pdf>.

91 <https://web.archive.org/web/20160421042133/http://qwgzyj.gqb.gov.cn/
qjxy/181 /2568.shtml>.

92 Anon., ‘China, Britain to benefit from “golden era” in ties—Cameron’,
Reuters, 18 October 2015.

93 <https://tin}url.com/scpdaf7>

94 <https://tinyurl.com/squysp4>.

95 <https.7/web.archive.org/web/20 1 90630233450/http://wemedia.ifeng.
com/89034940/wemedia.shtml>.

96 <https://tinyurl.com/t2yfcxr>.

97 <https://\\'svsv.youtube.com/watch?v=sUgrj2r6FR8>.

98 <https://tinyurl.com/tso3r7x>.

99 <https://tin)url.com/sbbxhbx>.

100 <http://\\'\sw.channel4.com/news/boris-johns()n-london-propery-deal-china-
albert-dock>; <https://tinyurl.com/seflc8z>; <http://archive.today/qTqfr>.

101 <http://powerbase.info/index.php/Xuelin_Bates#Political_donations>.

102 Anon., ‘Tory peer Bates failed to declare /RC interests, paper reports’, Inside
Croyden, 12 April 2015.

103 Christian Eriksson and Tim Rayment, ‘Minister faces quiz over link to new
Crystal Palace’, Sunday Times, 12 April 2015.

104 <http://power base, info/index. php/Xuelin_Bates#Political_donations>;
<http://powerbase.info/index.php/The_Leader%27s_Group>.

105 <https://tin\Tirl.com/seffc8z>.

106 <https://tin\"url.com/wdcpdve>.

341

notes to PP, 137.

-140

107 <https.7/tinyuri.com/uvomjuz>,

108 <https://tinyurl.com/vwcb6v)>.

109 <https.7/tinyurl.com/wlaunsu>, 6 February 2019

110 <https7/tinyurl.com/tfwtu9u>.

111 <https://tinyurl.com/rgqmdw6>; <https7/mn w • •

G5XojgHiRyjnlG8A30GSJQ>. ‘ ''^‘^‘’“"•qq.com/,/

112 <https.7/tinyurl.com/vqavhj 8 >.

113 Wang Yisan and Bai Tianxing, ‘Lord Bates walks China: China co b
peace and prosperity to the world’, Peo/>/es Dai/y, 26 Sep tern ber^ 20 lT'

114 <https.7/tinyurl.com/tqljhn7>.

115 Anon., ‘China interaction: stories of Zhejiang premiers in Beijing’ Be -

Review, 11 October 2019. ’

116 <https.7/tinyurl.com/u46q5x7>; <https://tinyurl.com/yxytr5sj>; <https://
www.walkforpeace.eu/mission-possible/>. The UK China Friendship
Association was incorporated in November 2019, see <https://beta.
companieshouse.gov.uk/company/12295975/officers>. A British-China
Friendship Society was formed in 1949 but dissolved in 1 965 when Maoists
broke away to form the Society for Anglo-Chinese Understanding. See <https://

tinyurl.com/yjqroghc>.

117 <https://tinyurl.com/t3b8r8m>.

3

Chapter 8 The ecology of espionage

1 A sample of reports on the scandal includes John Pomfret, ‘China denies
contribution charges’, Ue Was/nugtou Post, 20 May 1998; David Jackson
and Lena Sun, ‘Liu’s deals with Chung: an intercontinental puzzle’, T/oe

W/ts/rngton /^ost, 24 May 1998.

! Agnes AnJrcsy quolfd by I'aligo., Chimr Spies. Melbourne: Scribe, 2019,

pp. 2()4, 255—7.

As in the case of former Australia defence minister Joel Fitzgibbon. Before
e.uering parliament. Fitzgibbon developed a close relationship with a
Chinese businesswoman. Helen Liu, who also made large donations to
his election fund and the Labor Parry. It turned out that Helen Liu had
close connections with China’s intelligence agencies, and with top united
front figures. She was a friend of Lieutenant-Colonel Liu Chaoying, the
daughter of the Chinese general who donated 5300,000 to the Clinton
campaign. Flelen Liu was also a good friend of Bob Carr, former
of New South Wales and former foreign minister, and director of a think
tank funded bv a Chinese businessman who is now banned from Austra ia
because he is believed b\' .Australia's intelligence agency to be an agent o
inHuence. See Hamilton. Si/etn Invasion, pp. 163—5. On Huang Xiangmos
e.vclusion, see Nick .McKenzie and Chris Uhlmann, ‘Canberra strands
Beijings man offshore, denies passport’, The Sydney Morning Herald,
5 February 2019.

342

NOTES TO PP. 140-142

4 Oustin Volz, and Aruna Viswanatlia, ‘FBI says Chinese espionage poses “most
sx'NX're” threat to American security’, The Wall Street Journal, 12 December
2018.

5 Cristina Maza, ‘China involved in 90 percent of espionage and industrial
secrets theft, Department of Justice reveals’, Newsweek, 12 December 2018.

(, William Hannas, James Mulvenon and Anna Puglisi, Chinese Industrial
Espionage, London: Routledge, 2013, pp. 204-7.

7 James To, Qiaowu, p. 43.

8 Anon., ‘China is top espionage risk to Canada: CSIS’, CTVNews, 30 April 2007.

9 ‘The ideal spy is one who is a citizen or resident of the target country, has
access to its sensitive decision-making portals, and/or is part of its government
or industrial machinery’. Sreeram Chaulia, ‘The age of the immigrant spy’,
Asia Times, 3 April 2008. ‘Instead of the classical methods used by other great
power intelligence services involving tight control over a few, deeply planted
and valuable assets, Beijing employs an array of decentralized networks that
thrive on the Chinese diaspora.’

10 Peter Mattis, “‘Beyond spy versus spy”: clarifying the analytic challenge of the
Chinese intelligence services’, Studies in Intelligence, vol. 56, no. 4, September
2012, pp. A7—57', Hannas, Mulvenon and Puglisi, Chinese Industrial
Espionage, chapter 5.

11 Mattis, “‘Beyond spy versus spy”’.

12 Hannas, Mulvenon and Puglisi, Chinese Industrial Espionage, chapter 8.

13 Robert Burnson, ‘Accused Chinese spy pleads guilty in U.S. “dead-drop”
sting’, Bloomberg, 25 November 2019.

14 Faligot, Chinese Spies, p. 2.

15 Peter Mattis and Matthew Brazil, Chinese Communist Espionage: An
intelligence primer, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2019, pp. 55-6.

16 Mattis and Brazil, Chinese Communist Espionage, p. 55.

17 Mattis and Brazil, Chinese Communist Espionage, p. 239. According to Roger
Faligot, whose information m.ay be less up-to-date, the Shanghai State
Security Bureau has responsibility for the United States and its main Western
allies, including Canada, Australia and Western Hurope; the Zhejiang office
covers Northern Europe: the Qingdao office covers Ja[)an and the Koreas; and
the Beijing office covers Eastern Europe and Russia. Faligot, Chinese Spies,
pp. 230-1.

18 Jay Solomon,‘FBI sees big threat from Chinese spies', The Wall Street Journal^
10 August 2005.

19 Faligot, Chinese Spies^ p. 275. In the 1990s the MSS expanded its ^special
section for broadcasting fake news (p. 396). Faligot also refers to confidential
economic reports produced by Xinhua news agenc)" (p. 279).

20 Hannas, Mulvenon and Puglisi, Chinese Industrial Espionage^ pp. 116—17.

21 Peter Mattis, ‘China reorients strategic militan^ intelligence , Janes, 20 17. See
the chart on p. 6.

343

notes to PP. 143-147

Mattis and Brazil, Chinese Communist Espionage, p 52

Jam« Scott and Dtew Spaniel, Chinas Espionage Dynassy. Washington, DC-

Institute for Critical Infrastructure Tcchnoloev, 2016 n in m ' •"

given for these numbers, so they should be treated with caution,

Mattis, ‘China reorients strategic military intelligence, p, 8, table. See alto
Faligot, Chinese Spies, p. 248.

Mattis, ‘China reorients strategic military intelligence’, p, 3,

Mattis, ‘China reorients strategic military intelligence’, p. 3.

Faligot, Chinese Spies, pp. 206,247. SASTIND was previously the Commission
for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence (COSTIND),
<http://www.xinhuanet.eom//politics/2017-08/26/c_l 121545221 .htm>.
Anon., ‘Survey of Chinese-linked espionage in the United States since 2000’,
Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019, <https://www.csis.
org/programs/technology-policy-program/survey-chinese-linked-espionage-

united-states-2000>.

Or at least had Chinese names. Andrew Chongseh Kim, ‘Prosecuting Chinese
“spies”: an empirical analysis of the Economic Espionage Act’, Cardozo Law
Review, vol. 40, no. 2, 2019.

Anti-Chinese racism but not anti-Asian racism because the share of
indictments for ‘other Asians’ remained constant between the two periods at

nine per cent.

Nate Rayond and Brendan Pierson, ‘FBI employee gets two years in prison

for acting as Chinese agent’,20 January 2017.

Zach Dorfman, ‘How Silicon Valley became a den of spies, Politico, 27 July
2()]8;'Irevor Lx)udon, ‘Feinsiein’s spy: Rus.sell Lowe and San Franciscos pro-

China left’, Epoch Times, 20 August 2018.

It was set up by the Chinese Progre,ssive Association, known to be a united

front group (Ixiudon, Feinsteins spy ). ^

tile,,,. Huniing. 'IxinMdn, luub.nd hold strong China connections, io,
Anoeh Times. 28 Marcli 1997. I cinsiein seems to have had early sympathies
I'onlie CCI> governiiieni and by the time she became mayor of San Francisco
was a friend of China. Her election to the US Senate in 1992 was perhaps a
pay-olf for the CCP’s ‘surround the city’ tactic.

<https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/lile/953321/download>.

b'aligoi, Chinese SpieSy p. 273.

Garrett Grart', ‘Chinas 5 steps for recruiting spies', Wiredy 31 October 2018.

<https://\v\\^v.justice.gov/opa/pr/chinese-nationabarrestecl-allegedly acting
within-unitecl“Stares-illegal-agent-people-s>.

Kate Mansew Boris Johnsons deputy: “1 had sex with a Chinese spy .
Beaun* lures politician to bed then drugs him to take secrets , The Mirror^
29 November 2009.

Andrew Porter. 'Downing Street aide in Chinese “honeytrap” sting , The
Telegraph, 20 July 2008.

NOTES TO PP. 147-148

^luttis iinii Hnizili ^httifsc CofjofitititstI^sptoitd^c^ p, 255» For iiscrui rcFcrcncc.s>
sec the glossary of Chinese espionage and security terms in the appendix.

4,^ See refciences 65—69 in glossary, Mattis and Brazil, Chinese Communist
Espionage.

44 Nigel Inkster, Chinas draft intelligence law’. International Institute for
Strategic Studies, blog post, 26 May 2017.

45 Peter Cluskey, Dutch ambassador to Beijing suspended over affair amid
honeytrap fears’, Irish Times, 17 October 2016.

46 Faligot, Chinas Spies, p. 394. See also: <https://tinyurl.com/y9d4o836>

47 Mike Giglio, ‘China’s spies are on the offensive’. The Atlantic, 26 August
2019.

48 Anon., ‘German spy agency warns of Chinese Linkedin espionage’, BBC
News online, 10 December 2017; Jeff Stone, ‘Linkedin is becoming China’s
go-to platform for recruiting foreign spies’. Cyberscoop, 26 March 2019.

49 Christoph Giesen and Ronen Steinke, ‘Wie chinesische Agenten den
Bundestag ausspionieren’, Siiddeutsche, 6 July 2018; Anon., ‘Chinese spy on
Bundestag through social media info purchased from German politicians:
report’. The Local.de, 6 July 2018.

50 Jodi Xu Klein, ‘Fear mounts that Chinese-American scientists are being
targeted amid US national security crackdown’. South China Morning Post,
3 July 2019.

51 US counterintelligence chief William Evanina said that the PRC’s intelligence
agencies ‘bring ungodly resources that we can’t handle right now’. Quoted
by Olivia Gazis, U.S. top spy-catcher: China brings “ungodly resources” to
espionage’, CBS Neivs onWne:, 5 September 2018.

52 Faligot, China’s Spies, p. 215.

53 CICIR is listed on official Chinese website as one of the top think tanks in
China, <https://web.archive. org/web/201901061 55604/http://www.china.
org.cn/top 10/201 1-09/26/content_23491278_5.htm>. Although now
dated, a good source on ClClR is Anon., ‘Profile of MSS-affiliated PRC
foreign policy think tank’. Open Source Center, 25 August 2011. See also
Peter Mattis, ‘Five ways China spies’. The National Interest, 6 March 2014.

54 Anon., ‘Profile of MSS-affiliated PRC foreign policy think tank’. On the 11th
Bureau, see Mattis and Brazil, Chinese Communist Espionage, p. 56. See also
Anon., ‘China’s Ministry of State Security’, StratFor, 1 Jtine 2012, <https://
worldview.stratfor.com/article/chinas-ministry-state-sectirity>.

55 Peter Mattis, ‘Assessing the foreign policy infiiience of the Ministry of State
Security, China BrieJ^(Janiestown Lou}idatio7i), vol. 1 1, no. 1, 14 January
2011; <http://\v'\N'w.chinavitac.com/biography/3969>.

56 David Shambaugh, ‘China’s international relations think tanks: evolving
structure and process , China Qitarterly, vol. 171, September 2002, pp. 575—96.

57 Anon., Profile of MSS-alflliated PRC foreign polic}'think tank’.

58 Faligot, Chinese Spies, p. 218.

345

NOTES TO PP. 148-151

59 'EU-China Strategic Dialogue 2015’, website of
Studies, 13 March 2015, <https://www.iss.c(
strategic-diaiogue-2015>,‘ ‘9th Meeting of the
Dialogue’, CSIS website, 2-3 February 20

events/9th-meeting-csis-cicir-cybersecurity-dialo

60 As an instance of China’s intellectuals using the weaknesses of democracy to
justify the one-party state, CICIR experts, responding to Russian meddling
in the US presidential election, argued ‘that the pervasive influx of fake news
affecting the US election is clear precedent for why the Chinese government
regulates the internet, to “insure that information online is true”’, <https 7 /
tinyurl.com/vvjkp79>.

61 <https://www.twai.it/journals/orizzonte-cina/>; <https://tinyurl.com/
rwpwzbt>.

62 For the link between the CUSS and PLA intelligence, see Peter Mattis, ‘China’s
military intelligence system is changing’. War on the Rocks, 29 December 2015.

63 Faligot, Chinese Spies, pp. 218-19.

64 The affidavit can be found at <https.7/www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/
file/975671/download>, p. 5.

65 Nate Thayer, ‘How the Chinese recruit American journalists as spies’, Asia
Sentinel, 4 July 2017.

66 <https://www.justicc.go\7opa/press-rclease/filc/975671/download>; Brandi

Buchman, ‘Bond revoked for ex-ClA agent charged with spying for China,
Courthouse News, 10 July 2017.

67 Carrect Graff, ‘China’s 5 steps for recruiting spies’. Wired, 31 October 2018.

68 Chaff. ‘China’s 5 steps for recruiting spies’.

69 'll), Qiuowu, p. 42

70 fo, Qiuowu, pp. 45-6.

71 Vo, Qiuowu,

71 Anon., ‘'fhreats to the U.S. research enterprise: Chinas talent recruitment
plans’, stalf report. United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on
Invesiigaiioiis, 2019.

7.^ Steplien Glien, 'America’s hidden role in Cdiinese weapons research’. South
China Morning Post, 29 March 2017.

74 4o, Qiaou'n, pp. -)3-4.

75 JcOVcv Mervis, ‘NIH letters asking about undisclosed foreign ties rattle U.S.

uiiiversities , 3 V;V/;(r 1 March 2019; Jocelyn Kaiser and David MalakoflF,

'NUl investigating; whether U.S. scientists are sharing ideas with foreign
governments'. Sric^nLY Alag, 2'^ August 2018.

76 lodd Ackerman. WID Anderson ousts 3 scientists over concerns about
edtinese conHicts ot interest'. Houston Chronicle, 19 April 2019.

77 Hvistendahl. Alajor U.S. cancer center ousts 7\sian” researchers after NIH
Hags their toreign ties'.

7S < https./A\ ww.justice.gov/opa/press-reIease/file/1239796/download>

1131 .iCCIJfity

CSIS-CICIR Cyber^urity
15, <https://www.csi*,org/

Kue>.

346

NOTES TO PP. 151-154

79 Douglas Belkin, Harvard chemistry chairman under investigation is a giant
of his field’, Wall Street Journal, 29 January 2020.

80 <https://archive.fo/7Htz#selection-234l.363-2341.497>.

81 Bill Wallace, Cox Report links S.R association to spy network / Chinese
exchange group accused of stealing U.S. weapons secrets’, SFGate, 28 May 1999.

82 <https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/press-release/file/1203021 /download>.

83 Hannas, Mulvenon and Puglisi, Chinese Industrial Espionage, pp. 78-80.

84 Hannas, Mulvenon and Puglisi, Chinese Industrial Espionage, p. 96.

85 For the case of Noshir Gowadia, see <web.archive.org/web/
20070523175209/>; <honolulu.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel06/defensesecrets
110906.htm>; <www.justice.gov/opa/pr/hawaii-man-sentenced-32-years-
prison-providing-defense-information-and-services-people-s>.

86 In 2015 Chinas ambassador, Luo Zhaohui, briefed the chief representative
of the China Association for International Exchange of Personnel (CAIEP)
Canada, Lyu Ge, on the latest developments in China—Canada relations. *He
encouraged CAIEP Canada Ltd to break new ground in introducing Canadian
talent to China, <http://ca.china-embassy.org/eng/gdxw/tl325872.htm>.
In 2007 the Canadian government signed a cooperation agreement on
science and technology with CAIEP and other agencies. The Canadian
government has been promoting and facilitating joint projects, workshops
etc. and removing barriers for the exchange of talent, <http://www.ec.gc.ca/

international/default.asp.?lang=En&n=BFl 39207-l&pedisable=truc>.

87 Hannas, Mulvenon and Puglisi, Chinese Industrial Espionage, pp. 79-80.

88 Hannas, Mulvenon and Puglisi, Chinese Industrial Espionage, p. 110 .

89 <http://www.cast-usa.net/>, sec News section. For a more detailed discussion
of CAST-USAs origins, organisational structure and operations, sec <https://

books.opencdition.org/irdcditions/2642?lang=cn>.

90 <http://www.cast-usa.net/>.

91 <http://www.c;ist-usa.nct/>, sec News section.

92 Hannas, Mulvenon and Puglisi, CJjinese Industrial Espionage, p. 1 13; <http://
www.castdc.org/cast_web_2006/nctwork.hiin>.

93 Hannas, Mulvenon and Puglisi. Chinese Industrial Espionage, p. 107

)4 llann.ts, Mulvenon and Puglisi, C.hinese Industrial hjptonas^e, chapter 5 .

95 The following text is modified from 1 iamilton, Stlent Invasion, pp. 1 84-6.

96 'Quan Ao 1 luaren zhuanjia xuezhe lianhehui chengli’

1(K ‘11 av hV.l.'Ml-C.hina .Association of C.hinese L.xperts and Scholars
established], leoples IXiily Clnlme, 11 October 2004, <htips://iinyurl.com/
r4cd9nj>.

Yl <"'"'v.chinac|l.org/c/2015-12-14/483805.shtml>. See also <htips://tinvurl.
com/rikes 3 v>.

.)8 Inters tew I February 201 with C.hinese defector (^hen Ybnglin, who says
sesme scientists are gisen very large bonuses for supplying information to the

NOTES TO PP. 154-157

99 Hannas, Mulvenon and Puglisi, Chinese Industrial Espionage, p, 11 /,

100 Hannas, Mulvenon and Puglisi, Chinese Industrial Espionagi pp. 122-3

101 Quoted by Diamond and Schell, eds, China’s Influence & American Interetu
p. 124.

102 Quoted by Hannas, Mulvenon and Puglisi, Chinese Industrial Espionage

p. 126.

103 Hong Xiao, ‘It’s all about the people’s exchanges: official’, China Daily,

16 December 2017.

104 Note this similar organisation, related to CAIEP and also overseen by

_China Society for Research on International Exchange and

Personnel Development: <https://web.archive.org/web/20190917013413/

http://yjh.caiep.net/index_en.php>.

105 <http 7 /ianharvey-ip.com/china/safea-caiep-china-and-ip-myth-and-reality/>,

106 Hong Xiao, ‘Academia feeling heat of trade conflict’, China Daily, 1 July

2019.

107 Bill Bishop, Sinocism newsUtter, 12 June 2019.

AUv Tnske Picking Flowers, Making Honey, report by Australian Strategic
Policy Institute, Canberra, 2019. See also Alex Joske, ‘The China defence
universities tracker’, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Canberra, 2019.

1 AO ni aiFIJ was merged with a few other institutes and universities in 2017.

' r' urrcrfull nLe is t W

I, was also transferred to the supervision of the PLAs new Strategic Support

„0 Siv^ Hamilton and Alex Joske, 'Chinas ghost university haunts U.S.
campuses', unpublished paper, November 2017. See also Joske, P,ck,ng

alvc-Hamilton and Alex Joske, 'Australian universities are ^ping Chinas
.uilitarv surpass the United States'. The SyS.ey Morning HnaU. 27 Oc.ol^r
2017. -i he text that follows borrows from this article by Joske and one of the

authors of this book.

12 He was an alternate member from 2012 to 2017.

13 Ben Packham. ‘Professor, Chinese generals co-authored defence rescarc ,

TheAustniliiin, ?>\ ]u\y 20\^. , , r r-L-

14 Clive Hamilton and Alex Joske. Australian taxes may help finance Chinese
military capability. The Australian, 10 June 2017. With thanks to Alex

Joske for permission to reproduce and paraphrase sentences from this a«icle.
CHTC's investment arm also holds the controlling share of Hikvision,

<https://ipvni.coni/rcports/cetc-increaso.

1 s Matthew Luce, A model company: CETC celebrates 10 years of civil-military
integration', China Brief (Jamestown Foutidation), vol. 12, no. 4, 2012.

16 Anon., '\\ oman sentenced lor U.S. military sales to China, Reuters,
29 Januarv 2011.

1 1

348

NOTES TO PP. 157-159

|l7 Matthew Godscy and Valerie Lincy, 'Gradual signs of change: proliferation
and from China over decades’, Strategic Trade Review, vol. 5, no. 8, winter/
spring 2019.

118 Anon., Threats to the U.S. Research Enterprise, p. 44.

119 I.aurcns Cerulus, ‘Europe raises flags on China’s cyber espionage’. Politico,
10 April 2018.

120 Stephanie Borys, ‘Inside a massive cyber hack that risks compromising leaders
across the globe’, ABC News online, 2 October 2019.

121 Anon., ‘Singapore health database hack steals personal information of
1.5 million people, including PM’, ABC News online, 20 July 2018.

122 A few months earlier, it was reported that Chinese hackers, probably the
notorious APTIO group, had been targeting Japan’s healthcare companies,
although in that case the intention appeared to be theft of proprietary
information on their products. Anon., ‘China hackers accused of attacking
Japanese defence firms’. South China Morning Post, 23 April 2013.

123 <https://www.cnet.com/news/justice-department-indicts-chinese-hackers-
allegedly-behind-anthem-breach/>.

124 Scott and Spaniel, China's Espionage Dynasty, p. 15.

125 Nicole Perlroth, ‘Hack of community health systems affects 4.5 million
patients’. The New York Times, 18 August 2014.

126 David Wroe, Defence medical records sent to China in security breach’, The
Sydney Morning Herald, 7 July 2015.

127 Hacking into medical records may not be necessary in Australia; there
has been a boom in Chinese investment in healthcare, a trend that seems
to have attracted no official interest despite the security risks. Mergers and
acquisitions totalling $5.5 billion took place over the three years 2015—17, the
same amount as in the vastly larger US market. Anon., Demystifying Chinese
Investment in Australian Healthcare, a report by KPMCj and the University of
Sydney, January 2018.

128 US House of Representatives Permanent Select Ck)inmittee of Intelligence,
Investigative report on the US national security issues posed by Chinese
telecommunications companies Huawei and Z l’K’, 8 October 2012, <http://
tinyurl.com/qrm3hc3> But see hlsa Kania, 'Much ado about Huawei
(part 1)’, The Strategist, ASPI, 27 March 2018.

129 Eran S. Medeiros, Roger Cliff, Keith Crane and James (7 Mulvenon, ‘A new
direction for China’s defense industry’, R.-\ND Corporation, 2005, p. 218.

OO BrAMn Krekel, Patton .-^dams and George Bakos, Occupying the Information
High Ground: Chinese capabilities for computer network operations and cyber
espionage, report prepared for the L .S.-China Economic and Securit}' Review
Commission by Northrop Grumman Corp, 2012, p. 75.

131 John Aglionby, Emily Feng and \uan \ang, ".Airican Union accuses China
of hacking headquarters. Financial Times, 30 Januarv 2018; Danielle Cave,

349

notes to PP. 159-161

‘The African Union headquarters hack and AustrallV, sr

Strategist, 15 ]\x\y 20\S. *' ’ /f'/'/

132 Norman Pearlstine et ah. ‘The man behind Huawei’ I n, A /

10 April 2019, In May 2019 i, was reported rhTL'

agency AIVD believes Huawei equipment used in the netwmit T
Dutch telecommunication network has a hidden ‘backdoor’ installcT^r
allows access to customer data. Anon., ‘Dutch spy agenev
alleged Huawei “backdoor”: Volkskrant', Reuters, 16 May 2019. ^

133 Pearlstine et al., ‘The man behind Huawei’.

134 Joanna Plucinska, Koh Gui Qing, Alicja Ptak and Steve Strecklow, ‘Hov/
Poland became a front in the cold war between the U.S. and China Reuters
2 July 2019.

135 See for example, Wayne Ma, ‘How Huawei targets Apple trade secrets’. The
Information, 18 February 2019.

136 Tripto Lahiri, ‘The US says Huawei had a bonus program for employees who
stole trade secrets’. Quartz, 30 January 2019.

137 Elsa Kania, ‘Much ado about Huawei’, ASPI Strategist, Part 1, 27 March
2018, Part 2, 28 March 2018.

138 David Shepardson and Karen Freifeld, ‘China’s Huawei, 70 affiliates on U.S.
trade blacklist’, Reuters, 16 May 2019.

139 Dan Sabbagh and Jon Henley, ‘Huawei poses security threat to UK, says
former MI6 chief’, The Guardian, 16 May 2019.

140 Christopher Hope, ‘Chinese firm Huawei spends tens of thousands lobbying
British politicians’. The Telegraph, 30 November 2012.

141 Hope, ‘Chinese firm Huawei spends tens of thousands lobbying British
politicians’.

142 Adam Satariano and llaymond Zhong, ‘How Huawei wooed Europe with
sponsorships, investmems and promises’. The New York Times, 22 January

2019.

143 Robert I'ife and Stephen Chase, ‘Goodalc says decision on Huawei 5G
network to come before election’. The Globe and Mail, 1 May 2019;
I'rin Dimne, Muawei’s latest advocate.^ An Obama cybersecurity official’,
WUshim^ron Examiner, 12 April 2019. Donald Irump tweeted: ‘This is not
giHiil, tir acceptable.’

l-i-l ‘lliiawei Deutschland—Deutschland besser verbinden’, Huawei website,
not d.ited, <bttps://web.archive.org/web/202001 122 10508/http://huawei-
dialo‘’.de/mission-staicment/>.

I D Satariano and /hong, ‘How Huawei wooed F!urope with sponsorships,
inve.stntents and promises’.

1-lU 1 imin Zhou and C^mid Ghoreishi, ‘ Ihe man behind McCall urn’s controversial
press conterence that led to his removal as Canada’s ambassador to China’,
Ep(ych I'isnes, 28 januarv 2019.

350

NOTES TO PP. 162-166

147 Tom iMackwell, ‘A curious mirroring of Beijing’s official line’, Windsor StaVy
23 February 2019.

148 Auon., 'Chincse-Canadian group defends detained Huawei CFO’, CBC,
11 December 2018.

149 Bob Mackin, ‘Richmond mayoral candidate says “there is no human rights
abuse in China’”, The Breaker, 3 October 2018.

150 \\An\\\Kon, Silent Invasion, 158-9.

151 Harrison Christian, ‘Huawei piles pressure on Govt with ads and sponsorship,
security experts say’, Stujf.com, 18 April 2019.

152 Kelvin Chan and Rob Gillies, ‘Huawei night in Canada: inside tech giant’s
push to burnish its brand’, Toronto Star, 13 February 2019.

153 Elizabeth Gibney, ‘Berkeley bans new research funding from Huawei’, Nature,
no. 566, 7 February 2019, pp. 16-17.

154 Satariano and Zhong, ‘How Huawei wooed Europe with sponsorships,
investments and promises’.

155 Robert Delaney, ‘Shutting the gates of academia: American universities cut
ties to Huawei and Confucius Institute’, South China Morning Post, 19 March
2019.

156 Ilaria Maria Sala, ‘Chinese tech firm Huawei’s bullying attitude fails to win
over hearts and minds’, Hong Kong Free Press, 15 December 2019.

Chapter 9 Media: ‘Our surname is Party’

1 Anon., ‘China’s Xi urges state media to boost global influence’, Reuters,
19 February 2016; ‘Xi Jinping: jianchi zhengc]ue fangxiang chuangxin fangfa
shouduan tigao xinwen yulun chuanboli yindaoli’

Jj [Uphold the correct direction
and innovate methods to raise communication power and guidance of news
and public opinion]; People’s Daily Online, 19 February 2016; <https://
tinyurl.com/u7utsnr>.

2 David Shambaugh, ‘China’s soft power push: the search lor respect’. Foreign
Affairs, July/August 2015.

3 Li Congjun, ‘Toward a new world media order’, I'he Wall Street Journal,
1 June 2011.

4 Didi Kirsten Fatlow, ‘Mapping China-in-Germany’, Sinopsis, 2 October
2019.

5 See lor example David Bandurski, ‘Journalism denied: how China views the
news , China Media Project, 1 Februarv 2018.

6 Anon., Document 9: a ChinaFile translation’, ChinaFile, 8 November 2013,
<http://\\’\\’w.chinarile.com/document-9-chinafile-translation>.

7 David Bandurski, The spirit ol control’, Medium, 25 February 2016. We are
indebted to John Fitzgerald lor highlighting the difference in connotation
benveen xing and ‘surname .

351

'^OTES TO Pp.

I6e-i

, ..^ ''■owion of regulations i f'-^'eniny

publishing a photo containing a serious politicai ^1., ^ f ^

7.2000, p. 12. NMu „„

9 Lizzie Deatden, ‘Chinese journalists punished fot

Jinping’s "tesignation” in state media speiline miol™"?, '''”’"'"8 X*
7 Decembet 2015. ^^*^ptndem,

10 Tom Phillips, ‘Chinese reporter makes on-air “confe«l„„" r

chaos’. The Guardian^ 31 August 2015. ^ markel

II

, at Ayu aClsU^USL jLU 1 J .

See CA/W Daily job ads: ‘Zhongguo ribao she gongkai zhaonin „
zuqiu’

itv online* 97 KT<~iara>mUa. TAIT I .

.com/

12

13

xuqiu [China Daily pubWc xtcoxn

positions], China Daily online, 27 November 2017, <https://tinyurl
yx7a6hzj>.

Lily Kuo, ‘Chinese journalists to be tested on loyalty to Xi Jinping’, The
Guardian, 20 September 2019.

For instance, the China Public Diplomacy Association offers ten-month
courses to journalists from Africa, South Asia and Southeast Asia. See Ros
Chanveasna, ‘China training journalists from 44 countries’, Khmer Times,
6 March 2018.

14 Anon., ‘China’s pursuit of a new world media order’, Reporters
Without Borders, 22 March 2019. <https://rsf org/en/reports/

rsf-rcporr-chinas-pursuit-ncw-world-mcdia-ordcr>.

1 ^ Anoji ‘China’s pursuit of a new world media order’; Anon., Weta York Times
Iio-STS 3rd World .Media Summit’, China Daily, 10 October 2013.

K, Niulcgc Rolkind. 'Mupiiing ibe looiprinl of IWIl and Road inHuence

,7 Twri'mipc^^r,', 'ronron H&'R; held in Hainan’, Xmhua S.lk Road

' .• 0 T1 t Viober 2018 , <https.7/tinyurl.com/rzoju5j>.

I,S' .stTr'cvinl^l '-Joinilv build a bridge of friendship and mutual

' underuanding-address bv ;«;;™;;:-‘'::2^::.Tu:.'r:ii:, 2^6

M::!rt;.:;:://::b:.r:lvc.org/web/2« , 91130 , 8,921 /iu.p://au,china-
cn,l,.„sv,org/engApisfi;.|.ial23/.l 185770.1,im>.

ixinhua

news acenev holds svmposium lo commemoraic ihe 6

es,ern,ii news disseminaiion). Duiwaixuamhuaa cankao, no. ■ ’ P

20 .Xi .shaovinc ■'} i'*'t 19,^1966 „ian Zhongguo

l-HollOM, (Research on Chinas e

propaganda hisrorv from I9-|9 ro I966J. Wuhan: Huazhong ke,i dairu
chuKinshe. 2010. p. 2S.

352

NOTES TO PP. 167-168

21 Louisa Liin and Julia Bergin, ‘Inside Chinas audacious global propaganda
campaign’, The Guardian, 7 December 2018.

22 Vivian Wu and Adam Chen, ‘Beijing in 45b yuan global media drive’. South
China Morning Post, 13 January 2009. According to Reporters Without
Borders, the sum was meant to cover a period of ten years and was later
increased to 10 billion RMB per year. Reporters without Borders, ‘China’s
pursuit of a new world media order’, p. 29.

23 Wang Guoqing Jianchi “ruan”, “ying” Hang shou qi zhua, nuli tigao

woguo mein guoji chuanbo nengli’

[Adhere to grasp with ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ hands together,
to make an effort to improve China’s media international dissemination
capabilities], Zhongguo guangbo dianshi xuekan, no. 10, 2010, p. 1.

24 See the graphic in Dang Xinwen Hanbo yu shang Zhongguo zhi sheng’^’IPT

iM -h 4^ , 1 April 2018, website of the Nordic Chinese Times,

<https://web.archive.Org/web/20191018121009/http://nordicapd.com/
content.asp?pid=31&cid=4l62>. The term used is ‘professional

guidance, which describes a relationship in which one entity can issue
binding orders to another in the Chinese bureaucracy.

25 Who we are , website of CGTN, not dated, <https://tinyurl.com/vc3d6ev>.

26 Reporters Without Borders, ‘China’s pursuit of a new world media order’,

p. 4.

27 ‘About China Radio International’, website of CRI, not dated, <http://
english.cri.cn/11114/2012/09/20/126 ls723239.htm>.

28 See also David Bandurski, ‘Xinhua News Agency' steps out into the world’,
China Media Project, 22 C'lctober 2009, <http://ch inamediaproject.
org/2009/10/22/xinhua-news-agency'-steps-out-inio-ihe-world/>.

29 ‘Guany'u Xinhuashc’ X' |About Xinhua News Agency], website

of Xinhua, not dated, <https://wcb.archive.org/web/2() 190827153150/
hnp://203.192.6.89/.\hs/>.

30 About (,N(, , website of ('N(\ not dated, <lmps://wcb.archive.org/
web/201908271 53 2.10/http://en.cnc news.cn/e_about_cnc/about.html>.

31 Kirsty Needha in, ‘llo\K Australians set up C'oninuinist (China’s official
propaganda tool’, IhcSyduey hlorningHnald, 5 December 2018.

32 Annual Report ot the i.hina Duily for 2018 on Service Units Online (gjsy.
gov,cn)» the otheial website for CdiinaS ‘Service units* ('}Dlk

33 About C hina Daily Ciroup\ website of ('hiria Daily, not dated, <https://
web.archive.org/web/2010082^ 1 53bS7/http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/
sracic_e/2011 about. html>.

34 Annual Report ot the C hina Daily tor 2018 on Service Units Online (gjsy.
gov.cn), the official website tor C hinas ‘Service units* ( iHk

C.hinCvSe observers have long admired what they consider the United States’
ability to let ‘dirterent voices sing the same tune'. By this they mean that
diffierent victors tvike on Jitiereiir roles when criticising China, doing so with

36

37

38

39

40

41

42

43

44

4S

■\b

47

notes to PP.

168-170

different degrees of intensity and i„

message. See Liu Yarning iilJRllW, and Li I’d .(7 " ' iht
WO guo duiwai xuanchuan xin chulu (cr)— Di ' • p
waixuan bixu xian fa zhi ren

n-mmmmmmx ia ncwl!; ' -

propaganda in the era of global communication-S,ar,i„g w",h ihru"**
sound, external propaganda needs to gain the upper hand bv rdr,.i„,' ™
first], Duiwai xuanchuan cankao, no. 12,2003, p. 18,

Benkan teyuc jizhe

^ ‘Tixian shidaixing, bawo guiliixing, fuyu chuangzaoxing: Ji 2003 n'un
qulnguo waixuan gongzuo huiyi’

,j^_2003 [Embody the characteristics of the

erasp the rules, be rich in innovation—Notes from the nationwide
k'meeting for external propaganda in 2003], Duiwai xuanchuan cankao,

from Americas capital, a TV station run by China’s

M The NcwMTi.es, 28 February 2019.
ommun s Pjy ^ ^ ^y Chinas Communist

Vlozur,

’’’■.o • 'Inridc China's audacious giobal propaganda campaign.

IC-l'og-of-t-cns<’''‘^''l’ l’‘^^’ PI I f^agic Weapon!, p. 10-

^ ,,,.,icom/.i3i5yw>t Jeff Moody.

example. .Scan C.allch. <'"‘1’ ehctps.//.inyuri com/

'lo.

56in>: jini 3ptlinun. 1

ns://iin\ iJrl.L<)ni/uyv2tjkx>. international Press Center, not

i„a Clunese ei.ians to do "“’'dit'O'' ' , ^43,3/hctp://ipc.fn'pro-

j:<lu,ps://«cl..archive.org/tveb/20UIIO

:„/e„gAegixah/n/'7lft«5»l""'=- .

iiiicd ill I Iciiaiuheng gciiung "H," Henan provincel. Ato

.‘m lOllicc- of the revolutionary A:^

K Copper, Wcsiern media '"y' g f2T935/http;//w'VVV.

China T\' (TV channel run by Xinhua), <https.7/www.youtu
i?v=a:L\\\lR\'E9mM>.

354

NOTES TO PP. 170-172

4i? CG FN America, ‘ The heat: autiior Martin Jacques discusses China & global
issues Pt r, CGTN YouTube channel, 19 October 2017, <https,7/www.
)’Outubc.com/watch?v=cOs4T0mEzA0>.

49 Diamond and Schell, eds, China's Influence df American Interests, p. 70. T he
scltolar reported she was paid US$150 per interview.

50 'History and milestones’, website of CRI, not dated, <https://archive.

is/201311 l6074500/http://english.cri.cn/about/history.htm>.

51 CWI and Xinhuanet sign cooperation agreement’, website of CWI,
4 November 2014, <https://web.archive.Org/web/20190829153344/https://
\vs\'w.cwi.nl/news/2014/cwi-and-xinhuanet-sign-cooperation-agreement>.

52 China Media Centre (CMC) hosts roundtable discussions with leading
UK specialists on China and senior Chinese officials’, 6 November 2018,
<https:// tinyurl.com/snc5hqv>.

53 Westminster, ac. uk/research/groups-and-cen tres/china-media-
centre>; China Media Centre (CMC) hosts roundtable discussions with
leading UK specialists on China and senior Chinese officials’, 6 November
2018, <https.7/tinyurl.com/snc5hqv>.

54 Professional exchange: the China Professional Leadership Programme’,
website of University of Westminster, <https://tinyurl.com/vfnbuo8>.

55 ‘Professor Hugo de Burgh’, website of University of Westminster, <https://
tinyurl.com/td22euk>.

56

57

58

59

60
61

62

63

64

65

66

Bill Kenber, Hugo de Burgh, professor who has pushed for closer ties with
China,’ The Times, 24 August 2019.

‘Professional exchange: the China Professional Leadership Programme’,
website of the University of Westminster, <https://tinyurl.com/vfnbuo8>.
Chinas international relations and economic strategies: perceptions of the
UK and China’, China Media Center, 31 October 2018, <https://tinyurl.
com/uw74p93>.

<https://tinyurl.com/r9vdl72>.

<https://tinyurl.com/r9vdl72>.

CMCs courses for media handlers: the practical elements’, website of the
China Media Centre, 16 October 2019, <https://tinyurl.coni/tktfph7>.
Professional e.xchange: the China Professional Leadership Programme’,
website of University of Westminster, <https://finyurl.com/vfnbuo8>

Viola Zhou, ‘Why is Linkedin so big in China? Because it censors’, Inkstone,
4 January 2019.

Enn Dunne, Linkedln’s China compromise shows price of market access’,
Washington Examiner, 3 January 2019.

Megha RajagopaJan, ‘Linkedin censored the profile of another critic of the
Chinese government’, Buz^eed News, 8 January- 2019.

"•’anghao “New China” zhengshi
yunxing «l^?±!*^F?±3?«f$|jE-as^“NewChina”iEit;istT [Xinhua's

355

Notes

To pp

1 ^ 2-174

unified

ina off;

Sceven Jiang, Taiw.

Ben Blanchard, 'China’a parliamenc ml,

*«/m, 21 August 2019. «an,e-«,

68

Brr

69

state media and other

ptcading

70

71

72

73

74

75

76

77

79

80

81

82

Layla Mashkoor and Kassy Cho, ‘Chinese

false information about the protests in Hone li'nT ft*"* TT
2019. ® News, 14 June

‘Zui “zhencheng” de daoqian’g^ifiJ/^itM’ FTk
Xmhua Xianggang on Facehooh, .3 Augt

Chen Weihua, Twitter, I September 2019, <https://tinyurl.com/sahdtnm>.
Screenshots on file with the authors.

Twitter Inc., ‘Updating our advertising policies on state media, Twitter blog,
19 August 2019, <https.7/blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2019/

advertising_poiicies_on_state_media.html>.

CCTV, ‘Lingdaoren shi zenme liancheng de.’’ [How

leaders are made], CCTV channel on YouTube, <https://www.youtube.
coni/warch?v=eGX2kMUWvIo>. For an English version of the same clip,
see <htrps;//ww'w.youtubc.com/w'atch.’v=M734o_17H_A>. ‘How leaders are
made' W. 1 S produced by Sludio on Fuxing Road, which some media reporcs
have linked ro d.e CCl>'s In.erna.ional Liaison Department. See Chun Han
Wong. 'Cihitiese president Xi Jinping's extreme makeover. The Wall Street

IW 7m,i7g7fFrance 1‘resse in Beijing. 'China turns to psychedelic
David Howie loolnilike to |>ush "live-year plan’”. The Guardian, 27

Julia i iolliitgsworih, 'Australian jsoliticians arc

Utit lake cotitetii could etid up costing them', CNN, 15 May •

loel liatding, I he Chinese government lakes nearly 5 mi

utedia cotutu'ents a tear. I his is why’. The Washinpan Pott, 19 May 20 7.

.See Zhe|tit.g Huattg. Chinese trolls jumped the firewall to attack
president and inilitan' on Facebook’, QiinrtZy 3 January 2017. Q^ts

Zhang Han, ‘Patriotic posts Hood East Turkestan pages to Hght unt P
on Xinjiang', Global Times, 10 April 2019.

Maggie Miller, ‘Twitter, Facebook accuse China of misinformation targe g
Hong Kong protests', Tbe Hill, 19 August 2019. A

kike Wallis, China's information warfare darkens the doorstep of Twitter an

Facebook',A5mm/r^^^sr,21 August2019, <hrtps:/AAWW^aspistrategist.org.au/

chinas-information-warfare-darkens-Lhe-doorstep-of-rvvitrer-anci-facebook/>-

Zuckerberg meets with Chinas propaganda chief , The \Tergey
arch 2016; LouJla-Mae Eleftheriou-Smith, ‘Chinas President Xi Jinping

356

NOTES TO PP. 174-175

"turns down Mark Zuckcrbcigs recjiicst to name liis unborn child” at White
House dinner'. The hulepetident, \ October 2015.

W'lll Oremus, 'Why You lube keeps demonetizing videos of the Hong Kong
protests'. OfteZero, 8 July 2019, <https://onczcro.mcdium.com/why-youtube-

keeps-dcntonctizing-videos-of-the-hong-kong-protcsts-460da6b6cb2b>.

84 IVrsonal experience while following the protests on Twitter, also noted by a
number of other users.

85 See Brady, Magic Weapons, p. 10.

86 For example, Fiir eine bessere Welt—Ein Gastbeitrag des Staatsprasidenten
Xj Jinping anlasslich seines Besuches in Deutschland' [For a better world —a
guest comment by president Xi Jinping during his visit in Germany], website
of the Chinese embassy in Germany, 4 July 2017, <https://web.archive.org/
web/20191130192124/http.7/de.china-embassy.org/det/sgyw/t 1475300.
htm>.

87 Jichang Lulu, Chinas state media and the outsourcing of soft power’,
Asia Dialogue, 15 July 2015, <https://theasiadialogue.eom/2015/07/15/
chinas-state-media-and-the-outsourcing-of-soft-power/>.

88 Koh Gui Qing and John ShifFman, Beijing’s covert radio network airs China-
friendly news across Washington, and the world’, Reuters, 2 November 2015.

89 Diamond and Schell, eds, China’s Influence & American Interests, p. 82. See

also Gongsi gaikuang , [Company overview], website of EDI

media, not dated, <https://web.archive.Org/web/20190827155315/http://
www.edimediainc.com/zh/%e5%85%ac%e5%8f%b8%e6%a6%82%e
6%b3%81/>. EDI Media Inc Qing and ShifFman,

‘Beijing’s covert radio network airs China-friendly news across Washington,
and the world’.

90 James Su (Su Yantao ‘Team’, website of EDI Media, not dated,

<https://web.archive.org/web/201908271 55537/https://www.edimediainc.
com/en/team/>.

91 ‘About us’, website of GBTimes, not dated, <https://web.archive.org/
web/20190827155713/htrps://gbtimes.com/page/about-us>.

92 ‘GBTimes’, Media Bias/Fact Check, not dated, <https://mediablasfactcheck.
com/gbtimes/>; according to the company’s self-presentation, it jointly
belongs to Guoguang and Finnish company FutuVision. Sec <https://tinyurl.
com/sbmpgkk>. However, FutuVision is simply an earlier name of the Zhao’s
company GBTimes. See ‘About us’, website of GBTimes; Koh Gui Qing
and Jane Wardell, ‘Chinese radio broadcaster taps front men in Finland and
Australia’, Reuters, 2 November 2015.

93 Zhao Yinong does not deny receiving funds from CRI. See Qing and
ShifFman, ‘Beijing’s covert radio network airs China-friendly news across
Washington, and the world’.

94 Zhongxinshe daibiaotuan Anfang Fenian Huanqiu shidai chuanmei gongsi’

[Delegation from China

357

NOTES TO PP. 175-17G

95

96

97

98

99

News Service visits GlVl'Inies incitiu company in Finland), Ghlttit Newt
Senncfy 6 September 2016, <hitps://tinyurl.com/urs7.vmz>,

Jichang Lulu, 'China’s state media and the outsourcing of soft power',
Asia Dialogue, 15 July 2015, <https://theasiadialoguc.eom/2015/07/15/
cliinas-state-mcdia-and-thc-outsourcing-of-soft-powcr/>,

Lim and Bcrgin, ‘Inside Chinas audacious global propaganda campaign’.
About us, ChinaWatch website, not dated, <https://tinyurl.com/thlo2xh>;
Vanessa Steinmetz, Anmerkung: Dieser Ausgabe kann Propaganda beiliegen’,
Der Spiegel, 25 August 2016; <https://www.nytimes.com/paidpost/china-
daily/china-watch.html>; <https://tinyurl.com/vwg 3 ac 6 >.

Jack Hazlewood, China spends big on propaganda in Britain but
returns are low’, Hong Kong Free Press, 3 April 2016. According to estimates
published in the Hoover Institute report on Chinese influence, inserts would
cost around US$250,000 per year in US media. Diamond and Schell, eds
Chinas Influence & American Interests, pp. 83-4.

‘Ambassador Liu Xiaoming holds talks with the Daily Telegraph editors and
gives an interview’, website of the Chinese embassy in the UK 23 la„„a„
2019, <https;//tinyurl.com/yx5f4vtp>.

100 ‘Minis^r Ma Hui visits Telegraph Media Group and holds talks with the
editors website of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 21 June 2019
<http://archive.is/20egn>. ^

Chinese embassy holds symposium on “Xi Jinping Thought r^
is/Tpud6T”’ <http://lhive"

!o 3 propaganda campaign’

03 Xinhua, AP sign MOU to enhance cooperation, Xinhua, 25 November

20 8 , <https;//web.archive.org/web/20190827160133/http-//www
xinhuanet.com/english/2018-1 l/25/c_137630583.htm>; Josh Rogin

Congress demands answers on AP’s relationship with Chinese state meL’’
7 he Washington Post, 24 December 2018.

104 AP and Xinhua had previously signed an MoU in 2011.

Xinhua, 19 December 2011, <https-//web

archive.org/weh/ 20 191130194357/http://www.xinhuanet.com//2iliao/

xhsld/2011-12/19/c_l 22447652.htm>.

105 ‘Xinhuashe yu Lutoushe qingzhu hezuo 60 zhounian’ Iff ^

6 0 'I'- [Xinhua and Reuters celebrate 60 years of cooperation],

Xinhua, 30 June 2017, <http://www.xinhuanet.com/xhsld/2017-
06/30/c_l 12124l072.htm>.

106 'Fti Ying visited headquarters of Reuters Group’, website of the Chinese
Embassy in the UK, 4 July 2007, <https://tinyurl.com/wrpmqwa>. According
ro the report published by the Chinese embassy, ‘the two parties also
exchanged opinicTns on feasibilir.' of Reuters being listed in Shanghai Stock

358

NOTES TO PP. 176-178

I'Achangc and the ways to strengthen communications between Chinese and
British online news media.’

107 Anon., Exclusive Q&A with Chinese President Xi Jinping’, Reuters,
18 October 2015.

108 Anon., Xinhua launches Belt and Road info partnership with European
media, think-tanks, Xinhua, 2 December 2017, <https://tinyurl.com/
rwrh5bn>.

109 China, Portugal ink cooperation agreement on media exchange under BRI’,
XinhtM Silk Road Information Service, TJ February 2019, <https://tinyurl.
com/v3rwv3f>.

110 ‘Xinhua CEIS, DPA ink agreement to promote information exchanges’,
Xinhua Silk Road Information Service, 15 May 2018, <https://tinyurl.com/
s79wj2d>; ‘Athens Macedonian News Agency: News in English’, Hellenic
Resources Institute, 17 May 2012, <http://www.hri.org/news/greek/
apeen/2017/17-05-12_l.apeen.html>; Xinhua, AAP sign new agreement
for closer cooperation’, 12 September 2018, <https://tinyurl.com/swndpot>;
‘Italy-China: cooperation agreement between ANSA and Xinhua, Ansamed,
17 May 2016, <https://tinyurl.com/tt48dm5>.

111 ‘Cooperation agreement between Class Editori and China Media Group’,
Xinhua Silk Road Information Service, 2 July 2019, <https://tinyurl.com/
r3kovfm>.

112 ‘Xinhua, AP sign MOU to enhance cooperation’, Xinhua, 25 November
201 8, <https://web.archive.org/web/201 908271601 33/http://www.
xinhuanet.com/english/2018-1 l/25/c_137630583.htm>; Josh Rogin,

‘Congress demands answers on AP’s rclaiionship with Chinese state media,
The Washington Post, 24 December 2018.

113 Ruptly, ‘Australia: Chinese protesters rally against Souili Cdiina Sea ruling in
Melbourne’, Ruptly YouTube channel, 23 July 2016, <hups://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=jSeaPFxR\OLA>.

114 To, Qiaowtt, pp. 179-80.

115 Alexjoske, Reorganizing the United Front Work Department: new structures
for a new era ol diaspora and religious afiairs work’, Clhina Brief (Jamestown
Foundation), vol. 19, no. 9, 9 May 2019, <https://jamestown.org/program/
reorganizing-the-united-front-work-dcparuncm-ncw-structiires-lor-a-new-
era-ol-eliaspora-afid-religioits-aflairs-work/>. Nick McKenzie, Richard Baker,
Sashka Kololi and C.hris Uhlmann, 1 he C.liinese C.oimminist Party’s [tower
and inHuence in Australia’, ABC News online, 29 March 2018.

116 lb, Qiaowu, pp. 176—8.

117 Diamond atid Schell, eds, China's Influence cr American Interests, p. 85.

118 John Fitzgerald, 'Beijing's versus .Australia’s wav of life’. Inside Story,

27 September 2016.

119 Hamilton, Silent Invasion, p. -i 1.

359

NOTES TO PP. 178-179

120 Dan Levin, ‘Cliincse-Canadians fear Chinas rising cl

The New York Times, 27 August 2016. '* '^‘•zzling

121 Tom Blackwell, ‘Host on Chinese-language station in 'Ibro
fired for criticizing Beijing’, The County Weekly News, 8 00^6^

122 Blackwell,‘Hoston on Chinese-language station’. cr20l9,

123 “‘JianghaoZhongguogushi,chuanbohaoZhongguoshcnevin”l,.n, r.

juxing’ ■ijfjff't-aitt*, I'Tra-’"?

story well, spread China’s voice well’ forum held (in) Beijing], OuzhouShih^'

28 September 2016 , <https://web.archive.org/web/2019l 1301 95737 /^ *
www.oushinet.eom/qj/qjnews/20160928/243581.html>. Sec also Hamiho^^
Silent Invasion, pp. 42-3.

124 ‘Xiehui jianjie’ [Introduction to the Association], website of the

Association of Overseas Chinese Media in Europe, not dated, <https://
tinyurl.com/uuwrom9>.

125 ‘Ouzhou shibao wenhua chuanmei jituan’ [Guang

Hua Cultures et Media], website of Ouzhou Shibao, not dated, <https://
tinyurl.com/rqucaen>.

126 ‘Ouzhou shibao wenhua chuanmei jituan’, <https://tinyurl.com/rqucaen>.

127 ‘“Oushidai” shequ yonghu xieyi’ “l^lfJ [Nouvelles

d’Europe community user agreement], website of Ouzhou Shibao, not dated,
<https://web.archive.org/web/20190818202416/http://www.oushidai.com/

intro/agreement?local=eu>.

128 See the bottom of their homepage at <https://web.archive.org/
web/20190801 l63031/hrtp://\^'^\^v.eztvnet.com/>.

129 ‘Guanyu women: gongsi jianjie’ X* "J [About us:

introduction to the company], website of the Nordic Chinese Times,
<http://archive.today/2019.10.1H-162821 /lmp://nordicapd.com/content.
asp?pid=22>.

130 ‘Shanghui jieshao' (l.uroduction t.) the Cdiamber of Commerce],

<lutp://wcb.archivc.org/wcb/20190801204004/hf tp://acec.org.es/language/
•/h/alH)ut-4/>.

131 ‘Zhcngxic gongzuo baogao jicdu: yi feti vangyi minzhu fazhi jingshen

llntcrprctation of the work report of the CPECX:: a report filled with the
spirit ol democrac)’ and rule of law], (^hina.org.cn, 4 March 2008, <https.//
iiiiyurl.coni/sso2uxiJ>.

K>2 'Xibanva Ouluia cluiannicri jituan jianjie ^

[liurodiiction the vSpanish Ouluia Media (jroupJ, <luips://web. archive.org/
\veb/201 ^)0801 1 S0949/htip://ww\v.ouhua.inl()/2016/0527/7269.html>.

133 For example. \Vu Zuolai Xff X'. ‘Duiwai chuanbo yu svenhua jiaolu

[(• 111 * J fh[External communication and cultural anxiety], Duiwai
chtunho, no. 2009, pp. 14—15.

350

NOTES TO PP. 180-183

134 Andre Tartar, Mira Rojanasakul and Jeremy Scott Diamond, ‘How China is
buying its way into Europe’, Bloomberg, 23 April 2018.

135 Philippe Lc Corre, This is China’s plan to dominate Southern Europe’,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 30 October 2018, <https://
carnegieendowment.org/2018/10/30/this-is-china-s-plan-to-dominate-
southern-europe-pub-77621 >.

136 Website of Propeller TV, <https://web.archive.org/web/20190827155110/
https://www.propellertv.co.uk/>.

137 ‘China-UK media roundtable held in London’, CRIEnglish, 24 November
2015, <https://web.archive.org/web/20191130200506/http://english.cri.
cn/12394/2015/11 /24/53s905534.htm>.

138 Ben Kwok, Meet YamTak-cheung, the new Forbes owner’, ejinsight, 21 July 2014,
<http://^vww.ejinsight.com/20140721-yam-tak-cheung-new-forbes-owner/>.

139 Kris Cheng, Forbes terminates contract with writer after deleting article
critical of Asia Society tycoon’, Hong Kong Free Press, 30 July 2017.

140 Adam Jourdan and John Ruwitch, ‘Alibaba’s Jack Ma is a Communist Party
member, China state paper reveals’, Reuters, 27 November 2018.

141 <https://tinyurl.com/s69hmq2>.

142 Phila Siu, ‘Sweden “using me as chess piece” says detained Hong Kong
bookseller Gui Minhai in government-arranged interview’, South China
Morning Post, 9 February 2018.

143 PEN America, Darkcncfl Screen: Constraints on foreign journalists in China,
PEN America, 22 September 2016, p. 7.

144 Joshua Keating, ‘Bloomberg suspends China reporter amid censorship
scandal’. Slate, 18 November 2013.

145 Diamond and Schell, eds, China’s Injluence & American Interests, p. 93; PEN
America, Darkened Screen, pp. 13-14.

146 ‘US Journalists’ visit to (dtina in October 2018’, website of CUSEF,
2 November 2018, <https://tinyuil.com/vwvdr35>.

147 HumWxon, Silent Invasion, pp. 104-7.

148 ‘Sverige bar varit som en sdmngangare om Kina’ [Sweden has been like a
sleepwalker on China], Hxpressen, 23 February 2019, <https://www.cxpressen.
se/Iedare/ledarsnackysvcrigc-har-varit-som-en-somngangare-om-kina/>.

149 Melissa Chan, Cioodbyc to (,hina, country ot contradictions’, AlJazeera,
13 May 2012, <https://tinyurl.coni/ckko84e>; Tom Phillips, ‘French
journalist accuses Cdiina o( intimidating foreign press’, I he Guardian,
26 December 2015; Foreign (.orrespondents CTib ot C'hina, Under watch:
reporting in China's surveillance state, Foreign ('orrespondents ('hib of ('hina,
2018, p. 10; Anon., China denies credentials to Wall Street journal reporter’,
Reuters, 30 August 2019.

150 Foreign Correspondents Club of China, Under Watch, p. 12. The FCXX’
report only speaks of‘French media’.

361

notes to PP. 183-187

131 ^vinLum, ■«««»««/W journalist Victor Malic, al»

Kong after visa denial'. South China Morning Po„ 2 (V^r ""t

152 PEN America, 0.rnWW,p. 11 . ^ ^

153 Anon. 'China seeks to shape Hong Kong narrative with .

Bloo^ erg. 21 August 2019; &rhcrme Wong, 'China urges forei;";:^^

to help right public opinion wrongs” on Hong Kong pro,esi,'

Morning Post, 22 August 2019. (.htna

154 PEN America, Darkened Screen, p. 7.

155 Personal conversation, 25 February 2019, Berlin; email conversation
10 January 2020.

156 Amenez, Darkened Screen, ip. 16.

Chapter 10 Culture as battleground

1 Janette Jaiwen Ai, ‘The political use of Chinas traditions in contemporary
China, PhD thesis. School of Social and Political Sciences, the University of

Melbourne, 2012. , r . ru

2 Anon., ‘The CCP s “Cultural Leadership” history since the founding ol the

PRC. PeopB Daily, 10 November 2009. • ■ . vj-ik t-yiv

3 Liu Runwei ‘Hongse wenhua yu wenhua

(« IM ..1... .nd *",'1 'li.'. bk,

cn/coliinin/120.html>. • • cTvi yhanxian de zui da

um.ed iroill „iabili.sa,ion llirougl.

<lutps;//tinyurl.coni/rlkgz)l>, Anon.,

ic, he published’, China Daily, 2 January 20 9. ^ ^ ^

S I.in Jian Jf ‘Zhonghua wenhua haiwai c man 2 O April

tCmthimilMHi, originally P-^ of Socialism,

2019, republished on the website ot i J g
23 April 2019, <hitps://tinyurl.com/vcuhhx3>.

<lurps.7/tinyiirl.coni/tc2iizjx>.

<htrps://tinyiirl.coni/vk3ynian>.

<lutps://\vw\v.londondcsignbieniiaJc.com/sLipp^^f^ *rp of China Poly

‘Jituan jianjic [Inrroducrion to the group], webs

Group <https://tinyurJ.com rxez i . Barbara

<https://\\^vw.globalsecurity.org/niiJitary/worJd/c ina po y ^ s

Demick, ‘In China, “red nobility” trumps egalitarian ideals , o

7 /V//es, 4 March 2013. _ crW a Poly

11 'Jinum jianjie’ [Introduction to the group], website o *ri

Group, <https://tinyurl.com/rxez766>.

b

7

8

9

10

362

NOTES TO PP. 187-189

12 <https://fortunc.eom/global500/2018/china-poly-group/>. For its corporate

structure, see <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/poly.
htm>.

13 'About us: introduction, <https://tinyurl.com/rjlgvuu>.

14 ‘ClilFord Chance advises Poly Culture Group on HK$2.57 billion IPO’,
website of Clifford Chance, 7 March 2014, <https://tinyurl.com/wvqpyz9>.

15 <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/poly.htm>. Cain
Nunns, ‘China’s Poly Group; the most important company you’ve never
heard of’. Public Radio International, 25 February 2013.

16 He Ping’s bio on CAIFC website, <http://archive.today/2019.10.04-

08043l/http://www.caifc.org.cn/content.aspx?id=4267>. See also Bo
Zhiyue, ‘Who are China’s princelings?’. The Diplomat, 24 November 2015.

17 Anon., ‘Mapping China’s red nobility’, Bloomberg, 26 December 2012.

18 Sam Cooper and Doung Quan, ‘How a murky company with ties to the
People’s Liberation Army set up shop in B.C.’, Vancouver Sun, 26 August
2017. See also <https://www.weforum.org/people/xu-niansha>.

19 ‘Chairman XU Niansha was awarded Great Officials of Star of Italy’, website
of Poly Culture Group, 28 July 2017, <https://tinyurl.com/qk6httf>.

20 Jiang Yingchun China Daily, 12 September 2018, <https://tinyurl.

com/uxkjh4k>.

21 Zheng Xin, ‘Poly Group set to boost ties with global partners’, China Daily,
21 September 2018.

22 Zheng Xin, ‘Poly Group set to boost ties with global partners’.

23 ‘China-Germany friendship concert successfully held in Cologne Cathedral
by Poly WcDo’, website of Poly Culture Group, 19 July 2017, <https://
tin)mrl.com/s257rzn>.

24 ‘About us: introduction’, <https;//tinyurl.com/rjlgvuu>; Cooper and Quan,
‘How a murk}' company with ties to the People’s Liberation Army set up shop
in B.C.’.

25 <http://beijing.lps-china.com/partners/poly-art/>.

26 Cooper and Quan, ‘How a murky company with ties to the People’s
Liberation Army set up shop in B.C.’.

27 Anon., ‘U.S. lists new Iran sanctions on several Chinese firms’, Reuters,
12 February 2013.

28 Bob Mackin, ‘Hard currency, soft power: Poly (Culture rolls into British
Columbia’, South Chifui Morning Post, 7 December 2016.

29 <https://tinyurl.com/ttvf3kf>; see also <https://twitter.com/geofi_p__wade/
status/1084683664380768256>. Poly Culture North America’s interim
2018 report noted that it had held ‘three high-end thematic exhibitions and
32 cultural exchange events’, <https://tinyurl.com/yx3t3xhp>.

30 Wengehua Zhonghua wenhua cujinhui jiepai chengli’

\L [Vancouver Chinese Culture Promotion Association

363

31

32

33

34

35

36

37

38

39

40

41

42

43

44

45

46

47

I^OTES to Pp, 189^,
inaugurated], Dahuawam 17 1..1

node3/n5/nl8/ulai26835.html>^ ^ <‘i«p://cla'.

Sam Cooper and Brian Hill, ‘Alleged gana kin •

MB’s law firm to launder money througlf B C
11 June 2019. ^ deal’, Qhhal News,

<https://tinyurl,com/r2ceb84>.

Zak Vescera, Local Chinese grouns take mif r... c'

•ArlAV > Ty " P''®‘Communist Party ad<

amidst Hong Kong protests, Vancouver Sun, 26 lunc 2010 m ^ T
• nni/' r' r'U • I . J nc /UI7. Note too that

m 2016 George Chow was appointed an honorary adviser to theTeo Chew

Society of Vancouver, <https://tinyurl.com/vydwptb>. The current president

of this group is Feng Rujie who in 2018 was appointed an oversea.s

council member of the 10th Committee of the All-China Federation of

Returned Overseas Chinese, <https://tinyurl.com/tn9obxe>.

Douglas Quan, ‘Defence minister ripped for attending gala honouring

Chinese Communist Party anniversary’. National Post, 30 September 2019.

Bob Mackin, ‘B.C.’s Premier and L-G to skip Communist China’s 70th

birthday parties’, The Breaker, 28 August 2019. Chow’s trip to Guangzhou

was also reported by the OCAO Guangzhou, see <https://tinyurl.com/

sbh 8 kxq>.

Sean Brady, ‘Kamloops’ Chinese community provides input on museum
proiect’, Kamloops This Week, 19 Januaty 2019.

Bndv ‘Kamloops’ Chinese community provides input on museum projea .
r ^nff Wide ‘Spving beyond the facade’, The Strategist, Australian Strategic
iClicy iHMiru.c, 13 Novcmlx-r 2013. ■I-Ik' name, u^d by ‘l.ffer becauae

,|,i, „.,s written prior to CItina', tnajor tnilitary reform tn 2015-16.

,,,„p;//www,caifc,org.ct./en/ig«J.a,,.x?cid=28>t <ht.p://www.catfc.org.cn/

ct./c„ntent.a,p,vrid=108.3>. ^ Liberarion Army General

M'lrk Stokes and Russell risiao, l i [ Prniecr

Politioal Departtnent: political warfare with Chinese eharttcrertsete,. Pro,ec

2049 Institute, 14 October, 2013. rf.ner-il Political

.Stokes and Hsiao. The Peoples l.iberatton Army General

Oepartineiu', p. 25.

W^ade, 'Spying beyond the facade .

Wade, 'Spying beyond the fac^adc .

Andv KroU and Russ Choma, ‘Businesswoman who bought Irump p
is connected to Chinese Intelligence Front Group’, Mother Jones, 5

China Arts Foundation (dt ^ 4> ^ ^<https://cinyurl.com/
stlxdro; <hrtps://tinyurl.com/rz5rm43>. ^ ^ ^

Zheping Huang, i\n intricare web ties the woman who paid $16 million o
Trumps condo to China's power elite’, Quartz, 17 March 2017.

Anthony Tommasini, ‘Let it rain! (After the music, of course) , 77^^ New
York Times, 14 July 2010. Photos of the concert are featured on the AfKT^s

364

NOTES TO PP. 191-192

Faccbook page. Chinese websites announcing it: <http://ent.sina.com.
cn/y/2011-08-08/11063380366.shtml> and <https://tinyurl.com/sb8f6bv>.

48 Anon., ‘Was Lang Lang’s propaganda song a jab at White House?’, CBS News,

24 January 2011.

49 <https://tinyurl.com/rol7pdp>.

50 <http://blacktiemagazine.com/International_Society/Shanghai.htm>.

51 <https://tinyurl.com/uxs4tor>.

52 <https://www.guidestar.org/profile/33-l 156962>.

53 <http://gaa.lucita.org/about_who_angela.shtml>; Anon., ‘New York
Philharmonic forms international advisory board’, Broudway World,
29 October 2014.

54 Anon., ‘New York Philharmonic forms international advisory board’.

55 Andy Kroll and Russ Choma, ‘Trump just sold a $15.8 million condo to a
consultant who peddles access to powerful people’. Mother Jones, 27 February
2017.

56 Kroll and Choma, ‘Businesswoman who bought Trump penthouse is
connected to Chinese intelligence front group’.

57 <https://rsvitter.eom/chinaartsintl/status/604404511197827072/photo/1>;

<https://rsvitter.coni/chinaartsintl/status/604405504643862529/photo/1>.

58 Anon., ‘New York Philharmonic forms international advisory board’.

59 Kroll and Choma, ‘Businesswoman who bought Trump penthouse is
connected to Chinese intelligence front group’.

60 <https://wss^v.thcquestforit.com/photos/it_charity_invites/china-arts-

foundation_ballet_tiftany-event.html>.

61 <https://tinyurl.com/tl8j59j>; <https://tinyurl.com/revjsda>; <https://
rsvitter.com/chinaartsintl?lang=cn>; <https://tinyurl.com/wmm2bwl>.

62 Huang, ‘An intriaue ss’cb ties the woman who paid $16 million for Trumps
condo to China’s posver elite’.

63 <https://tin)airl.com/s'qsvt2bb>, Huaxing Art froiipe

64 Another project is Chinese Mutual Aid Centers. See ‘Qiu Yuanping wei xin yi

pi “Huaxing yishutuan” jie pai’ /till [Qhi

Yuanping unveils plates lor new batch ol Htiaxing Arts IVoupes], Qiaowang,
28 September 2016, <https://tinyiirl.coni/stwvanl>.

65 <https://tinyurl.com/svb3sv7.rj>; Cdiongyi Feng, ‘How the Chinese
Communist Party exerts its inlluencc in Australia: detained prolessor, ABC
News online, 6 June 2017.

66 ‘Deguo Falankelu Huaxing yishutuan chenggong ban chunwan’

[Frankfurt Huaxing Arts Froupe successfully
organises Spring Festival gala]. Global limes online, 7 February 2018; <https://
tin)mrl.com/t7zahaj>.

67 <http://w\\'%\'.chinaconsulatechicago.org/eng/lghd/tl 547374. htm>.

68 <https://tin\airl.com/)'xq9zxgx>. T —

^ l/i tU A. 2 A ^ ^ ^

365

69

70

71

72

73

74

75

76

77

78

79

80

81

82

83

84

85

86

87

88

89

90

91

'^OTES to pp. ,33,

195

Nick McKenzie, Nick Toscano and Grace T b' •

linb: how Amtralias casino got tied up with

<https://tinyurl.com/uhz76hf>. ' ’ 28 July

Jeff Yang, ‘The shocking viral

3 May

2018.

Joyce Siu, in vogue: patriotic ladies revive “Oioao” fir ’ c

4 January 2018. ^ 7^.

Anon., ‘Qipao fans step out worldwide’, China Daily, 18 May 2015
Anon., ‘Qipao fans step out worldwide’.

<https://tinyurl.com/r8qxjbj>; <https://tinyurl.com/u3sd4ww>.
<https://tinyurl.com/uqhdt7k>.

<https://tinyurl.com/ru889ws>.

<https.7/tinyurl.com/sogu336>.

<https://tinyurl.com/vlseqh5>. There seems to have been an internal dispute in
2017. From 28 April 2017, Wang Quan is no longer ‘chairman’ of the Chinese
Cheongsam Association. In the same year, Wang set up the China Qipao
Society Global Alliance, <https://tinyurl.com/s5ywoe6>; <https://tinyurl.
com/r4gwmy8>. The China Qipao Association more recently translates its
name as the Chinese Cheongsam Association. There are a number of other
societies celebrating the qipao, <https://tinyurl.com/uxz61bo>.

<https://tinyurl.com/wbvgofd>. ,. n l

Anon., ‘Chinese Qipao Federation lands in Germany, Peoples Daily,
23 January 2018. , c jun

<lntps://tinyurl.com/ujhwanb>; <https://tinyurl.com/sfcdb3s>.

<https://tinyurl.com/wp69pyc>.

<https://tinyurl.com/uz215niz>.

<h,.ps://uMyurl.co„,/un^5/7c>; <h..ps://tinyurl.com/lw2:i5m>

In ,hc word, of ,he direcor of cl.e United Front Theory Depa *

LUoning party school, Shen Van, 'Use culture to

Iron, work u, ihe new era (W iM <https.//

rinvurl.com/sb3nbr5>. .j ju u^r xraUies

Slum Renping, ‘Canadian Miss World contestant misguided y

Globiil Times, 29 November 2015. FaJun

Anon., ‘Canada’s Miss World finalist Anastasia Lin comes o

Gong practitioner’, South China Morning Post, 28 August 2015. pin

Anon., 'Canada’s Miss World finalist Anastasia Lin comes out a
Gong practitioner’.

Tom Blackwell, 'Ottawa man says Dragon-boat festival CEO ordere im
remove Falun Gong shirt, citing Chinese sponsorship , National Post, 1 J >
2019.

Anon., ‘US town arts center removes paintings depicting President
Xi Jinping’, Radio Free Asia, 4 February 2019.

366

NOTES TO PP, 196-198

')2 Anon., US town arts center removes paintings depicting President
Xi Jinping’.

93 Anon., Zhang Yimous 'One Second” abruptly pulled from Berlinale’, Asia
in Cinema, 11 February 2019.

94 Patrick Prater, ‘Banned in Berlin: why China said no go to Zhang Yimou,
Variety, 11 February 2019.

95 Anon., Ai Weiwei hits out at self-censorship by Western organizations after
film is cut’. Radio Free Asia, 21 February 2019.

96 <https://audi-konfiizius-institut-ingolstadt.de/en/institut/ueber-uns.html>.

97 Anon., ‘Ai Weiwei hits out’.

98 Amy Qin, Dissident artist Ai Weiwei is cut from film; producer cites “fear of
China’”, The New York Times, 19 February 2019.

99 Anon., ‘Ai Weiwei hits out’.

100 Qin, ‘Dissident artist Ai Weiwei is cut from film’.

101 Tim Winter, One Belt, One Road, One Heritage: cultural diplomacy and
the Silk Road , The Diplomat, 29 March 2016; Zhang Xinjiang, ‘“Belt and
Road” boosts Chinese cultural industry’, China Daily, 2 May 2018.

102 <http://www.xinhuanet.com/ent/2016-l l/17/c_l 119928799.htm>. Full
text in Chinese at <http.7/archive.today/2019.10.05-001738/https://www.
scio.gov.cn/xwfbh/xwbfbh/wqfbh/37601 /38866/xgzc38872/Document/
1636159/1636159.htm>.

103 At least according to this article: <http://archive.today/2019.10.05-002647/
https://www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/xwzx/gnxw/1384l.htm>. Others give different
numbers.

104 Diana Yeh, The cultural politics of invisibility , in Ashley Thorpe and Diana
Yeh, eds. Contesting British Chinese Culture, London: Palgrave, 2018, p. 49.

105 Yeh, ‘The cultural politics of invisibilit)'’.

106 The League of Theatres is headquartered in Beijing’s Xicheng district. The
Peoples Daily WTOtc that the decision to establish the Silk Road International
League of Theatres was an extension of the strategic partnership between
the China Arts and Entertainment Group, the government of the Xicheng
district, and Beijing Lianqiao Zenith Investment Citoup (a state-owned
local company specialising in cultural performances, established in 2014),
<https://web.archive.org/web/20190208040104/http://ydyl.people.com.
cn/n 1/2018/0402/c411837-29901477.html>. Beijing lianqiao Zenith
Investment Group is a large company committed to build a comprehensive
production chain of culture and performing arts’, <https.7/web.archive.org/
web/20190208041156/http:/wwvv.bjtqss.com/index.php?m=content&c=
index&a=lists&catid=7>.

107 <http.7/www.xinhuanet.com/ent/20l6-l l/17/c_l 1 19928799.htm>.
Chinas Minister of Culture Luo Shugang said the establishment of the Silk
Road International League of Theatres was a creative achievement under the

367

'^otes to pp,

201

framework of the Belt and Rn ^ i ■ •

108 N T' f i" v'*'"''‘-“■J '“'""O'-™*

108 National Development and Reform r„ ^ 2'* Octobe, am,

“One Belt, One Road” Cultutal Devclonr"'T"'
website 2016 <l'ttp://www.„drc.gov cn fej« "l"
t20170720_855005.html>. ®®®''Bigh/ghwb/gjigl,/2oi7f/7/

109 <h^fps://web.archive. org/web/20l8082219204T/1,f // i

membets/>,<httpi//www.xmhuanet.com/e„t/20,6-U/,7t:i^

110 *e uncanny, unsettling world of ShenYun', Th,

New Yorker, 19 March 2019.

111 <http://leeshailemish.com/on-shen-) 7 un/whos-afraid-of-shen-yun/>.

112 Frank Fang, ‘Document reveals Beijing pressured UN diplomats to boycott
Shen Yun performances’, Epoch Times, 21 February 2019.

113 Juan Pablo Cardenal and Heriberto Araujo, China c^uiso prohibir el estreno
de una obra de teatro en Barcelona’, ElMundo, 6 April 2014.

] 14 <http://leeshailemish.eom/on-shen-yun/20l4/03/30/chinese-embassy-epic'

fail-in-berlin/>.

115 Copy of email in possession of authors. On 20 July 2019 Stacy Lyon was
emailed and offered an opportunity to comment or explain. She did not
reply.

116 Andreas Boje Forsby, ‘Diplomacy with Chinese characteristics: the case of

Denmark’, Asia Dialogue, 18 December 2018. In 2012 Danish police forces
‘.systematically prevented peaceful pro-Tibet demonstrators from exercising
their constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom of speech when Hus
motorcade toured the streets of Copenhagen . ^

1 17 Anon, ‘Xi urges Spanish enterprises to make best use of CUE platform,

China Daily, 29 November 2018.

118 Janita Kan, ‘Chinese embassy pressured theatre to cancel Shen un
pciTormances in Spain, investigation reveals , Epoch Times, 29 January 2019

1 19 Anon., ‘El Ecatro Real acercara al publico chino su contenido a traves de la
platafornia culniral online Palco Digital , hnropa Press, 1 April 2019. T
report does not appear to be an April bools Day spoof.

120 Amy Qin and Audrey Carlsen, ‘How China is rewriting its own script’, The
New York Times, 18 November 2018.

121 Qin and Carlsen, ‘How China is rewriting its own script .

122 <https://twitter.com/markmackinnon/status/1 15224l649893945346>.

123 Pradeep laneja, 'China-India bilateral economic relations, in Kanti Bajpai,
Selina Ho and Manjari Chatterjee, eds, Roiitledge Hundbook on China—hidiei
Relations, London: Routledge, forthcoming.

124 Anon., Xi sends letter to congratulate 70th anniversary of national writer,
artist groups’, China Daily, 16 July 2019.

368

NOTES TO PP. 201-203

125 hxtrick Boehlcr and Vanessa Piao, ‘Xi Jinpings speech on the arts is released,
one year later’, The New York Times, 15 October 2015.

126 Joel Martinsen, The Chinese Writers’ Association: what good is it?’, blog
post, Dotiwei, 17 November 2006. In his history of Chinese literature,
Hong Zicheng wrote that the more important functions of the CWA ‘were
to exercise political and artistic leadership and control of a writer’s literary
activities, and to guarantee that literary norms were implemented’, Hong
Zicheng, A History of Contemporary Chinese Literature, Leiden: Brill, 2007,
p. 27. Deng Xiaoping s daughter Deng Rong is a member of the Chinese
Writers’ Association, see <https://web.archive.org/web/20150322033230/
http://www.chinaartsfoundation.org/cn/leadership.html>.

127 Oiwan Lam, ‘Two writers publicly resign amid the Chinese Communist
Party’s tightening grip on culture’, Hong Kong Free Press, 20 March 2016.

128 On University of Waterloo, see Anon., ‘Our quilts: one world same
dream’, China Daily, 2 May 2014; <https://www.writersunion.ca/member/
yan-li>. On Melbourne Writers Festival, see Hamilton, Silent Invasion,
pp. 239—42. On University of Iowa, see <https://iwp.uiowa.edu/programs/
life-of-discovery/2012>.

129 Alex Joske, ‘Reorganizing the United Front Work Department: new structures
for a new era of diaspora and religious affairs work’, China Brief, vol. 19,
no. 9, 9 May 2019.

130 Adrain Zenz, ‘You can’t force people to assimilate. So why is China at it
again?’. The New York Times, 16 July 2019.

131 Anon., ‘Chinese Catholic bishop ordained with Pope’s approval’, BBC News
online, 28 August 2019.

132 See Hamilton, Silerrt Invasion, pp. 243—4.

133 Julia Bowie and David Gitter, ‘The CCP’s plan to “Sinicize” religions’, The
Diplomat, 14 June 2018; Laurie Chen, ‘Red Hag for Buddhists? Shaolin
Temple “takes the lead” in Chinese patriotism push’, South China Morning
Post, 28 August 2018.

134 Geoff Wade, tweet, 2 August 2018, <https://twitter.com/geoft_p_wade/
status/1024960867778093056>.

135 <https://www.dpmchina.org/directors-blog/chinas-plan-to-sinicize-religions>.

136 Rhiana Whitson, ‘Communist Party-linked group holds event at Hobart’s
Parliament House, Tasmanian politicians attend’, ABC News online,
5 December 2017.

137 <https://tinyurl.com/qsup4cp>.

138 <https://twitter.eom/alexjoske/status/l 161052811334828032?lang=en>.

139 Reported in David Gitter et al.. Party Watch, Centre for Advanced China
Research, Weekly report 3/1, 28 September 2019.

140 Lauren Teixeira, ‘He never intended to become a political dissident, but then
he started beating up Tai Chi masters’, Deadspin, 3 October 2019.

369

Notes to pp.

205-207

Chapter 11

1

3

4

5

nmK ranks and thought leaders

Quoted in Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian ‘Th* n

finding policy research at Washington’s mn.r * n billlonai,. h

Policyt 28 November 2017. ucntial in$(i(utiont’«

«^SJ 27 Oc.„?:;20,4" hf

mingpaocanada.com/van/htm/News/ 20 l 4 l 027 /tcbfl r htm'>^

<https://tinyurl.com/wy8bj7x>.

‘Professor John L. Thornton Honored Friendship Award’, Tsinghua SEM

13 October 2008, <https://tinyurl.com/v3zb7yf>. ^

‘About us’, <http://www.silkroad-flnance.com/en/about/>; ‘John

Thornton: Chairman of the Board’, <http://www.silkroad-’financc.
com/en/our-team/>. The SRFC has its own think tank, the Silk Road

Research Center, whose executive vice chairman is princeling Li Xiaolin,
daughter of former premier Li Peng, <https://twitter.com/geofF_p_wade/
status/1067775094875799562?lang=en>. Speaking to partners at Renmin
University, Li Xiaolin said that the centre is ‘a new type of think tank with
Chinese characteristics established to serve the “One Belt, One Road”
initiative’. See ‘Executive Vice Chairman of the Silk Road Planning Research
Center LI Xiaolin visits RUC’, website of Renmin University, 7 May 2018,
<https://www.ruc.edu.cn/archives/32079>.

6 ‘John Thornton: Chairman of the Board’, website of Silk Road Finance
Corporation, not dated, <hrtps://web.archive.org/web/20190606092335/
http://www.silkroad-finance.com/en/our-team/>; ‘Li Shan: huiguo
chuangye bi zheng qian geng you xingfu gan’ ^lil: 0

[Li Shan: returning to China and starting a business makes
me happier than earning money], Sina, 1 November 2011, <https://web.
archive.org/web/20150921232843/http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2006-11 -

01/102911389539.shtml>.

7 Rachelle Younglai, ‘The man with the key to China: Barrick Gold’s quest to
open new doors’, Ihe Globe and Mail, 6 December 2013, <https://tinyurl.
com/whrnclx6>.

8 ‘Professor John L. I hornron Honored Friendship Award , Tsinghua SEM,
13 October 2008, <https://rinyurl.com/v3zb7yf>.

9 ‘About the Brookings-Tsinghua Center for Public Policy’, website of
the Brookings Institution, not dated, <https://www.brookings.edu/
about-the-brookings-tsinghua-center-for-public-policy/>.

10 Brookings China Council launches on the eve of Obama-Xi Summit ,
website of the Brookings Institution, 22 September 2015, <https://
www.brookings.edu/news-releases/brooki ngs-china-co uncil-launches-

on-the-eve-of-obama-xi-summit/>.

11 <https://twitter.com/PekingMike/status/107144 1 574528192512>; <https://
threadreaderapp.com/thread/1084191340232142849.html>; Edward Wong

370

i:

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

NOTES TO PP. 207-208

and Michael Forsythe, ‘China’s tactic to catch a fugitive official: hold his two
American children’, The New York Times, 25 November 2018.

Isaac Stone-Fish, ‘Huawei’s surprising ties to the Brookings Institution’, The
Wiishiugtot! Post, 7 December 2018.

‘Donors to Chatham House’, website of Chatham House, <https://\vww.
chathamhouse.org/about/our-funding/donors-chatham-house>.

‘H.E. Ambassador Liu Xiaoming meets with director of Chatham House
Dr Robin Niblett CMC’, website of the Chinese embassy to the UK,
6 January 2017, <https://web.archive.Org/web/20190823174422/http://
\\'ww.chinese-embassy.org.uk/eng/tpxw/tl429999.htm>.

Robin Niblett, ‘What the world can expect from the Boris Johnson
government’. The Hill, 30 July 2019.

Yu Jie, ‘Britain needs to decide what it wants from China’, Chatham House,
26 February 2019, <https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/
britain-needs-decide-what-it-wants-china>.

‘Spotlight: overseas experts laud Xi’s speech on China’s foreign policy’,
Xinhua, 24 June 2018, <https://tinyurl.com/vdpkss5>.

‘Ambassador Liu Xiaoming attends “Vision China” hosted by China Daily
and delivers a keynote speech’, website of the Chinese embassy to the UK,
15 September 2018, <https://tinyurl.com/u2qmg8e>; <https://tinyurl.com/
v72jauj>.

‘Interview: consumers to underpin Chinese growth in coming years, says Jim
, Xinhua, 13 September 2019, <https://tinyurl.com/woj965n>.

Lei Xiaoxun and Wang Minglei, ‘Analysts agree that vision puts China on
right track’, China Daily, 21 October 2017.

‘Lord Browne of Madingley’, website of Chatham House, not dated, <https://
www.chathamhouse.org/about/governance/panel-senior-advisers>.

‘EU—China economic relations to 2025: building a common future’, a
joint report by Bruegel, Chatham House, China Center lor International
Economic Exchanges, and the Chinese University ol Hong Kong’,
September 2017, < https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/

eu-china-economic-relations-2025-building-common-future>.

‘Next steps in renminbi internationalization’, Chatham House, not dated,
<https://tinyurl.com/umd56fr>.

‘About the Paulson Institute’, website of the Paulson Institute, not dated,
<http://www.paulsoninstitute.org/about/about-overview/>.

‘A first gathering for implementation of the Green Investment Principles for
the Belt and Road’, 26 September 2019, <https://tinyurl.com/vgtbxyu>.

See for example articles filed under Macro Outlook, <https://macropolo.
org/analysis_category/macro-outlook/>. Neil Thomas, ‘Matters of record:
relitigating engagement with China’, Macro Polo, 3 September 2018.
‘Vice-premier meets former US treasury secretary Henry Paulson’, website of
the Chinese government, 11 April 2019, <https://tinyurl.com/tuknw6a>.

371

notes to P. 209

28 ‘Chen Jining meets with Chairman of Paulson Institute’, website , ^
government, 15 April 2019, <http://www.cbcijing.Kov.cn/rr ^

Mayor_office/OfficialActivitics/tl583250.htm>. '^'crnment/

29 ‘Chen Jining meets with Chairman of Paulson Institute’, website of Beijing
government, 15 April 2019, <http://www.ebei)ing.gov.cn/Govcrnmcnt/
Mayor_office/OfricialActivities/tl583250.htm>. The report does not
mention what the MoU was on, much less provide the full text of the
document. Based on the Paulson Institute’s previous work with Chinese
partners, it may have been about green finance.

‘China issues first certificates for overseas NGOs’, China Daily, 21 January

2017, <https://web.archive.org/web/20191201150112/http://www.china'
daily.com.cn/china/2017-01/24/content_2804l563.htm>.

CGTN America, ‘Authors say Western-style democracy won’t work in
Hnnrr Kone’ CGTN America YouTube channel, 17 October 2014.
S.//J:.,oucube.co™/wacch?v=n.hANA.POxg>. See al. CG^
Anaela, ‘Nicola. Berggruen on “Giving Pledge and .hmk CGTO

Lerica YouTube channel, 21 April 2015. <https://www.you, ube.com/

CCT^rcra^-Ai'-ay Westetn-scyle democracy won't work in Hong

30

31

32

36

37

33 /.hang Weivvi. / m"! 2017, <https://

,|„ws-rton.-pt.>speti.y<...dpO,,.pe.encc>^^

On Zheng Biji:.n. s« "''"'"/'yiJ.'J„ent_12581303.htm>.

l,„p://u'ww.cnd.s.cn/contcn - <https://web.archive.org/

On Understanding China con ere , org/people/group/21 st-

wel./:()in082I155415/h..ps://www.betgg g

cc-ntnry-couiKil/>: Rachel - . dialogue on global

University announce new hub or ,„sritute, 6 June 2018,

transformations affecting hiimanit) , i gg . ‘Chinese President

<ltttps://tinynrl.com/v.xgl/.3t>. See also at | Berggruen Institute,

Xi hoping meets the 21st Century Council .n Bc.j.ng , bergg
3 November 2015, <https://tinyurJ.com/s5frygq>. co-founder

'CUDS Chairman Zheng Bijian met with Berggruen Bereeruen

Nathan Gardels last weekend to discuss globalization an in ,

Institute on Twitter, 18 July 2017, <https://rwitter.com/berggr
status/88734235470054l952>. ,

‘The 3rd “Undersranding China” conference , <hrcps.//web.arc iv g
web/20190921003945/hrrp://img-CA"ol.com/img/ news/ ddzg.pdf>- ^

Pc?sr and Berggruen Institute partner to publish VC^ovldPost ,

The Washington Post, 6 Februarv^ 2018, <hrrps://\v^^.washingTonpost.com/

34 On

372

NOTES TO PP. 209-210

pr/wp/ 2018 / 02 / 06 /the-washington-post-ancl-thc-berggruen-institute-part-

ncr-to-publisli-thc-worldpost/>.

^8 The Huffington Post runs many articles under the WorldPost label and
republished Zhang Weiwei s praise of Chinas political model. See In China,
unlike Trump’s America, political legitimacy is built on competence and
experience’, Huffington Post, 3 March 2017.

39 Tiffany Li, ‘China’s influence on digital privacy could be global’, The
Washington Post, 7 August 2018.

40 Song Bing, ‘China’s social credit system may be misunderstood’. The
Washington Post, 29 November 2018; ‘Song Bing’, <https://www.berggruen.
org/people/bing-song/>. Hat tip to Mike Forsythe on Twitter. The
argument that the social credit system has not been portrayed accurately in
the media has merit, but Song Bing’s article portrays the system much too
positively.

41 ‘Daniel Bell’, <https://www.berggruen.org/people/daniel-bell/>; <https://
chinamatters.blogspot.com/ 2012 / 11 /its-not-freedom-vs-truth-its-daniel.
html>.

42 Mark Mackinnon, ‘Canadian iconoclast Daniel A. Bell praises China’s one-
party system as a meritocracy’. The Globe and Mail, 24 November 2012.

43 Andrew Nathan does a brilliant deconstruction of Bell in ‘The problem with
the China model’, Chinajilc, 5 November 2015.

44 ‘Gaoju dangmei qizhi, liixing zhize shiniing’

[Holding high the banner of Party media and performing the duties of the
mission], website of the Cyberspace Administration of China, 26 April 2017,
<hrtps://tinyurl.com/vn 39 gs 8 >.

45 ‘Gaoju dangmei qizhi, liixing zhize shiming’

[Holding high the banner of Party media and performing the duties of the
mission].

46 Mark Stokes and Russell Hsiao, ‘ The People’s Liberation Army General
Political Department: Political warfare with (diine.se characteristics’. Project
2049 Institute, (October 2013, p. 25; Bethany Allen-F.brahiniian, ‘This
Beijing-linked billionaire is funding policy re.search at Washington’s most
influential institutions’. Foreign Policy, 28 November 2017.

47 For example, <https://web.archive.Org/web/201909l4l72232/https://www.
eastwest.ngo/sites/default/files/us-china-sanya-initiative-dialogue -10 th-
meeting.pdf>: ‘The EastWest Institute (FIWI) convened the 10 th anniversary
of the U.S.-China Sanya Initiative from October 27 to 29, 2018. The dialogue
was made possible through the generous support of the China-United States
Exchange Foundation (CUSEF) and other private donors and was organized
in close partnership with the China ..Association for International Friendly
Contact (CAIFC). See also Michael Raska, ‘China and the “three warfares’”.
The Diplomat, 18 December 2015.

373

NOTES TO PP. 211-212

^8 Tony Cheung, ‘Former Hong Kong leader 'Fung Choc-hwa acc
United States and Taiwan of orchestrating “well-organised” recem^^T*
China Morning Post, 31 July 2019. ^'

‘Our founders’, <https://www.fungfoundation.org/our-foundcrs/>; <httfw;//

'vww.cuse£org.hk/dr-victor-k-fung/>.

50 The full name of this foundation is ‘The Victor and William Fung
Foundation’. See <https://www.Aingscholars.org/about/>.

51 ‘Mission’, AmericaChina Public Affairs Institute, not dated, <https://www.

americachina.us/mission>.

52 ‘Goals’, AmericaChina Public Affairs Institute, not dated, <https://www.
americachina. us/goals>.

53 <https://efile.fara.gOv/docs/5875-Short-Form-20150204-162.pdf>; ‘About’,
website of BLJ Worldwide, not dated, <http://www.bljworldwide.com/

about-us/>.

54 ‘Podesta, Tony, lobbyist profile: summary 2017, Center for
Responsive Politics, <https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/lobbyist.

php.>id=Y0000046505L&year=2017>.

55 Richard Pollock, ‘Tony Podesta made $500k lobbying for Chinese Arm
convicted of illegal sales to Iran’, Daily CalUr, 17 March 2017.

56 ‘Center For American Progress Visit 2016’, website of CUSEF, 23 June

2016, <https://www.cuscforg.hk/high-levd-dialogucs/center-for-american-

progress-visit-2016/>.

57 Robert Henderson, ‘China: Great power rising’, in B. McKercher (ed.),
Roudedge Handbook of Diplomacy and Statecraft, London: Routledge,

2021, p. 70.

58 Center for American Progress, ‘U.S.-China high level dialogue’, <https://

wiki leak; *.org/podesta-eniails/filcid/96l2/2554>.

59 Bethany Allen-Lbrahimian, ‘This Beijing-linked billionaire is funding
policy research at Washingtons most influential institutions’, Foreign Policy,
28 November 2017.

60 Fr.inyois Godement and Abigael Vassclicr, China at the Cates. A new power
auilit of HV-China relations, Ix)ndon: European Council on Foreign Relations,
2017. p. 78.

61 Jonathan (.)liver, ‘Which way will Nick Clegg turn.^ , Sunday limes, 25 April
2010.

62 Pierre Detraigne, letter to Politico in response to its article China-backed

think tank exits Brussels , <https://u'\s'xv.coleurope.eu/system/tdf/uploads/

pvii;c/ madariagu^/yr/V^>en.p(Jfrhlc= 1 &;rvpe=nodc&:id=9804&force>.

63 Janie'S Panichu 'China-backed chink rank exics Brussels’, Politico^ 23 July
20 IS.

64 Oewinter werkee voor Chinese "spion .* “.AJs hij een spion was, was ik James
bond , Gii'Z<n van Anvii'erpen. 12 Xovember 2018, <hn:ps://w^^v.gva.be/cnt/
dnil201S1112__03^\^>9^/^/hlip-de\vinrer-werkre-voor'chinese-spion>.

374

NOTES TO P. 213

65 Anon, Sichou zhi lu hepingjiang jijinhui zhuxi, hoping zhi lii lishizhang
Shao Changchun kan sichou zhi lu renwen hezuojiang huodezhe
Wcikcduo Youxianke boshi’

ilr [Shao Changchun, Chairman of Silk Road Peace Prize Foundation and
Chairman of Peace Journey visits Dr. Victor Yushchenko, winner of the
Silk Road Humanities Cooperation award], website of Beijing Peace Tour
Cultural Exchange Center, 21 March 2018, <https://web.archive.org/
web/20190823180811 /http://www.peace-art.org/detail/602.html>.

66 Pierre Defraigne, letter to Politico in response to its article ‘China-backed
think tank exits Brussels, <https://www.coleurope.eu/system/tdf/uploads/
page/madariaga/)o//>/Voen.pdf?file= 1 &type=node&:id=9804&force>.

67 For example, EU-China relations seminar for the students of the College
of Europe (17/01)’, College of Europe, <https://web.archive.org/
web/20190920155437/https://www.coleurope.eu/news/eu-china-relations-
seminar-students-college-europe-17/01>; ‘International conference: “a new
order or no order? Continuity and discontinuity in the EU-China-US
relationship , College of Europe, <https://tinyurl.com/see2o4w>.

68 ‘China-EU human rights seminar emphasizes diversity’, China Daily, 29 June
2018.

69 Euractiv, ‘EU-China: mending differences’, special report, 29 May—2 June
2017.

70 Luigi Gambardella: Eu-China should move beyond stereotypes’, in Euractiv,
‘EU-China: mending differences’, special report, 29 May—2 June 2017,

pp. 10-12.

71 ‘Mission’, ChinaEU, <http://www.chinaeu.eu/mission/>.

72 Nicholas Hirst, ‘Europe’s Mr. China’, Politico, 31 May 2017.

73 Reported meetings have taken place with Federica Mogherini, Andrus Ansip,
Jyrki Katainen, Eric Peters, Mariya Gabriel, Edward Bannerinan, Carlos
Moedas, Aare Jiirvan and Hanna Minrikus, <https://www.integritywatch.eu/>.

74 Chen Yingqun, ‘ChinaEU chief responds to Xi speech’, China Daily,
16 November 2016.

75 ‘Europe-China forum: cooperation, competition and the search for
common ground’, event held on 28 November 2018, <https://web.archive.
org/web/201 909 14 160202/https://www.triendsofeurope.org/events/
europe-china-forum-cooperation-competition-and-the-search-for-com-
mon-ground/>; ‘Europe-China policy &: practice roundtable’, event held
on 18 November 2019, <https://web.archive.org/web/201909l4l60854/
https://\^A\'^v.friendsofeurope.org/events/europe-china-policy-practice-
roundtable-2/>.

76 Zhu Oumeng shituan tuanzhang Zhang Ming dashi chuxi di ershiyi ci Zhong
Ou lingdaoren hui\\'u zhengee chuifenghui bing fabian zhuzhi yanjiang’

375

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l''M^ijt/2l(i'^7t^J|/n7'7 (Sinologist Pickc: my job is to lift the veil on peoples
stereotypes on (.liinaj,/W/rr/. 14 August 20)8, <https://www.jiemian.com/
aitiele/2383387.)it;nl>.

90 Open letter l)y Mf.RIC^S clircxtor an d CEO Frank N. Pieke', MERICS,

I October 2019, <https://wcb.archivc.Org/wcb/20191201l53357/https.//
www.nierics.org/en/china-flash/opcn-Jetter-merics-direcror'and'CecHfrarik'

n-pieke>.

376

NOTES TO PP, 216-217

91 ‘Press release: leadership change at MERICS’, MERICS website, 22 January
2020, <https://www.merics.org/cn/china-flash/prcss-relcase-leadership-
change-merics>.

92 Tom Plate, The world can think its way out of a US-China deadlock,
starting by reading Singapore’s Kishorc Mahbubani’, South China Morning
Post, 22 April 2019.

93 ‘Remarks by Ambassador Lu Shaye at the Seminar on China-Canada
Relations’, website of the Chinese embassy in Canada, 24 May 2019,
<https://web.archive.org/web/20191201161606/http://ca.china-embassy,
org/eng/gdxw/11666127.htm>.

94 Jeffrey Sachs, The war on Huawei’, Project Syndicate, 11 December 2018.

95 For a commentary on the affair, see Jichang Lulu, ‘Huawei’s Christmas battle
for Central Europe’, Sinopsis, 28 December 2018.

96 ‘Digital nation: stronger economy, better society, adept governance’, Huawei
position paper, November 2018, p. 2, <https://tinyurl.com/ubatdru>.

97 Sachs has also dismissed concerns when asked about tech theft. See Cristina
Maza, ‘China is using cyberespionage against U.S. to gain military and
technology advantages, report reveals’, Newsweek, 9 May 2018.

98 Matthew Russell Lee, ‘UN @JeffDSachs fled Twitter after shown as CEFC
adviser by Inner City Press Now Roanoke Cyprus’, Inner City Press,
20 February 2019.

99 Jichang Lulu uncovered and documented some of these functions on Twitter,
<https://web.archive.org/web/20191201 163721 / https://twitter.com/
jichanglulu/status/1076864146707283968>.

100 Kristie Lu Stout, ‘Jeflrey Sachs: Irump’s war on Huawei is “a danger to
the world’”. You l ube, 12 December 2018, <hi tps://www. you tube.com/
watch?v=N5 1 a_RhsXYY>; CBC' News, 'Canada doing U.S. bidding in
Hiuiwei case, economist s;iys’, YouTube, 15 December 2018, <lutps://w\vw.
youtube.com/watch.\'=NKX0tCC80SU>.

101 Li Qingqing, ‘Is neo-McC'arthyism what US elites want to see?’. Global
Times, 17 December 2018.

102 Yen Nee Lee, ' Frump’s “economic illiteracy” caused the US-Cdtina trade war,
s;iys professor', CNBC, 23 .March 2019.

10.^ Mission ik History’, website of the C?ommittee of 100, <htips://web.archive,
org/web/20 19092 1 0 1 3849/h 11 ps://www.commi t tee 1 00.org/mission-
history/>. A 2013 mission statement, now taken down, explained that (?100’s
stance ‘does not align with any political party in the United States or with
any government in .\sia, 'Mission A: History , website of the Committee of
100, archived version from 30 December 2013, <https://w'eb.archive.org/
web/20190921013849/https://www.committee 100.org/mission-history/>.

104 Mission &: History, website of the Committee of 100, archived version
from 30 December 2013, <https://web.archive.org/web/20131230025620/
https://\\'\\Av.committeelOO.org/mission-histor\'/>.

377

notes to PP, 218-219

web/20190921 o73849/h«p°!/w!^rmlTtte\MtT

106 See for example Deirdre Shesgreen. Trapped,

r4":p!3:e;2o“

107 See Mark Simon, 'How the "Committee of 100" is doing Beijing's bidding
in the US’, Hong Kong Free Press, 1 May 2019. ‘The Committee of 100 i$ a
pro-Beijing group, concerned almost exclusively with the interests aligned
with those of the Chinese Communist Party.’

108 <https://tinyurl.com/spehtk9>.

109 For example, ‘Guowuyuan Qiaoban zhuren Qiu Yuanping huijian Meiguo
“Bairenhui” huizhang’

[Qiu Yuanping, Director of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the
State Council, meets with the President of the U.S. Committee of 100],
website of the Chinese government, 16 April 2013, <https;//web.archive.

org/web/20190907233857/http://www.gov.cn/govweb/gzdt/2013-04/l6/

content_2379247.htm>.

110 Liu Yandong huijian Meiguo “Beirenhui daibiaotuan

Hi'A [Liu Yandong meets delegation from U.S. ‘Committee of

fo,,iyizhan.ian. 30 November 2007 ‘’''■

nre/wcb/20191201 1 80958/http://www.hztyax.org.cn/ariicle/132.html>, ^

k .h„ fnbuzhane pilu Dalai siren daibiao tijiao wenjian ne.rong

„“jL. w,i ivp,™.., "tsr;'D "irita

Dalai Lama’s personal representative], > /9nn81?07/

weLrcl,ive.org/web/20 1 909072307 1 5/h.tp://news.sohu.com/2008

„261060735.shiml>. riJSEF not dated, <https://

I ,2 -Mr. Ronnie C, Chan: governors , webs, e CUSEF, nor d ^ F

.vvwxuseforg3,k/e„/who-we.re/ourdeaders,p/_

Qi/ong' IRonn.e Chan), webs.te of t e ^

not dated, <https;//web.archive.org/web/20190824 / F

org.cn/Director/Mcmber.aspx?Jd-969>. Society of

113 Kris Cheng, ‘“Disappointed”: Joshua Wongs party 2017- Anon

self-censorship following "han"', Hong Ko„g tree lm>. 7 ^

■l.„rhes dele.es art.cle on Asia Society billionaire Chattman
BCM„ieei„e. 20 July, 2017; Tom Grundy, 'Deleted Forbes art.cle cr.ttc^mg
Asia Socien^ nxoon resurfaces online amid accusations o censors ip ,

Kong Free Press, 20 July 2017. u u r

114 Denise 'King, ‘Ronnie Chan: philanthropist taking charity through the roo ,

South China Morning Post, 22 September 2014.

115 ‘Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shisan

ge wu nian (2016-2020 nian) guihua gangyao’ rjd @ @ R;

= (2016-2020^) [Outline of

378

NOTES TO PP. 219-220

the Thirteenth Five-Year Plan for the economic and social development of
the Peoples Republic of China (2016-2020)], website of the government
of China, 17 March 2016, <http://www.gov.cn/xinwcn/20l6-03/17/
content_5054992.htm>.

116 ‘Zhonggong Zhongyang Bangongting, Guowuyuan Bangongting yin fa
"Guanyu jiaqiang Zhongguo tese xinxing zhiku jianshe de yijian’”

[The General Office of the Central Committee of the CCP and
the General Office of the State Council issue the ‘Opinion on strengthening
the construction of new type think tanks with Chinese characteristics’],
website of the Chinese government, 20 January 2015, <https://web.archive.
org/web/201908241622 5 9/http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2015-01 /20/
content_2807126.htm>. See also ‘Liu Qibao zap guojia gaoduan zhiku
lishihui kuoda huiyi shang qiangdiao tuidong gaoduan zhiku jianshe shixian
lianghao kaiju’

JF.^, Xinhua, 22 January 2016, <http://'www.
xinhuanet.eom/politics/20l6-01/22/c_l 117867512.htm>.

117 ‘Huang Kunming: dazao shiying xin shidai xin yaoqiu de gao shuiping zhiku’

[Huang Kunming:

creating high-level think tanks that meet the new requirements of the new
era]. People's Daily Online, 21 March 2019, <http://politics.people.com.cn/
n 1 /2019/0321 /cl 001 -30988496.html>.

118 ‘About us: who we are’, website of the Charhar Institute, not dated, <https://
web.archive, org/web/20191201 184 54 8/http://en. charhar.org.cn/index.
php?a=lists&catid=9>.

119 ‘Dr. Han Fangming, founding chairman’, website of the Charhar Institute,
<https://web.archive.org/web/20191201 18465 7/http://en.charhar.org.cn/
index.php?a=lists&catid=l 1>.

120

121 Anon., ‘China to introduce dual-management on think tanks’, Xinhua,
4 May 2017.

122 Chun Han Wong, ‘A rare champion of pro-market policies to close in China’,
The Wall Stieef Journal, 27 August 2019; Nectar Gan, ‘Chinese government
pressured property agent into welding iron gates to liberal think tank office
doors, penning in workers, director says’. South China Morning Post, 11 July
2018.

123 ‘Geren jianjie' [Sell-introduction], personal website of Wang

Huiyao, <https;//web.archive.org/web/20190825 l60957/http://scgti.org/
wanghuiyao/plus/list.php?tid= 11 >.

124 ‘2019 Munihei Anquan Huiyi zhuanti yantaohui chenggong juban,
chongjian xin duobian zhixu cheng guoji jiaodian’ 2019^/SM$^^

[2019 Munich

379

notes to PP. 220-222

Security Conference successfully held; building a new mi,I, it .

becomes international focus), personal website of Wang 1 |Mt„,

2019, <littps://web.archive.org/web/20l90S25I6I859 /Lo,,/'

wanahiiiVan/^/rlr^nm-of/on 1 O/no 1 O /1 onr\ I . i ''

-- ... '.a

[Chinese think tank holds official side event at Munich Security Conference
for the first time bringing together international voices to discuss new
opportunities of the ‘Belt and Road’], personal website of Wang Huiyao,
18 February 2019, <https://web.archive.org/web/20190825162042/http;//

scgti.org/wanghuiyao/a/dongtai/2019/0218/1901 .html>.

126 ‘Huiyao (Henry) WANG’, Paris Peace Forum, <https://parispeaceforum.org/
place/huiyao-henry-wang/>.

127 Hou Lei, ‘Top level think tank set up for policymaking’, website of the
Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN, 3 April

2009, <vvvm.china-un.org/eng/gyzg/t555926.htm>.

128 ‘Zhongguo guoji jingji jiaoliu zhongxin jianjie 4^ ffl ffl PT- ^ .

[Intmdlcrion .0 cbe China Center for International Economte
Exchanges), website of CCIEE. not dated ebttps:/we .arch.ve.org/
wcb/20190803152321 /ht.p://w'V'v.cdcc.org.cn/llst.aspx. dm - ^

m Ktilii IM.I. I”'-™'rSTccik

,c.sp<)nsibilincs of institutions insi ^ ^ ^ _ j j 32 /h„p://ws\^v.c

dated, <https://web.archive.org/web/20190803l53132/http

org.cn/list.aspx.AlniId=635>.

130 hi and Xu, 'Cdiinese think tanks .

131 <https://tinyurl.coni/vd92dkhp>.

132 <https://tinvurl.coni/yd92dkhp>. renter for International

133 lias, .-\sian Unreal, of Economic Kesearcl. economic

Economic lixclianges, hmnmhiffir Cbmge. Austral.a-Cbin )

report, Canberra: ANU Press, 201 6. fnrnre’ a

134 'F,U-China economic relarions to 2025: budding a commo

joint report by Bruegel, Chatham House, China Center ^ r^-mber

Economic Exchanges, and the Chinese University of Hong

2017. <http://bruegel.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/CH J -

China_EU_Report_1709I3_WEB.pdf>.

135 'About us’, website of theTaihe Institute, not dated, <hrtps. 7 /web.archive.org

web/20181109140630/hrtp://s\'\s-w.taiheglobai.org/en/gywm/index.html>.

1,56 Nadege Rolland, ‘Alapping the footprint of Belt and Road influence
operations’, Sinopsis, 12 aAugust 2019; ‘“Yi dai yi lu” guoji zhiku luntan
iijiang zai Dunhuang juban’

380

NOTES TO PP. 222-224

Center for China and Contemporary World Studies, 14 September 2018,
<https://web.archive.org/web/20190825154017/http://www.cccws.org.cn/
Detail.aspx.>newsId=4800&TId=103>; ‘Belt and Road Studies Network
inaugurated’. Belt and Road Studies Network, 24 April 2019, <https://
tinyurl.com/vplnujy>.

137 Rolland, Mapping the footprint of Belt and Road influence operations’.

138 ‘Silk Road Think Tank Network declaration on joint action’, website of the
Silk Road Think Tank Network, 16 May 2017, <https://web.archive.org/
web/20190920203610/http://www.esilks.org/about/declaration>.

139 Isaac Stone Fish, ‘Beijing establishes a D.C. think tank, and no one notices’.
Foreign Policy, 7 July 2016.

140 See Jonas Parello-Plesner and Belinda Li, ‘The Chinese Communist Party’s
foreign interference operations: how the U.S. and other democracies should
respond’, Hudson Institute, June 2018, p. 38.

141 Anon., Making waves: China tries to strengthen its hand in a dangerous
dispute’. The Economist, 2 May 2015.

142 Author interviews, April 2019.

143 Advisory board , website of ICAS, not dated, <http://chinaus-icas.org/
about-icas/advisory-board/>; Myron Nordquist, ‘UNCLOS Article 121 and
Itu Aba in the South China Sea Final Award: a correct interpretation?’, in
S. Jayakumar, T. Koh, R. Beckman, T. Davenport and Hao Duy Phan, eds,
The South China Sea Arbitration: The legal dimension, Edward Elgar, 2018.

144 Bateman, Sam S. , website of the University of Wollongong Australia, not
dated, <https://scholars.uow.edu.au/display/sam_bateman>.

145 Sam Bateman, ‘Rethinking Australia’s plan B’, ASPl Strategist, 29 October
2018.

146 Sam Bateman, The South China Sea arbitration ruling—two months on’,
AS PI Strategist, 21 September 2016. H e did not note his link to ICAS.

147 Gordon Houlden, Opinion: why the South (diina Sea decision matters to
Canada’, Edmonton Journal, 1 5 July 2016.

148 ICAS, Panel 1: risk of U.S.-China strategic competition’, ICAS YouTube
channel, 28 May 2019, <https.7/www. youtube.com/watch?v=F 1 LNEy 2 eHzA>;
ICAS, Luncheon speech: Ms. Susan rhornton’, IC'AS You lube channel,
28 May 2019, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7.8_K51m_l Im8>: ICAS,
Panel 1: Cd\ina-U.S. relations at a time ol flux’, KJAS You lube Channel,
8 July 2018, <https://www.youtube.coin/watch?v=NrgRvMACpxk>; ICAS,
ICAS Interview with Michael Swaine’, ICAS You l ube channel, 1 August
2016, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Yx30n YKPr7M&t=55 ls>;
Duncan DeAeth, Chinas actions consistent with status-quo in Taiwan
Stniit says ex-LIS State Dept, officitil’, Taiwannews, 26 April 2019.

149 China-CEE Institute , website of the China-CEE Institute, not dated,

<https://web.archive.org/web/20190419075129/https://china-cee.eu/
structure/>.

3S1

NOTES TO PP. 224-228

150 ‘News and events’, website of the China-CEE Institute, not dated, <https://
archivc.is/EB8MN>.

151 ‘Introduction of the World Forum on China Studies, website ol the China-
CEE Institute, not dated, <https://web.archive.org/web/20190921182720/

http://www.chinastudies.org.en/zgxltcl/l.htm>.

152 ‘China’s reforms help deepen common interests of US, China, World
Forum on China Studies, 25 May 2015, <https://web.archive.org/
web/20190921183120/http://www.chinastudies.org.cn/e/967.htm>.

153 ‘European symposium of World Forum on China Studies held in Berlin’,
World Forum on China Studies, 13 July 2017, <https://web.archive.org/
web/20190921183615/http://’www.chinastudies.org.cn/e/1517.htm>.

Chapter 12 Thought management: CCP influence in Western academia

1 These are three out of the four confidences that have been promoted under
Xi Jinping. The fourth is confidence in Chinese culture.

2 Liu Jianming, ^0^^, Deng Xiaoping xuanchuan sixiang yanjiu

[Research on the propaganda thought of Deng Xiaoping],
Shenyang: Liaoning renmin chubanshe, 1990, pp. 164—5.

3 Liu Jianming, Deng Xiaoping xuanchuan sixiangyanjiu

[Research on the propaganda thought of Deng Xiaoping].

4 Hao Yongping and Huang Xianghuai ‘Renmin Ribao

renmin yaolun: zengqiang xueshu zixin jiangqing Zhongguo daolu’A^

[Peoples Daily people’s

essential theory: increase academic confidence to clearly explain the Chinese
path]. People's Daily online, 23 February 2018.

5 ‘Jigou zhineng’ Ult^JlJ/U]l£ [Institutional functions], website of the National
Office for Philosophy and Social Sciences, 19 September 2018, <https://
web.archive.org/wcb/20 1 90802 1 54705/lutp://www.npopss-cn.gov.cn/
n 1 /2018/0919/c220819-30302949.html>.

6 Chen Zhuanghai , ‘Jianshe juyou ziti tese he youshi de xueshu

huayu tixi’ tliv^ JirYf f 1 iZW [Establishing an

academic discourse system with our own characteristics and strengths]. Peoples
Daily online, 23 May 2016, <http://theory.people. com.cn/nl/2016/0523/
c49157-28370464.html>.

7 See ‘Putong gaozhong Yingyu kecheng biaozlum (2017)’

(2017). ‘Putong gaozhong Deyii kecheng biaozlum (2017)’

4' (2017). We arc indebted to Katja Drinhausen for bringing

this to our attention.

8 Ingrid d’Hooghe, Annemarie Momulei, Marijn de Wolff and Frank N. Pieke,
Assessing Europe—China Collaboration in Higher Education and Research,
Leiden: Leiden.A.siaCentre, 2018, p. 11.

9 Editorial board, A prolessor at China’s premier university questioned Xi
Jinping. Then he was suspended’, The Washington Post, 28 March 2019; Didi

3S2

NOTES TO PP. 228—229

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

Tling, Professor Zheng Wenfeng suspended for saying Chinese history is
owrrated’, The Times, 22 August 2019.

Quoted in Anon., A message from Confucius’, The Economist, T1 October
2009.

David Shambaugh, Chinas propaganda system: institutions, processes and
efficacy’, China Journal, no. 57, January 2007, p. 50.

How many Confucius Institutes are in the United States?’, National Association
of Scholars, 9 April 2018, last updated 15 July 2019, <https://www.nas.org/

blogs/dicta/how_many_confucius_institutes_are_in_the_united_states>.

Benedict Rogers, How Chinas overseas Confucius Institutes pose a powerful
threat to academic freedom, Hong Kong Free Press, 5 May 2019.

This has not always been the case, but some institutions that did not follow
this arrangement have faced problems for precisely this reason. For instance,
the Confucius Institute Lyon was founded as an independent, not-for-profit
organisation in 2009. However, three years later, Hanban began demanding
the Cl be integrated into the University of Lyon, suspending its annual subsidy
for the institute without warning. The institute was closed in 2013 after the
two sides failed to find a solution. ‘Lyon Confucius Institute closure’, personal
website of Gregory Lee, the former director, <https://www.gregorylee.net>.
Alexander Bowe, Chinas Overseas United Front Work: Background and
implications for the United States, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission, August 2018, p. 13.

Rachelle Petersen, Outsourced to China: Confucius Institutes and soft power
in American higher education, New York: National Association of Scholars,

2017.

Petersen, Outsourced to China, p. 88.

Geoff Wade, Confucius Institutes and Chinese soft power in Australia’,
Canberra: Parliamentary Library, 24 November 2014; Hamilton, Silent
Invasion, p. 218.

Anon, Dalian Waiguoyu Xueyuan fabui waiyu yuanxiao youshi tuidong
Ciang Ao lai haiwai tongzhan gong/uo “wu xin” fazhan’

^l'7/ci’lld 1-f1'“ [Dalian Foreign

Studies University gives full play to the advantages of foreign language colleges
and promotes five new’ developments in united front work in Hong Kong,
Macau, laiwati and overse.as], website of the Ul'WD, 12 July 2018, <http://
archivc.ph/ 2019.03.18-05.3516/http://w ww.zytzb.gov.cn/ tzcx/291691.
jhtml#selection-217.0-226.0>.

Robert burton-Bnidley, 'China’s Confucius Institutes have spy agencies and
governments increasingly alarmed , ABC News onWnc, 10 March 2019.

Letter of protest at interference in IiACS Conference in Portugal, July
2014 , European A.ssociation of Chinese Studies, <https://web.archive.org/
web/20140809004S32/http://www.chinesestudies.eu/index.php/433-letter-
of-protest-at-interference-in-eacs-conference-in-porrugal-july-20l4>.

383

NOTES TO PP. 230-232

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

31

32

33

3-»

3(3

ChinA Confucius ImUiutcs: An inquiry by th, Comcrvuiivc Parsr H
Rights Commission, February 2019, <http;//conservativeh„m

newr/2019/CPHRC_Conft,cius_I„srieu,es_repor, FEBRm72mT'

Chinas Confiscius InsHtutcs: An inquiry by the ConservaUve Pursy Human RM,
Commission. 4""

Henry Jom, ‘Victoria Uni cancelled documentary due to Chinese consular
pressure, documents reveal’, NTD, 3 December 2018.

‘Staff code of conduct’, <https://policy.vu.edu.au/document/view.

php?id= 176&version=2>.

Anon., ‘Sydney University criticised for blocking Dalai Lama visit’, The
Guardian, 18 April 2013.

Adam Harvey, ‘Uni under fire for pulling pin on Dalai Lama event’, ABC
News online, 18 April 2013.

Jordan Baker, ‘China debate raises spectre of White Australia Policy, says uni
chief’. The Sydney Morning Herald, 23 August 2019.

Fergus Hunter, ‘Foreign influence showdown as universities decline to register
China-funded Confucius Institutes’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 21 March
2019.

Diamond and Schell, cds, China’s Influence & American Interests, p. 41. In an
interview with the BBC, Madam Xu Lin also confirms this when she claims
that the teachers that arc sent arc Chinese citizens and therefore must obey
Chinese hiw (1:12-1:28). John Sudworth, ‘('onfucius Institute: the hard side
of China’s soft power', BBC, 22 December 2014.

Daniel Sanderson, 'Universities "sign Chinese gagging clause’”. The Times,
5 Sc|uembcr 2018.

Daniel Ciolden. (diitta sa\s no talking Tibet as Confucius funds U.S.
universities'. Bloambng 2 No\ ember 201 I; 1 lannah Knowles and Berber Jin,
W'arnirtgs o( C'hinese government "itrlhtctrce" on campuses divide Stanford
cornmutrit) . Stanfoid Ihnly. 30 Ma\ 2019.

Shian\- lVrc/-('Ireng, La ernlrajada dc C.'hina err Fsparia coacciono a la
Universidad de Salarnarrca para cancelar cventos culturales de Taiwan’
( The t hittesc ernbasss' in Spain coerced the University of Salamanca
to cancel birltiiral eserrts oi laiwanj, Suciupolitica de Asia Pactfico,
2S Aitgust 2018. ,hitps://dcasiapacifico.wordprcss.com/2018/08/25/

la-embaiada-de-china-en-espana-coacciono-a-la-univcrsidad-dc-salamanca-

para-cancclar-e\entos-v ijltijrales-dc-iaiwan/>.

Maine Hou and t'luing Vir-Uicn. .MOT.A condemns attempted exclusion
s't laiwan student.s in Hungary , IuiU> Juitvan, 4 .May 2019.

\anessa Frangville y \ancvsaTrangvi, iwitter status, <https://twitter.com/
\anessaFrangsi 1 status. !112-!l 10355431426>.

.\nastasya Lloyd-Damnianovic, A. lAelimtnary Study ojPRC Political Influence
and Inrerre’r^'.ce Act:: Amerzean Higher Education, Washington D.C.:

Wilson Center. 2018, p. ~4.

NOTES TO PP. 232-233

37

38

39

40

41

42

43

44

45

46

47

feer Marris and Alex Joske, 'The third magic weapon: reforming Chinas
united front , War in the Rocksy 24 June 2019.

•Guanyu xueiian’ [About the Association), website of the Chinese

Students and Scholars Association UK, <https://tinyutl.com/ttx6gh5>.

-pA . See BUCSSA jieshao’ BUCSSA [Introduction to BUCSSA),
website of Boston University's Chinese Students and Scholars Asociation,
not dated, <https://weh.atchive.otg/web/20190802 1 54850/http://www.
bucssa.net/portal.php>; ‘Guanyu women' [About us), website of

Vanderbilt University Chinese Students and Scholars Association, <https://
web.archive.otg/web/20190802154939/https://studentorg.vanderbilt.edu/
vucssay?page_icl= 14>.

Lloyd Damnjanovic, A Preliminary Study of PRC Political Influence and
Interference^ Activities in American Higher Educatiomy Diamond and Schell,
eds, China's Influence & American InterestSy pp. 180-1.

See 2005 nian Kunshilanzhou Zhongguo xuesheng xuezhe lianyihui gongzuo
huiyi shunli zhaokai’ 2005^

[2005 Queensland Chinese Students and Scholars Association work
conference held successfully], website of the Chinese embassy in Australia,
11 May 2005, <http://archive.ph/2019.08.27-232636/http://au.china-
embassy.org/chn/zagx/jyjl/tl95066.htm#selection-287.0-287.26>. According

to the article, the Education Division ol the consulate funded ‘meaningful
activities, with a locus on large-scale events with over 200 participants’.
Hooghe, Montulet, de Wolfl and Picke, Assessing Europe-China collaboration
in higher education and research, p. 27.

Ben Packham, China diplomat slapped down over uni protest’, The
Australia?!, 27 July 2019. 1 he siudeiu who was assaulted, Drew Pavlou,
sought a court order restraining the consul-general. The court action was
unresolved at the time of writing.

jenniler Creery, 19ont mind the haters: 1 ibetan-Canadian student Chemi
Lhamo brushes oH pro-C.hina cyberbullying campaign’, llon^ Kong Free Press,
31 March 2019.

Jenniler Creery, Dont mind the haters; f. Kennedy, 'U[)date on petition’,
<https://www.change. 0 rg/p/ 11 pdate-on-peti 1 ion>. 1 he original text of the
petition seems to be no longer available, only an update, added alter the
cyberbullying received a backlash. 1 he cjuotcs and content cited here are
Irom the updated (and presumably watered down) text ol the petition.

Cerry Shih and Emily Rauhala, Angry over campus speech by Uighur activist,
Chinese students in Canada contact their consulate, film presentation’. The
\^iishingto?i Post, l4 Februarv 2019.

Justin Mowat, Mc\faster student government bans Chinese students’ group
Irom campus , CBC, 26 September 2019.

385

NOTES TO PP. 233-236

AS

49

50

51

52

53

54

55

56

57

58

59

60

61

62

63

64

65

Shih and Rrtuhula, 'Angry over campus speech by Uighur
Lloyd-Damnjanovic. /I Study of PRC Political Influence and

Interference Activities in American Higher Education, pp. 76-7.

Hooghc, Montulet, de WolfFand Pieke, Assessing Europe-China Collaboration
in Higher Education and Research, p. 27.

Personal communication, February 2019.

Perry Link, ‘China: the anaconda in the chandelier’, ChinaFile, 11 April

2002.

Sheena Chestnut Greitens and Rory Truex, ‘Repressive experiences among
China scholars: new evidence from survey data’, China Quarterly, 1 August
2018, p. 18; Lloyd-Damnjanovic, A Preliminary Study of PRC Political Influence
and Interference Activities in American Higher Education, pp. 56, 64-5.
Greitens and Truex, ‘Repressive experiences among China scholars’, p. 3.
Lloyd-Damnjanovic, A Preliminary Study of PRC Political Influence and
Interference Activities in American Higher Education, p. 45.

‘The debate over Confucius Institutes: a ChinaFile conversation’,
ChinaFile, 23 June 2014, <http://www.chinafile.com/conversation/
debate-over-confucius-institutes>.

See for example Edward Wong, ‘China denies entry to American scholar
who spoke up for a Uighur colleague’. The New York Times, 7 July 2014;
Perry Link, ‘The long shadow of Chinese blacklists on American Academe’',
Chronicle of Higher Education, 22 November 2013.

See Greitens and Truex, ‘Repressive experiences among China scholars’.
Personal experience, December 2017. The pattern was the same for others
the authors know who didn’t get a visa.

Concerned scholars of China, ‘An open letter from concerned scholars of
China and the Chinese diaspora: Australia’s debate on “Chinese influence’”.
Policy Forum, 26 March 2018.

^non., ‘Shifou tingzhi “Zhongguo shentoulun” Aodaliya liang pai xuezhe
^henfengxiangdui’

[Two scholarly factions in Australia clash on whether or not to stop the
Chinese infiltration debate’], Global Times online, 29 March 2018.

See testimony of Prof. Christopher Hughes (LSE) at the UK House of
Commons Foreign Affairs Committee on ‘Autocracies and UK Foreign
Policies’, 3 September 2019, <https://tinyurl.com/wwhv9ch>.

See Christopher Hughes, ‘Confucius Institutes and the university:
distinguishing the political mission from the cultural’. Issues & Studies,

vol 50, no. 4, December 2014, pp. 49-50. , ttl' u (

See re«imonv of Prof. Christopher Hughes (LSE) a, ^ House of

Commons Foreign Affairs Conrmittee on ®

Policies’. 3 September 2019.

Paul Musgrave. ‘Universitres arent ready for

Policy, 19 May 2019.

386

NOTES TO PP. 236—238

(,6 ‘Canadas foreign student enrolment took another big jump in 2018’,
ICEF Monitor, 20 February 2019, <https://monitor.icef.eom/2019/02/

cinadas-foreign-student-enrolment-took-anothcr-big-jump- 2018 />.

67 ‘International student statistics in UK 2019’, Studying-in-UK.org. <https://

mx'W.studying-in-uk.org/international-student-statistics-in-uk/>. Students

from India and the United States, the next two countries after China, are
under 20,000 each.

(kS Hazel Ferguson and Henry Sherrell, ‘Overseas students in Australian higher
education: a quick guide, website of the Parliament of Australia, 20 June 2019,

<https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/

Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rpl819/Quick_Guides/OverseasStudents>.

69 Josh Rudolph, UCSD stands by Dalai Lama invite despite protest’, China
Distal Times, 17 February 2017,

70 Lloyd-Damnjanovic, A Preliminary Study of PRC Political Influence and
Interference Activities in American Higher Education, p. 62.

71 ‘Introduction of the World Forum on China Studies’, website of the World
Forum on China Studies, <https.7/web.archive.org/web/20190802155359/
http://www.chinastudies.org.cn/zgxlte 1 /1 .htm>.

72 Liu Xiangrui, ‘Sinologists gets a look at local culture’, China Watch,

17 July 2018, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/china-watch/culture/sinology-

programme-beijing/>. Going by the URL, this article looks like it’s from The
Telegraph, but its not. Its one of the many China Watch articles prepared by
the China Daily.

73 R^g waiguo xuezhe jiang hao Zhongguo gushi 2019 qingnian Hanxuejia

yanxiu jihua Shanghai ban kaiban’ 4> H 2019#^

[Let foreign scholars tell China’s story well—
2019 Young Sinologist Training plan Shanghai class begins], Dongfangwa? 2 g,
17 June 2019, <https://web.archivc.org/wcb/20191128022003/http://www.
gxnews.com.cn/staticpages/20190617/newgx5d072662-18423310.shtml>.

74 ‘Chinese government special scholarship—CEE special scholarship ,
website of Chinas University and College Admission System, <https://

web.archive.org/web/201 90802155554/https://scholarship.cucas.edu.
cn/China_You th_Uni versi ty_for__Poli tical_Sciences__scholarships/
Chinese__Governmen t__Scholarships__scholarship/Chinese_Government_
Special_Scholarship_CEE_Special_Scholarship_scholarship_l 884.html>.

75 Lloyd-Damnjanovic, A Preliminary Study of PRC Political Influence and
Interference Activities in American Higher Education^ p. 58.

76 Waiguoren xiezuo Zhongguo jihua” di si qi zhengji zhiyin fabU

;^lj ^ 1^3 ^ I [Guidelines for fourth call of

Foreigners Writing on China Project’ published], website of the Chinese
Culture and Translation Studies Support Research Center, 22 August 2019,
<https://web.archive.org/web/2019112802555 l/http.7/\v^vw.cctss.org/article/
headlines/5386>.

387

notes to PP. 238-241

,, M.CC,. Moo„, «

Crllwi,''Power, kriowledge and .he universities', Al^
9 February 2012, <littps://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/02/
201 2269402871 736.html>.

‘China Executive Leadership Program’, website of the China Development
Research Foundation, <https://web.archive.org/web/20190802155639/

http://cdrf-en.cdrf.org.cn/qgb/index.jhtml>.

Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, ‘This Beijing-linked billionaire is funding
policy research at Washington’s most influential institutions’, Foreign Policy,
28 November 2017.

Elizabeth Redden, ‘Thanks, but no, thanks’, /nsiele Higher Ed, 16 January
2018.

82 Primrose Riordan, ‘London School of Economics academics outraged by
proposed China programme’. Financial Times, 27 October 2019.

Mike Gow, ‘Sino-foreign joint venture universities: an introduction’. The
Newsletter, no. 77, summer 2017, International Institute for Asian Studies.
Gow, ‘Sino-foreign joint venture universities’.

See in particular article 5 of the Regulations of the People’s Republic of
China on Sino-Foreign Cooperative Education, <https://web.archive.-'

web/20190610l64330/http://www.fdi.gov.cn/l 800000121 “

html>.

78

79

80

81

83

84

85

88

89

90

91

92

93

94

:.org/

1_39_1937_0_7.

86 Zhuang Pinghui, ‘Cambridge and Peking universities in talks about
partnership plan for “role model” Shenzhen’, South China Morning Post,
7 September 2019.

87 ‘History’, website of Sias University, not dated, <https://web.archive.org/

web/20190802155723/http://cn.sias.edu.cn/AboutSias/l68/894.html>.

Yojana Sharma, ‘Ministry ends hundreds of Sino-foreign HE partnerships’.
University World News, 6 July 2018.

Marjorie Heins, ‘Trading academic freedom for foreign markets’. National
Coalition against Censorship, 30 July 2012, <https://ncac.org/fepp-articles/
trading-academic-Ireedom-for-foreign-markets>.

Diamond and Schell, eds, China’s Influence & American Interests, p. 181.
John Levine, ‘NYU Shanghai campus “self-censoring, politically neutral” on
Hong Kong: faculty’. New York Post, 19 October 2019.

Cited in Levine, ‘NYU Shanghai campus “self-censoring, politically neutral”

on Hong Kong’.

Marjorie Heins, ‘Trading academic freedom for foreign markets; Daniel
Golden, ‘China halts U.S. academic freedom at classroom door for colleges,

Bloomberg, 28 November 2011.

Some insivht into Part)'-building activities on joint campuKS can e ga
some ms „ t Zhons wai hezuo banxue dangjian

from Chinese reports. See Q g

gonvzuo tuijinhui zai Chengdu juban SMT^'re.lF/a-

388

notes to P, 241

95

96

97

98

99

[National Conference on promoting Party building in Sino-
foreign jointly run schools takes place in Chengdu], originally published
on Renni.n zhengxie wang, 24 May 2018, <http://archivc.ph/2019.ll.28-
110411 /https://cfcrs.xmu.cdu.cn/2018/0601 /c4034a344069/paRc.htm#

selection-1235.0-1235.20>.

Emily Feng, ’China tightens grip on foreign university joint ventures’,
Fituwdal Times, 7 August 2018.

Zheping Huang, ‘A Dutch university has canceled plans to offer degrees at its
China campus’. Quartz, 30 January 2018.

Example from a study session at the Sino-Dutch Biomedical and Information
Engineering School. Anon., Xueyuan danwei juxing dang zhibu shuji niandu
shuzhi daliui’ [Party Committee

of the school holds annual debriefing of party branch secretaries], website
of the College of Medicine and Biological Information Engineering, 6 June
2019, <https://web.archive.org/web/20190802155816/http://www.bmie.
neu.edu.cn/2019/0606/c576al29912/page.htm>; example from Bangor
College at the Central South University of Forestry and Technology: Anon.,
‘Bangge xueyuan dang zongzhi zhongxinzu 2019 nian di er ci lilun xuexi’

[Second theoretical

study (session) of Bangor Party Branch Center in 2019], website of Bangor

College, <https://web.archive.Org/web/20190802155855/http://bangor.
csuft.edu.cn/djgz/201903/t20190319_84465.html>; example from Leeds-
SWJTU: ASO’, ‘Lizi xueyuan kaizhan benzhou yewu xuexi huiyi’

Jf [Leeds College conducts this week’s professional

study session], website of Southwest Jiaotong University-Leeds Joint School,
3 June 2019, <https://web.archive.Org/web/20190802155934/https://leeds.
swjtu.edu.cn/info/1041 /2034.htm>.

‘Lizi xueyuan kaizhan benzhou yewu xuexi huiyi’

[Leeds College conducts this week’s professional study session],
website of Southwest Jiaotong University-Leeds Joint School, 3 June 2019,

<https://web.archive. 0 rg/web/ 2 Oi 9 O 8 O 2 i 55934 /https://leeds.swjtu.edu.cn/
info/1041 /2034.htm>.

Zuo Qian ‘Wo xiao kaizhan qingzhu Zhongguo Gongchandang

chengli 98 zhounian “bu wang chuxin laoji shiming” chongwen rudang shici
zhuti dangri huodong’ IJctx JT'/l/icfJli'l'V.98ji^^L

[-1 [Our school held a Party day
event for the 98th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party with
the theme ‘Don’t forget the origins, remember the mission’ renewing the

Party oath], <https://web.archive.Org/web/20190802160503/http://news.
sias.edu.cn/contents/309/29795.html>.

100 Levine, ‘NYU Shanghai campus “self-censoring, politically neutral” on Hong
Kong’.

389

NOTES TO PP. 241-243

101 Colleen O’Dea, ‘Chinese government to control Kean U faculty in Wenzhou?
Union up in arms’, NJ Spotlight, 16 November 2018, <https://www,
njspotlight.com/stories/18/11/1 S/chinese-government-to-control-kean-u-
faculty-in-wenzhou-union-asks-nj-to-invcstigatc/>.

102 ‘Mission statement’, website of Duke University, approved by the Duke
University Board of Trustees 1 October 1994, and revised 23 February 2001,

<https://trustees.duke.edu/governing-documents/mission-statement>.

103 Joanna Gagis, ‘Teachers union critical of Kean ceding control of China
campus’, NJTV News, 13 December 2018, <https://www.njtvonline.org/
news/video/teachers-union-critical-of-kean-ceding-control-of-china-
campus/>; DonnaM. Chiera, ‘Op-ed: Kean University’s China fiasco illustrates
need for state oversight’, 13 February 2019, <https://www.njspotlight.com/
stories/19/02/12/op-ed-kean-universitys-china-fiasco-illustrates-need-for-
state-oversight/>.

104 Elizabeth Redden, ‘Is Kean giving control of its overseas faculty to Chinese
government?’. Inside Higher Ed, 16 November 2018; Kelly Heyboer,
‘Communist Party members “preferred” for jobs on Kean U.’s new China
campus, ad says’, NJ.com, 23 July 2015.

105 ‘About us: leadership’, website of Wenzhou-Kean University, not dated,
<https://web.archive.org/web/20190802160618/http://www. wku.edu.cn/
en/org/>.

106 Introduction to Asia Europe Business School (AEBS)’, China Admissions,
not dated, <https://web.archive.org/web/20191201225457/https://www.
china-admissions.com/asia-europe-business-school-aebs/>.

107 Friedman quoted in Jessica Chen Weiss, ‘Cornell University suspended
two exchange programs with China’s Renmin University: here’s why’. The
Washington Post, 1 November 2018.

108 Fudan-European China Forum 2017 successfully held’, website of the Fudan-
European Centre for China Studies, 8 May 2017, <https://web.archive.
org/web/20190802160731 /https://www.fudanccntre.eu/news/2017/5/26/
fudan-european-china-forum-201 7>.

109 About, website of Brussels Academy for China-European Studies, not dated,
<http://ww'w.baces.be/about/>.

110 Bruno Struys, ‘Waarom de Chinese directeur van het Confuciusinstitut aan
dc VUB ons land niet meet binnen mag’, DeMorgan, 29 October 2019.

111 Du Xiaoying, ‘Peking University opens UK campus’, China Daily online,
26 March 2018.

112 ‘UC is home to the first CASS Chinese Studies CT'iure in Portugal’, University
ol Coimbra, <https://web.arcliivc.org/web/2019082501 l406/http://www.
uc.pt/en/iii/initiatives/china/2018_12_05_CASS>.

113 ‘Ciuojia sheke jijin Zhonghua xueshu wai yi xiangmu jianjie’

Id |^Jl"[Brief introduction to the Chinese Academic
Foreign Language Translation Project of the National Social Science

390

NOTES TO PP. 244-245

Fund], website of the National Office for Philosophy and Social Science,
7 September 2011, <https://web.archivc.Org/wcb/20190802160848/http://
ww>v.npop.ss-cn.gov.cn/GB/230094/23 1486/15611673.html>.

114 Javier C. Hern;indcz, Leading Western publisher bows to Chinese censorship’.
The Nru> York Times, 1 November 2017.

115 'Peer review boycott of Springer Nature publishing company’, change,
otjt pedtion started by Charlene MakJey, Change.org, 1 November 2017,
<https://web.archive.org/web/20190802160927/https://www.change.org/p/
p^^^^'r^view-boycott-of-academic-publications-that-censor-content-in-

china/u/21865528>.

116 Elizabeth Redden, An unacceptable breach of trust’. Inside Higher Ed,
3 October 2018.

117 Taylor & Francis Social Sciences and Humanities Library: statement’,
website of Taylor & Francis Group, 20 December 2018, <https://

newsroom.taylorandfrancisgroup.com/taylor-francis-social-sciences-and-

humanities-library/>.

118 Personal communication. See also Publishers pledge on Chinese censorship
of translated works’, <https://pen.org/sites/default/files/Publishers_Pledge_
Chinese_Censorship_Translated_Works.pdf>.

119 Anon., Foreign authors warned about book censorship in China’, The
Guardian, 21 May 2015.

120 For the full lists, see <https://twitter.eom/CliveCHamilton/

status/1099454938453659649>.

121 Harrison Christian, Kiwi publishers face censorship demands from Chinese
printers’, Stuff.co.nz, 18 August 2019.

122 The book was Clive Hamiltons Silent hivasion. It was not the main concern
cited. The main concern was lawfare, viz. the use of the legal system to
impose an onerous financial burden on Allen &c Unwin through vexatious
defamation actions by pro-Beijing agents. A third reason given was the fear
of Beijing-inspired cyber attacks closing down the company’s website, which
is crucial to its marketing. Nick McKenzie and Richard Baker, ‘Free speech
fears after book critical of China is pulled from publication’. The Sydney
Morning Herald, 12 November 2017.

123 Michael Bachelard, ‘Chinese government censors ruling lines through
Australian books’. The Sydney Morning Herald, 23 February 2019.

124 ‘Zhong Mei hezuo chuban shi shang de kaituo xianfeng’ iHli&

i People’s Daily online, 15 November 2006, <https://
web.archive.org/web/20190824165314/http://book. people .com.cn/GB/
69360/5045049.html>.

125 Ke Liming ‘Zhongguo xueshu '‘zou chuqu”: Zhongguo shehui kexue

chubanshe Faguo fenshe zai Bo’erduo chengli’ 4^4^0

^ tti liS H fi: ^ [Chinese academia ‘going out’:

Chinese Social Sciences Press establishes French branch in Bordeaux], People’s

391

NOTES TO PP. 245-247

online, 11 April 2017, <http://archive.today/20 19.11.28-100840/
http://world.people.com.en/n 1/2017/0411 /c 1 002-2920 1762.h tml>.

126 Martin Albrow, Chinas Role in a Shared Human Future: Towards a theory
for global leadership. Global China Press, 2018. From the author bio: ‘His
first visit to China was in 1987 on an observational tour with the State
Family Planning Commission and in recent years he has contributed to the
annual Symposium on China Studies with the Academy of Social Sciences
and the Ministry of Culture of the PRC.’ See <https://www.amazon.com/
Chinas-Role-Shared-Human-Future/dp/1910334340>.

127 Michael Bates and Xuelin Li Bates, Walk for Peace: Transcultural experiences in

China, Global China Press, 2016.

128 ‘Belt and Road Initiative: Cutting-edge studies relating to China’s massive
BRI project’, <https://tinyurl.com/radd58a>.

129 Cai Fang and Peter Nolan, eds, Routledge Handbook of the Belt and Road,

Routledge, 2019.

130 ‘Science Bulletin’, <https://www.journals.elsevier.com/science-bulletin>.

131 ‘Springer Nature partners with FLTRP in promoting Chinese thought and
culture overseas’, website of Springer Nature, 25 August 2016, <https://
tinyurl.com/vv6fmpk>.

132 The four journals were Frontiers of Literary Studies in China, Frontiers of
History in China, Frontiers of Law in China and Frontiers of Philosophy in
China, published jointly with Higher Education Press, which belongs to
the Chinese Ministry of Education. Brill has terminated its agreement with
Higher Education Press in China’, website of Brill, 25 April 2019, <https://
brill.com/newsitem/1 26/bri 11-has-terminated-its-agreement-wi th-higher-
education-press-in-china>.

133 Jacob Edmond, ‘Three new essays on the Chinese script and a new twist to
the old problem of censorship in Chine.se stiidie.s’, 18 April 2019, <https://
tinyurl.com/yyexdqgf>.

134 Edmond, ‘Three new essays on the C'hinese .script and a new twist to the old
problem of censorship in Chinese studies’.

135 Edmond, ‘Three new essays on the Chinese script and a new twist to the old
problem of censorship in Chinese studie.s’. Another ca.se that did go public
was that of Timothy Groose, an assistant professor at the Rose-Hulman
Institute of Eechnology in Indiana, (iroose had prepared a book review by
request on behalf of the new journal China and Asia: A journal in historical
studies, al.so published by Brill. Due to the grave situation in Xinjiang, he had
opened his review with a paragraph on the mass detainment of Uyghurs and
othei ethnic minorities in Xinjiang. A day alter Groose stibmitted the review,
he leceived an edited manuscript back in which the opening statement about
Usghur.s had been crossed out. After Groose expressed his concern and
followed up with the journal’s editor-in-chief, Han Xiaorong, he received a
response suggesting that his piece may not be published at all. When, after

392

NOTES TO PP, 247-251

sevcnil more months of silence, Groose went public with his story, Han
Xiaorong responded publicly, claiming that the review had been excluded
because it was ‘not directly relevant to our journals central theme, which is
Chinas historical relations with other Asian countries’. He acknowledged
requesting the deletion of the comments on mass internment in Xinjiang,
s;tying they ‘were primarily of a political nature and were about a current
event that was still developing’, but denied that this constituted a form of
censorship. See Timothy Groose, ‘How an academic journal censored my
review on Xinjiang’, Los Angeles Review of Books China Channel, 13 May
2019; Elizabeth Redden, ‘X-ing out Xinjiang’, Inside Higher Ed, 20 May
2019; ‘My response to Timothy Groose’s “How an academic journal censored
my review on Xinjiang’”, MCLC Resource Center, 16 May 2019.

136 Edmond, Three new essays on the Chinese script and a new twist to the old
problem of censorship in Chinese studies’.

137 John Ross, ‘Journal articles “tacitly support China territory grab’”. Times
Higher Education, 11 December 2019; Clive Hamilton, ‘Scientific publishers
disregard international Isyf , Journal of Political Risk, vol. 7, no. 12 , December
2019.

138 Hamilton, Scientific publishers disregard international law’.

Chapter 13 Reshaping global governance

1 Melanie Hart and Blaine Johnson, ‘Mapping China’s global governance
ambitions’. Center for American Progress, 28 February 2019; ‘Xi urges breaking
new ground in major country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics’,
Xinhua, 24 June 2018.

2 Hart and Johnson, ‘Mapping China’s global governance ambitions’.

3 Ariana King, ‘China is “champion ol multilateralism”, foreign minister says’,
Nikkei Asian Review, 29 September 201 8.

4 Yi Ling and Liu Tian, ‘Xinhua headlines: at G20, Xi leads chorus for
multilateralism’, China.org.cn, 29 June 2019, <https://weh.archive.
org/web/20191202191 647/http://www.ch ina.org.cn/world/01f_the_
Wire/2019-06/29/content_74935190.htni>.

5 Anon., ‘China, EU vow to uphold multilateralism, facilitate bilateral trade,
investment’, China.org.cn, 10 April 2019, <https://weh.archive.org/web/
20190514153948/http://w\vw.china.org.cn/world/2019-04/10/content_

74664092.htm>.

6 Hart and Johnson, ‘Mapping China’s global governance ambitions.

7 Maaike Okano-Heijmans and Frans-Paul van der Putten, A United Nations
with Chinese characteristics?, Clingendael report, December 2018, p. 2,

<https://ww\v.clingendael.org/sites/default/riles/2018-12/China_in_the_

UN_l.pdf>.

8 Colum Lynch and Robbie Gramer, ‘Outfoxed and outgunned: how China
routed the U.S. in a U.N. agency’, Foreign Policy, 23 October 2019.

NOTES TO PP. 251-2B2

9 'Mr. Liu Zhcniuin, Unclcr-Sccrctary-Gcncral * United Nations Department
of Economic and Social Affairs, <https://www.un.org/dcvclopmcnt/desa/
statcmcnts/usg-liu.html>. Liu’s predecessor at the UN was Wu Hongbo

For advising on internet governance, see Okano-Heijmans and van
der Putten, United Nations with Chinese characteristics?, p. 13.

10 Cited in Colum Lynch, ‘China enlists U.N. to promote its Belt and
Road project’. Foreign Policy, 10 May 2018, <https;//foreignpolicy.
com/2018/05/10/china-enlists-u-n-to-promote-its-belt-and-road-pro)ect/>,

11 Okano-Heijmans and van der Putten, A United Nations with Chinese
characteristics?, p. 13 .

12 Jointly building Belt and Road towards SDGS’, United Nations Department
of Economic and Social Affairs, <https://www.brisdgs.org/about-bri-sdgs>,

13 Okano-Heijmans and van der Putten, A United Nations with Chinese
characteristics?, p. 4.

14 UN agencies Belt and Road involvement’, website of UN Environment
Programme, undated, <https://tinyurl.com/w49oc8t>.

15 Zhongguo zhengfii yu Lianheguo Kaifa jihua shu qianshu “Guanyu gongtong
tuijin sichou zhi lu jingji dai he 21 shiji haishang sichou zhi lu jianshe de
liangjie beiwanglu’”4^

[The

Chinese government and the United Nations Development Programme
sign Memorandum of Understanding on jointly promoting the Silk Road
Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road], website of the
Chinese government, 19 September 2016, <https://tinyurl.com/yjjjskw4>.

16 UNDP and China to cooperate on Belt and Ro.ad Initiative’, United Nations
Development Programme, 19 September 2016, <https://www.undp.org/

conten t/undp/en/home/prcsscenter/prcssreleases/2016/09/19/undp-and-

china-to-cooperatc-on-belt-and'road-iniiiativc.himl>. See also Sinopsis and
Jichang Lulu, United Nations with Cdtincsc characteristics: elite capture and
discourse management on a global scale’, Sinopsis, 25 June 2018.

17 ‘C.ooperation lor common prosperity*, 14 May 2017, <https://tinyurl.com/
tv9ukgl>. 1 he UNDPs 2017 Cjovernance Report focused on the BRI,
aitalysing its potential contributions to sustainable development. ‘A new
meatts to translormativc global governance towards sustainable development’,
9 M.»v 2017, <https://tinyurl.eom/r/tq9tq>.

IS V\t C'bin.i’s Belt and Road lorum, Ciuterres calls for “inclusive, sustainable
.utd durable” development’, UN News, 26 April 2019, <https://news.un.org/
et\ story/2019/0-)/1037381 >.

‘f'nited Nations poised to support alignment of C^hina’s Belt and Road
Initiative with sustainable development goals, secretary-general says at
opc'ning ceremonv , U nited Nations, 26 .April 2019, <https://www.un.org/
press, en 2019 sgsml9^>6.doc.htm>.

NOTES TO PP. 252-254

20 Human Rights Watch, ‘The cost of international advocacy: Chinas
interference in United Nations’ human rights mechanisms’,
Human Rights Watch, 5 September 2017, <https://www.hrw.org/
report/2017/09/05/ costs-international-advocacy/chinas-interference-
united-nations-human-rights>.

21 Ted Piccone, Chinas long game on human rights at the UN’, Brookings,
September 2018, p. 4, <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/
uploads/2018/09/FP_20181009__china_human__rights.pdf>.

22 Human Rights Watch, The cost of international advocacy’.

23 Human Rights Watch, The cost of international advocacy’.

24 Human Rights Watch, The cost of international advocacy’.

25 Chi wo huzhao wufa ru Lianheguo zongbu qiagong waijiaobu jiaoshe zhong’

H ^ y Apple Daily y 20 October

2015, <https://tw.appledaily.com/new/realtime/ 201 51020/7 1 5 101 />.

26 Lu Yi-hsuan and Jake Chung, UN body turns away Taiwanese without
Chinese IDs, Taipei Timesy 17 June 2017, <http://www.taipeitimes.com/
News/front/archives/2017/06/17/2003672712>.

27 Jennifer Creery, Taiwan lodges protest with the United Nations for denying
entry to Taiwanese reporter’, Hong Kong Free PresSy 15 October 2018.

28 In an interview with @CCTV, former UN Under-Secretary-General & head
of@UNDESA Wu Hongbo said he represented Chinese national interests in
his position as a UN official, saying he ordered that WUC President @Dolkun_
Isa be expelled from the 2017 UN Indigenous Forum @UN4Indigenous’,
World Uyghur Congress on Twitter, 25 April 2019, <https://twitter.com/

uyghurcongress/status/1 121349082457485312?lang=de>; Human Rights

Watch, ‘The cost of international advocacy^’.

29 Randy Mulyanto, Taiwan weighs options after diplomatic allies switch
allegiance, Al Jazeera^ 26 September 2019, <https://www.aljazeera.
com/ news/201 9/09/tai wan-weigh s-opt ion s-diplomatic-al lies-s witch-
allegiance- 190925070254771 .html>.

30 Chen Shih-chung, Taiwan’s participation vital to global influenza pandemic
preparedness and response’. Voice Ptdblishingy 22 May 2017, <https://
thevoiceslu.com/20 17/05/taiwans-participation-vital-global-influenza-
pandemic-preparedness-response/>.

31 Amir Attaran, ‘Taiwan, China and the WHO: of pandas and pandemics’,
Canadian Medical Association Journal^ vol. 180, 2009, <https://www.ncbi.
nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC26798l4/>.

32 <https://tinyurl.com/u6bhadn>

33 Ben Blanchard, ‘Tah\ 'an calls China ‘vile’ for limiting WHO access during
virus outbreak’, Reuters, 4 February 2020.

34 Rintaro Hosukawa and Tsukasa Hadano, ‘Did WHO’s China ties slow
decision to declare emergency-?’, Nikkei Asian Review, 1 February 2020.

395

NOTES TO PP. 254-255

35 Kimmy Chung, ‘Beijing never pressured me in office, former WHO chief
Margaret Chan says,’ South China Morning Post, 7 July 2017.

36 ‘Taiwan accuses World Health Organization of bowing to Beijing over
invitation to top health meeting’. South China Morning Post, 8 May 2018: ‘In
Beijing on Monday, foreign ministry spokesman Geng Shuang said the island
was only able to attend the assembly from 2009-2016 because the previous
Taiwan government had a consensus with Beijing that there is only “one
China’”; ‘Taiwan: Ministry o(Foreign Affairs urges WHO to issue invitation
to annual assembly’. Underrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization,
20 February 2019, <https.7/unpo.org/article/21384>.

37 Jennifer Creery, ‘Watchdog urges United Nations to defy Chinese pressure
and let Taiwanese journalists cover events’, Hong Kong Free Press, 19 September

2018.

38 Sam Yeh, ‘YAR: let’s not abandon Taiwan on international stage’, Toronto

Sun, 3 May 2019.

‘(2hina: framework agreement aims to help enterprises reduce risks in overseas
operations’, website of the International Committee of the Red Cross,
27 March 2019, <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/icrc-cccmc-dcaf-sign-

framework-agreement-in-responsible-business-conduct>.

40 ‘ICRC’s special envoy to China Jacques Pellet speaks with CGTN’,
CGTN channel on YouTube, 23 April 2019, <https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=IgPN_Rvul Gs>.

41 ‘China: livelihood project reduces poverty, changes mindset in
Xinjiang’. ICRC, 26 March 2019. >https://www.icrc.org/en/document/

china-ccoscc-xinjiang-livclihood-2019>.

42 Matt Schrader, ‘“Chinese Assistance C:cntcrs" grow United Front Work

43

44

Department global presence, houruLitioti, 5 January 2019.

‘2018 “Hua /hu /hongxin” nianhui liuimou: ning qiao xin qiao li gongxiang
mitm. fuxing meng’ 2018

^ [Looking luck at the 2018 aitnual meeting of the ‘Overseas Chinese
help center’; solidifying overseas C.'hinese hearts and overseas Chinese power,
sharing the dream of national rejuvenation].

'2018 "Ilua /hu /hongxin " nianhui huiinou; ning qiao xin qiao li gongxiang
luinzu fuxing meng 2018 “‘ 'L' d /v 1 ** 111^1 •' Jj

UAX [Looking back at the 2018 annual meeting of the ‘Overseas Chinese
help center: solidih ing overseas Chinese hearts and overseas Chinese power,
sharing the dream of national rejuvenation).

Frank Chung. "‘Its a police station honouring a police state”: outrage
as Melbourne cop shop raises Chinese Communist flag’, News.com.au,
3 October 20 M

46 Lhomas Eder. Bertram Lang and .Moritz Rudolf, ‘China’s global law enforce-

45

ment drive; the need for a European resp>onse’, MERJCS China Monitor,
18 January 201' <https: weh.archive.org web. 20191011035019/https://

47

48

49

50

51

52

53

54

55

56

57

58

59

60

61

62

NOTES TO PP. 255-257

\^'^v^v.merics.org/sites/clefauIt/flles/2018-05/Merics_China-Monitor_36_

Uw-Enforcement.pdf>.

‘Europol and the Peoples Republic of China join forces to fight transna¬
tional crime’, Europol, 19 April 2017, <https://www.europol.europa.eu/
newsroom/news/europol-and-people’s-republic-of-china-join-forces-to-
fight-transnational-crime>.

‘Europol executive director receives the vice minister of China at agency’s
headquarters’, Europol, 19 January 2018, <https://www.europol.europa.eu/
nwrroow/news/europol-executive-director-receives-vice-minister-of-china-
agency’s-headquar ters>.

Michael Martina, Philip Wen and Ben Blanchard, ‘Exiled Uighur group
condemns Italy s detention of its general secretary’, Reuters, 28 July 2017.
Ben Blanchard, China upset as Interpol removes wanted alert for exiled
Uighur leader’, Reuters, 24 February 2018.

Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, ‘Can the Chinese be trusted to lead global
insdtutions?’. Foreign Policy, 11 October 2018.

Chris Buckley, Ex-president of Interpol is sent to prison for bribery in
China’, The New York Times, 21 January 2020.

Eder, Lang and Rudolf, ‘China’s global law enforcement drive’.

Michael Laha, Taking the anti-corruption campaign abroad: China’s quest
for extradition treaties’, CCP Watch, 13 March 2019, <https://www.ccpwatch.
org/single-post/2019/03/13/Taking-the-Anti-Corruption-Campaign-
Abroad-Chinas-Quest-for-Extradition-l'rcatics>.

Kevin Ponniah, Why is Spain in the middle ol a spat between China and
Taiwan?’, BBC, 23 March 2017.

Anon., Spain deports 94 Taiwanese to Beijing for telecom fraud’, Retiters,
7 June 2019.

Zhongguo jingyuan jiangshu shouci Zhong Yi jingwu lianhe xunluo jingli’

[Chinese police officer

recounts first Sino-Italian police patrol experience], Xinhua, 18 May 2015,
<https://web.archive.org/weh/2019101 1 034 150/http://www.xinhuanet.
com/world/2016-05/18/c_l 118891085.htm>.

Eder, Lang and Rudoll, 'China’s global law enforcement drive’.

Eder, Lang and Rudoll, 'China’s global law enlorcement drive’.

Emma Graham-Harrison, ‘China suspends cooperation with France on
police aftairs, says report’. The Guardian, 3 August 2019.

Anon., ‘China says its police brought gralt suspect back from France , Reuters,
13 March 2017; Harold Thibault and Brice Pedroletti, Quand la Chine
vient recuperer ses lugitils en France’, Le Monde, 23 May 2017, <https://

www.lemonde.lr/asie-pacifique/article/2017/05/23/quand-la-chine-vient-

recuperer-ses-fugitils-en-lrance_5132103_3216.html>.

Anon., ‘China says its police brought graft suspect back from France .

397

NOTES TO PP. 257-259

63

64

65

66

67

68

69

70

71

72

73

74

75

76

Philip Wen, ‘Operation Fox Hunt: Melbourne grandmother Zhou Shiqin

returns to China’, i l

Tim Nicholas RUhlig, Bjorn Jordan, Frans-Paul van dcr Putten, John
Seaman, Miguel Otero-lglesias and Alice Ekman, Po itica va ucs in
Europe-China relations’, European Think Tank Network on China Report

2018, pp. 25-6.

Kate O’KeefFe, Aruna Viswanatha and Cezary Podkul, ‘China’s pursuit of
fugitive businessman Guo Wengui kicks off Manhattan caper worthy of spy
thriller’. The Wall Street Journal, 22 October 2017; Josh Rogin, ‘Without Rex
Tillerson’s protection, a top State Department Asia nominee is in trouble,
The Washington Post, 15 March 2018.

Peter Walker, ‘Xi Jinping protesters arrested and homes searched over London
demonstrations’. The Guardian, 23 October 2015.

Riihlig et al., ‘Political values in Europe-China relations’, p. 25; ‘Tibetan
protest targeted in Belgium and Nepal’, Free Tibet, 3 April 2014, <https://
freetibet.org/news-media/na/tibetan-protest-targeted-belgium-and-nepal>.
Anon., ‘Dozens arrested during Swiss protests against Chinese president’s
visit’, The Guardian, 15 January 2017.

Cited in Peter Walker, ‘Xi Jinping protesters arrested and homes searched
over London demonstrations’.

Dou Kelin ‘Guojia jiancha tizhi gaige zhuli fan fubai guoji zhuitao

zhuizang’ [Reform of

national supervision system aids international pursuit in anti-corruption],
Zhongguo jijian jiancha zazlji, no. 1, 2019, p. 1, <https://web.archive,
org/web/20191202181143/http://zgji jc.ccdi.gov.cn/bqml/bqxx/201901/
t20190109_186640.html>.

‘Swedish Supreme Court rules against extradition to China’, Safeguard
Defend ers, <https://sa(eguardwdelenders.com/en/swedish-supreme-
court-rcluseS'Cxtradition-china>.

Anon., ‘Kinas ambassador: “Vi bar bagelgcvar for vara fiender”’,
Hxpressen, 1 I3ccember 2019; <https://twictcr.com/jojjcols/status/
1201376527713099776>.

Hder, Ling and Rudolf, ‘China’s global law enforcement drive’; Julie Boland,
Ten )eafy oj the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: A lost decade? A partnerfor
the U.S.?, Washington D.C.; Brookings Institute, 20 June 2011, p. 8.

Peter Stubley, ‘Uighur Muslims forbidden to pray or grow beards in China’s
“re-education” camps, former detainee reveals’, The Independent, 22 March
2019.

Interpol SCC^-R-ALS Memorandum of Understanding, 2014 <https://www.
interpol.int/en/content/download/11136/file/21 -%20SCO-lLATS.pdf>.
Xiuanvu Shanghai Hezuo Zuzhi Diqu Fankongbu jigou zhiweihui daibiaotuan
canjia guoji xingjing zuzhi “Ka’crkan” xiaogmu gongzuo zu huiyi qingkuang’

NOTES TO PP. 259-261

0 Xf^^Ji'Ki^'ll!x% [About the participation of a delegation from
the Executive Committee of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s Regional
Anti-Terrorism Structure in Interpol’s project ‘Kalkan’ working group], website
ofSCO-RATS, 21 July 2017, <http://ecrats.org/cn/news/6915>.

77 'New framework for enhanced cooperation between RATS SCO and
UN CTED , UN Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee,
25 March 2019, <https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/news/2019/03/25/
new-framework-enhanced-cooperation-rats-sco-un-cted/>.

78 Jan-Peter Westad, Richard Assheton and Peter Oborne, 'Campaigners
against Uighur oppression blacklisted on terrorism database’. Middle Eastern
Eye, 16 April 2019, <https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/exclusive-

campaigners-against-uighur-oppression-blacklisted-terrorism-database>.

79 Westad, Assheton and Oborne, Campaigners against Uighur oppression
blacklisted on terrorism database’.

80 Winslow Robertson quoted in Lily Kuo and Niko Kommenda, ‘What is
Chinas Belt and Road Initiative?’, The Guardian, 30 July 2018.

81 Alice Ekman, Chinas new type of security partnership” in Asia and beyond:
a challenge to the alliance system and the “Indo-pacific” strategy’, Elcano
Royal Institute, 25 March 2019.

82 Ekman, ‘Chinas “new type of security partnership” in Asia and beyond’.

83 Ekman, Chinas new type of security partnership” in Asia and beyond’.

84 Formerly known as 16+1, or China and the Central and Eastern European
Countries, it was joined by Greece in 2019. I he summit has been described
as ‘a network of bilateral relations more than anything else’. Richard Q.
Turesanyi, ‘Growing tensions between China and the EU over 16+1 platform’,
The Diplomat, 29 November 2017 .

85 See for example 9th Business Forum of ('FFX^ A’ (Ihina, <https://croatia-
forum2019-ceec-china.hgk.hr/>.

86 Piccone, Chinas long game on human rights at tlic UN’, p. 18.

87 Ravid 1 rasad, F..U amb;issadors condemn C.hin.i's Belt aiul Road Initiative’,
The Diplomat, 21 April 2018.

88 Information Othce of the State Ca)uncil of the People’s Republic of C'hina,
Human rights in C.hina, Beijing, November 1991, <http://www.china.org.

cn/c-whitc/7/index.htm>.

89 China Society for Human Rights Studies’, Clhinahumanrigbts.
org, 1 August 201 - 11 , <http://www.chinabumanriglns.org/btml/20l4/
BRIHFINGS_0801 /126.btml>.

90 Zhongguo renquan wanjiuhui jianjic’ ‘I'l*! A/cfiO/F [Introduction
to the Chitia Society for Human Rights Studies], Zhongguo renquan,
17 June 2014, <http://\\A\ w.humanrights.cn/himl/2014/l_06l7/675.html>.

Cui \uying. sev Cui Yuying chuxi "goujian rcnlci mingyun gongtongti
yu quanqiu renquan zhili' lilun yantaohui bing zhi ci’ IP h.

Jt'N humanrights.cn.

NOTES TO PP. 261-264

8 June 2017, <https.7/tinyurl.com/yzpgw2d3>. Since January 2018 she has
been serving as the head of the Fujian PPCC.

91 ‘Zhongguo renquan yanjiuhui jianjie’.

92 ‘Human rights record of the United States’, website of the Chinese embassy
to the US, put online 23 October 2003, <http://www.china-cmbassy.org/
eng/zt/zgrq/t36633.htm>.

93 ‘China Society for Human Rights Studies’, Chinahumanrights.
org, 1 August 2014, <http.7/v^rww.chinahumanrights.org/html/20l4/
BRIEFINGS_0801 /126.html>.

94 Sonya Sceats with Shaun Breslin, ‘China and the international human rights
system’, Chatham House, October 2012, <https://www.chathamhouse.
org/sites/default/files/public/Research/International%20Law/r 1012_
sceatsbreslin.pdf>, p. 10—11, 18—19.

95 UN Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Working Group on the Universal
Periodic Review—China’, pp. 8, 10, 13.

96 Danny Mok, ‘Canto-pop singer Denise Ho calls on UN Human Rights
Council to remove China over “abuses” in Hong Kong’, South China Morning
Post, 9 July 2019.

97 Anon., ‘Internet regulations can protect human rights: experts’, China Human
Rights, 24 July 2014, <https://web.archive.org/web/201912060205l6/
http://www.chinahumanrights.org/html/20l4/IE_0724/34.html>.

98 ‘EU; suspend China human rights dialogue’, Human Rights Watch, 19 July
2017, <https://www.hrw.org/news/201 7/06/19/eu-suspend-china-human-
righ ts-d iaiog u c>.

99 Hinnerk Feldwisch-Drentrup, ‘Peking sagi Dialog mit Berlin ab’, TAZ,
6 December 2019.

100 Piccone, ‘China’s long game on human rights at the UN’, p. 4.

101 Piccone, ‘China’s long game on human rights at the UN’, p. 4.

102 ‘ImiII text of Beijing Declaration adopted by the hirst South-South Human
Bights I'orum’, South-South Human Rights horuni portal, 10 December
2017. <http://p.china.org.cn/2017-12/10/contcnt_5()095729.htm>.

10.1 '(diinese human rights delegation visits UK’, China Daily, 5 July 2018,
<http.7/www.chinadaily.com.cn/cnd\7201 8-07/05/content_365 14008.
htm>. 1 he C.SI IRS has also been holding an annual Europe-China Seminar
on Human Rights in dillerent European cities since at le;ist 2015. Ehe 2019
invitation and program description is on file with the authors.

104 See tor example State Cx^uncil Information Office, ‘d'he Eight against
terrorism and extremism and human rights protection in Xinjiang’, White
paper. March 2019; jun Mai, ‘Chinese state media “terrorism” documentaries
Seek tel justih’ Xinjiang crackdown after US vote on human rights bill’. South
China Morning Post, S December 2019.

400

NOTES TO PP. 264-265

|0S 'Human rights improve in Xinjiang, experts say’, China Daily,

27 June 2018, <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/kindle/2018-06/27/content_
36464925.htm>.

]()(> G«e Cadell, 'China think tank calls for “democratic” internet governance’.
Rotters, 4 December 2017.

107 Josh Horwitz, Tim Cook and Sundar Pichai’s surprise remarks at China’s
"open internet” conference’, Quartz, 4 December 2017.

lOS Hor\vitz, Tim Cook and Sundar Pichai’s surprise remarks at China’s “open
internet” conference’.

109 Adrian Shahbaz, Freedom on the net 2018: the rise of digital authoritari¬
anism, Freedom House, p. 8, <https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/
FOTN_2018_Final%20Booklet_l 1_1_2018.pdf>.

1 lO Trinh Huu Long, Vietnams cybersecurity draft law: made in China?’, The
Vietnamese, 8 November 2017, <https://www.thevietnamese.org/2017/ll/
vietnams-cyber-security-draft-law-made-in-china/>.

111 Zak Doffman, Putin signs Russian Internet Law” to disconnect Russia from
the World Wide Web’, Forbes, 1 May 2019.

112 Yao Tsz Yan, Smart cities or surveillance? Huawei in Central Asia’, The
Diplomat, 7 August 2019. For another example of the global expansion
of the CCPs tech-enhanced authoritarianism’, see Samantha Hoffman,
Engineering global consent: the Chinese Communist Party’s data-driven
power expansion’, ASPI Policy Brief, no. 21, 2019.

113 Joe Parkinson, Nicholas Bariyo and Josh Chin, ‘Huawei technicians helped
African governments spy on political opponent.s’, The Wall Street Journal,
15 August 2019.

114 Kristin Shi-Kupfer and Mareike Ohlberg, ‘China’s digital rise: challenges for
Europe’, MERICS papers on China, no. 7, April 2019, p. 21.

115 Shi-Kupfer and Ohlberg, ‘China’s digital rise’.

116 Anna Gross, Madhumita Murgia and Yuan Yang, ‘Cdiinese tech groups
shaping UN facial recognition standards’,/-/m/z/r/V//7/wt'r, 1 December 2019.

117 Gross, Murgia and Yang, ‘Chinese tech groups shaping UN facial recognition
standards’.

401

ndex

Note: Chinese names are shown with surname first and personal name second.

Where the owner of the name reverses the order, a comma appears after the surname.
Most Chinese names are also given in Chinese characters to avoid ambiguities.

2PLA see Peoples Liberation Army
3PLA see Peoples Liberation Army
5G network, 24, 59, 71, 78, 114

17+1 summit, 260

19th Party Congress (2017), 15, 65, 240
48 Group Club, 54, 60-7. 74, 208
fellows and members of, 79, 109,
135-6, 160, 170, 176. 222, 238
50 cent army 173

985 Program 985-L^*i!, 171

Abdiijclil F.mct, 130
Aboil, Serge, 55

academic freedom, x. 120, 229. 237.

239. 240. 268. 269

Academy of C.hinese ( uliiiie tee ( Vniial
lii.siiliue of Socialism
Adlianom (ihebreyesus. rcxlios. ZS-'i
Advanced HiisiiiCNS Park, 13
African Union, I‘'9, 183
/((je, ihe, 168, l'’S
Agence l iancc IVcss. Pb. PH, 183
Agon, lean Paul. '’•>

Ai. Jancuc jiawen. IS^

.•\i W’eiwei *2. f. . 1 ‘>6
Airbus. ^2
Al la/cvra. K83
Albrow. Martin, (hv 2-P

Alibaba 16, 26, 74,

98, 180

All-China Federation of Industry and
Commerce

107

All-China Federation of Returned
Overseas Chinese

123, 124-5, 174, 193.

220, 336n20

All-China Journalists Association 4’-^

182

All-Party Parliamentary China Group
United Kingdom
Allen dv: Unwin. 245
Allcn-l-bfahimian, Bethany, 94, 1 14,
183. 212. 256

Alliance C'ultural Media Inc., 93
Alternative for Germany (AID), 56
.Althusrnann. Bcrnd, 90
America C.'hina Public Affairs Institute

128.211,

322nl7

-Anbang Croup 44

Andrevts, 1 Daniel, 81
Annaud, jcan-Jactjues, 74
ANSA (Italian news agency), 177
Anti-Secession 1-aw of 2005 /X:5)'^lk|
iCA. ^3. 233

Antsverp. part of, 1 16

INDEX

InpICi 1 264|

Deutscher

‘ (^ina-Gescllschaftcn see Federation
of German China Friendship

Associations
Armani, Giorgio, 191

183

Asia see Central Asia

Asia Europe Business School

see EMLYON Business School
Asia House, 67
AsiaMatters, 40

Asia Pacific Committee of German
Business, 115

Asia Society, 180, 192,219, 225
Asian Culture and Media Group, 177
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, 4
Associated Press, 167, 177
Association des Chinois Residant en
France 133

Association of Overseas Chinese Media
in Europe
178-9

Athens-Macedonian News Agenc)', 177
Audi, 196

Australia, x, 24, 27, 132-3, 182, 221,
235-6, 258
and Huawei, 162
business pressure, 27
CAIFC activities in, 42
Chinese investment in, 116, 349nl27
Chinese language media in, 120, 177—8
Chinese students, 236
cyber theft, 158

foreign-influence transparency laws,
230-1

PLA research collaboration, 156—7
response to Chinese interference, 24
subnational ties to China, 81, 88,
118,188

united front work in, 72, 127, 129,
131-3, 153, 194, 202, 342n3
see also Age, Thr, Ci\MG Media
Australia China Buddhist Council

^ l ^-^#,202

Australia-China Veterans Club 4^ iS
127

Australian Chinese Exsersnces
Association
127

Australian Chinese Labor Association

132

Australian Council for the Promotion of
Peaceful Reunification of China ^

129

Australian National University, 158,

221, 234

Australian Security Intelligence
Organisation, 132

Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 173,
214

Austria, 179, 186, 188
Aviation Industry Corporation of China
4'SM$X^^a^^^,72, 157
AXA,74

Baidu WJ^, 74, 98,218
BAME Labour (UK), 135
Bandurski, David, 56, 165
Bank of China 4' , 36, 38, 70,

112

Bannon, Steve, 71, 3l6nl55

Barbizet, Patricia, 74

Barboza, David, 184

Barkawi, Tarak, 238

Barton, Dominic, 49-50, 331n59

Bateman, Sam, 224

Bates, Michael, 136-8, 245,

Bates, Xuelin 135-138, 245

Baum, Richard, 28, 42
BBC, 115, 167, 169, 183,

Bear-Stearns, 101

Beijing Jbjjf, as synonym for Party-state
see Chinese Communist Party
Beijing Foreign language Peaching and
Research Press
Ifei-i:. 246

Beijing Olympics (2008), 57-8, 146
Beijing Peace lour Cultural F-xchange
Center XvXH f Ailli A4L^yfL‘l'

'D, 212-3

Belgium, 57, 168, 176, 212, 243, 258,
310n74

see also Brussels
Bell, Daniel, 210

Belt and Road Initiative 3-5,

13,61, 115-8, 242
and culture, 188, 192, 194, 197
and Italy, 67, 118
as an alternative order, 3, 117, 259

403

INDEX

Belt and Road Initiative —

(continued)

as discourse control, 117-8, 165
as economic statecraft, 3
corporate support for, 115
investment, 206

local government support for, 81, 85,
90-1, 109, 118

Policy Coordination Committee of
the Belt and Road Initiative in
Europe, 59
publications, 256

rhetorical affirmation of, 25, 52-3, 223
see also Leading Small Group for
standardisation along the Belt
and Road; Media Cooperation
Forum on Belt and Road; Silk
Road Chamber of International
Commerce; Silk Road Finance
Corporation; Silk Road
International League of Theatres;
Silk Road Think Tank Association;
Silk Road Think Tank Network
Belt and Road Economic and Financial
Information Partnership, 176
Belt and Road Forum for International
Cooperation, 252
Belt and Road Initiative Executive
Group (Sweden), 79
Belt and Road Studies Network '

rre Xinhua News Agcnc)'

Ben Shenglin 107-8, 110

Bcnbihy, Emmanuel, 196
Bcraha, Frederic, 72
Berger, Roland, 63-^, 312nlOO
Berggriien Institute, 209-10
Berggruen, Nicolas, 209
Bergin, Julia, 167

Berlin, 114, 131, 196, 199,215, 225
Berlin litteritational Film Festival
(Berlinale), 196

Berlin Philharmonic tVchcstra, 186
Berlin W all, fall of. 10
Bertal ai\s Toth, 53
Bertelsmann Foundation. 225
Bethune. Norman. S'*

Be/atxl. Bruno. "'2. 316nl59
BGA ^.Gerntany). ^6
BFIR Partners, 36

Biden, Hunter, 35-6
Bldcn, Joe, 35-6

big external propaganda, 12-3, 273
big united front, 186
Bilbao, port of, 116
Bishop, Bill, 155
BlackRock, 44, 50, 102
Blackstone Group, 38, 44—5, 99, 191
see also Schwarzman, Stephen
Blair, Tony, 43, 53, 60-1, 66,133-5,
190

Blair, KatyTse 135

Bloomberg, 56, 112, 179, 181, 183-4,
221,240

Bloomberg, Michael, 36
Blustein, Paul, 101
BMW, 114

BMW Foundation Herbert Quandt, 55
Bo Guagua 47, 105, 331n60

Bo Xilai 46-7, 105

Boao Forum 73

Boeing, 44, 214
Bollywood, 201
Boustany, Charles, 114
Bowie, Julia, 52, 305n2
boycotts, 268-9
Bpifrance, 72
Bradficid, Geoffrey, 191
Brady, Anne-Marie, 10, 16-7,21,40,
'86, 91,272
Brandt, Willy, 75
Branstad, ‘ferry, 85
Brcxit,4. 14. 107, 109, 207,

BRl see Belt and Road Initiative
Bridgewater /Vssociates, 1 10
Brill. 246, 392nl35
Britain see United Kingdom
British Airways, 60
British-China Friendship Society,

342nl16

British Chinese Project
if ic'J. 133-5, 340n79
British ('hinesc Veteran’s Association

127

Brookings Institution, 43, 82, 101,
206-7, 212, 222

Brookings- fsinghua Center for Public
Policy, 108, 206
Brown, Gordon, 147, 209
Brown, Kate, 82

INDEX

Browne, John (Lord Browne of
Madingley), 161, 208
Bruegel (think tank), 222
Brussels, 212-3, 222
Brussels Academy for China-European
Studies, 243

Buckingham, Geraldine, 50
Buckman, Bernard, 63-4
Buddhism, CCP attempts to control,

X, 202-3

Buddhist Association of China 4'

202

Bulgaria, 68, 256
Bundestag, 77-8, 89, 147
Burgh, Hugo de, 61, 170-1
Bush Foundation, 40
Bush, George H.W., 39-40
Bush, George W., 37, 99, 101
Bush, Jeb, 39
Bush, Neil, 39—41

BiiSo (Citizens’ Movement Solidarity), 79
see also Larouche Movement
Buzzfeed, 183

C4ADS (think tank), 117

Cahn, Andrew, I6l

Cai Fang 246

Cai Mingpo WM'Ok, 71-2, 316nl63

Caijing)\\l^^., Ill, 192

Caixin 69

California, 109, 157

Cambridge University, 60-1,237-9, 246
China Executive l^*ader.ship Program,
237

Cambridge University Press, 243
Cameron, David. 134, 136-7, 160. 207
Cameron, Fra.ser, 214
CAMG Media
H1. 175

Canada, 186-7

and Chine.se students, 236
arrest ol Meng W'an/hou, 2, 216-7
Conhicius Institutes. 229, 231
elite capture. 31-3. 45-50, 87
history ot Chinese immiiiration, 189
intimidation ot 130, 238

pressure on journalists, PS
Canada-China Business Council

Canada Chinese Veterans Society

Ml

Canadian Security Intelligence Service,
47,141

Capitol Counsel, 114
Capria, Carlo, 69

Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, 31, 212
Carney, Matthew, 183
Carr, Bob, 182, 342n3
Carter Center, 212, 225
Carter, Jimmy, 216
Cary (North Carolina), 195
Cassa Depositi e Prestiti, 70
Cathay Capital 71-4,

316nl59, 318nl89
Cathay Pacific Airways, 112
Cato Institute, 108
CCP see Chinese Communist Party
CEFC (energy corporation)

217

censorship, 172, 195, 197-9, 200, 218,
227,230, 264, 392nl35
and technology, 264
normalisation of, 246-7, 262
sec also .scll-cen.sorship
Center for American Progre,ss, 211
Center for China and Globalization

'IMi4'i^LMtfVKls 69, 105,
218-9,220. 322nl7, 330n50,
330n56

( 'enter lor Str.uegic and International
.Studies, 1 10. 144, 148
C'eiuial .\si.i, 52, 259
C'emr.il Clommittee of the CCP ‘I'tSliJ^

148. 157, 177,

186. 203

Central and l^asiern Furope, 68, 224,
229,238,260

Cciural Institute ol Socialism 'I'
1;^'/:!%, 20. 186

C,'entral Military ('omtnission ((diina),

^11,43, 1.39, 143, 187, 190

loint Stall Department

141-2, 187

Central News Agency ' |' lliM iHf 1:

(Taiwan), 254
Central Part}' School

19, 170, 198, 216, 220, 223

405

INDEX

Central Propaganda Department

see Propaganda Department of the
CCP Central Committee
Centre for Peace and Development
Studies

190

Centrum Wiskunde & Informatica, 170
CGTN reeChina

Global Television Network
Champagne, Fran^ois-Philippe, 50
Chan, Ho-tin (Andy) 183

Chan, Margaret, 254
Chan, Melissa, 183
Chan, Michael 49

Chan, Ronnie 180, 218—9

Chanda, Nayan, 4
Chao, Elaine 36-7, 45

Chao, James 36-7

Charhar Institute 219-20

Charoeun Popkhand, 139
Chatham House, 25, 207—8, 222—3
Chen, Angela , 42, 191

Chen Guangcheng 131

Chen, Huaidan 39

Chen Jianqing 127

Chen Jining , 209

Chen Shuang 74

Chen Wenhua 257

Chen Xiaodan 105

Chen, Yi |Vj;'rL. 188
Chen Yuan |5(1;7C. 105. 331n59
Cheng, Lijun ‘Glad’, 86
Cheng. Simon, 297n76
Chernow, Ron. 191
(]hiang Chingkuo Foundation
iii(i):;^.229

(!hikhuchcv, Alexei, 317nl67
China

anil the international order, 9, 31.
299-<>l

tX'P rule fee Cdiincsc Cximmunist
Party

control ol univerxitiex, 227-8

ecottoinic syxtcrn, 9S-7, 117

global [Hiwcr ambitionN, -1

ieual svstettt. 1-i, 239

media and journalism in, 165-^>, 18-1

ntilitarv fee IWples Liberation Army

nationalistu, 12, 18^

^vlitivral system, o. 23. 1^2-3. 209

see also Chinese Communist Party
relations with the United States, 182
restrictions on civil society, xii, 15,
21,202

social credit system, 111, 204, 210,
373n40

stock market. 111, 116
China Arts and Entertainment Group,
367nl06

China Arts Foundation International
42, 44, 190-2
China Association for International
Exchange of Personnel 0 0

124-5, 152, 154,

347n86

China Association for International
Friendly Contact S ®

20, 34, 42, 74, 143, 190,
210,373n47

China Banking Regulatory Commission
China Brief, 84

China-Britain Business Council
Mli^J'^.60-1,65, 109
China-Britain Trade Group see China-
Britain Business Council, 61
China Business Network (Duisburg) W-

WtJ-.flHtKlSiTj 90

China case see China model
China-CEE Institute, 222, 224
China Center for Contemporary World
.Studies 222

C'hina Ontcr for International
Fxonomic Exchanges 1-^
208,221-2

(diina Cxiural lclcvision (CCTV)
'ai^llfr.3.69. 75.87, 108, 138,
167-8. 170. 181,209
China ('ouncil for the Promotion of
Iniernutiunal IVade Ig

^ 61^.63, 65. 89. 124-5
( .'hina C'ountil for the Promotion of
Peaceful National Reunification
-fo:iit^.2l,94,
123, 124-5. 128-9, 135
China Daily 'IM4 I HU, 24, 57. 64-6,
69, 82. 86. 110. 134, 166, 168-9,
172, 175, 193, 208, 210, 214
(diina Development Bank
'UlUfJ . 29. 50. 71. 105

INDEX

Development Research
lund;Uion

^,219.237

c:huuDrcam‘1'rS^.l7, 30. 203
(^ina Economic Cooperation Center

('hina Electronics Technology Group
Corporation

157

China-Europe Culture and Education
Foundation
^^,212

China-Europe Friendship Award, 77
China Europe International Business
School 72

China Everbright Group 4"

104

China Everbright Ltd. 4^ ffl 7

China Federation of Literary and Art
Circles

201

China Foundation for International and
Strategic Studies 4US1*110
143

China Global Television Network '4^ I^i4'
41, 50,66, 168-70, 254
China International Capital Corporation

4 m la Rv* uj (4

ife^T7]),207

China International Publishing Group
4[aiaR);|lirjs(IXl41ree Foreign
Languages Office
China International Trust and

Investment Corporation 41RIRR]'
4^41:41};C 4fniliN1). 46-8,
74, 102, 139, 187
China Institutes of Contemporary
International Relations 4Nll4fl^
124-5, 142,

148-9, 222, 345n53, 346n60
China Investment Corporation 41*44^4
^ fl R4ih'fTXV‘''J> 38, 44, 50,
China Italy Chamber ot Commerce, 70
China Media Centre at the Universitv ot
Westminster, 170-1
China Media Group *4' 9iL 4SiIi Fll.&
0,71, 167, 169, 177
China model, 13, 79, 117, 210, 250
China News Service 4 W ft, 123,
126, 177, 179

China Ocean Shipping Company, 116
China Overseas Exchange Association

123,124-5,

132-3

China Overseas Friendship Association,
124-5

China Philanthropy Forum, 190
China Poly Group 404^44^04, 102,
139, 187-8

China Qipao Association 4
193

China Qipao Society Global Alliance 4

194

China Radio International 400
41^^, 58, 167-8, 170, 174-5
China Reform Forum, 19
China Reform Friendship Medal 4 0
214

China Resources Group 139
China Social Sciences Press 4 0|i^44
245

China Society for Human Rights Studies
40A4^fijf5t#, 213, 261-2, 263
China-Sweden Business Council, 79
China UK Film and TV Conference,

180

China-UK Friendship Group, 60
China-UK Media Roundtable, 180
China Uncensored, 174
China-United .States Exchange

Foundation 4 44,

83.182.190.210-2,219,221,
222,239,373n47

China Universitv lor Political Science
and Law 41i4il':^'X A4, 55
China Watch, 175-6
(diina Writers Association 41441- 3^ Rl
A,201,369nl26
(diinagatc (1996), 34, 46, 140
Chinese Academv of Social Sciences 4

149, 208, 224,

243, 246

Chinese Association for Science and
Fechnology USA 4 IRfjlcALl'jA
R>1C153

Chinese Benevolent Association 44'^

lTi74 44X34, 189
Chinese Canadian Museum, 189
Chinese Cheongsam .Association,
366n79

407

INDEX

Chinese Civil War (1930s/1940s), 16
Chinese Communist Party 4*
ix-xii, 1-7

and private companies, 17, 97-9, 143
anti-corruption campaign, 97, 1 ji2, 257
as Leninist party, xi, 15
Cold War thinking, 5, 8-13
history, 14, 16, 27

hostile forces, CCP term, 1, 5, 9, 13,
22-3, 25, 227
ideology, 10-1, 23
legitimacy, 12, 24—5
‘lifted 700 million people out of
poverty’, 7
nameplates, 18-20,
operating principles, 26—7
Organisation Department of the
Central Committee of the CCP, 14,
61,96, 237

self-image as vanguard of the people,
15,23
slogans, 25
structure, 15-6

see also censorship; friendship; united
front; and items on contents pages
Chinese diaspora, 2, 15. 69, 119-38,

141, 150, 173, 193, 201,268
Chinese Dream /<•<• China Dream
Chinese-language media 31.

120, 122, 126, 177-9
(Chinese Mutual Aid Centers, 365n6-i
(diinese Overseas Lxchange Association,
123,124-5

C'liinese Peoples Asstxiation lot

I riendship with R)reign ('-ountiies
'I'N 21.40.

S6-7. 6‘)-70. H3-/>. 89. 91. 93.

123. 124-5. 136. 138. 220,

Chinese Pet)[ile’s Institute for foreign

AH;urs'|'N/cK^f'a:4^1\73-i,

124-5

(.'hittese Parples Political C'onsultative
(.'oitference N K o?!/>

19. 40. 48. 104-5. 108.

123. 124-5. 12^-8. 133. r9, ]H'^,
C'4. 202. 20tv 210-1. 213. 220,
222. 2 61

I'oa'ign Athiirs Comminee ot
the f'hinese IVv'ple's Political
onsulrative Conference, 1S~

Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region
Committee of the Chinese Peoples
Political Consultative Conference

4 '

Shanghai Municipal Committee
of the Chinese People’s Political
Consultative Conference

90

Zhejiang Provincial Committee
of the Chinese People’s Political
Consultative Conference 4'SA^

108

Chinese Red Culture Research
Association 4”

186

Chinese Students and Scholars

Associations 4'(
ii)^, 92-3, 124-5, 232-3, 283
Chinese University of Hong Kong

4'2i:A^, 222

Chinese wisdom see China model
Chinese Women’s Association of
Germany

194

Chinese Writers Association see China
Writers Association

Chisholm (electoral .seat, Australia), 132
C3ioma, Ru.ss, 42
C’h(»ng (^uan 50
C3unv. George, 189, 364n33
(Chretien, Jean, 47—8, 50
('hristian Democratic Union

((iermany), 52, 76, 78, 90, 161
(.hun, Joey (Kun Shan Chun), 144
City ol London see London
City of London Corporation, 107,
109-10

City Utjivcrsity ot New York, 156
Livil-military fusion, 99, 160
edaiborne, ('atulace, 145
edark, (-olin, 230
( darksvillc (Maryland), 93
(dass Lditori, 176-7, .3l6nl54
CLiivs oj the l*andii, 46
Clement, Ian, 146
Clernent-Jones, "Pimothy (Lord
Clement-jones), 161
Ciemson University' in South Carolina,
156

INDEX

(law firm), 187
,46,99-100,103,139,

35,211
,217
221

, 33, 144
sff aho new Cold War
Cold War mindset, 5, 8, 217, 289n3
College of Europe, 212-3, 243
Collins, Lyman, 195
Colour revolutions, 11
Columbia (Maryland), 93
Columbia University, 47, 188, 216
Committee of 100, 155, 217-20
Communist International, 51
Communist Party of China see Chinese
Communist Party

Communist Party of Great Britain, 64
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 9
community of common destiny see
community of shared future for
mankind

community of shared future for

mankind 4, 52,

61,118, 250, 263-4
Confucius Institutes, 152, 196, 226,
228-31,237, 243
Congressional Research Service, 43
Conservative Party (UK), 52, 136-7
Cook, Tim, 113, 264
Copenhagen, 87, 197, 199, 242
coronavirus, 253-4
Corr, Anders, 180

Council on Foreign Relations, 43, 116
Coveney, Simon, 40
CPSU see Communist Paru’ of the
Soviet Union
Crawford, Alan, 56
Credit Suisse, 105-6
Cristofini, Patrice, 73
Crook, Isabel, 73
Crown Casino, 193
CuiTiankat nrAlDl. 84-5
Cut Yuying K 261
Cultural Revolution 169.

193,196

Culture Going Global strategy’ (t
fh Ax®, 185, 188, 33>nl43
c>’ber attacks, 50, 149, 158

linmn, dih.

190,211
Jiitton, Hillary,
;iNN, l6d, 169,
ohn. Gary, 38.

Cyberspace Administration of China, 210
Czech Republic, 68, 94

Daily Beast., 114

Daily Telegraph, 175, 178, 313nll9
Dalai Uma, x, 58,74, 76, 91, 109, 115,
161,169, 203, 230, 237, 268
see also Tibet
Daley, William, 103
Dalio, Ray, 110-1
Darwin (Australia), port of, 82
Davidson, Neil (Lord Davidson of Glen
Clova), 108-9
Deep Panda, 158
Defraigne, Pierre, 212-3
democracy with Chinese characteristics,
14

Deng Rong 187, 190
Deng, Wendy, 316nl63
Deng Xiaoping 46, 122, 151,

187, 201,227
Denmark, 81, 199, 209
Department of Energy (U.S.), 150
Der Spiegel, 76, 107, 115
Desmarais, Andr^, 46-7
Desmarais, Paul, 46-7
Des Moines Register, 86
Deutsche Bank, 106, 259
Deutsche-Chinesische

Wirtschaftsvereinigung (German-
China Business Association),

55, 89

Deva, Nirj, 57-60

developing world, 5, 24, 27, 260, 263
DGSK see Direction gtMierale tie la
securite cxitYicurc
Diamond, Dirry, 74
Ditirio (le Noiii ius, 180
Diba 'ilj-Ulli, 173
Die Linke (Germany), 78
Die Welt, 57, m
Ding (Tun J 6ti, 67
Direction gtaicYale de la securite
exterieure (l)GSl'.), 147
discourse power, 12, 117, 250
Document No. 9, 165—6, 228, 273
Dolkun Isa, 253. 256, 259
DongYaoqiong YiLllfij’,, 196
Dotson, John, 84, 128
DPA, 176

409

INDEX

DPA-AFX, 176
Drysdale, Peter, 221
Duisburg, and Huawei, 90
Duke University, 105,

Duke Kunshan campus, 239, 241
Diisseldorf, 90, 194
Duverne, Denis, 74
Dvorchak, Gary, 323n39

East Turkistan see Uyghur people
Eastern Europe see Central and Eastern
Europe

EastWest Institute, 373n47
EDI Media 174

Ekman, Alice, 260
El Pais, 175

Elcano Royal Institute, 25, 223
Elsevier, 246
Emerson, Merlene, 134
EMLYON Business School, 242
Asia Europe Business School, 242
End National Security Scapegoating
coalition, 145

enemies of the people see people, the
Epoch Times, 177, 199
Ernst Young, 44
espionage, 56, 139-63, 212
ESPN, 113
Esriin, Peter, 109
extradition agreements, 256-8
EU'Asia Center, 213
EU-Cdiina PVieiulship Association, 59,
309n57

IvU'Cdtina I riendship Croup, 56-60
Pairocopter, 72

Hurope. X. 6. 179,212-4,260-1
as tlie pri/.e of the BRl, 4-5
C'onlucius Institutes in, 229-30
political elites, 51-75
sec also individual l'urv)pcan countries;
Associatioit ot C^verseas Cdiincse
Media in l-.uro|H‘; Central and
Pastern Europe

I'uropeAdriita Seminar on Human
Rights. 21

luirope.m Association tor the Peaceful
ReuitiHs'.uion ot China. 129
Pairope.m Association ot China Studies,
229

Pui\>pean Commission. '>9. ~2, 2!2

European Institute for Asian Studies,

214

European Parliament, 56-61, 170,

212-3

European Union, 4-6, 40, 55-6, 212,
243

Europol, 256
Euroscepticism, 6, 67-8
External Propaganda Office of the CCP
Central Committee, 11, 20, 168,
171,213, 225, 26l,295n6l
EZTV, 179

Fadden, Richard, 49
Facebook, 172-4
Faligot, Roger, 141, 148, 272
Falun Gong ix, 23, 120,

129-31, 177, 195, 198-9, 231,
325n78

Far Eastern Economic Review, 4
Fang Fang , 103-4, 330n50
FBI, 113, 130, 140, 142, 144-6, 149,
257

Federation of Chinese Scholars in
Australia, 153

Federation of German China Friendship
Associations (Arbcitsgescheimschaft
Dcut.schcr China-Gesellschaften),
89

Feinstcin, Dianne, 144-5, 344n35
Financial Crisis (2008/2009), 13, 101,

I 11. 175, 179

h'inancial Times, 43, 104, 110, 183, 239,
241.265
Fink, 1-arry, 102
Firigerald, John, 177, 229, 271
Fiiigibbon, Joel, 342n3
Five Eyes intelligence alliance, 155
Five Star Movement (Italy), 56, 68
Florida, 39

Flushing (New York), 129
Focus Cinitalia’, 177
I on, Jonathan, 178
Forhei magazine, 180, 182
Ford Foundation, 10
Foreign Affairs Committee of the
National People’s Congress, 61
Foreign .-^gent Registration Act see
United States

Foreign Correspondents Club, 183

INDEX

r:.„tisnLangua^s Bureau r|a|l|^h:fcHi
' 20. 138, 245

PorstfTU>i''™» Theodore, 191
Forsythe, Michael, 181, 184
r rt Meade, U.S. Cyber Command, 92
Foucaulr, Michel, 289n23
France, 60, 71—75, 130, 147, 242

Chinese investment, 116
extradition treaty with China, 255-7
PLA veterans, 127
united front work, 132-3
France China Foundation, 73-5, 79,
317nl77

France Chine Enreprendre Fondation,
318nl89

France Unbowed see La France
Insoumise
Frankfurt, 178,

financial centre of interest to CCP,

no

influence activity in, 110, 178
Frankfurt Huaxing Arts Troupe, 192
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 178
Frankopan, Peter, 66
Free University of Brussels see Vrije
Universiteit Brussels

French Foreign Legion Chinese Veterans
Association, 126

French National Theatre Union, 198
Friedman, Edward, 238
Friedman, Eli, 242
Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 76
Friends of Europe, 213
friendship ^ 20-1,28, 276

China Reform Friendship Medal, 62,
214

definition of, 20-1,40
Friendship Ambassador, 84, 86
Friendship Award. 72-3, 101,206
Lwpengyou, 73. 75. 77. 87, 221
Walks of Friendship, 138
Yellow Riser iTicndship Award
(Henan) l.V>^ 77

see also China Association for
litternational Friendly Contact;
China-Eurtspe Friendship Award;
Chinese Pecsple's Association lor
Friendship with Fesreign Countries;
EU-China Friendship Gaiup; UK
China Friendship .Association;

U.S.-China Peoples Friendship
Association; Federation of German
China Friendship Associations
FuYingfllf 11,61, 153, 176,

Fudan University 12, 67, 84,

242-3

Centre for European Studies, 67, 242
Fudan-European Center for China
Studies at the University of
Copenhagen
Fugh, John 218

Fung Foundation, 211,218
Fung, Victor 211, 218, 222,

Futurewei Technologies, 207
see also Huawei

G20 Summit (2019), 66, 249
G77 see Group of 77
Gai Lin Mitt, 57-9
Gambardella, Luigi, 213,

Gao Hucheng 103

Gao Jue tiJIi, 103
Garcetti, Eric, 82
Gardels, Nathan, 209
Gardiner, Barry, 133
Garnaut.John, 10, 42-3, 272
Gasperis, Michele de, 70
Gates, Bill, 43, 190
Gauthier, Ursula, 183
GBTimes
174-5

Cjcdhun Chockyi Nyima, 203
C>cng Huichang, 148
Cicraci, Michele. 67-71,79
Cjcrman-C.hincsc Business Association
see l)cutsch-C3iincsische
Wirischaftsvcrcinigung
Gcrman-Chincsc Friendship Association
of Mainz-Wiesbaden, 89
Cjcrinan Development Institute, 25, 273
German Institute of Global and Area
Studies, 225

Cjerman Oserseas Chinese Federation,
188

Germany, 55. 57, 194, 199. 222
business lobbies, 1 14-5
China Bridge (China Briickc), 78
Chinese investment, 116
CCP harassing dissidents, 131,258,
259

411

INDEX

Germany (continued)

Huawei, l6l

human rights dialogue with China,

263

political elites, 75-9, 89-91
Giddens, Anthony, 66
Global Covenant of Mayors for Climate
and Energy, 88

Global Leadership Program at Tsinghua
University, 101

Global Alliance (consultancy), 191
Globul Times, 6, 8, 10, 24, 31—2, 57,
168,172-4,195,215,217, 236,

289n22

Globe and Mail, 47, 48-9, 87
Glocer,Tom, 61, 176
Godement, Francois, 68, 212
Goethe University see House of Finance
of Goethe University
‘Golden Era’ of UK-China relations, 53,
135-7, 176, 207

Goldman Sachs, 38, 60, 99, 100-2,
104-6, 205-8,210
Google, 174, 215, 264
Gorbachev, Mikhail, 9 ,

Great Britain-China Centre zee United
Kingdom

Great Firewall, 6, 165, 172-3, -7 i
Greece. 53.68.117.198. 261
Green, Stephen (l^rd Green), 67

Groose. Timothy. 39211135

Groot, Gerr)’. 121
Group of 77 and China, -50-1
Gruiul, Manired, 52
Chiajardo, Jorge, 32
Guangdong) /j^, 77, 158, - .

Clu.,.gao,.pOv««Bch,,|B.

Acviu'iiition !

132

ir,umyi X:^i,37. 103, 126, 191

Ciui, Angela. 5-1

Gui Caingi’ou H li., 55, 79

GuiMinh-ii H 54-5, 181

GuoWengui 'i. 'U. 24S

Guoj'u.ins; Century Media Consultation

H.ichigi.in, Nina. 82
H.igue Tribunal. The. 24. ■'4, 1 0, 1
" 144. 22.^. 24~

see also South China .Sea
Hainan M\^i, 195

Hainan Cihang Charity Foundation, 78
Hamburg, CCP influence in, 90
Hamburg Chamber of Commerce, 75
Hamburg Summit, 75, 77. 90
Han Dongmei 162

Han Fangming W)]^)], 219
Han Jun 93
Han Zheng #]E, 208
Hanban WJh 125, 228, 229-30, 231,
383nl4

Handelsblatt, 114, 175
Hangzhou 71, 136
Hanke, Steve, 108
Harper, Stephen, 161
Harrison, Barbara, 84
Hart, Melanie, 5

Harvard University, 106, 151, 191, 219,
320n217, 330n56
He Ping 187. 190
HeRuf'jM, 179

He, Xiaohui (Helen) ('HHySiuX, 93—4
Heilmann, Sebastian, 215
HelldorfF, Hans von, 115
Henan 77, 156
Heseltine, Mich.icl, 60
I ligher Education Press, 246
I likvision, 348n 1 14
I liil, Nathan, 66-7
I lilton, Isabel, 230
1 linklcy Point, 1.34
HNA Group 'I'75, 78.
97.218

Ho. Denise 174.262,

Holden. Bob. 82-3, 32In 12
Holland see Netherlands
hoinett)wn associations, 126, 1 .14

Hong Kong, 195, I 12-3, 1 15-6, 119,
131, 133, 1-39, 142. 152
l'K( ' ct)mpanies based in, 46-7, 143
protests o) 2019—20, xi, 1 1
Umbrella Mtjvernent ol 2014-15, 1 1
ire ,//rr; China-United States Exchange
Foundation; (»ui Minhai; lung
Chee-hwa

Hong Kong Tree Tress, 174
Hong Kong StfKk Exchange. 187
Hong Zieheng, 369nl26
Hopkins-.Nanjing Center, 239—40

INDEX

hostile forces see CCP

Houlden, Gordon, 224

House of Finance of Goethe University,

110

Howell, David (Lord Howell), 66

Hrib, Zdenek, 94

Hsiao, Russell, 41

Hsieh, Wayne 180

Hu Jintao 12, 101, 191, 228

HuXijin 168

Hu Yaobang 105

Hu, Yuli 254

Hua Bin,318nl87

Hua Chunying 8

Hua Jing Society (Hong Kong)

104

huaqiao 119, 274

Huang Kunming 0J3, 219

Huang Ping 222, 224

Huang Renwei, 84

Huang Xiangmo 24, 129, 202

huaren canzheng^^ 93 , 13 I- 8 ,
339n52, 339n53

Huawei 59, 68, 98, 159-63,

214-5

alleged IP theft by, 159

and Germany, 78, 90, 114, 161

and Italy, 71

and the UK, 61, 160-1,208
participation in 5G, 24, 71,78
research funding, 163, 207, 208, 222
‘safe/smart city’ infrastructure, 90, 265
spying allegations, 159, 350nl32
Western advisors, 55
see also Canada; l uturcwei; Meng
Wan/.hou; Ren Zhengfei; Sun
Yalang

Huaxing Arts IVoupe 192

Hubei Provincial High lechnolog)'
Investmeitt Company. 72
Hu(fi>igton Post, 209. 373n38
Hughes. Ch ristopher, 236
human rii;his. 267
activists, 130, 105,
criticism of Chinas record, 8, 35, 57
dctence ot China's record, 49
in China, 76,81, 109, 115, 120, 145,
161, 171, 218, 258, 261-4
in Hong Kong, S3
Uwwers, 23. 29,

redefining of, 14,52,55,109, 250
universality of, ix, xii
violations of, 37

Human Rights Law Foundation, 81
Human Rights Watch, 252
Humphrey, Peter, 172
Hungarian Socialist Party, 53
Hungary, 68, 224, 232, 261
Huntsman, Jon, 192

IBM, 44

Icebreakers see 48 Group Club
Illinois Institute of Technology, 146
Indo'Pacific, 117

Industrial and Commercial Bank of
China, 38, 112
Inkster, Nigel, 147
Institute for China-America Studies,
223-4

Institute for Security Studies (Paris), 148
Institute of World Economics and
Politics, 208
Integrated Whale Media
1^,180

Intel (company), 44
Intelligence Bureau of the PLA Joint
Staff Department, 141-2
Intelligence Online, 71
International Chamber of Commerce of
China, 72

International Civil Aviation
Organisation, 251, 254
International Committee for the
Promotion of Trade, 62—3
International Electronic Commission,

265

International Liaison Department, 15,
34,41, 51-2, 77, 122, 190, 206,
222,305n2

International Monetary Eund, 75
International Monetary Institute,

107-8,110

International Olympic Committee, 40
International Organization for
Standardization, 265
International lelecommunication

Union, 251,265
internet governance, 250-1, 264
Inter-Parrv China Group of the British
Parliament, 133

413

INDEX

Interpol, 255-7, 259
Iowa City, 35
Iraq, invasion of, 6
Ireland, 40

Islam see Uyghur people
Islam, Shada, 213
Israel, 152, 262

Italy, 56-7, 67-71, 79, 149, 192, 229
and the BRI, 118
CCP influence in media, 176-9
extradition treaty with China, 256-7
Order of the Star, 187
Torino World Affairs Institute, 149
Italy China Link Association, 69

Jacques, Martin, 66, 170, 208
Japan, 145, 152, 198, 203, 349nl22
JD.com, 98
Jelinek, Thorsten, 222
Ji Chaoding 63—4, 310n78

Ji Chaozhu 61, 310n78

Jiang Enzhu 61

Jiang Haiying

Jiang Yingchun 187

Jiang Zemin 62, 105, 129

Jichang Lulu, 57, 59, 80, 91, 123, 174,

111

Jinan University 193

Jiusan Society • 220

Johns Hopkins School of Advanced

International Studies (SAIS). 212,
238

johnson, Blaine, 5

Johnson, Boris. 136-7. 1'46. 171.207
|oskc, Alex, 15S-6, 171
jouyet. jean-Pierre. 72

J. P. Moigan, 102-6

),P, Morgan C Jrasc, •'<•'<, Wl. 102—(K»,
330nS0

Kacser. |<.>c, 11
Kania, l isa, 1(»0
Karl. Relnwa. 2-l0

K. trst. Kurt. S'*

Kean Stare I’niwrMty, 2-i 1
Keating. Paul. 2'>. 33ln>‘)

Ketu St.«e I’trivcrsity. shiK'trng ol
.students at. 14^

Keutvicky. gvnerttors' suninut. —t

Kerrv. lohtt,

KGB. 73

Khan, Aamir, 201

Kissinger, Henry, 29, 40, 217, 221, 22.3,
331n59

Kissinger Institute, 212, 220
KNG, 180
KongWeiwei, 189
Korean War, 62
Kovrig, Michael, 23, 48, 189
Kranish, Michael, 44
Kroll, Andrew, 42
Kuhn, Robert Lawrence, 62
Kuomintang see Nationalists
Kushner, Jared, 38, 45
Kwan, Jenny, 189
Kwok, Miles see Guo Wengui
Kwok, Peter Viem 74

La France Insoumise, 60
Labour Party (UK), 64, 108-9, 135
Lafitte, Gabriel, 214
Lafon, Jean-Pierre, 318nl88
Lam, Louisa, 178
Lamy, P.iscal, 73, 220
Landc, Sarah, 86
UngUngflUWJ. 191

lao pcnfiyou see friendship
I jRouchc, Lyndon, 79, 320n223
I jRouchc Movement, 79, 320n223,
321n225

lao peniiYou see friendship
lawfarc, 391 n 122
Ie/'ix>srv, 175, 178
IfSiosuie, 183
irSan, 176

Ixading Small C',roup for

standardisation along the Belt and

lL>ad, 265

Uaguc (Italian political party), 67-8,
71,3l6nl55

Ixc, CJhristinc ^ 133—5, 137—8,

340n74

Ixc Hsicn laK)ng 158

Ixrti/t, V'ladimir. 9, 86, 1(K)

Ixninist tapitaJisin. 96
Ixong. Sonny Y 134-5
ILIA (Ijtvian news agency), 177
Irung (jhun-ying 104

Leung, frank i 1 / t,

LCjB'I'Q rights in China, 172

INDEX

#, 77. 228

39

, 164

u.EricX. 239

UKeqiang^m62, 75

U, Robin ^0^,98
U Shan ^lil. 206
LiXiannian 83, 123

Li Xiaojun 261

LiXiaolin 83,123, 136, 138,

370n5

LiYe^i^^, 194
U Yuanchao 61

Li Zhaoxing 74

Liaison Department of the Political
Work Department of the Central
Military Commission, 20, 29,

41-2, 143

Lian, Yi-Zheng 97

Liang Wengen 98

Liaoning H'r', 57, 59
Liberal Party (Australia), 132
Liberal Party (Canada), 161
Lieber, Charles, 151
Lim, Louisa, 167
Lin, Anastasia 195

Lin Jian 186

Lindstedt, Anna, 54-5
Lindstrom, Mikael, 55
Link, Perry, 3, 234-5
Link, Soren, 90
Linkedin, 147, 149, 172
Linneweber, Colin, 13
Lippo, 139
Lithuania, 290n3
Liu Chaoying, 342n3
Liu, Gladys 132

Liu He 99

Liu, Helen, 342n3
Liu Huaqing 139

Liu, Jin, 247

Liu Mingkang 61

Liu, Richard 98

Liu Runwei 186

Liu Xiaobo 27, 131, 252

Liu Xiaoming 8, 65, 1^5, 207,

243, 313nU9
Liu Yunshan ^iJ'ZJLI], 106
Liu Zhenmin 251-2

Liyang (Jiangsu) 93
Lloyd-Damnjanovic, Anastasya, 234
lobbying

on behalf of Beijing, 55, 102, 114,

211

transparency, 269
Locke, Gary, 39, 301n49
Logicor, 44
London

as financial capital, 100
CCP influence in, 106-10
see also City of London; United
Kingdom

London Design Biennale, 186
London Export Corporation, 63
London Philharmonic Orchestra, 186
London School of Economics, 236,
239

Lopez, Carol, 85
Lord Davidson of Glen Clova
see Davidson, Neil

Lord Woolf of Barnes (Harry WoolO,
332n84
L’Oreal, 74

Los Alamos Club, 150
Louisiana State University, 156
Lowe, Russell, 144
Lower Saxony (Germany), 90-1
Lu, Max 153-4

Luo Zhaohui, 347n86
Lysckil (Sweden), 81-2

Ma,Jack 'Vz;, 26, 98, 180,

Ma, Pony 74, 98

MacGregor, Ian, 67, 175
Macron, Emanuel, 60, 72—4, 220
Madariaga-College of Europe
Foundation, 212-3
Made in China 2025, 68, 99
magic weapons 17

Mahbubani, Kishore, 216
Maio, Luigi Di, 67
Mallet, Victor, 183
Mallory, Kevin, l49
Malta

as member of BRI, 68
Mandelson, Peter, 53—4, 60, 160, 222,
306n20

Manioc, Henri, 147

Manthorpe, Jonathan, 46, 47-8, 271

Lhamo,

Li Changchun
U, Cliff Zhong^n|
f: C' nnffiun

415

INDEX

Mao Zedong xii, 17, 46. 105,

167, 169, 201
Mao Zedong Thought
65,241

‘On Contradiction’ 21

‘On Protracted War’ 84

Maritime Silk Road see Belt and Road
Initiative

Mar-a-Lago, 39, 45
Marriott International, 113
Marsh, David, 108
Marsh, Terri, 81
Martin, Paul, 47
Martin, Peter, 56
Marxism-Leninism see ideology
The Marxist, 64
Marxist news values, 165, 182
Maryland, 92-4, 153
Mattis, Peter, 141-3, 176
May, Theresa, 134, 137,

McCallum, John, 31-33, 49, 54, 160-1
McCarthyism, accusations of, 8, 155
McConnell, Mitch, 36—7
McGrath, Hannah, 133
McGregor, Ian, 313nl 19
McKenzie, Nick, 132, 272
McKinsey & Company, 49-50
Mclx*an, John, 61, 109
McMaster Universit)'. 231,233
MD Anderson, 151

Media Cooperation Forum on Belt and
Road, 167

Melbourne, CCP influence in. 81, 127,
132, 177-8. 192-3,197
Melbourne Writers Festival, 201
McMenchon, Jean-Luc, 60
Meng, Grace, 257
Meng Hongwei 255-7

Meng Wan/hou , 2, 31-2, 46-8,

^S. S7. 160-1,216-7
Mercator Institute tor China Studies,

55. 215-6
Mercedes-Ben/, 113
Merkel, Angela. "'6. “'S, 1 14, 220
Merrill 1 vnch, 104-5, 191
M15 a'KL M5
Ml6 a’KL lA-'

Mictvsoft. 1^2

Military Affairs Translations Press, 11
Mingjing News ^ , 1

Ministry of Culture and Tourism 4’^ A

mm rai, 194.238

Ministry of Education

mnTnm, \i

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

54, 76, 93. 123, 238
Ministry of Public Security 4^4^ A
256

Ministry of Science and Technology 4^

152

Ministry of State Security 4’i^AK^

20, 121, 141-2,
145-6, 148-50, 195, 234, 258
mixed martial arts, 203—4
Mnuchin, Steven, 38, 45
Moinet, Edouard, 71, 318n 188
Montgomery (Maryland), 92
Montreal University, 48
Morey, Daryl, 2—3
Morgan Stanley, 99
Morgan, Stephen, 240
Morrison, Scott, 132
Mother Jones, 39, 42, 191
Movisol, 79
Mulroney, Brian, 47
Mulroney, David, 33
multipolarity, 25-6, 298n86
Muscatine (Iowa), 85-6

Nan Hanchen 63

Nanjing Massacre (1937), 88
Nanjing University of Aeronautics and
Astronomies
146

National Association for China’s Peaceful
Unification (Washington D.C.),

93. 128

National Association of Scholars (US),
229

National Basketball Association (US), 3
National Clommittee of the Asian
American Republican Party, 39
Natit)nal Committee on U.S.-China
Relations, 222

National Defense University of the

FL3 444AKI^/A'444|5;/A^

see PI A

National Development and Reform
Commission (PRC), 221
National Economic Council (US), 38

INDEX

Miitional Institute for South China Sea
Studies, 223

National Institutes of Health (US), 151
National Intelligence Law (2017), 97
National Office for Philosophy and
Social Sciences, 228
National Peoples Congress

13, 15,

19, 50, 58,175

China-UK Friendship Group of the,
60

Foreign Affairs Committee of the, 61
provincial-level equivalents, 188
National Public Radio, 182
national rejuvenation, 4, 17, 94, 186,
203,255

National Social Science Fund, 243
National Theatre of Catalonia, 198
National University of Defense

Technology 143,

156

National Work Conference for
Propaganda and Ideology, 22
Nationalists (Chinese Nationalist Party,
or Kuomintang) 26

NATO, 56, 76
Navarro, Peter, 99
NBC, 169, 183

Netherlands, The, 170, 233, 241
Netherlands School of Human Rights
Research, 262
new Cold War, 1,13
New Era STrHlUi, 113, 117-8, 138,
166,225

New Silk Road see Belt and Road
Initiative

New Tang Dvnasrv T\' U] Ml A 'li fill

M, 177'

New York Times, 35, 49, 99-100, 167,
181,196

aitd China Watch 175, 214
New York University, 239—41
NYU Shanghai, 239—41
New Zealand^ x. 23, 82-3, 86, 120,
127, 131-2, 155, 162, 198, 244,
251

New Zealand (Chinese) Veterans

Association M iS ^ '4' H iM (It ^

^), 127

Niblett, Robin, 207
Nine-Dash Line, 113, 247
Niquet, Valerie, 163
Nishan Forum on World Civilizations,
190

Nolan, Peter, 61, 238, 246
non-governmental organisations
foreign NGO law (2018), 10, 209
Nordic Chinese Times, 179
Nordquist, Myron, 223-4
North-Rhine-Westphalia (Germany), 90
Nottingham University, 107
Nottingham Ningbo campus, 69,
239-40

Nouvelles d’Europe 90, 178-9

NPC-European Parliament Relations
Group, 61
Nueno, Pedro, 72
Nye, Joseph, 11
Obama, Barack, 35-6, 39, 99
Official Monetary and Financial
Institutions Forum, 108, 110
Olympic Games see Beijing Olympics
(2008)

One Belt, One Road (OBOR) see Belt
and Road Initiative
One Belt and One Road Cultural
Development Action Plan
(2016-2020), 197
O’Neill, Jim, 207-8
open letter from US China experts
(‘China is not the enemy’), 30—1,
224

Organisation Department of the Central
Committee of the CCP see Chinese
Communist Party
OrizzonteCina, 149
Orlins, Steve, 222

Ouhua Croup (CJrupo Ouhua Medios
de Comunicacion S.L) llkTlfJl
179

Oushinet see Nouvelles

d'europe

Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, 70, 93>
120-1. 123-7, 133, 177, 179, 192,
218,336nl9

Overseas Chinese Service Centres

tp-ll',255
Owens, Bill, 43-4
Oxford University, 66, 156, 163

417

INDEX

Pacific Century Institute, 216
Pale, Rose 81
Palgrave Macmillan, 108, 244, 246
Pamperrien, Sabine, 76
Panchen Lama, 203
Paris Peace Forum, 220
party-to-party diplomacy, 51—4, 77
see also International Liaison
' Department
Paulson, Henry, 101, 208-9, 221
Paulson Institute, 208-9
Pavlou, Drew, 385n43
Paxman, Jeremy, 170
peaceful evolution, CCP theory, 11, 13,
292n29

peaceful reunification, 19, 194
peaceful rise 19, 34—5

Pei, I.M. m#lg,217
Pei, Minxin 97

Peking University 109, 209,

243, 246
Pence, Mike, 224
Peng, Jack, 154
Peng Keyu i^yd3l, 130
Peng Liyuan 199-200

Peng, Xuehua, l4l

Penn Biden Center of the University of
Pennsylvania, 35

people, the, CCP concept. 20-4, 62
enemies of the people. 23, 258, 273,
297n76

contradictions Isetween the j>coplc
and the enemies of the people,

21-2. 23. 25

lh>p//s Daily. -U). 58. ‘X). 92. 98. 135.

138. l'53. 167-8. 172, 186, 198.227
people-to-|Koplc diplomacy
S. .JO. 42. 80. 85, 152
I'et'ples 1 il'veration Army fii 4-.

4. 20. 28. 42-3. :'4, 139
2 PI-A. 141-2
3PIA. 1^')
front groutys. '4
intelligence work. 1 >0
iiwMsion ot ribet. "'4
N.nion.il Defense L’niversirv ^ K

lo'

N.uional L'niversitv ot Defense
Ttvhnologs- V ^ ^ ^ S

PLA Airforce
72

PLA Navy

117,187

PLA Strategic Support Force ffi) A

143

PLA Strategic Support Force
Information Engineering University

156

research cooperation with Western
universities, 155-8
veteran’s associations, 126-7
Perry, Jack, 60—4, 313nl04
Perry, Jack (jr), 65
Perry, Stephen, 61—2, 65—6, 208
Petro-Canada, 46
Peschisolido, Joe, 189
Peterson Institute, 219, 319n 189
Pflug, Johannes, 89, 324n6l
Philadelphia Inquirer, 182
Philippe, Edouard, 74
Philippines, 24, 59, 116, 170, 247
Phoenix TV, 109
Pichai, Sundar, 264
Pickc, Frank, 215—6
Pierre Elliott Trudeau Foundation, 48
Piraeus, port of, 116
Pitt, Brad, 74
pivot to Asia (2012), 35
Plate. Torn. 216
Platt, Nicholas, 192
Podcsta Group, 211
Podcsta, John, 211
Pocnisch, Herbert, 108
Poggetti, Lucrezia, 68, 272
Poland, 68, 159
Polish News Agency, 176
Politburo, xi, 77, 97
Standing Committee, 12, 64, 97, 106,
128, 148, 192, 206, 208
political (as CCP category), 185, 196
mistakes, 166
struggle, 11,13
vs. academic issues, 22
Political Work Depanmcni of the

Centra] Military Commission 4* ^

190,301n63

Polv.Auction 188

Poly Culture 186-90

INDEX

Polv Group see China Poly Group
Poly Technologies Co. Ltd.

139. 187

Pontfret, John, 31, 113
Port Cocjuitlam, 87
Portugal, 168, 76, 229, 243, 256
Power Corporation, 45-8
Prato (town in Italy), 257, 315nl47
Prescott, John, 60
Priestap, Bill, 140
princelings, 103-4, 106, 123
see also red aristocracy
Propaganda Department of the CCP
Central Committee, 3, 5, 14-5,
19-20,71, 122, 138, 167, 169,

171, 177, 180, 201,209,219, 228,
245, 261

Qi Quansheng 193

Qian Gang^^, 165
Qiao Jianjun 258

Qiao Liang ^ 4

qiaowuWf^, 17, 119-21, 135, 136,
150,336nl9

Qingtian Hometown Association of
Germany W .[H Vf [11^ 194

qipao 193—4

see also China Qipao Association ‘1’
China Qipao Society
Global Alliance ‘ 1' 1^1 Ul ^
iHl; World Qipao United
Association Htl/f
Qiu Yong CIJJ/J, 207
Qiu Yuanping 'K', 70, 192
Qiushi 9, 186
Qu, I'ao ( rhomas) I6l

Radarin, Jean-Pierre, 73, 317nl77
Rajagopala, Megha, 183
RBS Grec'nwich, 102
Rcbiya Kadcer, 58

red aristocracy, 36. 46, 83, 103-4, 111,
187

Red Cross. 254

red culture, 186

Rehnitiv, 45

Reixera, Lauren, 203

Ren Limin 133

Ren, Margaret 105

Ren Zhengfei 9"^, 159

Renmin University 68, 107,

242-3

renminbi AKiHi, 107, 286
as world currency, 4, 70, 102, 107-8,
208

Reporters Without Borders, 167, 184
Republican National Committee (US),
44, 52

Reuters, 45, 167, 174, 176, 381nl06
Ringier media group, 76
Robertson, Gregor, 87-8
Rockhampton (Australia), 88
Rogin, Josh, 34, 36, 100, 271
Rolland, Nadege, 222
Rosier, Philipp, 78
Rosneft, 76
Ross, Wilbur, 38, 45
Rotterdam, port of, 116
Routledge, 244, 246
Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 47
Royal Danish Theatre, 199
Royal Opera House (UK), 60
Royal Theatre (Madrid), 198
Rudd, Kevin, 221
Russia, 76, 152, 198, 259, 264
see also Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics
Russia loday, 169

Sabaihil, Gerhard, 57

S.ichs, Jefirey, 216

Sajjan, Harjit, 189

Salinond, Alex, 60

Salvini, Mattco, 67, 71

Samaranch, Juan Antonio, 40

San Francisco, CCP influence in, 81, 144

San Francisco Opera Company, 186

San Kin Yip MiE'lk, 139

Sanya Initiative, 43-4, 210, 373n47

SARS virus, 253

Sassoon, James (Lord Sassoon), 66
Schaefer, Michael, 55-6
Scharping, Rudolf, 77
Schell, Orville, 74
Schiller Institute, 79
Schlund, Robby, 56
Schmidt, Helmut, 75, 77
School of Advanced International

Studies ree Johns Hopkins School of
Advanced International Studies

419

INDEX

School of Industrial and Labor Relations
at Cornell University, 242
Schroder, Gerhard, 76
Schwab, Klaus, 214
Schwarzman College, 45
Schwarzman Scholars, 210
Schwarzman, Stephen, 38, 44—5, 191
Schwcizer, Peter, 35
Scott, James, 143

Second World War, ix, 50, 64, 145
Seefeld, Jorg, 199
self-censorship, 234—5
Seven Years in Tibet, 74
Sexton, John, 240
Sha Qiguang 11

Shaanxi Association for the Promotion
of Chinese Culture
19

Shambaugh, David, 25, 148, 228,
295n6l

Shandong University 17

Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences,

20, 149, 225, 238

Shanghai Cooperation Organisation

259

Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure itii

258

Shanghai State Security Bureau, 142 ,
145, 149, 343nI7
Shao Changchun , 212

Sliao Jiang (l|5?l., 258
sharp power, 13
Shen Yun 198-9

Sheng Xuc , 131
,Shen/hen 90 . 159 . 239
Sheraton 1 lotel, I 13
Shi Xuecheng ff'y’iMl. 202
Shirk, Susan, 8

Shiivei, (ilenn Duthe, l-i9-50
Si.is University, 239
Siriewiiuler rejnrrt, •l’’-8
Sie. C'harles iSH il N'J, 218
Siemens, 11^, 1 ""O
Silent C ontest. 10
Silent Int iision. \

Silicon \ allev, I

Silkvn X’allev C hinese Kngincers
Asswiation. 1 ^4
Silicxsn \ allev C hinese 0\ erseas
Business Assiviation. 1''4

Silk Road Chamber of International
Commerce
19

Silk Road Finance Corporation, 206,

370n5

Silk Road International League

of Theatres p/pWl) fvcif’A

W, 197-9, 367nl06
Silk Road Think Tank Association

206 ,

222

Silk Road Think Tank Network
25, 222-3

Silverstein, Larry, 191
Singapore, 39, 152, 156, 158
SingHaiyi 39

Sino-German Belt and Road
Conference, 77

Sino-German Center of Finance and
Economics at the Frankfurt School
of Finance and Management, 110
Sinocle, 319n 189
Sinophobia, 49, 224, 230
Sin ops is, 57

Sister Cities International, 85
slogans, 25—7
smart cities, 85
Snowden leaks, 6
Sobcl. Mark, I 10

social credit system. 111, 204, 210
Social Democratic Party of Germany,

76 8

Society for rhreatened Peoples, 252
solt |>ower, 1 1-3, 1 18, 123, 200, 228
S.rg.»u 98

Song Xinning 243

Suicide, Inc Eriksen, 53
South (.hina Morning Post, 26, 82, 167,
180-1

South C:hinu Sea, 48, 109, 223, 247-8
frccdoin of navigation operations in, 8
PR(' annexation of islands and
features in, 35, 36, 41,49, 1 16
ruling on by I laguc Tribunal 2016,

24. 51, 59. 170, 177, 194,223-4,
233. 261
South Korea, 2

South-South Human Rights Forum, 263
^o'. ict Union see Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics

INDEX

Spaniel- Drew, 143

S' unish-Chinesc Chamber of
'I _- 170

Si\m>r, Michael, 24, 48, 189
5per>cc, Michael, 230
Sperack, Ben, 117
s^>onwneous, as CCP category for
protests, 22-3

Springer Nature, 243-4, 246
Stalin, Joseph, 9-10,

Standing Committee of the Politburo
see Politburo, Standing Committee
Stanford University, 105, 163, 231
State Administration for Science,
Technology and Industry for
National Defence

143

State Administration of Foreign Experts
Affairs 124-5,

152-3

State Council [5#[^, 75, 154, 167,

219

State Council Information Office

ffl ^ 1^Iff ^ xee External

Propaganda Office of the CCP
Central Committee
State Grid Corporation of China
^, 116

State University of New York at Buffalo,

156

state-owned enterprises, 170, 187, 237
Stokes, Mark, 41-2
Stone-Fish, Isaac, 207, 214, 271
Strauss-Kahn, Dominique, 75
Straw, Jack, 60
Strittmatter, Kai, 183-4
Strong, Maurice, 46
Su, James

Success International Mutual Liaison
Services, 93

Silddeutsche Zeittitig, 183
Sun Yafang -Ph 159
Sun Yusheng f/hXIl!!;, 170
Sunflower Movement 3 W Taiwan
Sung, CB. )tMf3,218
Swaine, Michael, 31, 224
Sweden, 24, 54-5, 79, 81, 130, 181,

258

see also Gui Minhai

Sydney Morning Herald, 175
Syngenta, 116

systemic confidence, CCP term, 227

tai chi 193, 203

Taihe Civilizations Forum

JS, 222

Taihe Institute 222

Taiwan , 6, 11, 27, 75, 119, 256,
270

and the United Nations, 252-5
arms sales to, 43, 78
CCP propaganda on, 120, 128, 172,
173,210, 231,254-5
elections in, xi, 292, 254
erasureof, 88, 91, 107, 109, 113,
115, 129, 169, 200, 229-30, 232,
235

relations with Western countries, 75,

88

Sunflower Movement, 11
Westeners who side with Beijing on,
37, 43, 73, 78, 88, 107, 109
see also Anti-Secession Law of 2005;
China Council for the Promotion
of Peaceful National Reunification
Taiwan Compatriot Travel Documents
n IKliij'l:, 253
Tan, Amelia, 102
Tan Tianxing iljiXM, 133—4
Tang, Gordon 39

Tang Shuangning 104

Tang, Xiaodong Tony, 102
Tang Xiaoning104
tantrum diplomacy, 267
Lao, Dacheng, 156

Tariffs Hurt the Heartland group, 114
Tatlow, Didi Kirsten, 89, 131, 165
Taylor & Francis, 244
Teck Resources, 50
Telegraph, The, 175, 238
Telegraph Media Group, 67, 175,
313nll9

Tencent IBIift, 16, 74, 114, 201
TengBiao 131,297n76

Teng, Fred Btm, 128, 211, 322nl7
terrorism, 35, 211

CCP definition of, 250, 258-9, 263
Thailand, 54
Thayer, Nate, 149

421

INDEX

diink tanks

CCP inHucncc at Western think
tanks, 182, 205-15
Chinese think tanks, 69, 105, 107,
142, 148-9, 219-25
see also Belt and Road Think Tank
Cooperation Alliance; Silk Road
Think Tank NetworkThorley,
Martin, 107—8
Thorne, Devin, 117
Thorning-Schmidt, Helle, 209
Thornton, John L., 101, 206-8
Thornton, Susan, 30, 224
Thousand Talents Plan 102,

150-2, 157

Three Evils doctrine 259

three Ts (Taiwan, Tibet and Tiananmen
as sensitive topics for CCP), 230,
235

Tiananmen democracy movement, 23
Tiananmen massacre
189,217, 258

Tibet, 74, 202, 203, 218, 255
CCP censorship of West discussion,
113, 161,214, 230, 231,233, 235
suppression of Tibetans abroad, ix-x,
93, 120, 131,258

visits by friends of China, 57-8, 109
see also Dalai Lama
Tiffany’s, 191

To, James Jiann Hua, 121, 123, 140, 150
Torino World Affairs Institute, 149
tourism, as political lever, 27, 269
trade war, US-China, 3, 27, 54, 73,
82-4, 95, 99, 101, 113, 182, 217
traditional Chinese medicine, 76, 126,
203

Trans-Pacific Partnership, 37
Triway Enterprise, 153
Trudeau, Justin, 32, 45, 48-50, 161
Trudeau, Pierre, 47

Trump, Donald, xii, 3-5, 37-9 86, 160,
216-7

on Xi Jinping, 45
see also trade war; Chen, Angela
Trump Hotels, 38
Trump, Ivanka, 38, 45
Trump Tower, 38, 42, 191
Trump-Grau Elizabeth, 39
Tsai Ing-wen xi, 242, 254

Tschcntschcr, Peter, 90
Tsinghua University irPr 45, 50,
101, 104, 113, 170, 206-7, 210
Tung Chee-hwa 83, 182, 205,

210,221-2,238
Turdush, Rukiye, 233
Twitter. 3, 113, 172—4, 217

UBS, 106, 112

Umbrella Movement see Hong Kong
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, xiii,
11.34, 62, 74
fall of the, 9-10, 291nll
see also Communist International
see also International Committee for
the Promotion of Trade
United Nations, 188, 249-53
International Civil Aviation
Organization, 251, 254
UN Conference of Non-

Governmental Organization, 261
UN Convention Against
Corruption, 258

UN Convention on the Law of the
Sea, 247

UN Department of Economic and
Social Affairs, 251
UN Development Program, 251-2
UN Human Rights Council, 250,
253, 262, 287

UN Office of the High Commissioner
for Human Rights
UN Security Council, 78, 250
UN Universal Declaration of Human
Eights, xi

Unirule Institute of Economics, 220
United Association of Women and
Children of Canada ^111$ A
161

united front work tjt —17, 19,

20, 119-26. 135, 152
and Confucius Institutes, 229
defined, 16-8
role of culture in, 186, 194
‘round outside, square within’
principle, 26
united front studies, 17
see also China Council for the
Promotion of Peaceful National
Reunification; Chinese People’s

422

INDEX

Consultative Conference; United
Front Work Department
United Front Work Department

19, 29, 63,

128, 135, 189, 193-4,218,229
in Party structure, 20, 122, 124-5,

126,132, 143

role of, 15,17,28, 51, 122-3, 177,

202,255,287, 336nl9
United Kingdom, 28, 52-3, 129, 130,

152, 154,168, 207, 229, 251
All-Party Parliamentary China Group,
60-1

CCP influence in, 53-4, 60-5, 67,

155,160-1, 175-6, 197, 255
CCP-linked media in, 170, 178-9,

180,245

Chinese investment in, 68, 116
Chinese students, 232, 233, 236
economic relations, 207
Great Britain-China Centre, 53, 60,
160, 170

huaren canzheng \n, 133-8
UK Chinese Association for
the Promotion of National
Reunification

129

see also 48 Group Club; China-Britain
Business Council; China Media
Centre; China-UK Friendship
Group; City of London; Golden
Era of UK-China relations
United States, 4-6, 8, 10, 33-45
alliances with other Western nations,
260, 270

as principal adversary of CCP, 4, 24-5
CCP media in, 168-9,

China engagement policy, 30, 113
Conhicius Institutes in, 229
espionage in, 142, 144-6, 149-51
Foreign Agent Registration Act, 168,
211

financial elites, 100-6, 110-1
local elites, 82-6, 92-5
think tanks, 206-9
united Iront work in, 128—9, 153—4
see also China-United States Exchange
Foundation; Committee of 100;
Fives Eyes; Flushing; trade war;
Wall Street; whataboutism

United States Heartland China
Association, 83, 210
U.S.-China National Governors
Collaboration Summit, 83
U.S.-China Peoples Friendship
Association, 84, 322n23
U.S.-China Transpacific Foundation,

114

Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
xi

University of Auckland, 23
University of California Berkeley, 163
Tsinghua-Berkeley Shenzhen Institute,
239

University of Coimbra, 243
University of Edinburgh, 231
University of Groningen, 241
University of Lyon, 383nl4
University of Maryland, 92-3, 153, 237
University of Nottingham, 239—40,
315nl40

Nottingham Ningbo, 69, 239-40
University of Rochester, 2
University of Salamanca, 231
University of Surrey, 154
University of Texas at Austin, 83, 239
University of Texas at Dallas, 156
University of Westminster, 61, 170-1
using the countryside to surround the
cities, 27

using the local to surround the centre

^iJ|}]itkA12.li4'A,27

USSR see Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics

Uyghur people, 58, 120, 130—1, 173
see also World Uyghur Congress;
Xinjiang

Valencia, port ol, 116
Vancouver, CCP influence in, 87, 161,
188-9

Vancouver Association for Promotion of
Chinese Culture
189

Vanderbilt University, 104
Vaughan, Derek, 59, 309n67
Veil, Sibyle, 74
Velshi, Alykhan, 161
Verona (Italy), 71
Victoria University, 230

423

INDEX

Vietnam, 257
cyberspace law, 264
Villepin, Dominique de, 73
visas, as political weapon, 182-3, 195,
199,214, 226, 235
Vision China, 208
Voice of China, 167
Volkswagen, 77, 90, 115
Vox, 182

Vrije Universiteit Brussels, 232, 243

WA Chinese Liberal Club, 132-3
Wade, Geoff, 4l, 43, 190, 271
Wall Street, 99-106
Wall Street Journal, 138, 164, 175
Wang Homing 192

Wang Chengjun, 189
Wang Huiyao 220

Wang Huning 12

Wangjingiy^, 127
Wang Jun 46, 139
Wang, Marco 179

Wang Qishan lil, 99, 101, 106,

192, 206

Wang Quan 193-4, 366n79

Wang Weijing iEfln'in, 159
Wang Xiaochuan l-!^J'>jl|, 98
Wing Xiaolu Ill, 166

Wang Xinde lEim, 202
WangXisha106
Wing Van '/'EM, 74
Wang Yang 7l:vYs 106
Wang Yi 249
Wang Yiwci 68

Washington D.C., 33—41, 223
see abo United States
WashiHorton Post, 34, 44, 100, 175. 207,
209. 233.

Wat.'leresa 188

Webb. David. 96
Webster University, 82
WeChat. 69. 130. 173. 233
Wei, Nathanael (Lord Wei), 136
Wen jiab.io 7U'Y''ii, 65. 106, 221, 228,
238

Wen Rucluin Yf, 238
Wen Yunchao 130

Weng Bing 195

West, Brad, 8~

Western I'nion, 259

Westgarth, Kate, 263

whataboutism, xii

Whcatcroft, Patience, 161

Wilkes, Daniel, 134

Wilkes, Michael, 134

Wind (mobile phone operator), 68

Wolf Totem, 74

Wong, Chun Han, 183

Wong, Joshua 180, 219

Wong, Ola, 182

World Association of Chinese Mass
Media
178

World Economic Forum, 45, 73, 78,
110, 209,214, 222-3
World Forum on China Studies, 225, 237
World Health Assembly, 129, 254
World Health Organization, 253, 254
World Internet Conference, 213, 264
World Media Summit, 167, 176
World Meteorological Office, 251
World Post, The, 209
World Qipao United Association tS;^
194

World Trade Organization, 11, 73, 100

World Uyghur Congress, 253, 256, 259

Wright, Oliver, 133

Wu Bangguo 105

Wu Chau f/iJii, 93

Wu Hongbo 253

Wuhan University of Technology, 151

Xi jin|ung .ij Jil T', xii, 9-10, 16, 35-6
85. 202

and the BRl, 3—4, 13
governance of China (2014), 75
increased repression under, 15
on friendship system, 21
on global governance, 249
on humanities and social sciences, 228
on ideology, 22
on media, 164, 166
on overseas Chinese, 17
on party-to-party diplomacy, 51
on united front work, 119, 121, 232
permanent presidency of, 228
personal wealth of, 97, 181
praise for, 45, 50, 52, 56, 61-2, 216
Xi Jinping Thought, 65-6, 136, 138,
166, 175,208, 241

INDEX

Vi mc Debao 117

yiao ma da bangmang ^ tt, 26,

36. 276

Xijing Group 180

Xing Yunming 42

Xinhua News Agency 13, 126,

148, 164, 167-9, 170, 172
Belt and Road Studies Network, 222
China Economic Information Service,
176

cooperation agreements, 176, 179
World Media Summit, 176
Xinjiang fr®, 50, 58, 77-8, 172, 235
concentration camps, 77, 115, 171,
232,254, 392nl35

repression in, 130, 259, 264
see also Uyghur people
xinqiao 119, 276

Xu Jiayin W^Ep, 98
Xu Lin 229, 384n30

see also Hanban
Xu Liping, 299n20
Xu Niansha 187

Xu Qiliang 43

Xu Xiaodong 203^

Xu Yanjun , 146

Xue Jingling 157

Yale University, 188, 219, 245
Yam Tak-cheung 180

Yang, Cindy Will, 39
Yangjiechi 4

Yang Lin 186

Yang Sluiping 92, 237

Yang Weidong J |j /jl ,131
YangXuejun1^y‘r-As 157
Yangtze River International Chamber of
Commerce, 72
Yao Yichun 137

Yau, Kenneth JihiPtn, 178
yi shang bi zheng Ul see economic

coercion, 27, 113-5, 276
YouTube, 172-4
Youxie see Chinese People’s
Association for Friendship with
Foreign Countries

Yu Long ^1^, 191
yuan see renminbi

Zahradil, Jan, 59
Zeebrugge, port of, 116
Zeman, Milos, 94
Zeng Peiyan 221

Zepp-Larouche, Helga, 79
Zha Peixin 61

Zhang Aiping 106

Zhang, Victor, 61
Zhang, Xinliang (Nicholas)

106

Zhang, Xudong 247

Zhang Ya-Qin 74

Zhang Yimou 196

Zhao, Bo (Nick) 132

Zhao Dongchen 112

Zhao Hongying 69

Zhao Yinong 175

Zhejiang jJJri'I, 138
Zhejiang Overseas Exchange
Association, 135

see also China Overseas Exchange
Association

Zhejiang Symphony Orchestra, 85
Zhejiang UK Association
135-6

Zhejiang University 110

Zheng Bijian 19, 209, 292n29,

294n58

Zheng Ning XJPj', 257
Zheng Wang, 288nl3
Zhengzhou Information Science and
technology Institute see Peoples
Liberation Army Information
Engineering University
Zhou Enlai 63—4

Zhou, Fengsuo 172

Zhou, Tom (Zhou Jiuming) jnJAHiJ.
192

Zhu Muzhi 261

Zhu Rongji 99, 105

Zuckerberg, Mark, 174
ZTE, 211, 265
Zwart, Tom, 262

425

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